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This is a retrospective case study about severe pressure ulcers and why healthcare 
services may contribute to people developing them. Pressure ulcers are caused when 
skin and tissues are damaged as a result of pressure. They range in severity from non-
blanchable erythema (Category 1), superficial skin loss (Category 2) to large wounds 
involving fat, muscle and bone (Category 3/4). Category 3 and 4 pressure ulcers are 
also referred to as severe pressure ulcers (EPUAP/NPUAP, 2009, NHS Improvement, 
2018). These can contribute to death. Although there is little known about how patients 
develop severe pressure ulcers, this study offers possible explanations.  
 
As well as the main finding that the health care environment contributes to the 
development of severe pressure ulcers; four possible explanations are i) patients not 
being heard, ii) decision making in complex environments, iii) safety culture lacking in 
mindful awareness and iv) diffusion of responsibility and poor communication between 
staff, wards and health care services. These also link into a model of intervention. The 
study’s method offers a way of investigating pressure ulcers retrospectively, which 
differs from current techniques. The main difference is the focus on the patient’s or 
carer’s view as the primary source of evidence, in contrast to the current focus on 
service level investigations. This study offers a ‘Safety III’ approach which combines 
empirical (correspondence) approaches of investigation with coherent (rational, 
explanatory) approaches. 
 
The study recommends including patients and carers in investigating severe pressure 
ulcers, empowering nurses to make decisions regarding pressure ulcer care and 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction summary 
 
Pressure ulcers (PUs), which are also known as bed sores or decubitus ulcers, cause 
much suffering for patients, and severe pressure ulcers can contribute to death. The 
introduction to this thesis identifies severe (Category 3 and 4) pressure ulcers as a 
patient safety issue, and explains why they are a significant problem. It also situates 
pressure ulcers within current healthcare policy, and thus highlights the personal, 
economic and organisational costs in the UK and worldwide.  
 
Health services literature indicates that organisational environments may have an 
influence on severe pressure ulcers (SPUs) and that clinical negligence may also 
contribute despite little organisational knowledge about how patients develop them 
(Bennett et al., 2004, Nixon, 2009). These concerns about negligence in healthcare are 
nevertheless why pressure ulcers are seen as a fundamental patient safety issue. 
 
This thesis was undertaken as part of an NIHR Programme Grant on pressure ulcers 
(RP-PG-0407-10056).  It introduces a retrospective case study method as a way to 
explore and explain why people develop severe pressure ulcers, focusing on 
organisational and patient safety issues alongside the patient’s view. In doing so, it 
draws together theories from psychology, sociology, systems theories and 
organisational studies. The cross disciplinary focus is admittedly an ambitious one and 
it is not feasible to include all literature from every avenue of thought: however, as 
patient safety crosses these disciplinary boundaries, it is useful and novel to attempt to 
synthesise the areas together in one study to understand more about why patients 
develop severe pressure ulcers in health services.  
 
1.2 Background  
 
1.3 Pressure ulcers-definitions and clinical aspects 
Pressure ulcers are caused when an area of skin and the tissues below are damaged 
as a result of being placed under pressure sufficient to impair its blood supply. They 
manifest when mechanical load applied to soft tissues causes cell deformation leading 





both resulting in tissue damage. Pressure ulcers are defined by the European Pressure 
Ulcer Advisory Panel and National Pressure Ulcer Advisory Panel (EPUAP/NPUAP/PP, 
2014, EPUAP/NPUAP, 2009) as: “localised damage to the skin and/or underlying 
tissue, usually over a bony prominence (or related to a medical or other device), 
resulting from sustained pressure (including pressure associated with shear). The 
damage can be present as intact skin or an open ulcer and may be painful” (NHS 
Improvement, 2018). Categories of pressure ulcers are described in EPUAP/NPUAP 
international guidelines as ranging in size and severity, from skin redness or non-
blanchable Erythema (Category 1) and partial thickness skin loss (Category 2) to 
severe ulcers involving fat, muscle and bone (Category 3, 4, unstageable or suspected 
deep tissue injury) (NPUAP/EPUAP, 2014; 2009). Typically, they occur in a person 
who is confined to bed or a chair by an illness and as a result they are sometimes 
referred to as 'bedsores', or 'pressure sores'. Category 3 and 4 pressure ulcers are also 
referred to as severe pressure ulcers (EPUAP/NPUAP, 2009). In this thesis I refer to 
them as severe pressure ulcers (SPUs).  
 
All patients are potentially at risk of developing a pressure ulcer. However, they are 
more likely to occur in people who are seriously ill, have a neurological condition, 
impaired mobility, impaired nutrition, poor posture or a deformity (National Institute for 
Health and Clinical Excellence, 2020, National Institute for Health and Clinical 
Excellence, 2015). Pressure ulcers are prevalent in healthcare (Smith et al., 2016) and 
as the elderly population increases, and advances in medical care lead to increased 
disability and complexity in the management of patients, improving the evidence base 
for improvements in their prevention should be a focus in healthcare research (Nixon et 
al., 2015).  
 
The use of equipment, such as seating and beds which are not specifically designed to 
provide pressure relief, can cause pressure ulcers (Nixon et al., 2019). Pressure ulcers 
may arise in a number of ways, and interventions for prevention and treatment need to 
be wide ranging. A priority in clinical practice is prevention of PUs through repositioning 
(to intermittently completely off-load high risk skin areas) and provision of specialist 
mattresses/cushions to reduce mechanical load. In relation to specialist mattresses, 
systematic review evidence supports guideline recommendations that high 
specification foam (HSF) mattresses are used as a minimum for high risk patients to 





equipment and knowledge around provision, pressure ulcers may still deteriorate in 
patients to become severe pressure ulcers (Coleman et al., 2013b). 
 
1.4 Pressure ulcers in a policy context 
 
Pressure ulcers (PUs) represent a major burden and quality of life issue to patients, 
carers but also healthcare systems (NHS Improvement, 2018) (National Institute for 
Health and Clinical Excellence, 2015) (Gorecki et al., 2009, Severens et al., 2002, 
Schuurman et al., 2009a, Bennett et al., 2004, Dealey et al., 2012). As well as the high 
personal costs incurred by patients there are also high financial costs incurred by 
healthcare funders and providers in the treatment of PUs due to increased length of 
hospital stay, hospital admission, community nursing, treatments (reconstruction 
surgery/ mattresses/ dressings/ technical therapies) and complications (serious 
infection). The average length of stay in hospital for patients with pressure ulcers is 25 
days (NHS Improvement, 2016). Latest figures from the NHS Safety Thermometer 
suggest that 4.3% of patients in the United Kingdom will develop PUs every year; 
However, recent prevalence research found that in a typical acute hospital in the UK, 
the point prevalence of pressure ulceration is more likely to be 7.1% (Smith et al., 
2016, Briggs et al., 2013). Pressure ulcers are prevalent in all health-care settings. 
 
Studies around the world have reported large differences in pressure ulcer prevalence 
rates, varying from 4.7% to 22.9% in hospitals and 7.7% to 83.6% in nursing homes 
(Whittington et al., 2000, Vanderwee et al., 2007, Vanderwee et al., 2011, Halfens et 
al., 2013, Smith et al., 2016, Briggs et al., 2013). In the NHS in England, 24,674 
patients were reported to have developed a new pressure ulcer between April 2015 
and March 2016, and treating pressure damage costs the NHS more than £1.4 million 
every day (Guest et al., 2018, NHS Improvement, 2018). Finding ways to improve the 
prevention of pressure damage is therefore a priority for policy-makers, managers and 
practitioners alike. The total cost of PUs to the National Health Service is £1.4 to £2.1 
billion, making up 4% of the annual National Health Service budget (Bennett et al., 
2004, Dealey et al., 2012) a number which has remained an area of concern for policy-
makers and the UK Department of Health (Department of Health, 2013a). Patients who 
develop pressure ulcers remain longer in hospital, and often require extensive 
treatment (Bosch et al., 2011). Severe pressure ulcers can also lead to death 






Crucially (and the focus of this study) pressure ulcers can be preventable with 
adequate healthcare intervention (Hibbs, 1998, Downie et al., 2014) and because of 
this they have become an important indicator of quality of that care (Lyder, 2003). Their 
prevention is included in a number of UK healthcare policy documents, for example, 
the Department of Health's NHS outcomes framework 2014/15, NHS Improvement, 
2016 and the NHS Patient Safety Strategy 2018. Recommendations for prevention 
include methods for identification and risk assessment and the preventive measures 
that should be applied. Treatment of pressure ulcers includes recommendations on 
wound care, adjunctive therapies and support surfaces (NHS Improvement, 2016; 
(National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence, 2015, National Institute for Health 
and Clinical Excellence, 2020).  
 
Pressure ulcers have been highlighted for a number of years now as a quality and 
patient safety issue in health policy agendas worldwide, but particularly in the USA, 
Australia and the UK (Institute of Medicine, 2000, Runciman et al., 2002, NHS Institute 
for Innovation & Improvement, 2010, Department of Health, 1997). Arising from this 
concern in the developed world, for the past three decades pressure ulcers have also 
been identified in successive UK Department of Health (DoH) policies as a key quality 
indicator (Department of Health, 2000); From 'worst' to 'first' in pressure ulcer incidents, 
(2010, Darzi, 2008a, National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence, 2015). More 
recently, reflecting the links between quality, impact and cost, the DoH set out the 
ambitious aim of eliminating all avoidable pressure ulcers in NHS provided care, (QIPP, 
2011), along with developing a Commissioning for Quality and Innovation (CQUIN) 
payment framework to facilitate this (National Patient Safety Agency, 2008). Although  
debates on the term 'avoidable' have continued alongside these drivers (NICE, 2018) 
and have been largely replaced with 'Present on Admission' (NHS Improvement, 2018).  
Recent changes have also added pressure ulcers into patient safety strategies within 
Trusts. A review of death and severe harm incidents reported to the National Reporting 
and Learning System (NRLS) (2011/2012) (National Institute for Health and Clinical 
Excellence, 2015) found that pressure ulcers were the largest proportion of patient 
safety incidents, accounting for 19% of all reports. It has also been acknowledged that 
a significant proportion of pressure ulcers are avoidable (NHS England, 2018). 
Although since the NRLS review (2012) was done, patient falls have been equal in 





Pressure ulcers also became a ‘high impact action’ for Nursing and Midwifery (Darzi, 
2008a, NHS Institute for Innovation & Improvement, 2010) placing them high on UK 
health policy agenda, and they were incorporated into a National Operating Framework 
((Department of Health, 2012/13). Similarly in the USA, insurance companies 
implemented a national change to their reimbursement policies to incentivise 
prevention (hence the research papers focusing on costs in the USA). Healthcare 
organisations receive a higher baseline allocation of funding to deliver care, but are 
now liable for treatment costs arising from organisation acquired avoidable pressure 
ulcers (Department of Health, 2012a, Stevenson et al., 2013). 
 
1.5 What is known about pressure ulcer risks? 
 
One of the main clinical risk factors for developing a pressure ulcer is immobility, whilst 
other clinical risk factors such as perfusion (including diabetes) and skin/pressure ulcer 
status have been identified (National Institute for Clinical Excellence, 2001a, 
EPUAP/NPUAP/PP, 2014, Nixon and McGough, 2001, Nixon, 2009, Coleman et al., 
2013b). However, some severe pressure ulcers develop that cannot, however, be 
explained by the above risk factors alone. A systematic review of epidemiological 
evidence relating to pressure ulcers identified primary and secondary patient 
characteristics which increase susceptibility to developing them. This included mobility 
limitations, skin condition, conditions affecting the circulation (such as vascular disease 
and diabetes), skin moisture and nutritional deficits (Coleman et al., 2013). However 
this review also highlighted important research gaps around the complexity of factors 
surrounding the development of pressure ulcers. It noted limitations in evidence and 
methodological challenges due to the large number of descriptor variables used to 
describe risk factors which may affect interpretation and use of the data in meta-
analysis, highlighting the need for an internationally agreed minimum data set and 
further exploration in the area of what other factors lead to patients developing severe 
pressure ulcers. Study quality was also considered poor in the review. Limitations in 
underpinning conceptual frameworks and  Furthermore, few epidemiological studies 
include patients who develop severe pressure ulcers (only three to date (see Literature 
Review below; one of which is this study) and it is not possible to identify from the 
current evidence base the risk factors associated with development. This highlights an 







1.6 What is the significance of Category 3 and 4 pressure ulcers?  
 
Severe pressure ulcers (Category 3 and 4) are seen as a ‘serious’ clinical event in the 
NHS, and other health care services internationally, and reported as a patient safety 
issue when they occur in patients (WHO; Department of Health, IHI). Safety 
improvement initiatives regarding all categories of pressure ulcers have had varying 
degrees of success and to date do not offer conclusive evidence around how to 
address prevention and management of severe pressure ulcers (NHS Improvement, 
2018). These Category 3 and 4  pressure ulcers are required to be reported at Board 
level and to the local Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCG) and investigated within 
organisations to elicit learning for service improvement (NHS Safety Thermometer, 
2017, National Institute for Healthcare and Clinical Excellence, 2005) (Department of 
Health, 2000). However, despite the interest in learning from Category 3 and 4 
pressure ulcers, there still remains little research to date focused on these particular 
categories. Other than this study, and the other implementation study by Greenwood 
and McGinnis (2016), which was part of the Programme Grant work stream, there are 
few known studies which focus specifically on severe pressure ulcers. Various factors 
at different levels in the healthcare organisation have been examined in an attempt to 
understand how different categories of pressure ulcer can affect patient outcomes from 
an organisational perspective (Al-Kandari and Thomas, 2009)((Ausserhofer et al., 
2013, Baier et al., 2009, Berlowitz et al., 2001, Blegen et al., 1998). However, Category 
3 and 4 skin damage, which may lead to death from an infected ulcer is the focus of 
this study; and there has been little attention paid to date on this particular sample of 
patients (Pinkney et al., 2014).  
 
Examples of organisational factors which impact on patients and pressure ulcers 
include hospital organisation, nurse staffing, workload and factors in direct patient care. 
A systematic review focusing on this area by Lake and Cheung (2006) found that some 
studies showed a significant link between nurse staffing and pressure ulcers, but other 
studies did not show such an association. The review concluded that research to date 
is equivocal (at times there is a staffing effect and at other times not) appearing to 
suggest that having more nurses, rather than more of the right ones and in the right 
environment, does not necessarily achieve better outcomes for patients. The review by 
Lake and Cheung however suggests instead that skill mix should be a focus for further 





no support for relationships between basic staffing ratios and pressure ulcers. It is 
noted in recent research that better models of care may impact on pressure ulcer 
outcomes (Schubert et al., 2008) which are discussed in detail in the literature review 
below (Chapter 2). To date, however, it is still largely unclear why some patients 
develop severe pressure ulcers within the health care system, yet other patients with 
similar high risk characteristics do not. Costs to the patient and healthcare systems are 
much greater if a patient’s ulcer deteriorates, or they develop a severe pressure ulcer. 
There has been no attention paid to this area in literature. Category 3 and 4 pressure 





A number of characteristics of severe pressure ulcers substantially influenced my 
research approach. As it is only possible to identify severe pressure ulcers when 
patients have already developed one, this meant that the study had to be retrospective 
in nature. Severe pressure ulcers cannot be predicted: we do not know where or when 
they will occur. Also, severe pressure ulcers are comparatively rare events in terms of 
the large numbers of other categories of reported pressure ulcers. They are difficult to 
define and measure using current clinical incident reporting systems. Taking these 
points into account, it was clear that an experimental study would not be possible and 
that the study was likely to be observational and involve small numbers of patients.  
 
The study design was influenced by the ‘fixed’ features of the problem. I realised that 
the research would require some design choices. Some of these choices flowed 
naturally from the fixed features, while others involved conscious decisions between 
plausible alternatives.  
 
The decisions made were that the study had to be an observational, retrospective, in-
depth study of small numbers of patients (n=8), and that I would collect rich data that 
would allow me to evaluate any explanation for the development of a severe pressure 
ulcer, ranging from an isolated event to problems with the organisational context. The 
rationale for conducting a retrospective case study design is provided in greater detail 
below and in Chapter 3. Because the findings might be used to inform practical 
guidance on preventing pressure ulcers particular attention was given to the validity of 






The initial questions that this study seeks to answer are:  
Why do patients develop severe pressure ulcers? And more specifically-does the 






































Chapter 2: A theory-driven review of severe pressure ulcers and the 
organisation and delivery of health care 
 
2.1 Chapter summary 
 
This chapter reviews the global literature concerning healthcare and delivery of 
services for patients with severe pressure ulcers. It focuses on patient safety and 
organisational perspectives as a basis for understanding how they occur. Little 
evidence has been available to date about why patients develop severe pressure 
ulcers and how far healthcare organisation contributes to their development. 
 
Because there is sparse evidence about how severe pressure ulcers develop in 
healthcare organisations, this review has necessarily drawn on other patient safety 
theories developed from the literature review, and out of current debates in safety, 
which includes the recent Safety I and Safety II paradigm shift (discussed below as part 
of this review). Safety I focuses on why things have ‘gone wrong’ in healthcare, which 
was the prominent paradigm until 2015, and Safety II focuses on why routinely things 
go right which is now widening the thinking around patient safety and generating much 
debate. Theories developed from this literature review incorporate these wider safety 
debates. This review considered a broad range of safety-focused literature from 
psychology, sociology, organisational theory and healthcare when it was initially carried 
out in 2009 and 2016 (Searches 1, 2 and 3). It has since then been updated to 
incorporate more recent developments in the field of patient safety (Searches 4 and 5). 
This review has thus focused on the care of patients with pressure ulcers, and how this 
links with patient safety, human error and organisational research. The main research 
question in  this review, which takes us forward to the main study, following theory 
refining is: How far does the healthcare organisation influence patients developing 
severe (Category 3 and 4) pressure ulcers?  
 
2.2 Introduction-an iterative and theory driven literature review  
 
The literature review began as a scoping review (in 2009) to search for possible 
explanations for severe pressure ulcer development in the context of health care 





progressed and offered insights (2011-16; updated in 2019). I used Ovid MEDLINE, 
EMBASE, Psychinfo, CINAHL, HMIC, Open Grey, Google, NICE as data search 
engines alongside snowballing searches. Those above were seen as the most relevant 
databases regarding health services literature.  
 
Below is a timeline of the iterative process which was used to review literature in the 
context of this study. The timeline highlights how an initial exploratory review 
underpinned the first phase of data collection and analysis. At this point I began to 
formulate tentative explanations as to how patients developed their severe pressure 
ulcers and to search for these within patient safety literature. The final iteration of the 
review was to update it following the final write up, incorporating Safety I and Safety II 




Figure 2.1: A timeline of literature reviewing. 
 
Search 1; Exploratory search for ‘Severe pressure ulcer’ and ‘Category 3 and 4 
pressure ulcer’ in patient safety and health services literature. 28 papers retrieved; 2 
fulfilled the eligibility criteria, which included all primary research which focused on 
pressure ulcers, organisations/healthcare and safety (detailed below). Also, surveys, 
qualitative research studies, before and after studies and cohort studies, along with 
RCTs. I did not include small scale studies, if they were not qualitative. I was not 
interested in patient level treatment interventions, because they did not offer any 
•Exploratory 
literature review 
based on previous 
clinical research 




•First iteration of 
review including 
wider safety 
literature and specific 
healthcare literature 
(Searches 2 and 3)
•Initial sense-check 
and analysis of Cases 
1-3 









to inform further 
fieldwork
Further theory-driven 
data collection and 
analysis 
• literature review updated in 
2016 and 2019
• includes  newer safety 
literature and current 
debates (Safety I and II; 
Searches 4 and 5)
Re-write of literature 
review based on 
findings.
Search 1 






information about the influence of the organisation, I therefore excluded these, along 
with education programmes for nurses, equipment based studies, and other papers 
seen as irrelevant to the review questions (see below). 
Search 2: Broad snowballing search of patient safety and health policy literature; 
human error and organisational theories. This did not follow the specific eligibility 
criteria. 
Search 3: Focused search of health services literature 1,185 papers assessed for 
inclusion and exclusion. 353 assessed as potentially eligible. 74 fulfilled eligibility 
criteria; 53 relevant studies appraised.  
Search 4: Keyword search on Safety I and Safety II (2000 onwards. Revisit of patient 
safety literature. 
Search 5: Grey literature searches: OpenGrey database 171 articles. Google 
searches. 
 
2.3 A theory driven literature review 
I chose to carry out a theory-driven review to define candidate explanations around 
which to investigate and apply a case study methodology, as research on severe 
(Category 3 and 4) pressure ulcers is such an under-researched area.  Although the 
approach I took to reviewing the literature followed a scientific realist methodology, it 
differed in its method of execution from a realist synthesis (Pawson, 2006) (see 
Chapter 1). In the realist method, the primary ambition is explanation building. ‘The 
purpose is to articulate underlying programme theories and then interrogate the 
existing evidence to find out whether and where these theories are pertinent and 
productive.’ [p. 74; (Pawson, 2006). A realist synthesis articulates, then tests, revises 
and refines preliminary theories, which is what I intended to do with my theories or 
explanations, but I was more interested in multiple causality and explanation building 
than articulating programme theories. The following section contrasts traditional 
systematic reviews with theory driven reviews and explains why a theory driven review 
may be more useful in the context of this particular thesis. 
2.3.1 Collating multiple evidence to inform practice in health care 
Certain sectors and disciplines have sought to use evidence derived from research in 
different ways. The idea of closing the gap between evidence and practice (Trinder and 
Reynolds, 2000) filtered into the healthcare sector, which until recently allowed less 
transparency in its practices (Davies et al., 2000a). A more questioning outlook has 





no doubt fuelled by more accessible information, such as internet resources, the 
growth of a Ill-informed and educated public, and corresponding improvements in 
information technology. This has been coupled with a quest for transparency in 
practices and focus on productivity in service delivery, to match the more managerial 
and consumer orientated approach in healthcare (Department of Health, 1997), and 
associated with a subsequent rise in governmental scrutiny and accountability (Davies 
et al., 2000a, Glasby et al., 2007). 
Emphasis on valid knowledge has led to healthcare professionals searching for better 
ways to defend their professional status. Evidence based practice has appeared in 
various forms, and one of the ways it has manifested is through accumulating ‘rigorous’ 
research evidence in a systematic way to provide a stronger defence for practice. If the 
emphasis is on a simple outcome-based study, such as a drug trial, then an RCT can 
be the most ‘rigorous’ research design to examine effectiveness; however there are 
many issues with research, that are not relevant to an RCT (Rycroft-Malone, 2006). For 
example, when there are complexities and service delivery issues involved, the 
positivist view that evidence must be ‘scientific’, with its search for a politically neutral 
‘rational truth’ becomes more questionable (Harrison, 1998).  Additionally, research is 
not always interpreted in the same ways, and there remain longstanding disputes about 
what constitutes best evidence in health care (Forbes and Griffiths, 2002) . This 
suggests that the movement towards evidence based policy is itself contested (Becker 
and Bryman, 2004). Yet an RCT retains its position as the ‘gold standard’ in health 
research and the systematic review method magnifies both its pros and cons, by 
elevating its status and judging evidence in relation to the research hierarchy as shown 






Critics of this method of collating evidence include Bastian (Bastian, 2004), who argues 
that many systematic reviews make “judgement calls” too soon in the process, resulting 
in incorrect treatment decisions. Systematic reviews are designed to help identify which 
forms of health care work best by bringing together results from similar randomized 
trials, assessing them, and combining the best to produce a statistically reliable result 
that can be more readily applied in other settings. Although the processes of traditional 
systematic reviews and meta analyses are systematic in the sense that a predefined, 
transparent methodology is used, they use a linear process, which works well for 
clinical or drug based trials. However, as Rycroft-Malone et al. (Rycroft‐Malone et al., 
2004) highlight, in reality, practitioners draw on multiple types of evidence, which are 
likely to include research, clinicians’ experience, patient experience (of themselves as a 
person and their illness) and local information/data. They state that…‘practitioners 
need to draw on and integrate multiple types of evidence that have been critically and 
publicly scrutinised. Furthermore, these processes are not acontextual — the melding 
of this evidence base occurs within a complex, multi-faceted clinical environment’ 
(2004; p83). 
Rycroft-Malone (Rycroft-Malone, 2006) argues that the focus of the traditional evidence 
synthesis  approach to promoting evidence based practice has meant that there has 
been a neglect of the actual process of implementation and therefore a continuing gap 
between evidence and practice. People are not ‘passive recipients of evidence’ but 
instead ‘stakeholders in a problem-solving process called evidence-based practice’ and 
Table 2.1: The Hierarchy of Evidence (see Becker and Bryman, 2004) 
Hierarchy Type: 
Type I Systematic reviews and meta-analyses 
Type II Randomised controlled trials 
Type III Cohort studies 
Type IV Case control studies 
Type V Cross-sectional surveys 
Type VI Case reports 
Type VII Expert opinion 





there needs to be a focus away from individuals to the ‘multiple factors that affect 
implementation success’ (2006; p104).  
For example, a clinical treatment is not the same as a healthcare programme, which 
differs from service delivery, and health policy (Pawson, 2006). There have been 
recent attempts to take into account the complexities involved in implementing 
evidence into practice using systematic synthesis of evidence. Pawson’s model uses 
theory based evaluation, and instead of focusing on appraising research at the outset, 
and thus losing credible messages from otherwise poor studies (Pawson, 2006), this 
theory based method offers a different approach to reviewing evidence, which is 
more… ‘generative rather than successionist’ (Pawson, 2006), thus providing a useful 
contrast to linear reviews. The search and appraisal of evidence is purposive and 
theoretically driven with the aim of refining theory. Multiple types of information and 
evidence can be included. Thus, rather than building up the evidence successionally, in 
an x to y linear fashion, the in between of x to y is examined. The focus becomes less 
on the outcome of ‘what works’ and more on… ‘what is it about this that works for 
whom and in what circumstances?’ (Pawson, 2006). The approach I have taken follows 
a realist approach, yet differs from the generative concept of Pawson’s causality. Mine 
sits more with George and Bennett’s (2005) idea of multiple causality and theorising, 
which is developed further as part of my method of analysis (see below).  
However, to this end, a theoretically driven review with a realist worldview allowed me 
to consider multiple types of information and causality when exploring an under-
researched area. I searched a range of different types of literature, considering 
alongside traditional health services databases, grey literature, internet based 
evidence, ‘poorer’ quality evidence.  
2.4 Search 1: The absence of severe pressure ulcer research  
Initially, I searched the literature (see databases) for the terms ‘severe pressure ulcer’ 
and ‘Category 3 and 4 pressure ulcer’. Pre-2013 when the paper arising from this PhD 
was first published (Pinkney et al, 2013), there were 0 results obtained. When I ran the 
search again in 2019, there were 28 papers which had the terms above as a subject 
heading. Of these 28 papers: 14 were focused on biomechanical aspects of pressure 
ulcer development (Ruschkewitz and Gefen, 2009, Fang et al., 2018, Kazemikhoo et 
al., 2015, Portnoy et al., 2011, Ruschkewitz and Gefen, 2011, Sopher et al., 2010, 
Linder-Ganz and Gefen, 2007, Linder-Ganz et al., 2009, Linder-Ganz et al., 2008, 
Gefen et al., 2008a, Loerakker et al., 2010a, Loerakker et al., 2010b, Loerakker et al., 





(Coomer and Kandilov, 2016, Kandilov et al., 2014, Demarre et al., 2015); 3 were 
focused on nutrition and how this affected patients with all categories of pressure 
ulcers (Louw et al., 2016, Banks et al., 2010, Hudgens et al., 2004). 3 were prevalence 
studies about pressure ulcers (James et al., 2010, Vowden and Vowden, 2009, 
Vangilder et al., 2008). One study was focused on patients who have spinal cord injury 
(Goodman et al., 2014); one focused on a case study of a child with spina bifida (Aksu 
et al., 2013); one was the published paper from this PhD (Pinkney et al., 2014); and 
one was a study reporting on the outcomes of this work within one local Trust 
(Greenwood and McGinnis, 2016). This meant that only 2 of the papers fulfilled my 
eligibility criteria (see below). This initial search highlighted that, although academic 
research may have focused on clinical risks for patients with pressure ulcers, (Nixon 
(2009), (Coleman et al., 2013a), there has, to date, been less emphasis on non-clinical 
risk factors, or underlying organisational processes which may influence the care of 
patients in both hospital and community settings in regard to severe pressure ulcers.   
 
There have been implications in previous literature that negligence can be a factor in 
the development of pressure ulcers, particularly in association with deteriorating 
pressure ulcers, and that better management can prevent them occurring (Bennett et 
al., 2004, Buckley et al., 2014, Department of Health, 2012a, Downie et al., 2014).  
These suggestions nevertheless often refer to older papers published several years 
ago, which suggests a need for updating the research in this area although there have 
been many papers focusing on the costs of pressure ulcers (Bennett et al., 2004, 
Bosch et al., 2011, Bredesen et al., 2015a). However, the implication of poor care and 
the issue of harming patients also suggests links between patient safety issues and 
pressure ulcers. This link has been highlighted in health policy agendas globally (see 
Introduction chapter) (in particular the USA; (Richardson et al., 2000, Institute of 
Medicine, 2000, Institute for Healthcare Improvement, 2004, Agency for Healthcare 
Research Quality, 2014)  Australia; (Healthcare, 2011) and the UK (Department of 
Health, 2000, Department of Health, 1997, Department of Health, 2013b, Department 
of Health, 2012a, Secretary of State for Health, 2014); NHSi pressure ulcer definitions, 
2018. However, gaps in research evidence in the area of patient safety and pressure 
ulcers have also been acknowledged within previous literature (Coleman et al, 2013). 
This review has sought to address these gaps and find possible links between the 






2.5 Search 2 (incorporating Search 5): Pressure ulcers as a patient safety issue  
 
I then sought to examine pressure ulcers as a quality of care or patient safety issue and 
began to search the patient safety literature. These searches informed my 
epistemological stance and subsequent methodological approach, so will not be 
discussed in detail here, but I will examine these areas in in Chapter 3.   
2.6 Combining disciplinary thoughts (using Searches 1, 2, 4 and 5) 
I originally drew together evidence from all of the most prominent approaches to safety. 
I surmised that underlying theories are different according to each academic discipline, 
finding that none crosses disciplinary boundaries; therefore none can explain a patient 
safety problem comprehensively.  For example, the Safety I psychological perspective 
understands an adverse event as a psycho-social, but nevertheless cognitive error, 
situating it around an individual’s reaction to the error or organisational context. This 
means that explanations are found within this particular of learning. Reason’s model 
(2000) is neat yet is less able to predict organisational factors or ‘latent conditions’ 
based on its model, leaving these more to the reader’s assumptions. The sociological 
focus on explaining adverse events in terms of the organisational and institutional 
culture means that theorists are reluctant to consider an individual or cognitive 
explanation in examining errors, given their discipline and knowledge. Organisation 
theorists apply organisational, macro level theory to understanding the topic (more in 
line with Safety II). This does not encourage them to also assess findings from the 
individual or small group perspective.  Perrow’s (1984) account comes near to a 
combination of disciplines, but doesn’t account for cultural overtones, and is criticised 
for being a rather negative, nihilistic view of safety (Shrivastava et al., 2009). In 
essence, the theoretical concepts that are adopted for research, like the disciplines that 
generate them, always frame the locus of attention. We are thus left with ambiguity of 
meaning, and often with incompatible findings and studies. However, my study’s main 
aim was looking to support or refute the claim that severe pressure ulcers were linked 
to any aspect of the health care organisation, or the environment surrounding a 
patient’s care. I didn’t know where the explanations lay. I needed to somehow consider 
all of the above areas to explore my research questions. Furthermore, other reviews in 
patient safety had highlighted the need for cross-disciplinary research in patient safety, 
(Waring et al., 2010) so it was appropriate to try and combine areas for a possible 
multi-disciplinary perspective and explanation. Having carried out the broader searches 





out a more focused search to explore the areas I had identified above to add subject 
relative research on pressure ulcers within organisations to my review. 
 
2.7 Search 3: Focused review-Health Services Literature 
 I thus carried out a systemic search of health services literature to try and link and 
explore literature in more detail around pressure ulcers, organisational influences and 
patient safety. I produced a search strategy using key words and MesH terms from key 
papers found during the scoping search (see Table 2.1 below). The search terms 
reflect topic areas identified at the beginning of this section. 
 
2.8 Search strategy-search 3 
I was able to conduct a focused search based on the refining of my exploratory initial 
searching. At this point I searched electronic databases from 1996 to 2016 using Ovid 
search engines. The results are shown below. I searched MEDLINE, EMBASE, 
Psychinfo, CINAHL, and HMIC. In addition, an auto-alert function was set up within 
these databases until 2016.  I also did a citation search on systematic reviews. I 
searched grey literature using OpenGrey. I used key papers identified from a 
theoretical review to identify appropriate search terms, and cross checked these with 
retrieved papers to make sure I had not missed any further associated terms. The 
search strategy included all known search terms for PUs, organisations, safety and risk 
(see Fig 2.2 and Table 2.2 below). 











Search terms used:  
• adverse 
• adverse event* 
• bed 
• bed sore* 
• bedsore* 
• clinical 
• clinical incident* 
• damage* 
• decubitus 
• decubitus sore* 















• patient safety 
• pressure 
• pressure sore* 
• pressure ulcer 
• pressure ulcer* 
• prevent* 
 
• quality of health 
care 
• risk 
• risk assessment 
• risk factors 
• risk management 
• risk* 
• safety 
• safety management 
• skin 








Figure 2.2 is a diagram of the initial scope of the search and subsequent strategy: 
Fig 2.2 Initial scope and strategy 
A    B         C 

































Pressure ulcer and 
related terms 
Electronic search 
Citation search on systematic 
reviews 
No grey literature  
 
HMIC  8 +7 (2011-16) 
MEDLINE 155 + 125 (2011-16) 
Psychinfo  11 +21 (2011-16) 
EMBASE 399 +288 (2011-16) 
CINAHL 171 (ended 2011) 
Exclusion criteria 
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2.9 Data Extraction and analysis 
 
Data extraction involved reading through each health services study and identifying key 
findings using a theory focused technique for seeing if the study was relevant to the 
review questions (7). I also used an appraisal I attached a relevance criteria framework 
(Fig. 2.3) in order to identify those relevant to our refined literature review question. I 
included all primary research which focused on pressure ulcers, 
organisations/healthcare and safety. I included surveys, qualitative research studies, 
before and after studies and cohort studies, along with RCTs. I did not include small 
scale studies, if they were not qualitative.   As I was not interested in patient level 
treatment interventions, because they did not offer any information about the influence 
of the organisation, we excluded these, along with education programmes for nurses, 
equipment based studies, and other papers seen as irrelevant to the review questions 
(see exclusion criteria above and Table 2.3 below). 


















• Opinion papers  
• Editorials  
• Mattress trials  
• Equipment trials  
• Patient level treatment intervention trials (e.g. mattresses, patient  
education programmes, healing of ulcers  
Inclusion criteria 
• Primary research  








1,185 papers were retrieved from the search to be assessed for inclusion and 
exclusion. 353 were assessed as potentially eligible for inclusion. Of 74 studies initially 
retrieved, 53 papers were selected and appraised using the CASP tools for research 
(Critical Appraisal Skills Programme, 2019) (see Table 2.4).  



































Latimer et al. (2014) 
4 Clear aim, appropriate 
method, clear data and 
findings. Limited 
value/scope. No 
examination of researcher 
role. Pilot sudy. 
 
 
Clear aims, method, data, 
Small scale study, but 
across sites. Rigorous 
analysis. Limited scope. 
Careful analysis of 
researcher role.  
 
Clear aims, method, 
appropriate design, biased 
sample, limited analysis. 
Researcher's roles analysed 
and considered. some useful 
insights into risk assessment 
use. 
Analysis and aims not clear, 
Method not rigorous. 







findings about the patient's 
































Berlowitz et al, 2003, 
 
 
8 Clear aims, analysis. Poor 
response rate (45%), good 
sample, but limited scope as 
SCI patients only. 
 
Clear aims, good response 
rate (65%). Large but biased 
sample, clear method and 
analysis. interesting insights 
into rationing nursing care. 
 
Clear aims, method, 48% 
response rate, limited scope 
and findings, although large 
sample used. Some insight 
into protocols used in 
agency care. 
 
Clear aims, methods, 
analysis. Excellent response 
rate (86%). Limited 
relevance to this research as 
USA based study and 
activities. Limited scope, 
but interesting insights into 
empowerment of nurse 
aides.  
 
Unclear aims, but clear 
method and analysis. 












Wang et al, 2014 
but interesting findings 
about QI and culture. 
 
Clear aims, and rigorous 
methods, and analysis. 
Limited scope and 
application. Good insights 
into patient safety culture. 
 























Igarashi et al, 2013;  
 
9 Unclear aims, clear method, 
limited scope. good insights 
into clinical judgement. 
 





Unclear aim, methods 
unclear, interesting findings 




Clear aims, outdated study, 
US based longitudinal 
study, large sample. Useful 
insights. 
 
Questionnaire based study, 
clear aims analysis, 




















Bredesen et al, 2014;  
insights. Limited 
applicability.  
Census study, clear aims, 
method, useful insights into 
prevalence over 15 years 
 
 
Clear aims, method, useful 
findings from prevalence 
data. Good quality 
indicators. 
 
Clear aims, methods. Useful 
study Germany based, 
insights into mobility link 
with Pus, 
 
Clear aims, method, 
analysis. Useful for insights 










Horn et al 2010  
Chaboyer W.  et al 2014 
 
McInerney JA. 2008 
  
 
Ballard N.  et al. 2008;  
 
McElhinny ML.  Hooper C. 2008 
 
19 Clear aims, limited scope 
Clear aims, limited scope 
 
Clear aims, longitudinal 
study. Useful insights 
 









De Laat et al, 2006 
 
 
Rosen et al. (2006) 
 
 



















Lyder et al. (2004) 
 
Clear aims, clear method. 
Inadequate data as poor sign 
up for heel ulcer study. 
 
Clear aims, method, good 
insights into QI and pressure 
ulcer management. 
 
Clear aims, unclear method. 
limited scope and limited 
local applicability.  
Clear aims, clear method, 




Clear aims and method. 
Poor analysis, and limited 
scope. Useful pilot study. 
 
Clear aims, method, and 
analysis. Limited 
applicability to UK as 




Clear aims, method and 
analysis. Good large scale 
Before and After study. 
Insights into process 
improvement for Pus. 
 
Clear aims and method. 














 Dlugacz et al. (2001) 
 
 





 Brilli et al. (2013) 
 
 








Hartmann et al. (2016) 
hospitals). Interesting 
insights into pressure ulcer 
improved performance by 
staff. 
 
Clear aims, but unclear 
method and design. Clear 
analysis. Significant results 
of improvement in PUs in 
nursing homes. 
 
Unclear aim, method and 
analysis. Poor quality study. 
 
 
Clear aims, method and 
analysis. Insights into 
electronic health care 
records and PUs. 
 
Clear aims, unclear method 
and analysis. Useful insights 
but limited scope. 
 
Clear aims, method and 
analysis. Insights into QI 
and Pus. 
 
Clear aims, method and 
analysis. Large scale study. 
insights into changing  
culture in nursing homes. 
 
Clear aims, method and 







longitudinal study. Insights 
into organisational readiness 
and sustainability.  
 








Selected key studies 






























Clear aims, method, 
rigorous analysis. Useful 
insights into safety culture, 
nurses' perception and 
clinical outcomes (PUs) 
 
Clear aims, method, and 
rigorous analysis. Insights 
into Pu prevalence in 
relation to safety culture. 
E.g no relationship with org 
culture and prevalence. 
 
Clear aims, method. limited 
scope as in one 
organisation. Pressure ulcer 
prevention package reduced 
incidence by 67% in both 
facilities.  
Clear aims, method and 
analysis. Insights into nurse 
model of staffing and lower 
risk of Pu. 
 
Clear aims, methods, 
analysis. Insights into RN 
staffing and PU rates. high 











 (Bredesen et al., 2015b, Bredesen 
et al., 2015a) 
 
 













Unruh and Zhang (2012) 
Clear aims, method, 
analysis. Limited scope due 
to self reports. insights into 
nursing extended hours. 
 
clear aims and method. 
unclear analysis. insights 
into PUs and culture. 
 
Clear aims, but unclear 
method and analysis. 
Limited scope and 
conclusions. 
 
Unclear aim. Method and 
analysis clear, but limited 
scope. 
 
Clear aims, method and 
analysis. Limited scope due 
to one US centre. insights 
into links between nurse and 
patient injuries.) 
 
Clear aims, unclear method 








Van Gaal et al, (2009, 2011) 2 Clear aims, methods and 
rigorous analysis. Useful 
study and follow up study 
for this area. 






There were mostly cohort/case control studies (32) and before and after studies (19) 
eligible for inclusion in the review. Along with 2 RCTs, 9 prevalence studies, 8 survey 
designs, and 4 qualitative studies.  
 
2.11 Combining literatures to propose theories 
 
I appraised the studies and considered their relevance to my initial review questions. I 
examined empirical evidence in the light of possible theories from the broader 
literature, which situated the health services evidence within broader safety literature. 
During this appraisal, interestingly, and although not surprisingly, I found that there 
were differing approaches to studying patient safety and pressure ulcers at health 
services level, which in some ways mirrored the more general patient safety literature. 
For example, some studies focused on individual or small group level research 
samples, which led to conclusions and recommendations based within this area, similar 
to psychological theories (Safety I) set out above. Other studies focused more on 
safety culture, mirroring a sociological approach to studying pressure ulcer care and 
management (Safety II). Further papers researched the politics of the healthcare in 
terms of pressure ulcer care, and focused more organisationally, with political 
conclusions and recommendations. With these corresponding theoretical stances in 
mind I then set out some initial theories resulting from the appraisal of evidence: 
 
2.12  Levels of inquiry 
Level 1:  
Nurses’ have individual responsibility for reduction of pressure ulcers 
There were several papers covering perceptions and beliefs about pressure ulcer care 
(9 surveys and 2 qualitative papers). Of these studies, themes emerged around nurses’ 
personal beliefs that pressure ulcer care could be of better quality. Service users felt 
care could be better quality. Staff self-reported that they were too busy to care as well 
as they should for patients (Kennedy, 2005). They also believed that they were using 
outdated techniques of nursing. There was both lack of consistency and varied use of 
guidelines. They felt that they implicitly rationed patient care, not through choice, but 
based on resources (Dopierala et al., 2007, Schubert et al., 2009, Chaves et al., 2006, 
Ausserhofer et al., 2013). Where staff turnover was high, this had a negative effect on 





appeared to affect pressure ulcer outcomes, with professional models of nursing care 
(measured at unit level) having lower rates of safety-related events than functional 
models (Dubois et al., 2013).  
 
Level 2 
Pressure ulcers can be reduced by a strong safety culture 
The 19 ‘before and after’ studies offered evidence around Quality Improvement 
initiatives. These, in the main, reduced pressure ulcer frequency when implemented in 
sites. For example, these included electronic health records implementation and 
various other Quality Improvement initiatives such as care bundles and culture change 
programmes (Dowding et al., 2012, Brilli et al., 2013, Hartmann et al., 2016). Where 
the organisation welcomed improvement, the culture change towards pressure ulcer 
prevention was better. This is echoed in more recent Government documents around 
quality improvement (Care Quality Commission, 2019).  Some studies were lower in 
the quality of the method of approach, and based in one clinical area, or site, limiting 
the scope of the study findings (Ballard et al., 2008, Lepisto et al., 2006), but others 
offered longitudinal results, which offered more promising findings of sustainable 
culture change (Brilli et al., 2013, Burston et al., 2015). With the increasing focus on 
Quality Improvement at national policy level, these approaches to measuring safety 
culture have increased massively in recent years, however, remaining at local level. 
Nevertheless they offer important insights into change at local level, that may be 
replicated elsewhere, and have continued to appear in health policy with the NHS 
Patient Safety Strategy (NHS Improvement, 2019b) although the updated literature 
review has highlighted more mixed results around the impact of safety culture in regard 
to pressure ulcer care.  
 
One study which examined organisational culture and team climate found that only in 
pressure ulcer care did institutional management contribute to preventative 
management at ward level and not in other adverse event areas (Bosch et al., 2011). 
This was noted to be due, in part, to the ‘concerted action’ between different caregivers 
for pressure ulcer care. The evidence from these before and after studies remains 
misleading, as often when the organisational culture is ‘ready’ to implement quality 
improvements, this tends to reduce pressure ulcers (Berlowitz et al., 2003, Ma and 
Park, 2015) which biases studies towards reporting good outcomes. There is a 





are not celebrated and written up for publication if they are less significant or 
interesting. There is currently not enough evidence about what factors cause reduction 
in pressure ulcers, which was highlighted in a recent pilot meta-analysis (Groves, 2014, 
Miller et al., 2014). 
 
Case control and cohort studies which were appraised in this review offered more 
evidence around improvements in nursing and care home quality, and these studies 
(32/11) highlighted that the service environment plays a part in reducing pressure 
ulcers (Bonner et al., 2009). For example, when residents in two nursing centres were 
compared  (one using a pressure ulcer prevention strategy and the other a control 
group) the prevention group reduced pressure ulcers by 67% in a 6 month period 
(Shannon et al., 2012) although this study was limited to one organisation.  Another 
case control study examined unit level nurse work environments in comparison to 
overall Magnet Hospitals (USA), and found that although Magnet Hospital status and 
unit level environment were significantly associated with hospital acquired pressure 
ulcers, (21% lower odds), the unit level appeared to have a more positive (lower odds) 
effect on pressure ulcer odds (29%) in comparison with non-Magnet hospitals. These 
findings suggest something around the unit level environment has an effect on 
pressure ulcers (Ma and Park, 2015).  
 
In countries (for example the USA) where financial incentives have been given to staff 
for a number of years, this was associated with a lower incidence of pressure ulcer 
rates (Barry et al., 2005), and ambitious quality measures seem to work (Baier et al., 
2009). This appears to have been replicated globally. For example, a Dutch prevalence 
study, which was conducted between 2001 and 2008 reported declines in pressure 
ulcers of 8.5% in 2001 to 3.4% in 2008. In the UK, Safety Thermometer data is now 
published, although few explanations are provided around prevalence rates nationally. 
Prevalence rates were measured at 5.39% when the Safety Thermometer was 
introduced alongside the CQUIN framework (financial penalties), and reduced to 4.6% 
in 2015 when hospitals were no longer required to collect pressure ulcer data for this 
national policy (Department of Health, 2012a).   
 
A Norwegian study by Bredesen et al. (Bredesen et al., 2015a) found that the average 
ward patient safety culture was significantly related to the hospital acquired pressure 





hospital acquired pressure ulcer odds. This also echoes the supposition that if a ward 
is ‘ready’ to improve then safety improvements will occur. However, two other studies 
carried out previously, which examined links with safety culture and presence of 
pressure ulcers found no such association (Bosch et al., 2011, Ausserhofer et al., 
2013), so further research is necessary to draw more conclusive evidence. 
 
Both RCTs included in the review developed and tested an evidence-based in-patient 
safety programme, which used bundles and indicators, and a combination of safety 
guidelines. These studies found that there was a significant positive effect of a tailored 
educational programme on nurses’ knowledge of pressure ulcers. Patients in 
intervention groups developed 43% and 33% fewer adverse events compared to usual 
care groups in hospitals and nursing homes respectively  (van Gaal et al., 2010, van 
Gaal et al., 2009). To support this view, with a caveat that the evidence was based on 
nurses' beliefs, and not a large scale study, a survey of nurses’ views of patient safety 
culture in China found that an improvement in culture was associated with a decrease 
in adverse events (Wang et al., 2014).  
 
Level 3 
Service issues such as delays and service delivery affect pressure ulcers 
This level of focus was based on more organisational and political evidence where 
workload appeared to be a predictor of pressure ulcers, with better qualified nurses 
achieving lower pressure ulcer rates (Yang, 2003, Unruh and Zhang, 2012). According 
to Unruh and Zhang (2012) changes in Registered Nurse (RN) full-time equivalents 
were positively related to changes in RN per adjusted patient day. All patient safety 
incidents were negatively and significantly related to one or both RN staffing measures; 
particularly in relation to pressure ulcers, although this was a weak association. 
Specialist wards appear to help with patient safety incident reductions. For example, in 
a study by Suwanwela et al. (2007) overall complications in a stroke unit and a short-
term ward were 16.8%, compared to 26% of patients admitted into a general medical 
ward (Suwanwela et al., 2007). Although this study was based on stroke patients, 
rather than around pressure ulcers per se. Higher nursing ratios were linked to 
improved outcomes for residents in nursing homes (Wan et al., 2006, Bredesen et al., 
2015a) and lower staff turnover impacted on pressure ulcer rates (Dellefield and 
Magnabosco, 2014) (Barry et al., 2005).  Other studies in acute sites offered 





impact on pressure ulcer rates (Lee et al., 2014) although the Lee (2014) study was 




Although the primary research evidence offered interesting insights into areas of 
pressure ulcer care and the effect of the environment, it has still offered little about the 
process of care and the development of pressure ulcers. Instead, in the main, it has 
remained concerned with comparing points in time, and how incidence of pressure 
ulcers may decrease with the implementation of Quality Improvement initiatives. The 
evidence to date, still offers very little about patients who develop severe pressure 
ulcers despite quality initiatives, and in this review the studies which focused solely on 
severe pressure ulcers were either excluded as not being relevant to the organisational 
focus of the review, because they were concerned with biomechanical aspects, or were 
the findings from this thesis. The small amount of good quality evidence shows the 
paucity of research in this area despite nine years of exploratory work. 
However, despite the lack of evidence on severe pressure ulcers, the primary research 
studies did offer three potential levels of interest from which I could refine theories 
further to underpin a research study. At one level (Level 1) there was a focus on 
individual staff and responsibility for patients’ pressure ulcers, another level (Level 2) 
focused on service delivery, and the other (Level 3) focused on the organisational 
culture. In the light of general safety literature these mirrored in some ways general 
approaches towards patient safety (i.e. psychological, sociological and organisational 
or political approaches). I thus used the combination of literatures (see Fig 2.4. below) 
to then apply general theories of safety to pressure ulcer literature, which no one, to my 






Fig 2.3 Combining literature 
 
 
Perceiving pressure ulcers as errors or adverse events in a patient safety perspective 
(Berlowitz et al., 2001, West, 2000) and categorising these adverse events using 
different disciplinary explanations, helped to address the purpose of the review and 
organise what sparse evidence there was into testable areas. Following my initial 
scoping searches I fed back findings of the review to clinicians and verified my tentative 
theories with them to see if they found them to be applicable to practice (Pawson, 
2006). This iterative process helped to construct an investigative, yet inductive 
approach to explore why patients develop pressure ulcers, despite finding little 
evidence from primary research literature on severe pressure ulcers.  
I combined evidence about pressure ulcers found in primary health services research 
(Berlowitz et al., 2003, Baier et al., 2008, De Laat et al., 2006, van Gaal et al., 2010, 
Baier et al., 2009, Berlowitz et al., 2001) to name a few of the studies which offered 
valid insights, with broader underlying theories on patient safety (Reason, 2000a, 
Perrow, 1984, Vaughan, 1996, Waring et al., 2007, Waring et al., 2006).  I then used 
this combination of evidence to produce a refined list of possible, testable explanations 
or refined theories (below) which could be influential in the development of severe 
pressure ulcers which develop in healthcare organisations. The first theory is a null 
hypothesis, where a patient may develop a pressure ulcer regardless of the care 
received (Explanation A). The second theory allows for an interaction with health care 
services to an extent, but centres around a single error committed by a staff member, 
team, or service (Explanation B) and remains at an individual interactive level. The third 
theory (Explanation C) alludes to both Reason’s and Perrow’s models, which 
























(Perrow). The fourth theory (Explanations D) alludes to Vaughan’s model in the main, 
and would be an explanation if the organisational culture were to be the main cause of 
the pressure ulcer. The final theory is one which allows for the explanation for a severe 
pressure ulcer to be a combination of any of the others, or alternatively none of the 
theories set out (Explanation E). Therefore I set out testable explanations to underpin 
my study as follows: 
 
2.14 Testable explanations: 
Explanation A 
A patient will develop a pressure ulcer if good care (current best practice) is provided 
regardless of the care he or she receives (null hypothesis) 
 
Explanation B 
The severe pressure ulcer is caused by a single error  
 
Explanation C 
A severe pressure ulcer is caused by a series of errors, or in a complex framework of 
errors which add together to make a serious incident 
 
Explanation D 
The organisational culture makes the severe pressure ulcer more likely 
 
Explanation E 





I initially found out little of how severe pressure ulcers are caused or prevented from 
the primary research evidence in this particular area. None of the studies I found 





severe pressure ulcers (aside from the work from this thesis). However, despite the 
lack of findings around severe pressure ulcers in health services literature, by using a 
theory driven, iterative approach set out above, I was able to broaden the scope and 
draw on more general theories of patient safety to conceptualise the area of scrutiny. 
These general theories and my candidate explanations also underpin the primary 
research literature in this area, and I was able to set out tentative hypotheses to frame 
my study and investigate patients who develop severe pressure ulcers, to explore 
whether the environment, if at all, contributes to their development. The paucity of 
empirical evidence and the theoretical stance I have taken to counteract it, have 

























Chapter 3: A retrospective case study method 
3.1 Chapter Summary 
 
This chapter investigates the retrospective case study approach as a method of 
examining the development of severe pressure ulcers in hospital, defining them as 
‘adverse events’, or ‘failures in care’. The method draws on George and Bennett’s 
(2005) case study method, which was derived from the field of political history, and 
aimed to study historical experience, in order to create analytic explanations. This 
method examines ‘severe pressure ulcers as failures in care’ retrospectively, using a 
process tracing technique and identifies possible causes of them. 
Study sites were eight NHS acute and community settings in the north of England 
between September 2008 and August 2012 and included eight patients who had all 
developed severe pressure ulcers, who were purposively selected for varied 
demographic characteristics. The reasons for identifying these particular patients and 
the choice of case study design are explained below. Although the approach presents 
some difficulties in practice – notably in demands on time, and the risk of hindsight 
bias– it has some advantages over current investigative techniques which aim to 
uncover the causes of severe pressure ulcers based on linear causality. It offers a 
detailed, coherent view of events and, using analysis of eight cases, develops a style of 
theorising about the development of pressure ulcers, which highlights the significance 
of the health care environment.  
3.2 Introduction: the importance of quality, safety and case studies  
The notion of ‘quality’ of care has been merged with the notion of ‘safety’ in the area of 
patient safety (Darzi, 2008a, Vincent, 2010). Safety is often seen as a dimension of 
quality, and this notion arose from situations where patients came to harm because of 
deficiencies in their healthcare, although there is no obvious dividing line between the 
two areas. Historically, Donabedian, an eminent theorist of healthcare quality, made the 
distinction in 1968 between the structure, process and outcome of healthcare, and its 
associations with quality, which gained widespread acceptance (Donabedian, 1968).  He 
suggests that quality is a dimension of elements and interactions within the process of 
medical care, adding that provider performance (namely the manner and humanity with 
which care is delivered) needs to be taken into account when judging quality.  When 
Donabedian set forward these ideas provider performance and delivery had not yet been 





Institute of Medicine report “To Err is Human: Building a Safer Health System” in 2000 
brought to the forefront links between performance, harm, safety and health care. It 
established patient safety and the occurrence of adverse events as quality issues, with 
safety being expressed as the first dimension of quality (Kohn et al., 2000). The World 
Health Organisation defines quality of care as the proportion of potential health gain 
actually delivered by a healthcare organisation for its set of patients (World et al., 2006). 
Quality thus reflects the gap between what can be achieved and what actually happens 
(Vincent, 2010).  Arising from the changing paradigms around quality and safety, there 
was a theoretical shift from individual blame to system-level and organisational culture 
as responsible for adverse events, as the technical and social complexity of healthcare 
was recognised as a contributor to patient harm alongside human error (Department of 
Health (2000), Reason (2000a), Reason (1997a), (Pidgeon and O'Leary, 2000, Perrow, 
1984).  
 
3.3 Safety I: The error-focused psychological approach to patient safety 
(incorporating findings from Search 2) 
Historically, patient safety literature was concerned with the interaction between clinical 
practice and the work environment at a ‘micro’ or individual cognitive level (Ballard et 
al., 2008, Healey et al., 2006, Reason, 2000b). It emphasised patient safety as ‘safety 
science’ (Waring J et al., 2010) and still to some extent remains influenced by the field 
of human factors, cognitive and social psychology (Reason, 2005, Leape et al., 2009, 
Vincent, 1997, Vincent et al., 2008, Reason, 2000b). This sits under what is termed as 
Safety I.  
 
The Safety-I view appeared alongside early patient safety policy publications such as 
To Err is Human (Institute of Medicine, 2000) when safety in healthcare rose to the top 
of global health agendas (World et al., 2006, Department of Health, 2000, World Health 
Assembly, 1997). This approach focused on ensuring that as few things as possible go 
wrong in healthcare and other complex systems. Given that there were few healthcare 
systems based tools to look at error in healthcare at this time, these influential reports 
borrowed from approaches used in technological systems such as aviation and 
manufacturing. Following this logic, the Safety I approach suggests that things ‘go 
wrong’ because of identifiable failures or malfunctions of specific components:  
technology, procedures, human workers and the organisations in which they are 






Human behaviour in health systems is seen through this positivist orientated lens as 
logical, measurable and graphical (NHS England, 2018, Campbell and Stanley, 1966). 
The purpose of investigating adverse events (or things going wrong) through this 
Safety-I lens is to identify any root causes and contributory factors relating to adverse 
events, while risk assessments aim to determine their likelihood (Hollnagel et al., 2013, 
Vincent, 2010). The safety management principle is thus to respond reactively when 
something happens or is categorised as an unacceptable risk, usually by trying to 
eliminate causes or improve barriers, or both (Reason, 2000b, Institute of Medicine, 
2000). 
Graphical linear models, such as Heinrich’s (1931) Domino Model, (Heinrich, 1931, 
Heinrich, 1980) were originally at the heart of Root Cause Analysis, which by its name 
suggests that it searches for and identifies root causes. This model was prominent in 
the technological industries throughout the 1980s. This model was later supplemented 
by more composite linear models such as Reason’s Swiss Cheese Model (2000), and 
these were adopted as the basic safety tools in health care when patient safety 
became more popular in health policy in the late 1990s (Institute of Medicine, 2000). 
The graphical view of safety (see Reason’s Swiss Cheese Model; 2000) had already 
became widespread and popular in the safety critical industries (nuclear, aviation, and 
so on) between the 1960s and 1980s, and is still the most prevalent model used in 
frontline healthcare safety management today (NHS England, 2015, Reason, 2000b).  
 
However, few people within healthcare noticed that these models were already being 
challenged by industrial safety outside healthcare as inadequate to newer, more 
complex working environments (Hollnagel et al., 2015). Also during the 1960s to 
1980s, when the Safety I approach was popular in industry, performance demands in 
healthcare were significantly lower than today (for example, CQUINs (Commissioning 
for Quality and Innovation). However, well publicised targets such as those in Accident 
and Emergency departments are now prominent drivers in healthcare (NHS England, 
2017) yet complex systems such as the NHS were also less interdependent back then 
(complex discharges, Choose and Book initiatives etc.). As these systems have 
become more and more complex and have become more politicised (see Introduction 
section) it has become more difficult to analyse them in terms of components and 






The Safety I approach, influenced heavily by Reason’s early work on error 
management (1997a) argues that error can be attributed to either active (individual) or 
latent (organisational) factors which are inherent in the system. This approach provides 
essentially a cognitive psychological account of human error, focusing on the psycho-
social environment, and suggests a ‘Swiss Cheese model’ (Figure 2.2) as the basis for 
studying human errors, where holes (errors) line up and multiple holes lead to an 
‘adverse event’.  
 
Figure 3.1: Swiss Cheese Model: Reason (1997) 
This conceptual model suggests that a hazard is always present, but occasionally 
breaks through if defences are missed, for example a missing defence would be if a 
health care professional forgot a procedure, the patient did not turn up for treatment, 
staff did not follow policy properly and so on. If all of these defences fail, then an error 
occurs. The approach was aimed mainly at Reason’s peers, who were cognitive 
psychologists. Reason updated much of this original work to counteract issues with 
latent failures and focused more on  cultural overtones in his later work (Reason, 
2016); however the simplicity of the earlier Swiss Cheese Model had a strong impact in 
healthcare in its effect on investigative processes (NHS Direct, 2011).  
 
Despite this model being a very simple metaphor, and easily memorised, it has been 
criticized by organisational theorists. Pidgeon and O'Leary (2000) for example, argue 
that although the emphasis is on the promotion of active failures by latent conditions, 
the model lacks an organisational level of analysis to describe ‘inter-organisational 
phenomena’ or the interaction between the active and latent precursors.  Different 
layers are explained further in later models, for example, organisational defences, 





To date, despite further modifications of the model, (Reason, 2004) this influential work 
has not yet fully developed a ‘whole system’ of latent errors (Waring, 2007, Wallace et 
al., 2009). It remains a linear systems approach to error causation, which relies on a 
sequential pattern and focuses on the ‘active failures’ to examine error.  This school of 
thought is influenced by work done in other technological industries, and was central to 
the argument in the USA patient safety report mentioned earlier ‘To Err is 
Human’.(Institute of Medicine, 2000) This approach leads professionals to seek out 
‘root causes’ of errors (Reason, 2000a, Andersen and Fagerhaug, 2006). However, the 
root causes, or factors, that are associated with this factorial model of error causation, 
are themselves not developed theoretically or analytically, yet relied upon by health 
professionals to focus their improvement work (Nicolini et al., 2011). According to this 
model, these must be tangible and be ‘do-able’. A further drawback with translating 
such ideas, is that health care organisations do not act like technological organisations; 
they are dealing with humans, not machines, and are more complex and difficult to 
predict (Waring, 2007, Waring J et al., 2010, Institute of Medicine, 2000). What works 
for technological systems may not work for more human, decision-focused systems 
such as the NHS.  Neither are ‘latent conditions’ examined in such a depth of detail, 
even in Reason’s later work (Reason, 2008).  
 
While Reason’s model has remained the dominant model in healthcare, an update of 
this model has been offered by Lawton et al. (2015) in the guise of the Yorkshire 
Contributory Factors model. This is based on a framework of factors which contribute 
to incidents in hospital settings. In the centre are the ‘active failures’ (following the 
Swiss Cheese model) but around this are a series of circles representing situational 
factors, local working conditions, and two layers of ‘latent’ factors, which include the 
organisation and wider external policies. While this model is both evidence based 
(following a systematic review (Lawton et al., 2012) and the model is more related to 
healthcare, which are both improvements in comparison to  Reason’s model; it is only 
relevant currently for hospital settings, and is rooted in ‘preventing’ errors. It does 
suggest a more complex insight into investigating errors, and is being more 
incorporated into frontline work across the NHS as a way of investigating errors using 
the Root Cause Analysis process.  
 
Over the last decade Root Cause Analysis (RCA) and other methods of error 





pressure ulcers in health care (NHS Direct, 2011, Ovretveit, 2005). Originally used in 
high risk industries such as nuclear power and aviation (Carroll JS and Edmondson 
AC, 2002) RCA was adopted in 2001 by the National Patient Safety Agency, (now NHS 
Improvement)  arising from the Department of Health’s report ‘An Organisation with a 
Memory (2000). RCA still remains the most popular method in health care to examine 
clinical incidents retrospectively, and then to recommend strategies to change practice 
(Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, 2017). It is designed to 
work towards preventing future adverse events based on the learning achieved from 
incident investigations.  
 
Normally, a root cause analysis is undertaken when an incident is reported; however, 
this requires correct and accurate reporting of incidents, and not all adverse events are 
easily reported and measured. Pressure ulcers, for example, often do not have an 
easily identifiable beginning, and tend to happen on wards gradually, where the staff 
are sometimes not aware of their development. There have been debates amongst 
health care researchers and practitioners; whether this technique for analysing 
incidents works as well as it should (Wallace et al., 2009, Nicolini et al., 2011). 
Although health care professionals appear to value it as a tool, there are suggestions 
that an RCA’s focus on systems problems is not understood enough by staff trained in 
its use. Although the tool aims to avoid blaming individual staff members in the event of 
an error and focuses on the system instead; see Lawton et al. (2012), a large study 
around its uses conducted in 2009 found that 47.1% of staff who attended a national 
training programme thought that disciplinary or punitive actions should result from an 
investigation. Only 49.5% understood the management strategies for how to deal with 
staff afterwards in a non-blame outcome (Wallace et al 2009). Further UK based recent 
research in this area has found similar outcomes around the utility and poor 
implementation of RCA (Peerally et al., 2017). It is often difficult to recruit a wide range 
of staff members to an investigation, which led to investigations being localised to 
clinical level. Although most RCA tools are designed to provide a ‘helicopter view’, in 
practice health care professionals seem to prefer the tools that allow them reconstruct 
the event in a temporal linear style, (such as a chronology of events) which follows a 
narrative rather than argumentative approach (Nicolini et al, 2011). This preference has 
been shown to lead to narrative rather than argumentative style investigations and 
conclusions. This also culminates in conclusions based at clinical level rather than staff 
examining organisational factors such as lack of resources, due to the complex nature 






Therefore, although staff may understand ‘on paper’ the human factors approach which 
underpins the method of RCA, the systems focus is not so well understood when 
applied to real world cases and outcomes of investigations are therefore not helpful for 
learning (Peerally et al., 2017). The emphasis on a linear timeline, finding a root cause 
or causes, and implying a ‘reductionist view’ of events (Peerally et al., 2017) leads us 
to over simplify in particular the causes of the pressure ulcer, and implies that solutions 
can be understood as ‘root causes’ to fix. This approach however, still remains the 
most influential school of thought within patient safety in frontline practice, with 
government health policies still emphasising patient safety as safety science (Waring et 
al., 2010; Department of Health, 2000; National Audit Office, 2005; National Patient 
Safety Agency, 2008; Healthcare Commission, 2008). Safety I literature and related 
concepts therefore offered another area to explore in the study: Did a patient develop a 
severe pressure ulcer due to a human error, with a root cause? 
 
3.4 Safety II: the organisational resilience/sociology focused approach 
(incorporating findings from Searches 2 and 4) 
Safety II, in contrast to Safety I, focuses its investigations on gaining an understanding 
of how things usually go right, since that is the basis for explaining how things 
occasionally go wrong (Hollnagel et al., 2013). Hollnagel and colleagues, who are 
some of the chief advocates of this movement (which is a relatively recent advance in 
global healthcare; 2014 to date) remind us that, in contrast to the tried and tested 
Safety I style tools of investigation, the situation is different for the many more events 
that go right. Despite their importance, they usually receive less attention in safety 
management activities such as risk identification, safety assurance and safety 
promotion. There are no current requirements from authorities and regulators to look at 
what works well, although things appear to be slowly changing; (Hughes et al., 2019, 
Lawton et al., 2014), but to date few agencies and departments do that. Possible 
exceptions are audits and such where good practice is celebrated (NHS Wales, 2010).  
If we analyse how these approaches differ, a system (for example, a hospital) is said to 
be unsafe if there are several adverse events; alternatively, a system is said to be safe 
if such adverse events occur rarely or not at all. This is, by logic, an indirect definition 
because safety is being defined by its opposite, by what happens when it is absent 






Safety II asks that instead of only looking at the few cases where things go wrong, we 
look at the many cases (90 per cent) where things go right and try to understand 
instead how that happens (Hollnagel et al., 2013); Lawton, 2014; Hughes et al, 2019). 
The advocates of the Safety II movement advocate that clinicians are often able (90 
per cent of the time) to adjust their work to conditions. Resilience engineering 
(Hollnagel et al., 2013) also acknowledges this, and argues that the reason why people 
are able to work more or less effectively is that they continually adjust their work to 
current conditions. Thus, as health care systems expand, these continual adjustments 
by staff at the frontline become increasingly vital for safety and therefore present both a 
challenge and an opportunity for safety management (Weick et al., 2008).  
Organisational sociology and anthropology raise the issue of whether culture can be 
‘measured’ using quantitative psychometric methodologies such as questionnaires or 
surveys. Furthermore, this approach does not support the analysis of safety from an 
individual or small group perspective (Waring J et al., 2010). This highlights a 
fundamental knowledge gap between the areas of psychological and sociological 
research. This approach is Safety II.  
Links still remain tentative, to date, in healthcare research between the two areas of 
Safety I and Safety II, although studies have been done in other industries by 
sociologists, which have attempted to analyse both areas (Perrow, 1984; Vaughan, 
1996).  Two such influential studies, focusing on organisational risk, examined failures 
of large systems in fine detail (Vaughan, 1996, Perrow, 1984). Perrow’s ‘Normal 
Accidents’ (Perrow, 1984), retrospectively examined accidents in high risk industries. 
He investigated system failures that contributed to the Three Mile Island nuclear 
disaster, and situated it alongside other catastrophes in high risk industries, including 
the Bhopal gas leak disaster and the Challenger disaster. Perrow’s conclusions differed 
substantially from those drawn during prior investigations which concentrated on 
individual, frontline blame. By focusing on patterns within the system as a whole rather 
than at an individual level, he found that there was a complex sequence of events 
within the system which led to the accidents. Instead of a linear approach to 
understanding the connectivity of tasks, Perrow conceptualised how discrete and 
apparently unconnected failures can interact in unanticipated ways, leading to 
accidents which are ‘normal’ within a system. The more complex and tightly connected 
a system is, the more there is a high degree of ‘interactive complexity’. Similarly, 
Turner argued in his ‘Man Made Disasters’ book (1978),  that disasters arise from an 
interaction between the human and organizational arrangements of the socio-technical 





systematic qualitative analysis of 84 British accident inquiry reports spanning a 10-year 
period, the theory starts from the observation that disasters in large-scale technological 
systems are neither chance events, nor ‘Acts of God’. The man-made disasters model 
defines a disaster purely in sociological terms, as a ‘significant disruption or collapse of 
the existing cultural beliefs and norms about hazards’ (p.72). Turner argues that there 
is an accumulation over a period of time of a number of events. Within this ‘incubation 
period’ a chain of discrepant events, or several chains of discrepant events, develop 
and accumulate unnoticed, similar to Reason’s model, however, the man-made 
disaster model proposes that latent errors and events are accompanied by a failure of 
organizational cognition and ‘intelligence’, as the developing system’s vulnerability to 
failure is concealed by social processes.  
 
Latent failures may cascade to produce catastrophes, as in Reason’s and Lawton et 
al.’s models, but they are not linear, and are unavailable to any humans who are 
involved within the system.  Precautions put in place may even contribute to failures, as 
they may alter a system that relies on multiple complex connections to function. In 
contrast to the analysis and uncovering of ‘factors’, which was associated with the 
Reason/Lawton models, Perrow’s model in particular focuses on producing a ‘coherent 
account’ of what went wrong, which takes into account the complex causal interactions 
within a system within a narrative chronology. His work evaluates both psychological 
and organisational explanations in one study, and highlights that failures in large scale 
systems are caused by the ‘tight coupling’ of connections, where there is little room for 
error, and where a number of factors can act together to create a high risk situation 
(Perrow, 1984).  
 
Using a similar approach, Vaughan (Vaughan, 1996), another sociologist, studied the 
space shuttle Challenger’s launch disaster. The technical reason for the disaster is well 
known; the failure of viton O-ring seals in the solid rocket boosters shortly after the 
launch, leading to the structural break-up and catastrophic loss of the system and its 
crew. Vaughan’s account demonstrates how this interpretation is lacking in a number of 
key respects; in particular because it fails to account for why people in the launch team, 
who had access to all of the information about the O-ring problems, still allowed the 
launch to take place. She discusses the four-tier launch decision team of NASA, and 
describes the various communications on the eve of launch that took place between 





manufacturing the Solid Rocket Motor (SRM). Vaughan, focused instead on the culture 
at NASA, and similarly to Perrow, contradicted original inquiry reports which found 
production problems and wrong-doings. These formal inquiries concluded that flaws in 
decision-making (primarily at middle management level), along with those in the 
surrounding communication processes, were the primary reasons for the fatal launch 
decision.  
 
Using an ethnographic chronology of events, Vaughan describes the discussion where 
Thiokol objects to the launch of the shuttle, due to abnormally low temperatures and 
fear of malfunction of the O-ring, which is designed to seal the joints between the SRM 
case segments of the Solid Rocket Booster (SRB). This decision, however, is reversed 
by replacing engineering judgment based on technical rationale, with management 
decisions. Vaughan’s account shows how the norms through which the risk was judged 
were negotiated and re-negotiated through the working practices of the teams of 
engineers. This worked well in resolving many of the safety problems with the Shuttle, 
but for the O-ring seals, a cycle of decision-making was set in motion where  deviances 
within the system were successively ‘ normalized ’ as acceptable through the standard 
process of risk assessment, which had become institutionalized in the working 
practices of the organization. 
 
To explain further, Vaughan describes the reasons why small deviances in behaviour 
amongst workers may slowly become normal, and additional deviances become 
acceptable in an organisational culture. The formative years of NASA culture were 
shaped by pure technical culture, where “can do” attitude was a part of the self-image. 
Slowly, it became structurally more complex and bureaucratic, and later budgetary 
constraints transformed it into technical production system. Vaughan concludes that 
decision-making was affected when the initial technical culture of NASA became 
amalgamated with bureaucratic and political accountability, leading to a structural 
source of the disaster, which she terms ‘structural secrecy’.  Decisions made by the 
work group in this culture may look “deviant” and “inappropriate” in hindsight, but to the 
working group, construction of the risk in the wake of engineering tests, mathematical 
models and previous flight experience had become normal. To summarise, a series of 
seemingly harmless decisions were made, which moved the space agency to a 






The more sociological examples above highlight institutional problems associated with 
safety. Barriers to effective organizational learning about safety, which are highlighted 
by the above case studies, are informational difficulties (for example (Perrow, 1984, 
Pidgeon and O'Leary, 2000) and organisational politics (Vaughan, 1996). In attempting 
to foster positive safety cultures, they all recommend that both issues need to be 
explicitly addressed (not ignored). 
 
3.5  The NHS as a complex organisation  
Within the NHS, the ideal of an positive, open culture which encourages admitting 
error, has still to become widespread (Darzi, 2008b). Instead there are suggestions of 
‘structural secrecy’ similar to Vaughan’s concept set out above, and there is diffusion of 
responsibility within large and complex organisations, which all contribute to adverse 
events in healthcare settings (West, 2000). In other words, it is easy to pass on the 
responsibility and ownership of anything that goes wrong day to day within the 
complexity of tasks, unless these result in catastrophe and are investigated. One of the 
ways that a large organisation may promote safety is designing a system of “checks 
and balances” so that important actions are not the sole responsibility of a single 
individual. For example, powerful drugs are always checked by at least two people 
before they are administered to the patient. However, such organisational 
arrangements only work if there are few or no social structural barriers to 
communication between the parties involved (described above in sociological accounts 
of disaster). If a junior nurse feels unable to tell her senior colleague that she has just 
drawn up the wrong dose of medication or is about to remove the wrong drain, then the 
mechanism for ensuring patient safety will break down. So far, little research attention 
has been given to examining the NHS in terms of focusing on failures of care using 
sociological methods such as those described above, which allow for detailed 
examination of the ‘whole’ system,  including process and social influences.  
 
3.6  Inquiries as analyses 
Although recent health policy drives towards ‘Never Events’ emphasise prevention of 
adverse events (i.e. accidents, or catastrophes) happening in the first place (Darzi, 
2008b); Safety Express (QIPP, 2011), the only source of whole system insights after an 
adverse event (in this thesis a severe pressure ulcer) has already occurred, are high 
profile inquiries such as the Francis report (Francis, 2013) and the Bristol Inquiry 





with public awareness, may offer useful recommendations for change at executive 
level, but these are not always easily absorbed into daily practice. The Francis report 
notes that Mid-Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust failed to tackle an 'insidious 
negative culture involving a tolerance of poor standards and a disengagement from 
managerial and leadership responsibilities’ (p.3) This failure was attributed partly to the 
consequence of allowing a focus on reaching national targets, financial balance and 
seeking foundation trust status, at the cost of delivering acceptable standards of care. 
However, Francis himself states that, arising from the inquiry; he ‘made a great many 
recommendations, no single one of which is on its own the solution to the many 
concerns identified’ (p.4). It remains the responsibility of the Trust involved to translate 
these recommendations into local practice. The Bristol Inquiry (2001), which found high 
rates of failures among heart operations on babies, found a lax approach to safety 
amongst doctors and an ‘old boys’ culture’ together with secrecy about failings, and 
lack of monitoring. This inquiry similarly lists many recommendations arising from its 
investigation, which were not easily absorbed into daily practice, including: 
‘To promote a new culture within the NHS: a three-way partnership of respect, 
honesty and openness between: 
– NHS and public; 
– professionals and patients; and 
– professionals and professionals.’ 
Although the recommendations, as in the Mid-Staffordshire report, needed to be 
translated to work in practice,  the inquiry marked a turning point in the NHS, with the 
advent of fresh legislation including the NHS Reform and Health Care Professions Bill 
introduced in November 2001, which directly addresses the concerns of the Inquiry 
(Secretary of State, 2001). This focused more health policy attention on safety and 
culture within the NHS, with a request to make all staff familiar with more psychology 
based approaches (referred often as human factors)  to understanding why errors in 
healthcare occur. One of these was pressure ulcers, and this thesis aims to address 
the issue of culture as a possible influence on severe pressure ulcers.  
 
Recent UK government policies emphasise pressure ulcers as one of the main patient 
safety issues, for example Sign up to Safety (Secretary of State for Health, 2014),  
Safety Express (QIPP, 2011), Seven Steps to Patient Safety (National Patient Safety 





concept of best practice sharing to learn about patient safety. Their philosophies 
originated mostly from safety initiatives in the USA, which used Institute for Healthcare 
Improvement Breakthrough Series Methodology (Breakthrough Series, 2003), and 
other best practice sharing methods (Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, 
2016). Similar organisational safety initiatives have gained popularity at pace in the UK 
with more theoretical insight such as the Model For Improvement (Langley et al., 1994, 
NHS Improvement, 2016). These have become embedded in new guidance for Quality 
Improvement in healthcare and are part of the Care Quality Commission's Key Lines of 
Enquiry (CQC, 2017). This is a welcome development and some excellent initiatives 
across many healthcare trust have been introduced at local level ((NHS Improvement, 
2016). However, these initiatives historically have offered little empirical evidence of 
how they work in practice to reduce incidence. They are based more on before and 
after measurement for change rather than research findings. These often rely on Plan 
Do Study Act (PDSA) cycles (Langley et al., 1994) to trial safety improvements 
(Institute for Healthcare Improvement, 2004) which are then implemented at local level, 
then shared through larger networks. The value of these initiatives has been 
recognised, and must not be denied, but in terms of researching an area, the local level 
studies do have limitations for adopting in other areas and Trusts.   
 
Guidelines for nursing and pressure ulcer prevention and care (National Institute for 
Clinical Excellence, 2001a, National Institute for Healthcare and Clinical Excellence, 
2005, EPUAP/NPUAP, 2009, NHS Improvement, 2018) are also currently based on 
consensus and opinion rather than research evidence. These guidelines and practices 
do show that practitioners are attempting to change practice at local level, and we 
uncovered best practice initiatives which have since been implemented in the UK with 
promising effects (1,000 lives, 2008; Sign up to Safety, 2014). So another area of 
exploration for the study became: Did a patient develop a severe pressure ulcer due to 
a series of complex errors due to the system, or did the organisational environment 
influence the severe pressure ulcer? 
 
Although most safety investigation tools are designed to provide a ‘helicopter view’ of 
adverse events, in practice, health care professionals tend to prefer investigative tools 
that allow them reconstruct the events in a temporal linear style, supporting a narrative 
rather than analytical, holistic approach (Nicolini et al., 2011). For example, Root 
Cause Analysis (RCA), which was originally used in high risk industries such as 





remained a popular tool for attempting to analyse adverse events in health care 
(Ovretveit, 2005). RCA was adopted in 2001 by the National Patient Safety Agency 
(NPSA), arising from the report, ‘An Organisation with a Memory' in 2000 (Department 
of Health, 2000). This tool, along with other similar investigative tools, is still used to 
date to examine clinical incidents retrospectively in order to recommend strategies to 
change practice. It seeks to uncover underlying ‘root causes’ and aims to prevent 
future adverse events by applying learning achieved from incident investigations. 
However, there has been debate within health care, shown elsewhere in this thesis, 
over whether such tools are sufficiently successful when applied in real world settings 
(Wallace et al., 2009, Nicolini et al., 2011). Indeed, with the recent advent of Safety II, 
this debate has been further complicated, with the suggestion that examining ‘things 
that go wrong’ may be less helpful than first thought. (see Chapter 1 and Chapter 8). 
Although health care professionals may value tools such as RCA, there are 
suggestions that the focus on systems problems, which arises from such tools, may not 
be fully understood by staff trained in their use (Nicolini et al., 2011). These tools were 
designed for engineers trained in developing robust solutions in response to assessed 
risks (Card et al., 2014) and despite improvements in diagnosing system-level 
problems in health care, the changes to risk control which follow on from the diagnoses 
have not always been successful (Card et al., 2012, Pham et al., 2010).  Workers must 
generate their own risk plans arising from the investigations, and health care workers 
are often not trained in safety engineering principles. Indeed there have been recent 
recommendations that all health are staff are trained in human factors to focus on this 
issue (National Advisory Group on the Safety of Patients in England, 2013).There is 
also a current need to improve tools and ways of investigating errors in health care so 
that in practice they achieve what they are originally designed to do (Card et al., 2014).  
A further problem with this current  approach to error analysis is that, because an 
adverse event investigation is undertaken after an incident is reported (National Audit 
Office, 2005), it not only requires incidents to have been reported correctly and 
accurately, but the approach is reactive. In practice, systems are not always completely 
understood and learning is limited to what we can describe and explain about those 
systems. There has been a recent call for more focus on processes rather than 
outcomes and less emphasis about what goes wrong. Erik Hollnagel argues that 
different outcomes (“normal” results vs. “failures”) are not distinct binary categories, but 
judgements of value (Hollnagel et al., 2013). This leads us to look for different ways of 
examining evidence arising from clinical investigations to find explanations. Recent 





and mixed method approaches to researching what is such a diverse and complex 
area (Waring, 2007, Waring J et al., 2010).  
Additionally, there have been several high profile inquiries into poor quality care in 
health care settings, which have similarities with retrospective case study methodology 
and are case studies in all but name (Keen, 2013). For example, the Francis reports 
(2010 and 2013) (Francis, 2013), examined failures in health care Trusts in fine detail, 
providing various sources of evidence, and thus discovered many examples of 
negligent care and poor communication using one case as a focus. As part of the first 
inquiry (published in 2010), documentary material was obtained from a wide variety of 
sources, including the Trust, the primary care trust (PCT) and other NHS bodies, the 
Care Quality Commission (CQC), the Strategic Health Authority (SHA), Monitor, the 
local authorities and the four local Members of Parliament. The first inquiry included in 
its evidence views from 966 individual members of the public and some 82 members of 
staff from the Trust, past and present, and heard oral evidence from 113 witnesses 
(Francis, 2013).  
One of the many findings of the inquiry was Mid-Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust’s 
failure to tackle an insidious negative culture involving a tolerance of poor standards 
and a disengagement from managerial and leadership responsibilities. However, the 
list of 192 recommendations, which were the outcomes of this first Francis report are 
referred to as ‘high level and will require considerable further detailed work to enable 
them to be implemented’ (p18). This makes the recommendations difficult to translate 
into daily practice (Francis, 2013). The findings remain wedded to the particular case 
involved, and do not openly offer analytical explanations drawn from the evidence. 
However, a retrospective case study methodology using George and Bennett’s (2005) 
complex causality approach could offer a better insight into these cases, in the area of 
adverse events analysis, or in this case the study of severe pressure ulcers.  
This leads us to ask: to improve on existing investigation techniques and understand 
more about why errors occur, could a retrospective case study method, with its detailed 
approach of process tracing retrospectively back through evidence, address issues 
with translating recommendations into practice? Could this gap in health policy be 
illustrated through investigating the causes of severe pressure ulcers? 
3.7 The importance of severe pressure ulcers as an outcome measure 
As has been highlighted in earlier chapters of this thesis, pressure ulcers are a major 





Institute for Healthcare and Clinical Excellence, 2005). They affect approximately 1 in 
10 hospital and 1 in 20 community patients and can contribute to death. Severe 
pressure ulcers (Category 3 and 4) have been classified for a number of years now by 
governing bodies such as the CQC, Department of Health, and National Patient Safety 
Agency and as serious incidents, or adverse events, and are required to be 
investigated by hospital Trusts. However, severe pressure ulcers are often difficult to 
quantify using incident reporting, because often they do not have an easily identifiable 
beginning, and tend to happen in health care settings  gradually (Evans et al., 2006) 
frequently deteriorating from Category 2 ulcers. These skin ulcers are associated with 
neglectful care (Bennett et al., 2004), which can lead to under-reporting of incidents 
(2008) particularly when the pressure ulcers develop gradually. According to NICE 
guidelines on pressure ulcer prevention, however, they should be reported using 
incident reporting tools when they develop into a Category 2 (NICE 2005; 
EPUAP/NPUAP 2009).  
Nurses typically have a fairly comprehensive understanding of patient characteristics 
associated with the risk of initial pressure ulcer development, and pressure ulcer 
recognition and management generally forms part of their basic mandatory training 
(National Institute for Healthcare and Clinical Excellence, 2005). Research has shown 
however, that after these risks are identified, links to care planning are less effective 
(Johansen et al., 2014, Coleman et al., 2013b). Some patients go on to develop more 
severe pressure ulcers (Category 3 and 4)and this cannot be fully explained by known 
patient risk factors (Coleman et al., 2013b). This makes it sometimes difficult for health 
care professionals to deal with them appropriately and record them accurately as a 
clinical incident (Evans et al., 2006). Although many investigations have been 
undertaken to date focusing on the root causes of pressure ulcers, all the previous 
arguments apply, which have been so far presented in this thesis. This includes lack of 
knowledge regarding organisational theory on the part of the health professionals 
conducting the investigations, a focus on service level and frontline changes to 
practice, as opposed to organisational changes (Waring et al., 2010).  The issues with 
investigating the causes of severe pressure ulcer therefore makes them an interesting, 
under-developed area to study using a case study methodology.  
3.8 Study design  
Many studies have focused on the ways in which organisation and culture affect patient 
safety (McDonald et al., 2006, Waring et al., 2007, Waring et al., 2006). Regarding 





these ulcers will appear, or which type of patient will go on to develop severe pressure 
ulcers. If, for example, I had prospectively identified patients with Category 2 ulcers, in 
order to evaluate differences between those who developed a Category 3 or 4 ulcer 
and those who did not, my presence would have drawn attention to the significance of 
the pressure ulcers. It is likely to have prompted swift action by the local clinical team, 
and it is possible that this may have halted the progression of Category 2 pressure 
ulcers to Category 3 or 4. Additionally, this may have biased the observations, possibly 
substantially, and I could not have been confident that I had observed the whole 
development process, from the earliest signs and symptoms to the point where action 
was taken.  
It was, though, possible to reconstruct the events that lead to the development of 
severe pressure ulcers retrospectively.  I therefore chose to use a retrospective case 
study design; specifically a type of process tracing method offered by George and 
Bennett which focuses on a style of structured focused comparison of cases (George 
and Bennett, 2005), rather than a traditional ethnographic method, or more qualitative 
case study method. This method is firmly based within a realist, post positivist 
philosophy, as opposed to an interpretivist or wholly positivist philosophy. According to 
George and Bennett (2005) "scholars have formalized case study methods more 
completely and linked them to underlying arguments in the philosophy of science" (p.6).  
This demonstrates the utility of case study for researching complex issues, and testing 
causality that can be applied across varied disciplines; which is what I needed to do. 
Case study method focuses on identifying complex causal relationships to constitute an 
explanation of a case. This also, more importantly for health research, offers a more 
interpreted and less structured method of investigation than current adverse event 
investigation techniques.  
3.8.1 Case study methods: a debated methodology 
Although case study methods offer a useful way to allow for all of the explanations set 
out in the literature review, there are conflicts and confusions within the communities of 
researchers who use them, (Ragin and Becker, 1992, King et al., 1994, Flyvbjerg, 
2006a). Over time, the contributions of researchers from varied disciplines have helped 
to develop and strengthen case study research, however the variety of disciplinary 
backgrounds has also added complexity, particularly around how case study research 
is defined, described, and applied in practice. Despite this variety, one of the common 





What differs between case study method approaches is mostly how they define 
causality. Ragin’s early concept of case study method as a bridge between quantitative 
and qualitative research argues that causality is defined by a ‘variable’ as a causative 
agent (Ragin and Becker, 1992). Therefore, the early stance of Ragin derives 
conclusions from analysis of the cross case comparisons focusing on ‘associations’ 
between variables. 
At the other end of research philosophy, Stake (Stake, 1995), and Guba and Lincoln 
(Guba, 1978), argue for an inductive, naturalistic case study method, which sits within 
their interpretivist methodological view, and deliberately avoids the idea of quantifying 
evidence generated from a case. An interpretative position views reality as multiple and 
subjective, based on meanings and understanding. The idea here is that causality 
within a case is instead replaced with interpretation and a reflection of the own 
researcher’s viewpoint. Generalisations would be futile, and causality would be 
irrelevant. Stake’s (1995, 2006)  approach has a disciplined approach to the process 
and acknowledges that case study can use quantitative methods, but the approach is 
underpinned by a strong motivation for discovering meaning and understanding of 
experiences in context in line with an interpretivist view. Stake’s case study research is 
"the study of the particularity and complexity of a single case, coming to understand its 
activity within important circumstances" The role of the researcher in producing this 
knowledge is also critical, and Stake emphasizes the researcher's interpretive role as 
essential. Stake (1995) recommends vignettes to illustrate aspects of the case and 
thick descriptions to convey findings. Knowledge generated is relative only to the time 
and context of the study and the researcher is interactive and participates in the study. 
Stake argues that situation shapes activity, experience, and one's interpretation of the 
case. For Stake (2006), to understand the case "requires experiencing the activity of 
the case as it occurs in its context and in its particular situation" (p.2). 
In principle I agreed with Stake’s method (1995) of collecting data sources as part of a 
case study methodology, however, I was interested less in interpretivist evidence 
generating because I wanted to accept at face value the evidence I collected as ‘real’ 
and true. Yin alternatively (2014) conceptualizes case study research as a form of 
social science, which is evident in how he defines "case study as a form of empirical 
inquiry" (p.16). Yin describes his approach to case study as using a "realist 
perspective" (p.17) and focuses on maintaining objectivity in the methodological 
processes within the design. Yin’s (2014) case study design offers a post positivist 
approach to research: seeking rival explanations and falsifying hypotheses, the 





generalisations (if required), minimizing levels of subjectivity, and the use of multiple 
methods of qualitative and quantitative data collection and analysis. While objectivity is 
a goal, Yin also recognises the descriptive and interpretive elements of case study. 
According to Yin, what makes case study research distinct from experimental studies is 
the case study is investigated in its own context, examined in its "real world setting". 
The goal of a post positivist researcher is to use science as a way to apprehend the 
nature of reality while understanding that all measurement is imperfect. Therefore, 
emphasis is placed on using multiple methods with triangulation to circumvent errors 
and understand what is happening in reality as close as possible to the "truth".  
Campbell, dismissed case study method in his (Campbell and Stanley, 1966) early 
work on experimental designs, as having ‘no scientific value’ as it was thus impossible 
to generalise from one. Yet, later, in his further work, he changed his stance to 
advocate the use of case study method (Campbell, 1975). He argued that he had an 
‘extreme oscillation’ away from his earlier disparagement of case studies, and that the 
‘degrees of freedom’ concept that strength of validity is in an increased number of 
participants or cases , did not need to be applied to this method. 
Thus, for my approach there was an acceptance of Campbell’s concept of ‘validity’ as a 
term within case study method over ‘trustworthiness’ (associated more with naturalistic 
case study method) which would satisfy my positivist audience, yet I also wanted to 
accept the realist approach that allowed for the social context to be taken into account. 
Therefore, somewhere in the middle of more extreme philosophical viewpoints, I took 
as a starting point a more pragmatic, realist ontology.  I was interested in organisational 
processes of care as they affect a patient, and wanted to follow each patient’s care 
pathway retrospectively, from the time when he or she had already developed a severe 
pressure ulcer, to the point where it initially developed, and further back if necessary. I 
wanted to accept the evidence as ‘true’ and work with it to analyse causal patterns 
(Hammersley, 1995; Yin, 2013). My focus was a more bottom up, open exploration of 
the causes of a patient’s severe pressure ulcer, including patient and carer views and 
elements of the organisational environment. However, I also aimed to find patterns 
inherent in patients’ pathways, or chains of events, which could generalise to other 
patient experiences. This placed it more alongside Yin’s approach. I was also trying to 
predict why a severe pressure ulcer occurs in terms of these complex causal 
sequences of events (George and Bennett, 2005).  This required adoption of a 
process-tracing type of approach to look ‘behind’ the data for complex causes. I chose 





and Tilley, 1997) and rather than trying to generalise empirically from data, (in a Ragin 
style) or look for competing hypotheses (Yin’s approach) the emphasis was on subtle 
yet generic features of specific phenomena. I wanted to produce a ‘coherent’ account 
for each patient in the study (Hammond, 1996, George and Bennett, 2005) which 
arrived at the best and most valid explanation (see Table 2.2 and Figure 2.2). I define 
‘coherent account’ as one which makes the best sense of available, yet relevant 
evidence, similar in nature to the process police use when they build evidence against 
a suspect (George and Bennett, 2005). I drew specifically on George and Bennett’s 
case study method approach, as they were interested in developing ways of studying 
historical instances of generic problems, which would permit usable lessons to be 
drawn. They adapted methods of historical explanation, taken from an historian’s 
approach to evidence, to convert descriptive explanations into analytic explanations, 
rather than a traditional social scientist’s approach. The background of a case study 
method taken from history and anthropology, rather than say a psychology case study, 
helped with my approach, as I wanted to examine an historical episode to develop and 
test explanations, yet keep my explanation coherent in its analysis, similar in the way a 
historian would approach evidence using a ‘best explanation’ for what happened.  
3.8.2 Explaining the causes of severe pressure ulcers 
Often in the social sciences there is an assumption that it is not possible to establish a 
definitive explanation for any given event or outcome (Hammersley, 1992). However, I 
took the view that it is important to attempt something practical and pragmatic, and 
useful for my audience, rather than opt for purely descriptive interpretation offered by 
such as Stake and Guba and Lincoln, while I still respected their worldviews. If I were 
to do the study properly, I would need a method which did not make any particular 
assumptions at the outset about the ways in which severe pressure ulcers develop.  I 
should collect data about each patient with a fairly open mind, and then analyse the 
data in order to find the best explanation for the facts in front of me; the best coherent 
explanation for the occurrence of a severe pressure ulcer.  This research objective sat 
well within George and Bennett’s concept of an heuristic case study (2005). This is 
described as a case study which inductively, identifies new variables, hypotheses and 
causal paths, and which emphasises the usefulness of ‘deviant’ or outlier cases to offer 
unexpected outcomes. I was also interested in their theory testing case studies, but felt 
at the initial stage my theories around the causes of severe pressure ulcers were too 





However, the review of the safety literature offered various different ‘kinds’ of 
explanations (Reason, 1997b, Perrow, 1984, Vaughan, 1996)(for further explanation of 
the theories see Chapters 1 and 2). I needed a method which would be open to other 
possible explanations too. This method needed to consider all possible explanations 
from each disciplinary perspective, which incorporated breadth, scope, psychological, 
historical and sociological understanding. The review of safety literature, which was 
then mirrored to an extent in the health services literature, I had deduced five classes 
of explanation which would incorporate all disciplines (Pinkney et al., 2013). I needed 
firstly to specify which these explanations were in the context of severe pressure ulcer 
development, and then try to find the best explanation, or if necessary find a new 
explanation, or combination of explanations (see Fig. 2.3). Therefore, for any one 
patient who develops a severe pressure ulcer, a possible explanation might be as 
follows in Table 3.1 below:  
Table 3.1: 
Classes of explanation A-E 
A:  The patient was going to get a severe pressure ulcer regardless of the care he or 
she received; 
B:  There was a single isolated error which was responsible for the development of 
the SPU, or one person made an error which was the reason behind the SPU;  
C. A sequence of apparently minor mistakes was made – a risk assessment was not 
done, a patient was not turned – and this sequence produced the severe pressure 
ulcer.  If the particular sequence had not occurred, for example because a nurse 
made sure that risk assessments Ire done properly that day, then the severe 
pressure ulcer would have been prevented;   
D:  The organisational environment made the SPU likely. For example; a ward that is 
short staffed, and where assessments are sometimes missed, could be a ward 
where mistakes are likely;   
E. There was an explanation or combination of explanations not covered by the first 
four 
 
No single method of approach however, would allow me to identify the best 
explanation, my strategy therefore was as follows:  
• To assess the possibility of explanations A to C, I developed a detailed 





• In order to support or eliminate the fourth explanation (D) based on the wider 
organisational context, I used a case study method, but a more ethnographic style; 
• For the fifth explanation (E) I was looking for either an explanation or 
combination of the explanations suggested already by the literature, or a new 
explanation which had not yet been discovered  
For the first three types of explanation in this study, a chronological account of key 
events allowed me to look both at isolated events as they unfolded in ‘real’ time, and 
look at events sequentially over time examining the processes involved. The timeline 
was an interpretation of events from one perspective. This would not drive the data 
collection; it would only add temporal structure.   
3.8.3 Sequence of events 
I needed to identify methods that would allow me to evaluate each explanation, and its 
underlying causal assumptions separately. As a timeline is based on an assumption 
that one cause leads to another, this method allowed me to trace sequences of events 
that happened, and to uncover complex causal relationships (George and Bennett, 
2005). This assumption about causation suggests that if one variable has an effect on 
another, there is “causation”. Studies that measure an isolated event in terms of cause 
and effect (for example in causing a severe pressure ulcer), and Reason’s (1997) 
sequential assumptions about causation, focus on this relationship. For the first three 
types of explanation in this study, this approach is helpful for understanding causation. 
For these explanations a chronological account of key events allowed me to look both 
at isolated events as they unfolded in ‘real’ time, and look at events sequentially over 
time focusing on complex causality.   
3.8.4 Institutional explanations 
However, I also needed a way of establishing whether or not the wider organisational 
context might be part of the explanation. A more ethnographic focus, yet remaining 
within a realist case study method (Geertz, 1973, Hammersley, 1992, Stake, 1995) 
would offer an alternative class of explanation to the first three above. I chose to focus 
on social phenomena (Hammersley, 1992); for example ‘why is a ward organised in a 
certain way?’ and to understand the environment despite looking causally at this data 
and remaining within a realist worldview (Hammersley, 1992).  Ethnography assumes a 
different view of causality which looks instead at describing a culture and shared beliefs 





development of a severe pressure ulcer. The emphasis is less on a linear cause and 
effect, or a complex causality, but more on a descriptive view. 
3.8.5 Alternative explanations 
While both the sequence of events or more ethnographic models of explanation were 
candidates, I also wanted to be open to the possibility of i) a new class of explanation 
which had not been stated already (E), or ii) a combination of already specified 
explanations (also E). For example, at the extreme end, it could be that an isolated 
event happens within a sequence of events, where the environment also makes an 
event more likely and all three explanations are equally as suitable for explaining why a 
patient develops a severe pressure ulcer.  
3.8.6 Coherent account  
However, my overall purpose of the study was to create a coherent account of what 
happens during the development of a patient’s severe pressure ulcer.  So, I developed 
and refined the method according to my findings as I went along. The study took place 
in 8 different NHS acute and community settings in the north of England between 
September 2008 and August 2012. It included 8 patients who had all developed severe 
pressure ulcers, who were sampled sequentially for varied demographic characteristics 
(see below). Each account took, on an average, 4 months to create, from the initial 
interview with an individual to the signing off of a detailed account of the development 
of that individuals’ severe pressure ulcer. The reasons for identifying these patients and 
the choice of case study design are explained below. 
3.8.7 Sampling in case study method 
There are different types of sampling strategies. Statistics-based research, in the main, 
seeks to generalise from a sample to the whole population from which it was selected 
(Bryman, 2004). However, other research strategies do not seek to generalise in this 
way; they instead focus more on ‘theoretical’ representation (Morse, 1991, Glaser and 
Strauss, 1967). 
Different case study traditions use different types of sampling. Early Campbell works 
(cited above), for example, used quasi-experimental methods, and criticised single 
case studies for their lack of generalisable findings (Campbell and Stanley, 1966). 
Case studies, in particular, have been criticised for what statistical researchers call 
‘selection bias’ (Geddes, 1990). The idea that cases are selected because they exhibit 





preconceived notions, has much been debated over the history of case study research 
(Campbell, 1975, Flyvbjerg, 2006b). However, often the most appropriate choice is a 
case that exhibits the given problem. Case studies often use purposive sampling at the 
outset to select cases with the widest possible range of personal and service 
characteristics  and look for recurring themes, and causal explanation (George and 
Bennett, 2005, Gobo, 2004, Flyvbjerg, 2006b). Mason speaks of purposive sampling as 
an inductive and organic practice, which grows and develops throughout the research 
process, to aid the researcher in what he or she wants to achieve analytically (Mason, 
2002). Emmel further refines this sampling strategy from a scientific realist’s 
perspective, and highlights that theory always precedes data collection (Emmel, 2013). 
Chosen cases allow theorisation of social processes, to test and refine ideas and look 
for explanations. Then ‘casing’ is used to further choose cases to challenge or re-
specify causal processes (Emmel, 2013, George and Bennett, 2005). The tentative 
theories I developed from the literature review set forward some fragile ideas from 
which I could begin to sample cases; these could then offer evidence from which to 
refine further theories.  
I used this particular theoretical sampling approach to identify the first of my eight 
patients, and cases were subsequently chosen to refine theories which emerged from 
the research (George and Bennett, 2005). However, there were very few patients who 
had severe pressure ulcers, so there was a pragmatic and demographic element in the 
choice of cases chosen to help refine theories. In reality, different health care settings 
where a patient presented with a severe pressure ulcer were chosen, simply to offer a 
more contrasting process from which to refine the evidence (George and Bennett, 
2005). I therefore sampled each patient to cover demographics above any other 
strategy (see Chapter 4 for further details of my sampling).  
3.8.8  Maximising validity? 
There is debate about validity in the social research literature; and indeed whether it is 
a relevant concept (Lincoln and Guba, 1985, Guba and Lincoln, 1981, Hammersley, 
1992, Shadish et al., 2002).  This debate centres on whether the positivist view, 
associated with knowledge existing independently of the world, is adequate, or whether 
it takes for granted the social reality which is precisely the object of study of the social 
sciences (Schutz, 1964). The backlash against traditional scientific thinking, with which 
the notion of validity had become associated, led advocates of the constructivist 





(Guba and Lincoln, 1981)  replace validity with the concept of trustworthiness, which 
has three main qualities; transferability, dependability and confirmability.  
Realists Pawson and Tilley (Pawson and Tilley, 1997) criticise the constructivists’ 
argument on two grounds: 
1) That evaluation data is “only another construction to be taken into account” and that 
‘findings cannot be generalised from one context to another’ (1989, Guba and Lincoln, 
1981) p.45). They argue that while Guba and Lincoln accuse positivists of ‘context 
stripping’ they are only able to replace it with what Pawson and Tilley call “context 
hopping” (p.21). This means that rather than take measurement and outcomes away 
from the context they are part of; this approach seeks only to move across comparable 
contexts in a descriptive rather than an evaluative manner. 
 2) Although member checks and negotiations are advocated by Guba and Lincoln to 
provide credibility to the research process; some of the members within the research 
may seek to dominate discussions. The negotiated reality may be in itself a threat to 
the ‘rigour’ of the research (Morse, 1991). Pawson and Tilley (Pawson and Tilley, 1997) 
argue that there is a risk that these “hermeneutic dialectic circles go round in circles 
rather than constituting a linear advance on the truth” (p.21).  
The scientific realist view offers a position which “seeks to avoid the epistemological 
poles of positivism and relativism”. Instead it focuses on the “mechanics of explanation” 
(Pawson and Tilley, 1997)( p.55), whilst also including social context. My concern lay in 
the mechanics of the explanation and the processes involved in a patient’s developing 
pressure ulcer. I wanted to be aware of the social context, but I also wanted to produce 
some knowledge which practitioners could work with. Therefore I adopted a type of 
scientific realist approach, because I was interested in two areas: i) testing a specific 
research question, ii) explaining the reasons why patients developed severe pressure 
ulcers. These questions cannot be asked in the context of a purely constructivist study. 
A constructivist approach would remain focused for example, on examining meanings 
and thick descriptions, but I wanted to develop mechanisms of explanation, to produce 
candidate explanations while respecting contextual influences.  
Furthermore, as the study was undertaken in the context of an NIHR Programme 
Grant, there was the expectation that findings would inform clinical practice. The 
assessment of what Morse (Morse, 1991) refers to as rigour, and the usability of 
findings, are important aspects for my research audience, which consists mainly of 





categories to explain rigour, rather than trustworthiness and following a constructivist 
interpretation.  This was because these terms were both familiar to my audience, and 
this version of ‘truth’ was more suitable for the realist case study approach I was taking 
(Pawson and Tilley, 1997).  
I took the view that the methods and findings had to ‘pass’ two tests, which I labelled 
internal validity (Shadish et al., 2002, Hammersley, 1992, Hammersley, 1991), and 
construct validity (Shadish et al., 2002). For internal validity, I needed to provide the 
best possible explanation of the available facts which arose from within the study.  
Construct validity, here, captures the idea that I needed to be confident that I had 
generated the best possible explanation of why severe pressure ulcers occur in order 
to provide a general predictive theory, which could apply to other settings or to other 
patients. For example, a predictive theory could be that errors are more likely when 
nurses do not use risk assessment tools properly.  
I did not use the concept of external validity (Hammersley, 1991, Shadish et al., 2002), 
as this refers to generalising across other settings using variable-orientated, cause and 
effect correlations, and is more relevant to large scale statistical studies in claims to 
validity. Neither was the constructivist view of generalising using ‘transferability’ 
suitable, because of its association with ‘context hopping’ set out earlier. However, my 
interest lay in the representativeness of concepts and applicability of theory to other 
situations; i.e. construct validity (Strauss and Corbin, 1990, George and Bennett, 2005) 
as I wanted to use findings to help develop and refine my theories.  The validity terms I 
have chosen, while derived from authors associated with a positivist approach, 
resonate with the thinking of authors from other philosophical realms, although some 
have reconceptualised the terms.  For example, Hammersley (Hammersley, 1991) 
prefers ‘explanatory adequacy’ rather than internal validity, and George and Bennett 
(George and Bennett, 2005)  refer to ‘conceptual validity’ rather than ‘construct’ validity.  
3.8.9 Being Realistic about Reflexivity 
The view that we have no way of escaping the social world in order to study it 
(Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995), has been at the centre of yet further debate 
between research approaches about the reflexive character of social research 
(Hanson, 1958). The notion of reflexivity implies that social research cannot be carried 
out objectively, or insulated from wider society or political framework (Hammersley and 





The positivist view that social research could be carried out using a natural sciences 
model to produce ‘facts’, has led to attempts within field research to eliminate the 
observer-researcher. This view advocated standardised procedures to attempt to 
replicate the fieldwork by other researchers (Bouchard, 1976). As qualitative research 
did not meet these positivist criteria, it was subsequently criticised due to lack of rigour 
(Blumer, 1969). In reaction, the constructivists argued that all findings and data are 
constructed, leading to doubts whether the research can produce knowledge at all 
(Guba, 1978, Denzin, 1971). However, to take the view of the constructivists would be 
to ignore the role that reflexive research can offer in reconstructing “a log ic of inquiry 
that shares much with positivism and naturalism but goes beyond them” (Hammersley 
and Atkinson, 1995)(p.21). I have chosen to follow Hammersley and Atkinson’s 
(Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995) position in my study. This recognises my reflexive 
role as researcher, but allows the knowledge that I do gain to be applied to practice, 
and to be recognised as ‘true’ within its context; while also appreciating that it can be 
difficult to interpret (Hammersley, 1992).  I developed multiple strategies to work 
reflexively and transparently in this study.  
I reflected my role in building up research evidence, so that I could be aware of where 
I, and other members of the research, had influenced the collection of data. Part of this 
reflexive working was the choice of myself as main researcher. I am a non-clinical 
worker (with a Psychology background) and it was decided, along with the research 
programme team, that I would be less biased than a person who had a clinical 
background, and any associated pre-conceived ideas about pressure ulcer care. This 
clinical area is associated with debated management approaches and associations 
with quality of care (Dealey et al., 2012, Ausserhofer et al., 2013), so views amongst 
clinical staff can be conflicting and biased.  I also addressed reflexivity and 
transparency issues within the study by using a stage by stage review process (see 
Fig. 3.4 and associated sections below) through which I checked data continuously 
within each patient’s account.  
3.9 Method, analysis strategy and field method 
In this section I describe how I applied the retrospective case study method in practice, 
with examples from patient cases where an illustration is necessary. I also describe in 
detail how the analytical strategy was conducted. When carrying out the method I came 
across a number of technical challenges and I will explain these through a worked 
example of one patient’s account as a field method. I applied the primary data 





3.9.1 Primary Data Collection: 
3.9.2 Interviews  
Ethical approval for the study was obtained from Leeds West Ethics committee 
(09/H1307/8), and local research governance approvals for all six study sites were 
granted. A decision was made to carry out the research field work in Northern England 
for pragmatic reasons and due to financial constraints. I used a theoretical (purposive) 
sampling strategy, set out above in Section 4.7, and based on the findings from the 
theory-driven literature review to find each suitable patient (George and Bennett, 2005, 
Yin, 2003). As I explained earlier in Chapters 1 and 2, I was looking for patients who 
would allow me to explore my two research questions, to progress my initial theory 
about why patients develop severe pressure ulcers, and to explore if there was a link 
with the environment which affects this. Therefore I looked for patients who had already 
developed a Category 3 or 4 pressure ulcer, whilst being cared for by health services. 
These patients could not present initially to services with a Category 3 or 4 pressure 
ulcer; they needed to have been admitted before their ulcers deteriorated.  
I began to collect data for the study by interviewing my first patient with a severe 
pressure ulcer to capture his or her perspective of how it had developed, mindful that I 
did not want to bias the data (see Appendix 4 for the Patient Interview Topic Guide). 
Each patient interview was the initial point at which I began to study each case. I did 
this before looking at any other evidence so that his or her voice was heard in the 
research and so that I would not have any preconceived perceptions about what might 
have caused the patient’s pressure ulcer, (detailed in Fig 3.4; Stage 1 below). A tissue 
viability (i.e. wound care) specialist nurse (TVN) at one of eight identified hospital or 
community sites identified one person within her local Trust (in practice always her) 
who presented unexpectedly with a severe pressure ulcer. I identified subsequent 
patients used a mixture of theoretical and pragmatic sampling to maximise the diversity 
of individuals and contexts which their pressure ulcers developed (Holloway and 
Wheeler, 2002, George and Bennett, 2005, Mahoney and Larkin Terrie, 2009). For 
example, if I identified that one patient was being treated in a community setting, the 
next patient I chose was one who was instead present in an acute hospital setting. I 
also sampled for diversity of age, gender, location, and alternative service provision as 
I continued to collect data. Settings included patients’ own homes, acute hospital and 
surgical wards, a community hospital and a nursing home during respite care. 
Sampling was also pragmatic, in that members of the local tissue viability nurse teams 





not feasible that I would have been able to find patients with Category 3 and 4 pressure 
ulcers without the aid of the tissue viability teams. 
I interviewed each patient while he or she was still on a hospital ward, or under the 
care of a wound care nurse in the community using my topic guide (Appendix 4). I 
allowed the patient to speak freely about why he or she felt they developed a pressure 
ulcer without interruption unless the interview came to a standstill. I then used probes 
to gain further information if necessary (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000).  Interviews were in-
depth and semi-structured, and contained some unstructured parts where the patient 
was able to guide the interview without prompting (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000). 
I investigated the patient’s version of events as soon as possible after the severe 
pressure ulcer had happened, and following their interview. My aim was to reconstruct 
a chronological sequence of events, based on all of the evidence offered to me, which 
offered insight into the development of the patient’s severe pressure ulcer (see Table 
3.2 below) in order to trace the process retrospectively through his or her pathway to its 
initial cause (George and Bennett, 2005). The patient interview helped to identify a 
provisional and unbiased sequence of events, and an idea of the time period involved 
in the development of his or her pressure ulcer.  
Interviews were digitally recorded and transcribed verbatim for accuracy during later 
analysis (see Fig 3.2). The patient interview normally lasted for an hour and a half. 
Where relevant a main carer was interviewed alongside the patient. The initial structure 
to the interview was one opening question, ‘Why do you think you developed a severe 
pressure ulcer?’ After this initial question, the patient was allowed to talk freely, of his 
or her experience of care in terms of the pressure ulcer, and the reasons that led to its 
development (see Topic Guide, Appendix 4). The patient’s perspective and people who 
they thought were main stakeholders in their case, were the initial framework which I 
used to explore further (See Appendix 10 for an example of data collection of initial 
sequence of events for one patient)  
3.9.3 Documentary searching  
I looked at a range of documentary evidence after interviewing the patient, to make 
sense of his or her story of events (See Figure 3.2, Box A). This consisted of hand 
searching through his or her nursing, medical and therapist notes, clinical incident 
reports and staff rotas, and any other relevant documents which were available on the 
wards and in patients’ homes (see Table 3.5 for details of the range of documents 





before and after the pressure ulcer occurred (Roberts, 1996, George and Bennett, 
2005). Documents varied in number and quality for each case as each patient had 
different clinical provisions, and were cared for using varying plans of care. Some care 
plans, nursing, medical and therapy notes were comprehensive; others were sparser. 
This made data collection variable for each patient. I made a judgement about the 
relevant time period for all of the patients based on as far back as I could process trace 
the cause of the severe pressure ulcer development and how much data there was 
available within the constraints of research governance and ethical considerations.  
The end point was when a pressure ulcer had healed enough for a patient to be 
discharged from hospital. This time period therefore included the sequence of events 
which led to the development of the pressure ulcer, (as it related to the patient), all 
decisions made relevant to his or her care, and all ward and community setting 
movements. For each patient the data collection period took an average of three 
months between the initial interview, documentary data collection and other interviews 
with stakeholders who the patient deemed to be relevant to their care, and whose 
written entries were noted in the patient’s notes. Below (Table 3.2) is an example of 
how I used the sequence of events timeline to record and interpret information (see 
also Appendix 10 for an example of my data collection during fieldwork). 
Table 3.2: Sequence of events timeline 
Source of data 
(below) 
Time 1 Time 2 Time 3 Time 4 




event 1  
Slept Ill, 
tramadol given 














































due to room 
isolation. Has 
headache, 
after bump in 
taxi on way to 
clinic.’ 
 
Patient’s version of 
events 
I was moved 
to a side 
room, and 
placed on an 
ordinary 
mattress 
   
 
3.9.4 Other interviews 
Following leads from the patient’s interview, and supplemented by evidence I collected 
from patient notes, I then interviewed relevant other people involved in their care 
(including nurses, health care assistants, ward clerks, ward managers, 
physiotherapists, and consultants on the ward that the patient was currently admitted 
on, and if relevant, previous ward staff. In the community this also included home care 
assistants, district and GP practice nurses, GP practice managers and GPs. I then 
added data from each interview into my chronological sequence of events timeline 
(Tables 3.2 and 3.2a). Interviews across all patient accounts totalled 70 (Table 3.3).  
Table 3.2a Extension to sequence of events timeline: 
Consultant’s 
version of events 
 ‘did they 
realise how 










his heel or 
foot? I think it’s 
generally is 
that people are 
not aware how 




has on the 
viability of the 
tissue, 
particularly on 
the heel.’  
Ward Manager’s 
version of events 
 Not available    
Significant others’ 
version of events, 
e.g. TVN, HCA, 
Informal carer 
 ‘the ward staff 
were 
requested to 
refer to the 
foot clinic at 
ACUTE 
TRUST and 
refer him back 
to the vascular 
team, and for 
that period of 
time just keep 
dressing the 
wound dry 
because I had 
no-  I had no 
communication 












to a side room 
   
 
I used broadly the same method as with the patient interview. Each interview began 
with the opportunity for the interviewee to give their version of what happened, and 
then on the basis of events and on basis of material that they gave us, I used more 
direct questions to probe further. I then started to formulate possible hypotheses about 
the cause of the pressure ulcer which I could take forward to question other informants 
in further interviews and to code into my temporal sequence of events (Pawson, 2006) 
(George and Bennett, 2005).  
This part of the data collection offered many challenges, as staff members were often 
reluctant to speak about ‘adverse events’. I developed an adapted style of ‘cognitive 
interviewing’ to counteract this. The foundation for the creation of the cognitive 
interview was rooted in several well researched facts about human memory. Research 
has shown that memory deteriorates over time  (Fisher and Geiselman, 1992).  This 
indicates that the more time that passes between initial encoding and subsequent 
retrieval the less likely accurate recall will be. Often I was not able to interview the key 
stakeholders in a patient case until some weeks after the patient was developed his or 
her pressure ulcer. To this end, I introduced some techniques associated with cognitive 
interviewing. These were Mental Reinstatement of Environmental and Personal 
Contexts (Fisher and Geiselman, 1992). This technique involves the researcher or 
investigator attempting to mentally reinstate the environmental and personal context 
around a ‘crime’ (in this case the development of the pressure ulcer), while asking 
about the witness’s general feelings and activities at a particular time, in an attempt to 
trigger recall. In experimental research, this technique has proved successful. It also 
requires little theoretical background or training (Fisher and Geiselman, 1992). For 
example, in a study by Geiselman et al (1985) which focused on recall of a violent 
crime video, the cognitive interview technique led to a significant number of correctly 
recalled facts, (41.2) in comparison to a standard interview (29.4). My choice of 
memory aids based on this technique, were medical and nursing notes to help prompt 
the interviewees’ memory. In this instance, following my experiencing that nursing staff 





case notes pre-interview and brought them with me to each interview to use as a 
memory prompt. I asked each interviewee to ‘think back’ to what I had already coded 
as ‘significant events’ and explored these moments in the patient journey with the 
member of staff to see what they remembered of this event. I followed the cognitive 
interview style of temporal sequencing, which breaks the interview into beginning, 
middle and end. I firstly established rapport with the interviewee, by explaining that I 
was not from any auditing, or quality assurance professional body wishing to ‘judge’ 
their answers in any way (see Figure 3.2). I then encouraged them to give an 
uninterrupted version of their account.  
 
Figure 3.2: Making sense of the data 
This was a planning phase to offer a basis for my strategy for probing. This was 
because this phase often offered little direction from staff, and necessitated the next 
phase of information gathering. The information gathering stage was where I then 
guided the interviewee through information rich mental representations of the case, 
based on the patient’s version of events to prompt recall (Figure 3.2). We then 
discussed the recall of events based on my prompting. Often this offered more insight 
into the case and allowed for more data collection. I also used Supplementary 
Techniques, which are similar to the above, but which use more detailed questions and 
I used these techniques to elicit specific items that the participant witnessed, to jog 
their memory for details (Tulving and Thomson, 1973). In interviews with staff, these 
















was done that could be to prevent the patient’s pressure ulcer?’  In practice I had to 
use this technique with certain members of staff, as some were defensive, given the 
aforementioned proposed links between pressure ulcers and neglectful care (Bennett 
et al., 2004). 
I also used In-depth Reporting; another method taken from cognitive interviewing. I 
encouraged every detail regardless of whether the interviewee felt it was directly 
concerning the pressure ulcer. We spoke, for example, about each ward around the 
time of each patient’s admission, what relationships were like between staff members, 
and how happy the interviewee was with other aspects of their daily work. 
I interviewed as many key informants as appeared relevant to the patient’s story, 
according to the initial temporal sequence of events based on the patient’s interview, 
and who were relevant to the documentary evidence. These ranged in number from 3 
to 14 per patient depending on the type of care setting and providers, and were carried 
out to gain as much evidence as possible to help ‘make sense’ of the data (see Fig.3.2 
above). After each interview, I ‘de-briefed’ with the tissue viability specialist nurse on-
site, in order to make sure that I did not follow any ‘false leads’, (for example, mistakes  
about who to interview) and to seek local expert advice on whether inferences about 
possible causes of the severe pressure ulcer arising from interviews were plausible 
given the context. This process also helped direct me to further relevant people 
involved in a patient’s care, who I may have overlooked.  
 I conducted more interviews with those seen by the patient, tissue viability nurse, and 
the expert witnesses as key informants, including informal and other professional 
carers such as occupational therapists, clinical incident team members, family carers, 
liaison nurses, and matrons. I gained each informant’s perception of the development 
of the patient’s severe pressure ulcer, as they understood it. Each interview a lso 
helped to make sense of previous evidence collected from other interviews. The 
process was iterative and involved looking for further evidence to help make sense of 
the timeline. 15 interviews in total were carried out relating to the first patient.  



































































































































































Alex 1 1 2  2 2 1  1 1 1 1 1  14 
Berni
e 
1  1  2 3 1 1 1  1  1  12 
Chris 1  1  2  1  1     1 7 
Danni 1 1 1 1 1 1   1      7 
Elliott 1 1 2 2 3 1       1 1 12 
Frank
ie 
1  1  2 1 1      1  7 
Glenn 1 1 1 1 2 2          8 
Hilary 1 1 1            3 
 
The average was 10 interviews per patient for the following 7 patients (8 patients in 
total) resulting in 70 interviews overall. See Table 3.3 above.   
3.9.5 Data recording and initial coding 
I began to record a ‘significant events’ timeline from my raw field notes (see Table 3.2 
above) in a Microsoft Access database (Microsoft Inc.; 2007) which had discrete 
sections for significant or key events surrounding a patient, ordered chronologically, 
with subsections which mapped each relevant person’s account of the pressure ulcer 
development according to the significant event (see also Appendix 10). I inputted all of 
the evidence I collected from the different sources (patient account, staff interviews, 
and documents) into one large database. At this point, I realised that I had already 
begun to code my data according to time and significant events that the patient and I 
had deemed relevant. Yin (1994) suggests that the early analysis of the data is a 
critical step in the overall interpretation of the case studies. Miles and Huberman (1994) 
also outline a number of methods that can be adopted in the early analysis of case 
studies however no prescriptive practical recommendations are made as to which one 
to use. I chose to code my initial data around the ‘significant events’ in each patient’s 
journey relating to his or her pressure ulcer. The significant events varied across 
different patients, but often centred around nursing and medical entries in notes, and 
the patient’s recollections. The focus was on mapping this developmental process 





research questions (Miles and Huberman, 1994). In effect I was also already examining 
decisions made by health professionals about the patient at this point, which influenced 
my analysis and direction of research, rightly or wrongly. I built the rest of my evidence 
from my field notes around these significant events in a lateral way across my 
database of evidence using a range of documents numbering approximately 9 types 
per patient and a range of national documents (see Table 3.4 below). This enabled me 
to view all events at once, yet to see them ordered by ‘significant event’ for process 
tracing purposes. I also made further sense of the context where the pressure ulcer 
happened, in a broader, more organisational framework by coding organisational 
issues alongside each significant event, where I deemed them appropriate. For 
example if a nursing entry stated ‘wound care plan documented’, I would add an extract 
alongside from the local policy about when wound care plans should be documented. 
According to Miles and Huberman (1994) these ‘partial ordered displays’ allow for the 
quick identification of the segments relating to the research questions and any potential 
themes (see Figure 3.3 below). All of these data were inputted into my now very large 
Access database for examining alongside other sources of evidence, if they were seen 









Figure 3.3 Ordering of data 
Significant event e.g. 
patient remembered 
being moved to a 
side room
patient was moved 
to side room due to 
D&V(nursing notes)







Field notes: nurse was very upset 
that she had not been to check 
the patient’s skin, but the ward 





 I also collected further descriptive data, which to some degree remained as written 
field notes (Geertz, 1973), that I had observed and experienced whilst interviewing and 
visiting different organisations and sites. I referred to these notes to interpret my 
temporal coding framework in an iterative, back and forth way. If relevant this data was 
added into the database. I kept extensive notes about my role within the research and 
how this affected or influenced my data collection. This practice took approximately 
three months in the field for each patient, and I immersed myself in the rich data, 
reading and re-reading my field notes and cross-examining the Access database to 
become familiar with it during this time. I also kept records of access situations (Lofland 
et al., 2006) including records of when it was difficult to get through ‘gatekeepers’ to 
interview certain members of staff. I kept records of my relationship with individual 
interviewees, and how this dynamic affected how the interview was carried out. I coded 
this reflective information into my database if it could be linked in any way with 
significant events and data. For example, if an interviewee found it awkward to discuss 
what had happened to his or her patient or family member, this was likely to affect the 
quality of the interview. Or if an interviewee told me about an aspect of their work that 
he or she felt upset about, relating to the organisation, if it had already appeared in my 
significant events timeline, this information was coded at this point. All of my written 
field notes and interview data were then also recorded in a qualitative data analysis 
software package (QSR, NVivo, 2008) in order to categorise my initial codes further 
(Richards, 2015) see below for details of categorisation, which happened later in the 
analysis. 
Table 3.4 Range of documents per case (not exhaustive as other documents were 
retrieved ad hoc if seen as relevant) 
Case         










































































































































































































































































   
 
3.9.6 Analytical strategy 
I developed my analytical strategy in order to seek balance between both 
interpretations (from all stakeholders and myself) and explanations about what must 
have happened. I had identified several threats to the stability of the findings, which 





accounts, my non-clinical background, site clinicians’ beliefs, research team beliefs and 
one person collecting the data. I used a continuous reviewing process to address these 
issues, and in the discussion section below I illustrate, with examples, how I overcame 
these issues in more detail. The evidence was evaluated against an account of ‘good 
usual care’ to further maximise the stability of the findings (see Nurse-led case note 
review section below). 
I also dealt with hindsight bias by using the sequence of events timeline, i.e. looking at 
events as they unfolded in real time (Table 3.2, 3.2a and Table 3.2b) and the 6-stage 
review process (see Figure 3.4 below). This review process was done on a case by 
case basis. I used the review process to further strengthen the coherent account and 
produce the most stable account of what had happened that I could, yet which would 
remain a ‘helicopter view’ of events (Perrow, 1984). 
Fig 3.4: Review Process 
STAGE 1 
 
STAGE 2   Initial analysis                              Nurse led case note review 
      
       Edit account 
STAGE 3    
 
 
STAGE 4  Review by expert witnesses group    (2 Tissue  Viability Nurses (TVNs; not on-
site) 1 hospital TVN; I community TVN; 2 academics)   
 
 




 Box A: Data collected/Patient interview/Patient 
notes/local policy documents 
Box B: Draft account Box C: Account by local 
nurse specialist 
Box D: Integrated 
account 
Box E: Revised account and 
summative group judgement  
Box H: Final ‘fair’ account and 
summative judgements  
Box G:Theory 








Stage 1: Box A. Data collection, patient interview, patient notes and local policy 
documents. 
Following the patient interview and collecting data from medical notes and nursing 
notes (Data stage; Box A), I coded the data into my initial significant events timeline, as 
shown above. I also used external criteria at this stage to judge my data; to strengthen 
it and make it more stable (see Table 3.2b). I looked for evidence from pressure ulcer 
care guidance and clinical practice outside of the study and my data collected so far to 
compare with the interpretations of events. I collected a range of local guidance 
material to cross reference with key events in the development of the severe pressure 
ulcer. This material was also inputted into my Access database, alongside other 
previously collected data according to a patient’s sequence of events. I also collected 
material from national and international policies and inputted it into the database for the 
same reasons. This included NICE guidelines on wound care (National Institute for 
Clinical Excellence, 2001b, National Institute for Healthcare and Clinical Excellence, 
2005), and NPUAP/EPUAP guidance (2009).   
Table 3.2b: Sequence of events: external criteria (with patient specific example) 
 Event 1 Event 2 Event 3  
 Patient not risk 
assessed (no 
record in notes) 
Patient 
admitted onto 


















staff per patient 
at all times 
 
NICE guidelines Patients should 
receive initial 
   
Box I: Cross-patient thematic 

























receive a care 
plan 
assessment, 
and will always 
undergo a Risk 
assessment.  
   
HighIighted 
evidence. Does 
the event meet 
expected 
criteria? 
Patient was not 
monitored for 
changes in risk 
status 
   
 
Stage 2: constructing a coherent account 
Although I had already coded my data into a temporal process (Stage 1, and Box B) 
above) I then used this data to construct a draft coherent account of what had 
happened (George and Bennett, 2005). This draft account contained both my 
sequence of significant events timeline, evidence from interviews with relevant people, 
documentary sources, policy evidence alongside the patient’s own account of what 
happened in full. This was mostly set out chronologically, with my fieldwork reflections 





Local TVNs conducted case note reviews in parallel with my data collection (See Stage 
1; Box C), following current guidance for investigating serious incidents in the NHS in 
England. Sometimes this was a practice that was carried out by them regularly; in other 
cases I requested them to write a review. This was to add further clinical evidence and 
insights, which I may not have identified, because I did not have a clinical background. 
The on-site TVN collected material from clinical case notes, which in her view (all TVNs 
were female in this study) were relevant to the patient’s pressure ulcer and its 
development. This evidence was put together in a case note review report by the TVN, 
including departures from local clinical guidelines, which was also written in 
chronological order.  
Stage 3: Integrated account 
I then combined the draft account and the nurse’s case note review, (Stage 1) to create 
an ‘integrated account’ of these data sources (Stage 3; Box D), by interleaving both 
accounts according to chronology and type of evidence, which would then be reviewed 
and revised in the stage by stage process (above). My data and timelines were revised 
in the light of additional facts or insights generated by the TVN’s account.  
Stage 3b: Changes to the Integrated account 
At the beginning of my data collection, for the first four patients, I presented my 
integrated account to the review team as a possible final account. However, after the 
first four accounts were reviewed, and following discussion about power balance 
between stakeholders, the decision was taken by the expert witnesses and myself to 
include raw data from interviews in the reviewing process from then on to add more 
emphasis to the patient’s version of events. I also added the expert witness’ 
judgements in a discrete section, along with an interpretation of the accounts according 
to ‘classes of explanation’ see below.  
Table 3.5: Timeline of data collection and initial analysis (Patient 1-4) before changes 
to integrated account and further analysis 
Time in 
months 
Month 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 






















Alex             
Bernie             
Chris             
Danni             
 
Stage 4: Revised account using expert witnesses 
Using the improved integrated account as my new source of data, I then incorporated 
the five possible explanations identified from the safety literature (See Table of 
Explanations above) to focus each integrated account and produce a more structured 
‘revised account’ of what had happened. This happened one year into data collection 
and analysis and allowed me and the team to iteratively analyse the accounts based on 
what had already been collected.  
I also incorporated the five classes of explanation into this next stage of analysis (see 
Stage 4 above) which consisted of a review and progressive focusing of the integrated 
account by a sub-group of the research team to produce a ‘revised account’ (Box E). 
This group included two tissue viability nurse specialists who were not involved with the 
patient or employed at the NHS site. One was a hospital based TVN and the other was 
a community based TVN. An academic with expert knowledge in nursing also helped to 
review the account at this stage. In this stage the tissue viability nurses and academics, 
who were experienced expert witnesses in legal proceedings, provided an account of 
‘good usual care’ which was a benchmark against which the care of the patients in the 
study could be judged. I also provided the expert witnesses with raw data so that they 
could compare the accounts with the original sources of information (Box F). They 
recorded departures from treatment and care that each individual might reasonably 
have expected to receive. This is similar to how evidence is used within a coroner’s 
inquiry.  
 The revised account: 
1. included information not initially available from the data collection, and further 
information, arising from the sub-group’s reading of individual accounts that I had not 





2. was mapped against chronological events and raw data to look for points of 
commonality and for events which did not meet the good usual care criteria. This 
included the expert witnesses recording precise points of departure in the sequence of 
events from clinical expectations of good usual care. They also recorded where good 
practice had been carried out, and whether there was any missing information in the 
accounts 
4.  included whether the expert witnesses felt that the account was a true and 
accurate account of what had happened.  
5.  included a record of the expert witnesses’ best class of explanation (see Figs 
/Table above) for what had happened.  
The expert witnesses’ views were merged into the revised account, which had discrete 
sections for the patient account, sequence of events timeline, expert witnesses’ 
reasonable clinical expectations, and the organisational environment. The sections 
were kept discrete, so that it was clear where interpretations had arisen from (for 
example, the review team may have had a different perspective to the patient, and I did 
not want their view to be stronger than the patient’s voice in the revised account and ii) 
so that it was possible to trace back to where the evidence for the explanations came 
from more transparently.  
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Stage 5: Consensus account 
Having brought the expert witness’ opinions into the account, I was now in a position to 
bring all these elements together; the existing revised account, what clinicians might 
reasonably have expected to happen, the patient account, the sequence of events, the 
environment on the ward at the time, and the expert witnesses’ best class of 











Fig 3.5: Coherent account 
An expert in health politics and an independent organisational psychologist then 
reviewed each revised account carefully. This was in order to check again that it made 
sense in terms of relevance to local and national policies and the raw data. On the 
basis of this, the two experts also made a summary judgement about explanations for 
each patient. It was also the aim at this stage to make a judgement about whether the 
account offered the best, most plausible explanation of a patient’s severe pressure 
ulcer in the context of current organisational safety research (Box G).  
I then identified whether there was a single class of explanation for each patient, 
competing explanations, or combination of explanations. I then went back to primary 
data, examining it in two ways: 





1) If everyone was in agreement, to see whether all of our views were consistent 
with the primary data, or whether these had drifted away from the actual data. I 
looked for whether there was a key moment in events, that all team members 
agreed on. 
2) If there were competing explanations, I examined the primary data to see if this 
data was consistent with the findings, and whether there were other points in 
the evidence that might support or undermine a competing or key argument. 
 This process followed, at one level, a Yin (2003) and George and Bennett (2005) 
approach in refuting and supporting hypotheses. Yin’s and George and Bennett’s 
approaches offer rival explanations for cross case comparisons and pattern matching.  
Thus competing explanations were supported or refuted according to strength of 
agreement with the data.  
However, my ‘consensus account’ did not, in reality, consist of one clear ‘answer’; 
because all those who were interviewed in the study gave us slightly different accounts 
of events, and it was difficult to ‘prove’ (demonstrate empirically) who was ‘right’, but it 
was the best logical and plausible explanation of what had happened for the patient 
involved. This follows the principles of Theory of Explanatory Coherence, which arose 
from the more widely known Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE). IBE was a 
concept developed originally by Lipton, but my version was based more on the version 
by Thagard 1989. IBE takes the relationship between theory and evidence to be one of 
explanation, not logical entailment, and in contrast with a Bayesian and Yin logic 
approach, it takes theory evaluation to be rather a qualitative exercise that focuses 
explicitly on explanatory criteria, not a statistical under taking in which we assign 
probabilities to theories.  Thagard suggests that IBE is a mode of inference by which 
one judges the best of existing competing explanatory hypotheses and theories that 
have been generated by other abuctive means (Haig, 2009). Thagard captures the idea 
that a theory is more explanatorily powerful than its rivals if it explains a greater range 
of facts.  Thagard calls this the Theory of Explanatory Coherence (TEC). Explanations 
are judged more coherent if they are supported by analogy to the theories that 
scientists (in this case our research team) already find credible.  
A major critic, Bas van Fraassen (1989), has maintained that the approach cannot 
provide a satisfactory basis for believing in a theory, and argued for the conclusion that 
the best of competing explanatory hypotheses might be "the best of a bad lot," all of 
which are false. He reasoned that because IBE can select the best hypothesis only 





provides us with no rational grounds for believing that the hypothesis that is judged 
best is true.  
However, proponents of IBE have since argued that scientists appeal to background 
knowledge (i.e. the expert witnesses views, and primary data collection)  in order to 
select the best of competing theories and that because this knowledge is approximately 
true, their selection of the best theory is generally well grounded theory. Although it 
should be acknowledged that the best of competing theories might be a poor theory, an 
explanatory theory with a historical record of successive appraisals like that just 
mentioned, judged to be better than its rivals, is likely to be the best of a respectable 
lot, not a bad lot.(Haig, 2009). This also sits with George and Bennett’s process tracing 
case study method in its search for the most plausible explanation from a number of 
hypotheses (George and Bennett, 2005), yet George and Bennett articulated this in a 
slightly different way, preferring to keep explanations in terms of typological theories, 
and contingent and specific generalisations. However despite my conceptual departure 
from George and Bennett’s approach, I was confident with my analysis that each 
consensus account was the best, most respectable explanation of what happened to 
the patient (Pawson, 2006).  
Stage 6: Cross patient analysis 
After each of the eight patients had been subjected to the staged review process on an 
individual basis (which took approximately four months from the start of data collection 
to constructing each final coherent account), I then compared across patients in each 
discrete area of the coherent accounts (see above figure: Stage 6, Box H, and Table 
3.7 below). This was to add further strength to, or eliminate the five explanations. I did 
this by reading all of the accounts closely again, and looking for common explanations 
across patients which seemed to be emerging from the data, following the principles of 
TEC set out earlier. This was also similar to the approach set forward by George and 
Bennett’s ‘historical explanation’ or narrative in their process tracing case study 
method. At the same time I was aware of the need to provide an evidence based 
account for the audience I was seeking to provide explanations to. I also used QSR 
NVivo software at this stage to examine line by line all of my interview evidence and 
categorise this data using nodes. This process of triangulation offered an interesting 
new perspective in devising theoretical categories. The temporal process had already 
offered some insights, but immersing in this rich data using line by line coding helped to 





This was actually a very straightforward exercise, in practice, as clear patterns had 
already emerged from the data, by this point due to the staged reviews. The process 
was a funnelling of evidence and I was able to eliminate explanations that were not 
feasible, and keep plausible explanations (George and Bennett ,2005), by checking 
against the primary data using the line by line coding once again, to find the most 
suitable, yet coherent explanation. See figure 3.6 below: 
Fig 3.6: Funnelling evidence 
 
I then produced one final explanatory coherent discussion of these cross-patient 
checks. This also incorporated primary data references to provide a transparent audit 
trail. This helped me to refine theories out of the evidence. These were the best, most 
stable explanations, given the data collected, that I could come up with.  
Table 3.7: Cross patient analysis grid 

























































3.9.7 Thematic exploration 
I then used the accounts to again explore first inductively, then abductively, my 
categories and themes that were raised in the cross patient analysis, to create causal 
theories to test (Box I). I was looking at the theoretical explanations generated from the 
accounts, to elaborate and illustrate these. I returned to immersing myself in possible 
patterns, theories and themes arising from the data and categorising further, by 
analysing these in more depth going back to the NVivo categories I had generated from 
my primary data collection, extracted by line by line coding (Appendix 11). I examined 
the emerging evidence carefully against raw data, comparing it with current research in 
the new theoretical areas of focus and then I developed my refined theories from this 
abductive analysis. I set out a hierarchy of themes and subthemes arising from my 
account to structure the thematic analysis (see below).  
3.10 Methodological issues 
3.10.1 Challenges with the method  
The method set out above was extremely detailed and raised several technical 
challenges when applied in practice. Here, I illustrate, by working through one patient 
account, how I addressed these issues.  
3.10.2 Background 
Chris was a 75 year old man with multiple health problems. He was staying on an 
acute vascular surgical ward in a large general hospital when I interviewed him, after 
having surgery for a pressure ulcer. Previously he had also been on a community 
hospital rehabilitation ward.  
3.10.3 Defensiveness and time constraints of participants  
As the study was observational, and was mainly carried out on NHS sites, this was a 
challenge, as most of the field work took place on busy hospital wards, where staff 
members had little time to spare to help with my research. Some people were helpful, 
but a number of informants were defensive, given the issues around severe pressure 
ulcers and patient safety indicators, so some didn’t give enough time, and others did 
not attend their arranged interviews.  
In the case of Chris, the ward manager did not attend her interview despite it being 
rearranged three times. I finally had an informal interview with her, which was helpful, 





setting, and the acute trust. This had led to a communication breakdown between the 
sites, and had implications for the man’s pressure ulcer development.  
I used the on-site TVNs as gatekeepers to overcome the defensiveness of staff, and 
mostly this was useful, however with Chris, some of the issues were amongst TVNs, as 
sites used different policies and these had caused animosity between acute and 
community Tissue Viability services. The outsider issue always presents a difficulty as 
for field researchers and can only be overcome to an extent.  
In addition, I was non-clinical and some aspects of the information were not 
understandable. I overcame these issues with partial knowledge by a parallel clinical 
review by the TVN (explained earlier). I therefore had an on-site account of what had 
happened, from the TVN’s clinical perspective. For Chris, this included adding aspects 
of his neurological condition, which contributed to his pressure ulcer.  
In addition to defensive informants, there were interruptions and distractions from other 
staff, and wards were noisy.  Interviewees would often avoid talking about the patient’s 
pressure ulcer, and would talk more generally about pressure ulcer care. This was 
partly because of lack of information about the patient, and partly because of fear of 
blame if they disclosed information about the pressure ulcer. One nurse became 
emotional when she reflected on her poor practice with Chris. Because of these issues, 
I had to use prompts and direct questions to re-focus the interview towards the 
patient’s severe pressure ulcer (see ‘cognitive interview section above), and interviews 
became more conversational. However, every informant could only offer an 
interpretation of the full story of the severe pressure ulcer; each one individually could 
not give us the whole explanation of what had happened. 
3.10.4 Representing information 
I wanted to represent the evidence in the most accurate way to get the most suitable 
explanation. However, I faced several smaller challenges while trying to do this. I 
found, while carrying out interviews with each patient that, although he or she was 
witness to most of what happened there were other people’s versions of events which 
he or she was not witness to, such as decisions made by nurses, Physiotherapists and 
consultants. Chris knew he had moved on to a side room, and thought it was because 
the staff wanted him to be nearer to the dining room because he struggled walking too 
far. However, he had a stomach virus and it appeared, from the case notes, that he 
had been isolated because of this. The actual entry in the notes is ‘Diarrhoea-confined’. 





collection would have to be substantial and I would have to gather numerous different 
sources of evidence for each patient to make sense of what had happened.  
3.10.5 Timeline issues 
The timeline encouraged me to think about evidence chronologically and avoid 
hindsight bias in the reporting of evidence. See below an excerpt from Chris’s 
chronology: However, I recognised that even a timeline is a judgement, based on 













In each case I chose the patient’s story to structure the timeline. The bias towards 
timelines according to staff members had been part of the issues with current 
investigative tools. This timeline was different as it offered significant events from the 
perspective of the patient, rather than the service. I realised that if I wanted to improve 
current practice I needed to minimise the effect of different perspectives of events. 
Although I knew each of the accounts was not perfect and couldn’t offer the ‘right’ 
answers, I began to think that I could still strive for a best explanation of what 
happened (Lipton, 1991, Haig, 2009). Other issues concerning the use of a timeline 
were that for several of the patients it was substantially longer than expected, so the 
data collection took much longer, as shown in Tables 3.5 and 3.6 above. Chris’s 
Excerpt 3.1 
(Date supplied) 
Nursing notes  
Catheter removed at 1.30am. Pt had poor night, anxious re urinating following catheter removal. Used a 
bottle. 
Wound care notes 
 ‘L heel has grade ¾ blister. Underlying tissue severely affected. TV referral faxed’. Wound care notes 
state: ‘Diabetic foot ulcer, wound 2-3 days on heel, allevyn, tissue type oedematous. Mattress soft ban-






pressure ulcer began 4 months before I began to collect data, so I had to process trace 
back to its initial development, and find case notes, locations and members of staff 
from four months previously. The staff, understandably, had often forgotten details of 
the patient by the time I interviewed them, and I used case notes as prompts to aid 
memory, and cognitive interviewing (Fisher and Geiselman, 1992). I examined the data 
closely, and looked for emerging patterns across each interpretation in the timeline, 
looking at events as they appeared in ‘real’ time. This is how I ascertained that Chris 
had been confined due to illness, rather than moved for safeguarding purposes. I 
looked across the data to see at which points that decisions had been made about the 
patient’s pressure ulcer, what actions were taken and who was involved at each point 
in time. This allowed me to start to make sense of hundreds of discrete events and to 
interpret this large volume of data. I aimed to produce the sequence of events as it 
happened in real time, but I knew that I would have to gain other people’s perspectives 
too to help make sense of it. This became my next challenge: 
3.10.6 Different perspectives. 
I wanted to understand what had happened from each individual person’s viewpoint, 
yet I also needed explanations for the cause of a severe pressure ulcer. Each of the 
sources of data gave me a slightly different perspective on what had happened, and 
interviewees (as in Chris’s case set out above) had faulty recollections of events.  For 
example, Chris recalled that he had always been on a high risk pressure ulcer mattress 
on previous wards and was not placed on one on the rehabilitation ward. His pressure 
ulcer developed when he was on an ordinary bed. However, there was no other 
reference to this, other than from the patient himself, and in one piece of documentary 
evidence when they had ordered a mattress for him (i.e. the mattress order form). 
Nurses did not volunteer this information until asked directly about it. I addressed this 
issue with carrying out many interviews with different informants, with the timeline 
above, and with the detailed analytical review process (See Figure 3.4). I needed to be 
sure that interpretations were stable enough to ensure I had chosen the best possible 
explanation, whilst retaining an open, helicopter view (Shadish et al., 2002, Guba and 
Lincoln, 1989, Hammersley, 1991, Lipton, 1991). I used the analytical review process 
to develop my coherent account for each patient, to counteract different perspectives 
and to compare the coherent account of what happened with good usual care seen on 
a ward. The expert witnesses offered their verdict on whether good usual care had 
been followed and offered a more balanced view of the evidence than if I had simply 
used my draft account. For Chris, the fact that he had been placed on the wrong 





recognise him as high risk. He was on a rehabilitation ward but had deteriorated and 
become high risk due to developing a diarrhoea and vomiting virus. This was not, in the 
opinion of the expert witnesses, a good enough assessment of his risk status, and this 
had led to the development of his severe pressure ulcer. However, alternatively 
regarding Chris, there were also queries over the initial onsite TVN’s review, which 
stated that the cause of his pressure ulcer was poor footwear. The researcher was then 
instructed to find further information to clarify this. It was decided by the expert 
witnesses, following a repeated review that this was not the explanation, and that Chris 
had developed his pressure ulcer following the episode of diarrhoea and vomiting for 
which he was placed in a hospital side room on a foam mattress.  
There were also instances where the expert witnesses disagreed with the researcher 
and asked for clarification. For example, one discussion included the following 
disagreements about the researcher’s coherent account: 
‘The researcher has said there were issues at an interpersonal level…I don’t think 
that’s the right title, but I think the issue is the right thing, but I don’t think that’s the right 
title… It’s a cognitive issue.’ 
These points were duly noted and the account was edited for each patient following the 
expert witnesses’ comments.  
Summative judgements for every patient from the expert witnesses were also extracted 
from the coherent accounts and raw data (namely the sequence of events chronology 
and interview transcripts) at this stage (see Chapter 4 for results of these).  
3.10.7 Power relations 
Although I respected the viewpoints of the expert team, I was also aware that they had 
their own views about clinical practice. At one point they concluded that Chris may 
have developed his ulcer due to his footwear, and this was not what he had suggested 
had happened. However, this was discarded after another discussion. However, when 
his issue arose, to counteract a clinical viewpoint overriding a patient’s view 
completely, I left the patient account intact until the final summative explanatory 
account.  This way I always had the primary version of a patient account to refer to 
throughout the review process. Although the coherent account was more integrated as 
it was reviewed, the individual accounts within it also remained discrete; so that it was 
possible at any point in the review process to see where the primary evidence had 





cover all disciplinary perspectives and yet offer traceable audit trails back to primary 
evidence. This was no easy task. 
3.10.8 Finding the best explanation  
I knew I wanted to be open to all disciplines (see Introduction; Chapter 1) when 
explaining how a severe pressure ulcer developed.  Applying this was more difficult. I 
used the review process as a forum for applying different cross disciplinary 
explanations (see Table 3.1 again above), and asked the team to choose which ones, if 
any, they thought were the most appropriate. I asked them to read each patient’s 
coherent account with the explanations in mind.  
I took the most competing explanations from each account and made sure that no 
other explanations could have fitted. By looking at the primary evidence in tandem with 
transparent primary evidence, it allowed me to focus the findings into a best 
explanation within a patient account. For example for Chris, his ulcer did not develop 
regardless of the care he received, as he developed it because of the conduct of staff 
(not Explanation A), it was not really due to a sequence of events (not Explanation C), 
as the best explanation was that he was placed on the wrong mattress. However, the 
organisational culture also made the ulcer more likely to happen because of the staff 
shortages, poor documentation, laissez-faire management and poor communication 
between sites (Explanation D).  
3.11 Discussion 
I came across a number of technical challenges in analysing data as I carried out the 
study as shown above; namely issues with representing evidence, including partial and 
faulty recall of events and interpretations, power relationships, and finding an 
explanation, which I addressed mostly with the lengthy review and analysis process 
detailed above. I recognise that due to these challenges, this technique of investigating 
complex adverse events is a time-consuming and multi-method approach (on average 
taking 3 months at two days per week) and that issues of time constraints and tools of 
adverse event investigation have already been well documented in research (Waring, 
2007, Nicolini et al., 2011). Nevertheless, aside from the drawbacks set out above, I 
have found that using this approach offered insights unavailable from other methods of 
error investigation. There has, until now, been no  way of discovering the causes of a 
complex event such as a severe pressure ulcer, which focuses on the patient’s view of 
events rather than an in-house investigation, based on health care professionals’ 





literature (Waring, 2007) and is currently gaining support amongst researchers (O'Hara 
et al., 2018). 
Current patient safety studies are still often based around outdated human factors 
approaches, (Waring J et al., 2010) and thus find a psychological explanation for an 
adverse event. However, in the context of this research, this would only be able to 
explain in part what happened to the patients (for example, Chris’s wrong mattress). 
Because my method cuts across disciplines instead, to look for explanations, I was 
able to explain both in terms of human factors, but include the organisational context.  
In parallel, organisational theory emphasises either systems or culture, however, the 
explanations within this method are able to cover both of these. A sequence of 
significant events may be responsible (systems) in part for a severe pressure ulcer 
developing, but these events may take place under a prevailing problem culture, where 
cultural norms allow pressure ulcers to develop without addressing them, consistent 
with the normalisation of deviance theory (Vaughan, 1996). This is where deviant or 
suboptimal work routines become accepted and normal over time, so that staff 
members fail to recognise risky practices. They conform to the practices, so are not 
aware that they are doing anything risky or wrong. In hindsight these practices are 
more easily detectable as deviant but at the time they go unnoticed and not seen as 
anything out of the ordinary.  
This method reveals a means to address the organisational culture and remain close to 
the primary sources of evidence. The method allows us to formulate an explanatory 
theory of what happened, which remains grounded in primary evidence (Pawson, 
2006). I do not suggest that this time-consuming method of looking at the whole picture 
should be transferred per se into practice. However, this new way of examining and 
understanding evidence does suggest ways of incorporating psychological, sociological 
and organisational research to offer  a more holistic, multi-method way of studying 
patient safety than has ever been practised before (Waring J et al., 2010).   
One of the main strengths of the method has been that I don’t need to provide every bit 
of evidence, as there is an abundance of rich detail. Instead, I am able to use the 
evidence that is available to infer that for example, a nurse’s account must have been 
right (or vice versa), because it fits with everything else I know.  The logic follows the 
style of inferred explanatory reasoning that I set out before (Lipton, 1991, Harman, 
1965, Haig, 2009), which is where this method departs in its execution from George 
and Bennett’s (George and Bennett, 2005) complex causality approach. This method 





this study is a severe pressure ulcer, by inferring the best, most plausible explanation, 
through eliminating inadequate explanations, and by stabilising the best explanation 
through reviewing accounts. This way of looking at data balances interpretations and 
hard evidence in a way that is not recognised currently within healthcare.  
The use of evidence gathering and making sense of the data corresponds to a 
coroner’s or large scale inquiry, see Mid-Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust Inquiry 
(Francis, 2013, Secretary of State, 2001); Bristol Inquiry; (Kennedy, 2001) and has 
similarities with the HSIB's approach to investigating several incidents (Health Services 
Investigation Branch, 2017).  However, the difference between this study and recent 
large scale inquiries is that it does not conclude with a list of recommendations, which 
can be difficult to put into practice. In contrast, I was able to use the evidence in a 
coherent way; in the form of an account of events, but also refer back at any point to 
corresponding evidence in the primary data. This gives a transparent audit trail for my 
choice of causes and strengthens the evidence, accountability and stability of findings.  
3.12 Concluding comments  
Although this type of method may offer possible solutions to bridging the gap between 
theory and practice in health care, it is only a small scale study by nature, and there 
would be a further exercise in testing resulting explanations out in daily practice. This 
method offers one approach to uncovering data, and others could be considered, such 
as a more interpretive approach to elicit different forms of data. Currently, the method 
has been applied only to pressure ulcer research, and it could be applied to other types 
of clinical setting to see if it works in the same ways to produce coherent explanations. 
It could also be tested alongside current adverse event investigation tools to see how it 
compares in practice, or alternatively, it could also be tested out in areas of good 











Chapter 4: Initial analysis-categorising, coding and hypothesising 
4.1 Chapter summary  
The previous chapter considered the retrospective case study method, and highlighted 
challenges arising from carrying out the method and analysis with reference to one 
patient’s case. This chapter now describes the results of initial data analysis, stage by 
stage, through the six stage review process, using examples from raw and coded data. 
It then introduces brief summaries of each patient’s case to describe the tentative 
candidate explanations which were arrived at for each account following the analysis 
described in the previous chapter. The final stage of analysis of iterative coding and 
patterning across cases is then described, which results in four discrete, testable 
hypotheses which are then expanded and discussed in subsequent chapters. 
4.2 Introduction 
The evidence that was collected and analysed through Stages 1-6 of the analysis 
process per individual patient case was checked within each case against the raw data 
for strength and authenticity by the researcher, the on-site TVN, the expert witnesses 
and the project team (see Figure 3.4 in Methods chapter, which displays this method of 
analysis).  
This 6-stage analysis made use of both correspondence data and coherence data 
(referred to in the previous Methods section). To reiterate, this definition refers to 
accurate and empirical data (correspondence data) coupled with rational or logical data 
(coherence data); see Methods chapter (Hammond, 1996).  This staged analysis was 
also designed to maximise internal validity (Shadish et al., 2002). 
4.3 Table of patients 
The eight individuals in the study had differences in their personal characteristics and 
in their treatment and settings. They were all, however at high risk of developing 
pressure ulcers, or of existing pressure ulcers deteriorating (see Table 4.1).  











Alex 38 year old woman 
with paraplegia  
Acute hospital, 
surgical ward  







medical ward  
Chris 75 year old man with 
multiple chronic 
health problems and 
acute infection  
Community hospital, 
rehabilitation ward  







Elliott 90 year old man with 
multiple chronic 




surgical wards  
Frankie 39 year old woman 





surgical wards  
Glenn 65 year old man with 
quadriplegia  
Community Nursing, 
respite care and 
elective admission in 
tertiary centre 
Hilary 89 year old woman 
who fell at home  






4.4 Stage 2: Constructing a draft account 
The first stage of focused analysis began at Stage 2 (Stage 1 was the initial data 
collection; see Figure 3.4 in Method chapter although there were elements of analysis 
even at the coding of raw data via the timeline). As set out in detail in Chapter 3, this 
involved the researcher and TVN comparing data collection and field notes per patient.  
At this early stage, analysis was partial, consisting of a ‘draft account’ and based 
largely on the patient’s interview and clinical notes (see Figure 4.1).  
Figure 4.1 Stage 2 
STAGE 2   Initial analysis                                 Nurse led case note 
review 
      
 
This stage included clinical sense-checking (Hammersley, 1991, Shadish et al., 2002) 
with the on-site TVN, to make sure that my data collection notes were accurate 
clinically, and the meaning of clinical terms and abbreviations within each case were 
clarified. For example, ‘Abx’ refers to antibiotics within medical notes, and ‘FY1’ refers 
to a grade of junior doctor.  All relevant data regarding skin status was included, and 
clarified by the TVN where necessary.  
4.5 Stage 3-creating the integrated account 
The next stage of analysis involved coding interviews with staff or carers for each 
patient, who were identified by the patient themselves as being involved in their care, 
or suggested by carers, or other staff members. A total of 70 recorded and transcribed 
interviews took place with a range of participants. See Table 4.2 (repeated from 
Chapter 3) below: 































































































































































Alex 1 1 2  2 2 1  1 1 1 1 1  14 








1  1  2 3 1 1 1  1  1  12 
Chris 1  1  2  1  1     1 7 
Danni 1 1 1 1 1 1   1      7 
Elliott 1 1 2 2 3 1       1 1 12 
Frank
ie 
1  1  2 1 1      1  7 
Glenn 1 1 1 1 2 2          8 
Hilary 1 1 1            3 
 
After my initial interpretation of the raw data (namely inputting the sequence of events 
chronology and interview data into the Access Database and examining the data in a 
cross tabulated way) these data were converted into a written coherent version of what 
happened (see Methods chapter for how this was conceptualised and structured). 











Excerpt 1  
The ward manager stated that the HCAs do most of the hands on cares now, and that the nurses 
rely heavily on the HCA to come and ask them if there are problems with patients’ skin. She felt the 
HCAs’ knowledge was variable. One HCA stated that she wouldn’t find a PU with her ‘being only a 
helper’. 
Excerpt 2 Discussion 
There were further communication delays during Bernie’s care, which appear to have significantly 
contributed to the deterioration of her condition. There were issues with verbal communication on the 





The coherent account was an integration of the researcher’s draft account and the 
notes and clinical knowledge added by the TVN. This was thus called an ‘integrated 
account’ (see Figure 4.2). In some instances (for Bernie, Chris, Frankie and Hilary) this 
included a separate on-site TVN clinical review which was written as part of their 
clinical role. In some cases this formed their report of the Root Cause Analysis. 
Figure 4.2 Stage 3 
STAGE 3   Researcher edits draft account 
  
 





4.6 Stage 4- Review of integrated account by expert witnesses. 
Stage 4 involved the expert witnesses and project team reviewing each patient’s 
integrated account and all raw data (namely interview transcripts and chronological 
time line) to produce a revised account and possible judgment (see Figure 4.3). The 
accounts were considered by the expert witnesses on a case by case basis. 
Figure 4.3: Stage 4 
STAGE 4        Review by expert witnesses    (2 Tissue Viability Nurses (TVNs; not on-
site) 1 hospital    
                  TVN; I community TVN; 2 academics)   
 
 
As described in the Methods chapter, the team of expert witnesses helped to create a 
balanced account of what happened, including highlighting the importance of other 
Box D: Integrated 
account 
Box E: Revised account and 
summative group judgement  
Theory refining  
Excerpt 3 
There is no record of skin assessment in A&E or on other ward.  A box was ticked 3 days after 
admission to say skin intact. A full skin assessment is not recorded till 10 days after admission which 
records grade 1 damage to sacrum, left and right buttocks  
 
 





issues that the researcher had not considered. Some typical examples of the expert 
witnesses’ review discussions are set out below: 
Example 1: 
Expert witness A: The fact is they were trying to do it from memory and trying to 
recall things from memory… 
Expert witness B:    For Bernie there was no mention at all of physios and OTs – 
(Agreement from Expert witnesses A and C) – and the physios being involved in 
repositioning.  
Example 2: 
Expert witness A So, we’re assuming that what we’re looking at is the ischial 
pressure ulcer, rather than anywhere else. But we’ve nothing definite to say that. 
Expert witness B But if he was elevated slightly in the ambulance, given that he’s 
so thin,  is there not that potential that although he’s not sitting directly on h is ischium, 
that actually, there would be... 
Expert Witness C      But I don’t agree... if you sit like that and you’re thin – 
Expert Witness A You still miss your ischials  
Expert witness B Yes, you still miss your ischials. 
Explanations for each patient’s ulcer were then inferred by the expert witnesses and 
myself from each coherent account. These were deduced from the expert witness' 
judgements following in-depth discussion and the evidence from the data (both raw 
data in the form of interview transcripts, the sequence of events data and my coherent 
accounts). Table 4.3 sets out the results of the summative judgements for each 
patient’s account. 
Table 4.3: Summative judgments 
Patient A - 
Unavoidable 









E - Other 
explanation 
(not first four) 





2 Bernie   Yes Yes  
3 Chris  Yes  Yes  
4 Danni   Yes Yes  
5 Elliott    Yes  
6 Frankie   Yes Yes  
7 Glenn    Yes  
8 Hilary Yes     
 
4.7 Stage 5: Final explanations 
 
Following the summative judgments, the eight revised accounts, chronological 
timelines and raw data were reviewed at one sitting by an expert in health politics and 
an organisational psychologist (see Fig. 4.4):  
Fig 4.4 Stage 5 





Following this final review one overarching explanation from the list of summative 
judgements A to E (see Table 4.2 above) was identified: that the organisational 
environment made a patient’s pressure ulcer more likely. For seven of the eight 
patients the overall judgement was that the environment, in some way, made the 
severe pressure ulcer more likely. For three of the seven patients it was the sole 
explanation. For four others the organisational environment explanation was in 
combination with other explanations too; in one case a single error was thought to have 
contributed to the pressure ulcer developing (namely Chris) and for three other cases 
(Bernie, Danni and Frankie) there was also a sequence of events (see Chapter 3). The 
expert in health politics and organisational psychologist did not change the overall 
conclusions and judgements of the previous expert witnesses group at this stage. It 
Box F: Final ‘fair’ account and 





must be noted that the explanations at this stage meant only that these were the areas 
to be focused on for further analysis and to search for a final theory about why patients 
develop severe pressure ulcers. 
 
4.8 Brief summaries of explanatory accounts 
 
At this point it is useful to introduce brief explanatory summaries for each patient 
account to contextualise the analysis further and highlight the judgements arrived at for 
each case. The use of summarised data for each patient is due to the lack of space 
within the thesis to reproduce detailed accounts for each individual patient, and for 
issues around confidentiality.  
Patient 1: Alex 
Alex was a 38 year old woman with paraplegia, who was admitted to a spinal cord 
injury unit.  She had been on a surgical waiting list for some time, but problems with 
previous pressure ulcers had led to delays in surgery.  When she was interviewed she 
had undergone surgical repair for closure of her severe pressure ulcer. Her wound 
broke down post-operatively. The patient’s view was that her SPU developed because 
there had been a failure to turn her every three hours during one night.  Alex also felt 
she was ‘blamed’ by staff for the deterioration of her post-operative wound. From the 
expert witnesses’ perspective, there was the consideration that this was likely to have 
been a surgical wound breakdown, which made this case a deviant case in terms of 
analysis. When the data was collected and the analysis carried out, it appeared that 
she was not a suitable participant as she did not fully fit the criteria for the study. 
However, evidence around the care Alex received for her post operative pressure ulcer 
pointed to a broader set of explanations than the view she offered. This supported 
other evidence within the study around organisational issues. These were poor 
adherence with the care plan (including turning her), the ward being under staffed, and 
poor communications between clinicians. Therefore, this evidence was included as part 
of the data. The expert witnesses judged this to be that the environment made the 
wound breakdown more likely (Explanation D).  
Patient 2: Bernie 
Bernie was a 65 year old woman, who had leg contractures due to a progressive 





collapsed, and on admission to hospital the diagnosis was initially a possible urinary 
tract infection, which was later changed to pneumonia. There was uncertainty over her 
diagnosis and a series of failings over a period of days – she was not properly 
assessed on admission, a full pressure ulcer risk assessment was not conducted until 
the seventh day.  This was attributed, by the expert witness team, to marked 
weaknesses in nursing practice, and in failures in team working. The nurses did not 
respond to Bernie’s high risk of developing a pressure ulcer. This also sat alongside an 
escalation of her illness. There was no team work between professionals involved in 
her care, yet she was a patient with multiple comorbidities. There were frequent ward 
moves during her time in hospital due to her co-morbidities, alongside queries over her 
mental capacity, and she was not responsive to instructions by staff. She preferred one 
position to lie in, although this issue was not considered at length by health care staff. 
This made the judgement of the case a combination of Explanations B and D. 
Patient 3: Chris 
Chris was a 75 year old man, who had a pre-existing pressure ulcer, but developed 
another one (Category 4) while on a community rehabilitation ward.  He had multiple 
health problems including Type 2 diabetes, cancer and congestive heart failure.  Chris 
was moved from a bed in an open bed bay into a side ward, due to a diarrhoea and 
vomiting virus– and the specialised mattress was not transferred with him.  The expert 
team concluded that although there was a single precipitating event (Explanation B), 
they took the view that Explanation D was relevant as there were staffing shortages, 
documentation was poor (risk assessments were lacking) and communication was poor 
between services. 
Patient 4: Danni 
 Danni was a 37 year old woman with a congenital neurological condition, who lived 
with her husband, who was her carer. There was a sequence of events over time, 
beginning with Danni’s superficial pressure ulcer, which was not assessed by the 
practice nurse at her GP’s surgery for five months. Neither were her risk factors for 
developing a pressure ulcer. Danni was instead given repeat prescriptions for wound 
dressings. This delay in assessment resulted in a deterioration of Danni’s skin damage, 
and she developed a SPU. She was then bed-bound for eighteen months.  The expert 
witnesses observed that the patient was let down by the system as a whole.  It 
appeared that she had not been given proper, detailed advice on managing her own 
PU risks, or any other basic prevention or management of skin damage. Her husband 





they developed.  The practice nurse did not have specialist knowledge of the patient’s 
risks, and there was no early referral to district nurses as the patient was seen to be 
mobile enough to access the GP’ surgery.  The patient’s GP, as well as the practice 
nurse, could have referred Danni to a DN much earlier, which may have been a more 
successful approach to managing her initial wound. There was an overall failure to act 
quickly enough. Danni was expected to self-manage her wound care without the 
knowledge to do this successfully. The expert team concluded that there was a 
combination of a sequence of events and the environment which led to the 
development of her SPU (Explanations C and D). 
Patient 5: Elliott 
Elliott was a 90 year old man, and was admitted to hospital with lower abdominal pain 
and cardio-vascular problems.  He was confused, and very ill on admission. He 
appeared – in retrospect – to have had PUs before his admission, despite his pressure 
ulcers reported as hospital acquired. But he was not properly assessed, no checks 
were made on existing wounds and pressure ulcers (nobody looked under dressings), 
nursing notes recorded pressure ulcers in different places on his body, and a wound 
care plan was not implemented until 15 days after admission. He was also subjected to 
frequent ward moves. The expert witnesses felt that Explanation D was the most 
plausible explanation.  
Patient 6: Frankie 
Frankie was a 39 year old woman.  She was admitted to hospital as an acute 
admission following previous elective surgery.  At the time, there was a major 
reorganisation of wards and theatres taking place.  Nursing staff – on more than one 
ward – failed to pick up clear signs of PU risk, for example her recent weight loss.  
There were clear operational problems such as failure to undertake proper risk 
assessments. Frankie was supine for 24 hours post operatively. The nursing notes on 
the wards were poor. Basic nursing practices (use of mattress and skin assessments) 
were not followed throughout her frequent ward moves. Her risks and serious condition 
were not communicated to the post-op ward staff properly, and a post-op bed on a high 
dependency unit would have been preferable, but, was not available for her. The expert 
witnesses judged that a combination of a sequence of events and the environment 






Patient 7: Glenn 
Glenn was a 65 year old man with quadriplegia.  He attended a treatment centre some 
distance away from his home for lung complications bi-annually.  His wife was his main 
carer.  He had an episode of acute illness, and around that time areas of redness on 
his sacrum and hips were identified.  Then he travelled by ambulance to a specialist 
hospital approximately 200 miles away, for treatment related to his respiratory 
problems, for a night and a day.  On his return, he entered his regular respite care 
facility, at which point a Category 1 PU was identified on his buttock.  This continued to 
develop into an SPU.  The expert team noted that DNs in the community, and staff in 
the ‘travel phase’ and in respite care all failed to respond to his high risk status. The 
DNs were task orientated.  Nobody took responsibility for this patient’s treatment and 
care. His carer (wife) was the only person with an overview of his condition, but was 
‘blamed’ by services for not accepting a pressure relief mattress, and this contributed to 
a complex relationship with various services involved in his care. Services surrounding 
him operated in silos and there were delays in referrals to the TVN. As the patient’s 
condition deteriorated, the services did not recognise this, and permitted the situation 
to continue unchecked. The expert witnesses felt that Explanation D was the most 
plausible.  
Patient 8: Hilary 
Hilary was an 89 year old woman.   She was living independently in her own home, 
though visited regularly by her daughter.  She fell as she was getting into bed – 
resulting in a fractured neck of femur.  Her daughter eventually found her, after a period 
that may have been 48 hours, and called an ambulance.  The ambulance staff 
identified and reported her severe pressure ulcer on admission to the Accident and 
Emergency department. The expert team took the view that, following this event, the 
staff involved did everything they should have done.  The SPU was identified early, and 
a care plan was implemented.  This was an unavoidable SPU (Explanation A).  
4.9 Initial cross case analysis 
The overall organisational explanation from the summative judgements by the expert 
witnesses and review team (see Table 4.2) meant that the area of focus for further 
analysis was based largely around an organisational explanation, and not around 
clinical symptoms, individual or clinical errors, or a cognitive psychological explanation 
(for example an isolated lapse in concentration-see (Hollnagel et al., 2015). This initial 





issues when conducting my further analysis, rather than for example, a more clinical 
one. 
4.10  Cross case coding and patterning 
The sharpening of analysis involved detailed reading across all of the patient coherent 
accounts, and cross-checking for patterns and recurring variables (George and 
Bennett, 2005). Again I checked that the evidence I had developed in the accounts was 
supported by correspondence evidence from the raw data (interview transcripts and 
sequence of events timeline)  for internal validity (see Figures 3.3 and 3.4 in Chapter 3) 
(Hammersley, 1991). The coding frame from this cross check is set out in Table 4.4 
below. These checks and the coding frame were further checked by the expert 
witnesses, expert in health politics and the organisational psychologist for internal 
validity (Shadish et al., 2002). Numbers in Table 5 refer to Patients 1-8, who were 
involved in the study namely Alex (Patient 1), Bernie (2), Chris (3), Danni (4), Elliott (5), 
Frankie (6), Glenn (7) and Hilary (8). Data sources were from four different categorical 
areas which I ordered into Data Source 1; which was the sequence of events 
chronology; Data Source 2; the expert witness discussions; Data Source 3; the 
patient's own account and Data Source 4; the other documents relating to local and 
national guidance and my observational  field notes. These are abbreviated to ‘DS’ 
from now on in this chapter. The 8 coherent accounts were thus systematically 
compared (see Chapter 3) using the four sources of data shown in Table 4.4 below and 
using this framework were cross tabulated with emerging codes which were generated 
by me, as they appeared repetitively, as I analysed using line by line coding within my 
NVivo based data. 

























High risk patients Pts 1, 2, 4, 
5, 6, 7, 3,  
Pts 5, 2, 4, 
6, 7,3,  
Pts 4, 5, 6, 
7,  








Pts 1, 2, 4, 
5, 6, 7, 3,  
Pts 5, 1, 2, 
4, 6, 7,  
Pts 8,  Pts 1, 2, 5, 7, 
3, 
Carer’s role Pts 1, 4,7, 
8 
Pt 5 Pts 4, 5, 
7,8 
 
Blame Pts 1, 2, 5, 
6 
Pts 1, 4, 7 Pts 
1, 6 
Pts 1, 4 
Poor communication 
with staff 
Pts 1, 5, 6, 
7, 8, 
Pts 1, 8, 5, 
2, 4, 6, 7,3, 





Pts 4, 1, 3 Pts 2, 5, 6,  Pts 4, 6,  Pts 4,  
Role of TVN Pts 1, 2,5, 
6, 7,  
Pts 5, 2, 6, 
7,  
Pts 7,  Pts 3,  
Role of HCAs Pts 1, 2, 6,  Pts 1, 5 ,   Pts 5,  
Staff busy Pts 1, 2, 4, 
5, 6, 3,  
Pts 5, 2, 3,  Pts 1, 6, 7, 
8, 3, 
Pts 1, 2, 3  
Governance Pts 1, 2, 5, 
6, 3,  
Pts 2, 4, 6, 
7, 3,  




Pts 1, 2, 5, 
6,7, 8, 3,  
Pts 2, 6, 3,  Pts 2, 5, 6, 
7, 8,  
Pts 2, 5,  





Pts 2, 3,  Pts 1, 2, 4, 
5,6, 7, 8 
Pts 2,  
Delayed response  Pts 1, 6, 8,  Pts 5, 2, 6, 
8, 3,  
Pts 2, 6, 7, 
8, 3,  
 





Documentation-poor Pts 1, 2, 5, 
6, 7,  
Pts 5, 2, 7, 
3,  




Pts 1, 2, 4, 
5, 6, 8 
Pts 2,  Pts 1, 6, 7, 
3,  
 
Sequence of events Pts 1, 2, 6, 
8,  
Pts 2, 4,  Pts 1, 6, 8, 
3,  
Pts 1,  
Decision in complex 
system 
Pts 1, 4, 5, 
6, 3,  
Pts 5, 2, 
4,6,3, 
Pts 6, 3,  Pts 1, 3,  
Explanations  Pts 1, 2, 3, 
4, 5, 6, 7, 8 
  
 
The raw data sources (DS 1-4) were therefore analysed inductively using line-by-line 
open coding at this stage, drawing on the Grounded Theory technique of open coding 
(Glaser and Strauss, 1967) (see Chapter 3 for further discussion). Open coding 
produced emerging patterns (see Table 4.3) that were then categorised into new 
constructs arising from the data (using NVivo 8 software). 
The codes that were identified from open coding and cross patterning were then 
ordered into a graphical and hierarchical representation of causal and variable patterns 
(see Figure 4.5 below), with prominent and cluster themes (grey boxes) and sub-
themes (clear boxes) according mainly to the strength and frequency of their 
occurrence. I then identified causal patterns and relationships according to these (see 
arrows) which helped me to formulate new tentative hypotheses to explore further. 
Emmel (a realist) suggests that, causal powers and liabilities can be described and re-
described, as the powers of the sample are better understood (Emmel, 2013), and this 
is what I began to do at this stage.  Although I had returned to the raw data sources for 
open coding purposes; my analysis and ordering the data in the coding framework 
above (Table 4.3) allowed me to see that the repetitive codes corresponded in some 
ways, although not completely, to areas in my literature review, and could be 
categorised as such. These were that the explanations could be categorised at 
individual or dyadic, decision based or team and psycho-social level, socio-cultural 
level and macro or service level.  This initial analysis was coupled with the expert 







Patient/individual level analysis 
 





Delays in decision making regarding risk of pressure ulcers 
       Decision making in complex system 
Defensive communication  
Delays in response (by the MDT team) 
Other priorities  
Role of TVN 
Role of HCA 
Inadequate 
documentation  
Inadequate and missing RCAs  
Staff busy 
Lack of responsibility/passing patient on  
Clinicians failed to 
listen to patient 
and carer 
 
High risk patients (Pts 1-8) 
Ward moves/organisational upheaval 
Sequence of events  
Risk assessment issues 
Failing to act on high 












Figure 4.5: Variable patterns and tentative theories 











4.11 Brief overview of coding strategy and categorisation 
Below I summarise the cluster themes and sub-themes which arose from my data 
coding and cross-checking. During and after coding, I noted strong and recurrent 
relationships between emerging constructs and combined these, categorising these 
into hypotheses to discuss and test, using an iterative coherence check with the data 
(George and Bennett, 2005, Yin, 2003, Emmel, 2013). Themes are sketched rather 
than examined in detail in this chapter, for reasons of space within this thesis. 
However, testable candidate explanations which emerged from the themes are 
developed in further detail in the next four discussion chapters.  
4.12 Patient and micro level analysis 
The first area of analysis related to those at micro level, where interactions between 
individuals impacted on the development of patients’ pressure ulcers. Below are the 
themes which fell into this category.  
4.12a. High risk patients 
All of the patients in the study were at high risk for developing a pressure ulcer 
according to risk factor review evidence (Briggs et al., 2013). They were all immobile, 
and had either had a previous wound breakdown (Alex, Chris, Danni, Elliott, Glenn; 
Data Sources (DS) 1, 2, 3, 4) or they were very ill, or immobile, and needed a lot of 
care and service input (Bernie, Chris, Danni, Elliott, Frankie, Glenn; DS 1, 2, 3, 4 ). Or, 
for Hilary this was being on the floor at home without help, for a long period of time. 
This evidence was picked up largely from the clinical notes and patient’s history. 
However, interview data also offered evidence such as ‘this was a poorly patient, (TVN, 
Bernie)’ ‘she had multiple co-morbidities’ (Physio, Bernie), ‘he was a very poorly man’ 
(Expert Witness, Elliot). This was the most prominent theme to emerge from the data, 
and not surprisingly, given the evidence of risk of pressure ulcer development in frail 
and vulnerable patients (see Table 1 above).  
4.12b Carer’s role. 
Particularly for Elliott and Glenn, the carers were prominent in decision-making and 
providing continuity of care for their relative (DS 1, 2, 3). This was apparent from their 
knowledge about pressure ulcer care and comments within their interviews. For 







For the community dwelling patients; Danni and Glenn, services often ‘relied’ on the 
carer knowing what to do for the patient. They were expected to aid services. For 
example, typical phrases used by carers were ‘I move his legs from one side, into the 
middle, to the other side, into middle, other side…I alternate them like that.’ Glenn’s 
wife also noted that she supplemented the DNs care with her own approach to Glenn’s 
care. For example, she said, ‘Next Monday when they come, I’ll say, well, we’ve got to 
do it this way’ 
At times the role of the carer had a negative effect for the patients, namely for Danni 
and Glenn (Data Sources 1, 2, 3) particularly when Danni’s husband been asked to do 
a swab of Danni’s wound, but because he hadn’t labelled it correctly, so it was 
discarded, causing delays in Danni’s treatment. Glenn’s wife refused an air mattress for 
Glenn, when offered one from the DNs, which may have contributed to his severe 
pressure ulcer development. Further thematic examples of the carer’s role are in Table 
4.5 below: 
Table 4.5 Carer’s role 
Carer’s role Typical Evidence 
Alex Carers did not feature 
Bernie Carers did not feature 
Chris Carers did not feature 
Danni ‘Yeah, he watched them do it and then he did 
it and it was fine, he didn’t do any damage to 
it or anything, but they came, you know it was 
them that was coming on.’(Danni) 
‘they came in the week, yeah, they came 
through the week, when they knocked the 
weekend off he did it at the weekend’ (Danni) 
Elliott  I want ... you to get in touch with CARER ... 







I just got them from the chemist and some 
micropores, something. And it was just, really 
... it hadn’t broken initially, it was just to stop 
them rubbing against it. And then it broke 
down and even then, it wasn’t infected at all -- 
it was a little bit weepy but it wasn’t 
infected.’(Elliott’s carer/daughter) 
Frankie Not relevant 
Glenn ‘she (Glenn’s wife) does an awful lot of his 
cares along with the carers, she does his 
catheter and I think she does his bowels 
when we’re not there, you know, if he needs 
them doing.’ (DN) 
‘And I said to one of the nurses at the 
surgery, Well, what happens if they don’t do 
it? I said  Can I do it? She says, Of course 
you can’ (Carer) 
 
Hilary (Hilary’s carer) ‘I asked them  (the 
neighbours) to keep an eye on her, you see 
... I  look after them for that reason – and I 
thought they would have noticed that the 
bedroom curtains were closed during the 
day.’ 
 
4.12c Poor communication/relationships between patients, carers and staff 
Other prominent themes arising from inductive coding were poor communication and 
relationships between patients, carers and staff. Bernie was seen as non compliant, but 
her cognition was poor and she couldn’t retain information (DS 1). Alex knew her own 
condition and needs well (from being paraplegic for a long time and accessing services 
for a number of years), but the staff appeared ‘too busy’ to accommodate her toileting 
needs which led to a breakdown in relationships with nursing staff (DS 1, 2, 3).  





than staff were prepared for on the ward she was on (DS 1; 2). Alternatively, Danni, 
Elliott and Glenn were patients who had what they considered good relationships with 
staff. Danni, for example noted that the District nurses were ‘like friends’ but despite 
this, her needs were not fully met by services (DS 1, 2; 4). For example, Danni suffered 
time delays in her referral and treatment that led to her ulcer worsening (DS 1, 2, 3, 4); 
Elliott was not asked about his pressure ulcer (DS 1, 3) although he was aware he had 
one, as was his carer, but the ward staff were not.  
Time delays in communication with health care staff affected the development of 
Glenn’s ulcer in a similar manner to Danni’s (DS 1; 2; 3), which was apparent from his 
sequence of events chronology. See Table 4.6 below for further examples of poor 
communication between patients, carers and staff. 
Table 4.6: Poor communication 
communication/relationships Typical Evidence 
Alex ‘I was left in my faeces for several hours. 
‘the staff had forgotten to turn me  in the 
night because,  ‘they were too busy’ (Alex) 
‘I think that’s why I felt so mad with the 
Sister that morning when I sat up like I’d 
been told I could do.  I think she felt I was 
sat up too much and then I think after a bit 
they stopped me lying on me back as well 
although that initially that’s what the doctor 
had advised (Alex) 
Bernie ‘She'd comply and you'd go away and turn 
your back and she'd be back on it. I mean 
she would comply and turn with it, but she 
wouldn’t comply to stop on that side, you 
can't force her (Healthcare Assistant). 
 
‘any time we turn her today, left side, by the 
time we turn she’s back to the right side, so 
if she is lying down we all agreed that she 






Chris Then they said we’ll move you down and 
whether they didn’t think about the bed or 
not, but they should think shouldn’t they 
really’(Chris) 
‘he was determined to walk’ (staff nurse) 
Danni ‘they (DNs) came in the week, yeah, they 
came through the week, when they knocked 
the weekend off he did it at the 
weekend’(Danni) 
Elliott ‘it was the only time I had any kind of 
communication, really -- she phoned me 
back to say (it was the next day) that she 
agreed with what I said. And they cleaned 
his mouth and I think she said to me it’d 
taken six packs to clean his mouth’.(carer) 
Frankie ‘Apparently I’m [bedbound] and walking 
about the ward frequently. It’s wrongly 
scored. No, no. They didn’t talk to me. They 
didn’t ask me any of the questions.’(Frankie) 
‘’That was probably the last moment I felt 
safe on that ward. I hadn’t felt very safe all 
day, but this was now sort of evening time 
and I was slipping into, ‘I’m in an emergency 
admission ward at the weekend, at night, 
and this is one of the worst places to be in 
the hospital’(Frankie) 
Glenn ‘I felt like she (Glenn’s wife) didn’t have a 
belief or a trusting relationship with them.’ 
(TVN) 
 
And there was no communication between 





to ...either the TVN or the spinal injuries unit, 
,or anybody. Or the GP.’ (Expert witness) 
 
Hilary Not relevant 
 
4.12d. Blaming each other (despite complex needs) 
There was a suggestion of ‘blame’ on the carer and patient arising from themes within 
the evidence gathered. This was noticeable for Alex, Bernie, Danni, Elliott, Frankie and 
Glenn (DS 1, 2, 3, and 4). For each of these patients, the word ‘blame’ was associated 
with their, their carer’s or health professionals’ accounts. Typical phrases involved ‘Alex 
appeared to want individual care’ (DS 1, 2, 3), Bernie had a contracture and ‘preferred 
to lie in one position’ (DS 1)’, Danni was seen as too ‘private’ for an assessment (DS 1, 
2, 3), Elliott’s carer ‘caused issues’ with staff (DS 1, 2, 3), as did Frankie (DS 1, 2, 3) 
who was described as ‘emotional’. Finally, Glenn’s carer was blamed for ‘refusing’ an 
electronic mattress (DS 2, 3).  
The notion of ‘blame’ was apparent between and within services too. Staff members 
were often defensive. Regarding Chris, some services blamed the other services 
involved in his care for ‘poorer care’ (DS 1, 2). Typical phrases included ‘I’m 
disappointed that they didn’t do that’ (Consultant)  and ‘it was the ward that should 
have done that’ (TVN). This was also the case for Bernie, where groups of staff in 
hospital hierarchies blamed other staff groups for ‘poor skin care’. For example the 
HCAs noted that the qualified staff were not turning patients, as ‘regularly as they 
should have been’ (DS 1, 2, 4). Frankie’s case was similar, as ward staff blamed other 
wards for her pressure ulcer. One staff nurse noted that ‘she’d been off our ward for 
over a week then, when it developed’ (DS 1, 3). See Table 4.7 below for further 
examples: 
Table 4.7: Blaming each other 
Blaming each other Typical Evidence 
Alex ‘it sort of got thrown back at me that it was my 
fault that…which annoyed me a bit, I felt I had 






Bernie ‘‘and everybody (MDT) rallied round and we 
said to her that if she doesn’t lie away from 
the place that is going to develop into a big 
sore, and she kept on lying on it’ (Staff nurse) 
‘We do tell them (Staff nurses) and in one ear 
and they think they know better’(HCA) 
Chris ‘I think even though he was seen by us 
(TVNs) as, almost unofficially, but we saw 
him on the ward, they will have been given all 
that advice and support there and then, 
unfortunately you can’t please everybody if 
they’ve not followed advice and 
support..’(TVN) 
 
Danni ‘I don’t know, I can always remember a nurse 
coming in once for this year, not this surgery, 
and saying to me ‘You’ve not been looking 
after yourself’, and it was her attitude to me 
that made me think that everybody else 
would think well, you’ve not been looking 
after yourself you know’(Danni) 
Elliott ‘I was told by this doctor in A&E that I’d had 
him discharged against medical 
advice.’(Carer) 
‘it was as if you were being a nuisance’ 
(Carer) 
Frankie  ‘it was-do this for me do that for me’(HCA) 
 
‘you know, you ... what she maybe doesn’t 
appreciate is that that other nurse ... you 







Glenn ‘ she (Glenn’s wife) didn’t want a mattress 
because she didn’t want to pay for the 
electricity.’(DN) 
 
‘I expected to go and it be an awkward 
family…but II think she’s (Glenn’s carer)more 
... questioning why’ (TVN) 
 
Hilary Not applicable  
 
4.13 Socio-cultural level analysis 
4.13a. Role of TVN 
The escalation of care of a patient often involved bringing in the advice and response 
of the TVNs. This appeared to happen late in a patient’s journey through services 
(Danni, Elliott, Glenn; DS1, 2, 3, 4). Often the TVNs said that they would have 
preferred to have been brought in earlier, as they could have helped to alleviate the 
worsening of the SPU, but there was confusion over the role of the TVNs amongst 
nursing staff. (This role is discussed in more detail later in this thesis in the sections on 
Decision-making and Communication; Chapters 6 and 7). Some staff felt that TVNs 
were too busy to be contacted, so coped with the patient until a PU became a SPU. 
The TVNs said that they usually were brought in for more complicated SPUs (namely 
for Alex, Bernie, Chris, Danni, Elliott, Frankie, Glenn, Hilary; DS 1, 2, 3).  See Table 
4.8. 
Table 4.8: Role of TVN 
Role of TVN Typical Evidence 
Alex ‘We only access the TVN specialists if we are 
really stuck.’ (Staff nurse) 
‘the TVN is only part-time and it might be a 
few days before she is accessible, which 





Bernie ‘Unfortunately we couldn’t get tissue viability 
to see her enough because there’s not 
enough tissue viability,’ ‘there’s two of them 
and they’re really busy’. (Dr) 
Chris ‘‘even though they (the ward) referred him to 
us they didn’t need to because he was 
already under the diabetes team which is 
standard’ (TVN). This was wrong information 
as Chris had a pressure ulcer, not a diabetic 
foot ulcer  on his foot. 
Danni ‘the remaining Tissue Viability nurses were  
struggling,’ (TVN) 
‘there was no access to Tissue Viability 
because they cover in other localities’ (TVN) 
Elliott ‘he’d been in quite a while before I saw him…’ 
we say if a patient develops a Grade 2 in 
hospital, we need to have them referred, 
because somebody that comes in with a 2 is 
usually being looked after by somebody at 
home’ (TVN) 
‘a lot of nurses feel a bit tentative about 
auctioning something’ (Staff nurse) 
Frankie ‘it was just chance that I got a phone call from 
the doctor saying we’ve got this patient in 
Outpatients now, can you come and see 
them?’(Consultant) 
Glenn  ‘ the initial referral –was mostly about, the 
mattress.’ (TVN) 
Hilary Not relevant 
 
4.13b. Role of HCA 
HCAs were often responsible for the initial care of the skin, and were relied on to report 





these staff were not trained adequately enough in patient skin care (especially those 
working with Bernie, Elliott, Glenn). With the exception of Danni and Alex, HCAs were 
not comfortable to be left with this responsibility. For those involved with Danni and 
Alex particularly, the HCAs were confident and well trained in skin care, however for 
the other patients the HCAs felt inadequately trained to take this skin inspection role on 
(in particular for Bernie, Elliott, and Frankie; DS 1). Typical phrases included ‘it wasn’t 
our job to assess skin’ and ‘It’s down to qualified nurses to do’. There was often a delay 
however, in communication between HCAs reporting skin damage, and the nurses’ 
response because it relied on a handover of information on an informal basis on shifts 
(particularly for Alex, Bernie, Chris, Danni, Elliott, Frankie, Glenn; DS 1). Some HCAs 
felt frustrated and annoyed that they could observe skin breakdown, but the nurses did 
not act on this, and also they were not allowed to record information about skin, but 
had to relay it to qualified staff. Typical evidence of this issue included phrases such as 
‘when you go to a qualified… I’m sorry but I’ve no time, I’m doing medicine’ (HCA). 
Further examples of the role of the HCA are in Table 4.9 below: 
 Table 4.9: Role of HCA  
Role of HCA Typical Evidence 
Alex The HCAs ‘know what’s going on with every 
patient on the ward’.(HCA) 
 
Bernie ‘with me only being helper I wouldn’t find it 
(SPU) anyway’ ‘if somebody says to me, 
right, she’s got to be turned every two hours, I  
turn every two hours’ (HCA) 
‘they rely heavily on the HCAs to come and 
tell them about skin status on this ward’ 
(Ward Manager) 
‘ a break in the skin ?, I always go to the 
nurse to have a look so that it’s all 
documented’ (HCA) 
‘when I’m washing a patient I always go and 







Chris ‘Well the healthcare assistants get patients 
up so you know’ (Staff nurse) 
Danni ‘we discuss it as a team’ (HCA and DN) 
‘HCA 1 is really well up on everything’ (DN) 
,’I like anything really, bloods, wound care – 
anything.  I’ll do anything yeah’ (HCA) 
 
Elliott ‘he was a guy that needed us to do all cares, 
basically’ (HCA) 
‘we didn’t have anything to do with the 
bandages’ because that’s not my position to 
do that.’ (HCA) 
 
Frankie  ‘healthcare-wise, [during the re-organisation] 
we were generally moving the stuff, so we 
couldn’t really look after the patients’ 
‘(HCA) 
I think we should record in the notes because 
we’re the people that are going and wash 
them and see them, rather than the nurses, 
but we see them and then go tell the nurse 
‘(HCA) 
 
Glenn ‘We have to praise ourselves because 
nobody does’ (HCA/Carer) 
we don’t actually see the PU…Because it’s 
always covered up’ (HCA/Carer) 
 





4.13c. Role of doctor 
Doctors played an interesting role regarding pressure ulcer care, although some 
seemed to highlight to the researcher that it was not their area of concern, and they 
used phrases such as ‘skin care is seen as a nursing issue’ (particularly for Bernie and 
Frankie; DS 2, 3, 4). However, they often escalated care for patients above the nurses 
(Alex, Bernie, Danni, Frankie; DS 1, 2, 3). There was something about the decision-
making related to this area that was recurrent in several of the cases and needed 
further analysis and attention. This is examined in further detail in the discussion 
chapter regarding decision-making. Examples of the doctors’ role are in Table 4.10 
below:  
Table 4.10: Role of doctor 
Role of doctor Typical Evidence 
Alex ‘in an organisation with such complexity 
(NHS) it needs someone who has the 
coordinating ability to actually work the 
system.’ (Dr) 
‘some consultants , including surgeons, still 
aren’t aware of current NICE guidelines 
which, state that patients with Grade 3 or 4 
ulcers should be put back to bed, and will 
insist they are ‘sat out’’ (TVN) 
Bernie ‘it takes such a long time, they lose the 
bloods, then you’ve to re-do them’ (Dr) 
‘He (the Dr) said to them…why hasn’t this 
been done?  (HCA) 
‘I told the Dr over the pressure 
damage……….’ (HCA) 
‘to be frank, rightly or wrongly, doctors don’t 
particularly play a part in pressure ulcer care’ 
but(Consultant) 
‘I’m really interested in sores because my 





Medical notes: Refer to Tissue Viability-noted 
last week.(Consultant) 
Chris ‘we highlighted to Chris that it was quite a 
serious situation and given his medical 
condition, it would take a lot to get it to heal’ 
(Consultant)  
‘he is a tremendously high risk patient.  And 
taking him off a mattress I don’t think would 
probably be the right thing for 
him.’(Consultant) 
 
Danni There is no access to the Tissue Viability 
service unless the patient is actually referred 
into the acute Trust by the GP (TVN) 
Elliott No evidence in this case 
Frankie  ‘if I’d been called sooner then I would have 
said, ‘ I think we need to do this etc because I 
remembered how difficult the surgery was the 
first time’( Dr) 
‘I knew what she was meaning’ (Dr) 
‘she was actually very sick, I would say’ (Dr) 
‘They maybe hadn’t appreciated the difficulty 
of the initial operation that I had done.’ (Dr) 
Glenn No evidence 
Hilary No evidence 
 
4.13d. Other priorities 
How staff prioritised their patients was a recurrent theme in the data analysis. Typical 
phrases around this theme included ‘other patients were more poorly’, ‘nobody realised 
how high risk she was’.  Chris was considered as too ‘high risk’ by the expert witnesses 





a post-operative surgical ward when the preference was transfer to  HDU (according to 
the Consultant; DS 1, and Expert Witnesses; DS 2). Bernie was transferred to a stroke 
rehabilitation ward, where they were trying to rehabilitative her, but she had pneumonia 
and was really ill (DS 1; 2). Danni was too immobile to attend the GP’s surgery as she 
could not transfer easily onto the bed at the Practice (DS 1, 3). The lack of prioritising 
skin care often meant that the patients’ needs weren’t addressed properly by the staff 
assigned to them. Their needs appeared too much for staff to cope with. Table 4.11 
sets out some examples of competing priorities:  
Table 4.11: Other priorities 
Other priorities  Typical Evidence 
Alex ‘I think maybe two or three times they had 
forgotten to  turn me in the night because they 
were busy’(Alex) 
‘whether they were too busy or forgot, they 
hadn’t been back to turn me’ (Alex) 
Bernie ‘it takes such a long time, they lose the 
bloods, then you’ve to re-do them’ (Dr) 
‘everything is priority on the list and you 
cannot do it’ (Staff nurse) 
 ‘‘the hospital where I was before was a lot 
better staffed and better organised’ (Dr) 
‘This ward does not provide a safe 
environment to  look after elderly patients 
properly’ (Dr) 
‘they (staff nurses) have to prioritise medicine’ 
(HCA) 
Chris ‘I think they were trying to safeguard me and 
make it easier for me (when they put Chris in 
a side room).(Chris) 
‘I think we were maybe short staffed, and over 





been one nurse down for a long time’ (Staff 
nurse) 
‘the original thinking was that if dependency 
got to a certain level that you’d get extra staff 
–but we didn’t’ (Staff nurse) 
Danni  ’ In-house, in our job, we don’t come across 
large pressure sores. If we do get people then 
they are tiny and they are treatable, or they 
are referred to the district nurses.’ (Practice 
Nurse) 
Elliott ‘He could almost have been invisible because 
he was so unobtrusive.’(Staff nurse) 
‘And I think there’s a kind of attitude that you 
don’t need to turn patients  now because 
they’re on all these wonderful mattresses 
(Staff Nurse) 
 
Frankie ‘That’s where your key problem is. They 
originally had colorectal post-op patients, but 
then overnight they had to take the urology 
major cases as well. These are really poorly 
and…what I’m saying is their workload has 
doubled.’( Ward Manager) 
‘ I think if she’d gone onto HDU, then the 
assessments would have been different’ (Dr) 
‘They maybe hadn’t appreciated the difficulty 
of the initial operation that I had done.’ (Dr) 
Glenn ‘But the District Nurses ... they just come in, 
do his bowels, and go.’ (Glenn’s wife) 
‘I suppose they are busy ...’(Glenn’s wife) 







One the main observations from the RCA investigations which were carried out for 
certain patients (Alex, Bernie, Frankie and Hilary), and the clinical notes, was a lack of 
documentation around patients’ skin care, and this seemed to be a causal influence 
around PUs worsening. Elliott’s ulcer was recorded as the wrong body site in the 
clinical notes, and the lack of documents meant his pressure ulcer looked like a 
hospital acquired one, which it wasn’t, as stated by his daughter and carer (DS 4). 
Chris’s notes were noticeably different in quality from ward to ward (DS 1, 4) with 
particularly patchy documentation on the rehabilitation ward where he developed his 
new pressure ulcer. This was in contrast to the vascular surgical ward which he was on 
previously. Glenn’s community nursing notes were very patchy, disordered and 
confusing, and this was noted by the Expert Witnesses (DS 4). Hilary’s notes were 
noticeably very clear and well set out, but she developed her pressure ulcer outside the 
hospital. This may suggest that when staff know they are not to ‘blame’ for a pressure 
ulcer they are arguably more willing to be very clear in their documentation to note this. 
The worst documentation for several patients was between wards (DS 1, 4). There is 
no table of evidence for this, as the omissions in the data showed the issues, rather 
than written evidence. 
 
4.14 Cluster themes and organisational level analysis 
The rest of the themes referred to cluster themes arising from coding of the data 
(Glaser and Strauss, 1967). I refer to cluster themes as those which have recurring 
codes in the raw data, but which codes also can be categorised in various codes at 
once. These cluster themes were relevant to all of the levels of analysis (namely micro, 
socio-cultural and organisational). However, all of the organisational level themes were 
also cluster themes.  
4.14a. Delayed response 
If staff had responded sooner to a patient’s early skin damage, then for each person it 
might have prevented their pressure ulcer from getting worse and developing into a 
severe pressure ulcer. The community patients (Danni, and Glenn) particularly suffered 
from the consequences of staff delaying referrals or actions regarding their patients’ 
pressure ulcers while they declined gradually (DS 1, 2, 3, 4). Danni’s pressure ulcer 





later when it was examined, and she was assessed properly. Typical examples of 
delayed response included, ‘In hindsight I should have referred her earlier,’ which was 
a comment regarding the practice nurse’s lack of action over Danni’s pressure ulcer, 
and ‘the pressure ulcer deteriorated more until the Tissue Viability Service was called’, 
which was noted by the TVN who was involved in Glenn’s case. Further examples of 
the delays in response by staff towards their patients’ pressure ulcers are highlighted 
below in Table 4.12. This theme again highlights the issue around role of the TVNs, 
and how soon they were contacted when a patient developed a lower grade pressure 
ulcer.  
Table 4.12: Delayed response  
Delayed response  Typical Evidence 
Alex ‘they had forgotten to  turn me in the night 
because they were busy’(Alex) 
‘whether they were too busy or forgot, they 
hadn’t been back to turn me’ (Alex) 
Bernie ‘it takes such a long time, they (pharmacy) 
lose the bloods, then you’ve to re-do them’ 
(Dr) 
‘’staff look at the skin but don't always act on 
it…to get involved at Grade 2 would have 
been better’ (TVN)  
Things get lost because they are not 
recorded’ (TVN) 
Chris  ‘the original thinking was that if dependency 
got to a certain level that you’d get extra staff 
–but we didn’t’(Staff nurse) 
 
Danni   ‘In hindsight, I would have asked the 
husband to attend with her and would have 
checked obviously, what she had said initially 







Elliott ‘they hadn’t taken the bandages down’ 
(Clinical coordinator) 
‘All the patients were left in gowns all 
day’(Carer) 
The nurses walked past and averted their 
gaze’(carer) 
‘nothing gets done about it’ (wound care) 
(HCA) 
 
Frankie ‘tasks got dropped’ (Frankie) 
Glenn ‘I suppose they are busy ...’(Glenn’s wife) 
‘they referred too late’ (TVN) 
Hilary Not relevant 
 
4.14b. Lack of responsibility 
Another prominent pattern, according to initial readings, was that individuals or teams 
did not appear to take responsibility for the decline in a patient’s skin status (particularly 
concerning Alex, Bernie, Chris, Danni, Elliott, Frankie, and Glenn; DS 1, 2, 4). Typical 
examples around this theme included ‘she came to us with it [the pressure ulcer], so it 
wasn’t ours to own’ and ‘nobody did anything’ (Staff nurse). This cluster theme will be 
examined in depth in the following chapters so will be only described briefly here.  
However, repeated themes also emerged from the data analysis that nurses did not 
take responsibility and make decisions about patient care regarding skin status. Often 
the doctors took responsibility to escalate the level of care (Alex, Bernie, Danni, 
Frankie; DS 1, 2, 3, 4). 
However, a certain ‘lack of responsibility’ may also appear as a passive style of care 
towards pressure ulcer developments where the patient was not referred or their skin 
‘prioritised’ (particularly for Bernie, Chris, Danni, Elliott, Frankie, Glenn; DS 1, 2, 4). 
Glenn and his wife appeared to take the most responsibility for his care. For example, 





pressure off his sacrum , she stated, ‘I got some foam, put two pieces of foam together, 
one had a hole in it, so that part of his bottom would go in the hole’. 
Patients appeared to ‘slip between services’ in several patient accounts, and no one 
seemed aware that this had happened until hindsight showed that they had (namely for 
Bernie, Chris, Danni, Elliott and Frankie; DS 1, 2, 3, 4).  Typical phrases around this 
theme included ‘he was under the care of the diabetic foot team’ (Ward manager), and 
‘the District Nurses didn’t pass on that information’ Staff nurse). Patients, and carers to 
an extent, appeared to provide the continuity between services (particularly for Chris, 
Danni, Elliott, Frankie and Glenn; DS 1, 3, 4) but they did not, and were not, able to 
coordinate services. Typical examples of this included,’ they came in the week, … 
when they knocked the weekend off he [Danni’s husband] did it’ and ‘she [Glenn’s 
carer] does his bowels when we’re not there, you know, if he needs them doing.’ 
(HCA). However, members of the Multi Disciplinary Teams tended not to communicate 
with each other (namely for Bernie, Chris, Danni, Frankie, Glenn; DS 1, 2, 4), which left 
further gaps in patient care. For example, the MDT team in Chris’s case did not 
communicate with each other, which was the same for Danni’s, and Glenn’s (DS 1, 2, 
3, 4). Further examples of this theme are included below in Table 4.13. 
Table 4.13: Lack of responsibility  
Lack of responsibility Typical Evidence 
Alex ‘..this lady had a pressure sore and massive 
surgery to it… and if only a little bit opened 
up I don’t think that’s bad management at 
all.’(Ward Manager) 
Bernie ‘they have many patients passing through, 
they can’t remember people individually’ 
(Stroke nurse) 
‘why did the staff not use their clinical 
judgment to assess the high level of risk 
involved with Bernie’ (TVN) 
I got the feeling that there wasn't really 
anybody taking responsibility’ (TVN) 
Chris  ‘we had no communication to what his 





establish his arterial status and know what 
plan the vascular team had for him, we 
couldn’t do anything pro-active’ (TVN) 
 
Danni ’her issues started way back when she was a 
teenager, really, when she ceased to be her 
mum’s responsibility and ceased to be 
health’s responsibility ‘ (Expert witness) 
‘they didn’t have the ‘man power’ to check on 
patients and they have to refer themselves. ‘ 
(Occupational Therapist)  
 
Elliott It’s almost like you give up-you think I can’t 
do it anyway’ (Staff nurse)’ 
‘Nobody cared’ (Expert witness) 
 
Frankie there was little verbal communication 
between the medics and the ward. (Dr) 
 
there ‘wasn’t a proper handover from 
recovery to the ward’ (Dr) 
Glenn ‘‘They didn’t refer to the TVS or contact the 
spinal cord injury ...nobody did 
anything.’(Expert witness) 
 
Hilary Ambulance staff passed on clear information 








4.14c. Staff busy 
Health care staff’s perception was that understaffing  was one issue that led to the 
patients in this study developing an SPU, and this was definitely a theme which was 
apparent from the data, particularly for Alex, Bernie, Chris, Elliott, Frankie, and Glenn 
(DS 1, 2, 3, 4). Chris and Frankie noticed this for themselves on the ward (DS 3), and 
Glenn’s carer noted that District Nurses were ‘too busy’ to free up time for anything 
other than bowel care (DS 1, 3). In Bernie’s case, most of the staff mentioned ‘staffing 
issues’ in their interviews (DS 1), as did Elliott’s nursing staff (DS 1).  
Often issues with staffing were apparent where there was no contingency plan in place 
to counteract the understaffing problems. Alex was resident on the ward over a bank 
holiday weekend (DS 1) and felt the staff were ‘too busy’ at this point, Bernie’s ward 
was chronically understaffed, which was noted by a number of interviewees, including 
the doctors, the HCAs, the Ward Manager and Staff nurses (DS 1, 4). For Chris, the 
staff appeared ‘too busy’ to be fully aware of his high risk (DS 3), Elliott’s staff were 
preoccupied with a ward relocation upheaval (DS 1, 2, 4), as were Frankie’s (DS 1, 2, 
3, 4). Glenn’s staff had not addressed any other than his bowel care, so they only 
focused on, and allowed time for this task (DS 3, 4). More examples are shown in 
Table 4.14 below: 
Table 4.14: Staff busy 
Staff busy Typical Evidence 
Alex ‘they were busy’ (Alex) 
‘whether they were too busy or forgot, they 
hadn’t been back to turn me’ (Alex) 
Bernie ‘it isn’t a failure of ownership it’s that…they’re 
incredibly busy,’ (Dr) 
‘because there’s two of them, and they’re 
really busy’ (Dr regarding TVNs).  
Chris  ‘the original thinking was that if dependency 
got to a certain level that you’d get extra staff 






Danni Practice nurse only had ten minute 
appointments (TVN) 
Elliott ‘the ratio now is 60:40 unqualified to qualified, 
whereas if was the other way round years 
ago’ (Carer) 
Staff do not have enough time (to document) 
they are too busy’ (Clinical coordinator) 
 
Frankie ‘ at the time she would have been on a busy 
ward’ (Ward Manager) 
Glenn ‘I suppose they are busy ...’(Glenn’s wife) 
 
Hilary Not relevant 
 
4.14d. Defensive communication and culture 
The defensive culture around SPUs was apparent in how the staff reacted to the 
research study. For several of the eight patients, staff members were not easily 
available to interview, and made it difficult when they were interviewed. This was 
evidenced in the response by staff to the researcher when trying to arrange and carry 
out interviews (which is further discussed in the Methods chapter). This happened 
particularly regarding interviews with staff who worked with Hilary, Chris, Frankie, and 
Bernie; DS 3). Often under these circumstances this was indicative of another issue 
with the ward or service which had made them particularly defensive. For example, for 
Hilary one of the wards was undergoing an inquiry by the CQC (DS 3). The sister on 
this ward refused to allow any of her staff to be interviewed. For Chris, the community 
and acute sites had a poor relationship, as did the staff who worked together caring for 
Bernie. Fortunately, other evidence from different data sources often made this area of 
data collection unnecessary. By using reflective field notes and recording issues, 
stressful and defensive environments could be identified in this way, as it gave a good 
indication of how the ward ‘culture’ was (which is discussed below). Further examples 






Table 4.15: Defensive culture 
Defensive culture Typical Evidence 
Alex  ‘the patient didn’t look after herself as well as 
she could. The breakdown of the wound after 
surgery was ‘just one of those things, (staff 
nurse) 
This nurse was reluctant to engage with the 
interview, and seemed defensive (Field 
Notes)  
Bernie  ‘there are wards that I know that are very 
good and wards that I know that are bad’ 
(TVN) 
Chris  ‘he left here (Acute Trust) without a pressure 
ulcer.  And even looking at those 
photographs, you can tell that had developed 
within the last few days’ (Consultant) 
Danni ‘Danni did not keep off her sore as much as 
she should have done,’ (Practice nurse) 
Elliott ‘I would have taken off the bandages, with 
that doctor there, because I always do.’ (Staff 
nurse) 
‘it isn’t hospital-acquired, his pressure ulcer, 
though, is it? Because he’s come in with it 
and we’ve documented it.’ (Staff nurse) 
 
Frankie ‘I wanted to say that, to me, the initial poor 
assessments started within the (specialist) 
ward’ (Matron) 
Glenn ‘ he was discharged home on the 27th…And 
then he doesn’t come in until the 22nd of 
October.so there’s something happened then’ 





‘Every time he’s come his skin looks 
dry…And I ask, are you using anything at 
home?’ (Staff nurse respite) 
 
Hilary ‘And the A&E consultant, came and he asked 
me if she had a pressure sore, and I said, 
yes, they’ve found one and they 
photographed it that day so that they weren’t 
liable for any claim.’ (Hilary’s carer) 
 
4.14e. RCAs inadequate 
Investigations into why patients developed their severe pressure ulcers, known as Root 
Cause Analyses (RCAs) in the NHS (so called because they look for the root causes of 
a serious harm affecting a patient) were conducted for certain patients (namely Elliott 
and Frankie). Yet, despite guidance from the National Patient Safety Agency and 
Department of Health (Department of Health, 1997, NHS Direct, 2011), which 
suggested all severe pressure ulcers should undergo an investigation into their root 
causes, Bernie’s original RCA investigation was never found, (another was carried out 
by the onsite TVN), Chris, as a diabetic foot patient,  was seen as out of the remit of 
the ward so the management staff didn’t conduct an investigation (DS 1, 2); Danni 
didn’t have an RCA because the investigations were not used in the community at that 
time (DS 1), and Hilary’s SPU was unavoidable, so her situation did not trigger an 
investigation (DS 1, 2, 3, 4). However, regardless of the investigations being carried 
out, the RCAs which were conducted for patients did not find the same issues with 
pressure ulcer causes and care as the study found. Elliott’s RCA concluded that ‘lack 
of documentation’ was a main issue, and was very vague in its recommendations and 
scope (DS 1, 4), Frankie’s RCA only included the nurses on the wards as informants 
and for evidence, and didn’t include doctors (who, when interviewed had more of an 
overview of what had happened to complicate her care) (DS 1, 4). Frankie’s RCA 
consisted only of a verbal meeting (I observed this), and a brief discussion, which had 
no documented learning points or recommendations other than requiring better passing 
on of documents from surgery to wards (DS 1, 4). This theme was included as RCAs 
were frequently  referred to as a source of learning and service improvement, yet this 
study found different outcomes from the RCAs (when they did happen) in comparison 





take place should have been done as they fitted the criteria for a patient safety 
investigation into the severe pressure ulcers (Secretary of State, 2014, Wallace et al., 
2009). This was particularly relevant for Bernie, Chris, Danni and Glenn.  
4.14f. Risk assessment issues 
When risk assessments were filled in they did not really help to show any visible 
decline in patients’ skin unless they were filled in regularly. Many of these were not as 
regularly carried out as they should have been. An exception to this was on the surgical 
ward where Chris was admitted previously, before he developed his new severe 
pressure ulcer. Because risk assessments were filled in very regularly, it was easy to 
see the pattern of decline in his skin status (DS 1, 4). However, in the main, within this 
study,  risk assessments and care plans were patchy and poorly completed, which did 
not describe the patient’s worsening condition (namely for Bernie, Chris, Danni, Elliott, 
Frankie, Glenn; DS 1, 4). There were no direct interview quotes about this area, as the 
evidence was picked up from nursing and medical notes, and the evidence was found 
due to noting omitted data, rather than written evidence. The chronological timelines 
which recorded these issues are available on request.   
4.14g. Sequence of events 
The deterioration of SPUs can be shown by a sequence of events which unfolds over 
time (and was apparent from the data collected as part of this thesis), but staff in the 
study often had no real sense that the deterioration in skin status was happening 
because documentation and actions were not monitored or audited. When patients 
were not tracked from ward to ward their skin often deteriorated without anyone 
noticing. This issue is examined in detail in the following Discussion chapters. The 
decline in skin status was most apparent for Bernie, Chris, Danni and Glenn (DS 1) 
from analysing their clinical notes. It is more obvious in hindsight how each PU got 
worse, but not always apparent to staff on the frontline in real time, who handover what 
they see as important, but only what they see at the time (DS 1). The sequences of 
events data are not available in this thesis as they make patient data too identifiable. 
The expert witnesses noted in their reviews that sequences of events were of 
importance in combination with organisational issues for Bernie, Danni and Frankie 
(DS 2). An example of this concerned Frankie, where one witness noted that ‘‘I think 
there’s also a sequence of events – that she wasn’t assessed properly at the beginning 
–By nurses or doctors –And that she wasn’t identified as that high risk, so no care plan 





pressure ulcer were noted by the expert witnesses to be ‘cumulative’ and she was not 
assessed until Day 7.  
4.14h. Ward moves/organisational upheaval 
Moving about from ward to ward was an issue for several patients in the study. Bernie 
was moved across geographical sites, as well as not being recollected by staff 
members during the time she was admitted onto the stroke ward. This issue was the 
same for Chris, Elliott and Frankie; DS 1, 4). One of the ward managers on a ward that 
Frankie was admitted onto did not know who she was, and refused any interviews 
because of this (DS 1), and certain staff refused interviews under the same conditions 
for Elliott (DS 1). The ward and geographical moves meant not only that the patients 
weren’t as well known to nurses as they should have been, but that along their pathway 
through care, other service  level priorities clashed with their needs. Further examples 
of this theme are shown in Table 4.16.  
Table 4.16: Ward moves 
Ward moves/upheaval Typical Evidence 
Alex Not relevant 
Bernie ‘they should have remembered her, she’s 
pretty memorable’ Bernie had complex 
problems, it wasn’t simply a stroke’, (Dr)  
Chris  ‘He was under the care of the diabetic foot 
team, so not us (Ward Manager)  
Danni Not relevant 
Elliott We get quite a lot [of patients from supported 
living’ ](Staff nurse) 
We get patients referred to us who’ve been 
in hospital 24 hours and they’ve still got the 
bandages on from home (TVN) 
The ward do ring the DN but it’s not routine 
and not seamless care (Matron) 
Frankie ‘She came from theatre so we won’t have 





from her name and what surgery she’s had. 
So we had to just get the basics.’ (Staff 
nurse) 
Glenn  Glenn moved from home to a national 
treatment centre to a respite unit.(Field 
notes) 
Hilary Not relevant 
 
4.14i. Decisions in a complex system 
Staff members appeared to be operating under complex conditions, which seemed 
stressful for staff involved (namely Alex, Bernie, Chris, Danni, Elliott, Frankie and 
Glenn; DS 1, 2, 3, 4).  Typical phrases regarding the conditions they worked under 
included, ‘it was chaos’ (Ward manager) and ‘we didn’t get chance to sit down as a 
team and discuss her complex needs’ (Physiotherapist-regarding Bernie). There 
seemed to be no time for staff reflecting on or auditing their work as they carried it out, 
or for checking their assessments. Typical evidence of this included missing 
documentation in clinical records. Staff made decisions under the circumstances, with 
the knowledge that was available to them at that time (DS 1, 2, 4). A typical example of 
this decision-making under complexity included the decision made by ward staff to 
move Chris into a side room near the dining room on his ward, partly because he had 
tested positive for a diarrhoea virus and partly so that he didn’t have to walk as far to 
the dining room. They then overlooked the fact that he was placed on a mattress which 
was not suitable for a high risk patient. Other examples included the decision to 
rehabilitate Bernie, although she was very poorly and confused at the time. 
The healthcare environment appeared complex in the study and there was no margin 
for error, or for reflecting if problems did happen (DS 1). Typical examples of this 
included ‘in hindsight I would have referred her earlier’ (Practice nurse) and ‘she should 
really have gone to HDU’ (Consultant). There was an exception to this regarding the 
first ward that Chris was on, which used a surgical huddle technique of reflecting 
weekly as a team when things did go wrong (DS 1, 4). Although staff felt like it was an 
‘extra task’ that they were not keen on carrying out, they still recognised the value of it 





Staff appeared in the main to try their best under these complex circumstances, which 
was evidenced in a range of interviews (DS 3), but which sometimes had adverse 
consequences. See Table 4.17 below for examples: 
Table 4.17: Decisions in complex system 
Decisions in a complex system Typical Evidence 
Alex  ‘the nurse made a judgement based on her 
experience, which I respected’ (Dr) 
Bernie  ‘she was complicated. Everyone was 
involved…’(Consultant) 
‘it becomes difficult when people are trying to 
prioritise management and for example you 
work in stroke so they focus on that rather 
then long term management of her 
contractures’ (TVN) 
Chris ‘I think they were trying to safeguard me-it 
was a slip up’ (Chris) 
Danni  ’the holistic assessment potentially goes 
because of the time pressure that they 
(Practice nurses) are under, and they’ve only 
got what the patient’s going to tell them.’ 
(TVN) 
‘how can they fit that into a ten minute 
appointment where the patient’s got to come 
in the door, get on the couch, have a dressing 
done,  say goodbye and then the nurse has 
got to start writing all the notes and refer 
them’ (TVN) 
Elliott  ‘I didn’t have anything to do with [looking 
under] the bandages’ because that’s not my 
position to do that.’ (HCA) 
We often don’t change bandages because it’s 
five o’clock…pharmacy’s shut and we can’t 





Frankie ‘we had to apologise to so many patients and 
say, this is what’s happening, we’ve been told’ 
(Staff nurse) 
And then they discovered that the mattress 
that they’d ordered wasn’t compatible with my 
bedframe. So they had to wait for another 
bed, a different type of bed to become free’ 
(Frankie). 
 
Glenn ‘Glenn’s wife refused a mattress’ (TVN) 
Hilary Not relevant 
 
4.15 Collapsing themes to produce tentative, testable hypotheses 
At this stage of analysis I re-formulated testable hypotheses out of the collated 
thematic evidence. I returned to immersing myself in the patterns, level of analysis and 
themes arising from the data. I analysed these in more depth going back to the NVivo 
codes and raw data. I then collapsed the initial codes into four new tentative 
hypotheses to test against other evidence (which are shown at the bottom of Figure 6). 
This process of collapsing codes at this stage seemed to lend itself emergently into 
individual or dyadic level of analysis, team or psycho social analysis, socio-cultural 
levels of analysis, and service or organisational level of analysis. It then became easier 
to examine the relationships between codes, focusing on the data at these different 
levels of analysis. The collapsing of codes within these areas produced four distinct 
candidate explanations or hypotheses for further analysis as follows: 
4.16 Hypothesis 1: Patients’ and carers’ voices were not heard (analysis at micro, 
individual and dyadic level). 
This hypothesis combined the codes around high risk patients, the carer’s role, blame, 
the role of HCAs, delayed response, and relationships with staff, and combining these 
codes enabled me to examine the evidence at a micro and individual or dyadic level.  
This focused on patients, carers and often the views of individual staff.  
There were several recurring constructs referring to the health care staff’s response to 





analysis emerging around the relationships between them at this micro level, but there 
were issues around responding to the needs of patients when they interacted with staff. 
For example Alex, Chris, Danni, Elliott, Frankie, and Glenn all felt that their interactions 
with certain staff members contributed to the development of their pressure ulcer (DS 
3), and felt that their voices were not heard by staff.  Alex, Chris, Danni, Elliott, Frankie 
and Glenn also referred to a delayed response to their needs by staff at this dyadic 
interactive level (see above Tables for details). On the other hand, staff working with 
Alex, Bernie, Danni, and Frankie all referred to difficulties in dealing with their patients 
(DS 1). HCAs were often responsible for patients, with staff nurses trained more fully in 
pressure ulcer care taking a lesser role (Alex, Bernie, Elliott, Glenn; DS 1, 2, 3, 4).  
 
Fig 4.6 Patient voices 
4.17 Hypothesis 2: Difficulties in decision-making within a complex system 
(analysis at psycho-social level) 
This candidate explanation combined the thematic codes around delays in decision-
making, delays in response, high risk patients, sequence of events, other priorities, and 
the role of the doctor The focus here was on the psycho-social decision making by 
individuals, and why these decisions were often difficult for them to make under 
complex circumstances (see Figure 4.7 below).  
Although decision-making also relates to the Safety Culture theory, there were a lot of 



























these decisions around pressure ulcer care, so much so that this area needed to be 
examined separately from a theory around safety culture. Nurses particularly, were 
somehow unable or not empowered to make decisions for patients in several cases 
(DS 1, 2, 3; see Table 18) namely for Bernie, Danni, Frankie, and Glenn. This lack of 
decision-making seemed to be associated with task-based, rather than judgement 
oriented nursing (particularly for Alex, Bernie, Chris, Danni, Elliott, Frankie, Glenn; DS 
1, 2, 4). This theory will be developed in the chapter on decision-making so will not be 
developed further here. However, delays in decisions appeared to have an effect on 
the development of severe pressure ulcers. Although patients’ risks were documented 
(to an extent), they were not prioritised (particularly Bernie, Chris, Danni, Elliott, Frankie 
and Glenn; DS 1, 2, 3, 4) (see Table above). This meant that referrals and escalations 
often did not happen when patients contacted services (Bernie, Chris, Danni, Elliott, 
Frankie, and Glenn; DS 1, 2, 3, 4) and the staff response (particularly from a nursing 
perspective) was not strong enough to combat patients’ high risks in time to prevent 
ulcers occurring. Patients went on to develop worsening or severe pressure ulcers, 
under the care of services (namely Bernie, Chris, Danni, Elliott, Glenn; DS 1, 2, 3, 4). 
Only Hilary’s (Patient 8) ulcer was completely outside of the responsibility of services 
when it developed (DS 1, 2, 3, 4). Again, this issue is discussed further in Chapter 5.  
 
Fig.4.7 Decisions 
The absence of decision making early in a patient’s pathway through services meant 
that decisions to escalate care were left too late to prevent the ulcer developing into an 
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SPU (Bernie, Chris, Danni, Frankie, Glenn; DS 1, 4). The doctors were the ones who 
took leadership and made the necessary changes regarding Alex, Bernie, Danni, and 
Frankie (DS 1, 2, 3, 4) where doctors stepped in and made decisions, in some cases 
referring the patients to either a specialist TVN (Bernie) or to a more suitable service 
(Danni’s referral to the DNs). The changes made were often simply to refer to the TVN, 
or just highlight the worsening ulcer. It seems that until this point the ulcer was being 
treated as a routine procedure and not considered in detail. The nursing and HCA staff 
did not seem to fully address the decline in patient skin (Bernie, Chris, Danni, Elliott, 
Frankie, Glenn). 
 
4.18 Hypothesis 3: Was there a mindless Safety culture? (Socio-cultural level 
analysis) 
This tentative hypothesis combined codes around lack of responsibility, defensive 
communication, ward moves, delayed response, governance, other priorities, 
inadequate documentation, risk assessments and ward moves. See Figure 4.8 below: 
 
Fig. 4.8 Mindless safety culture 
There were many references in the data, which I develop and examine further in the 
theoretical section ‘Safety Culture’, around the response to all the high risk patients, 
which was seen as ‘lacking’ from services, which was not just at an individual decision-
making level. The decisions made in the complex system were part of a culture that 
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was laissez-faire, or mindless and unresponsive to high risk patients (Weick, 2010). 
This theory will be developed in the following chapter on Safety Culture so will not be 
detailed here. However, it appeared that patients’ pressure ulcers developed as staff 
were seemingly powerless as a team to stop the deterioration of them, and the issue 
here was that they were seemingly unaware of where these ulcers first appeared 
(Bernie, Chris, Elliott, Frankie, Glenn; DS 1, 2, 3, 4). The culture in health care seemed 
to ‘allow’ the pressure ulcers to develop.  
4.19 Hypothesis 4: Was there diffusion, poor communication and coordination 
between health care services, wards and teams? (organisational level analysis) 
This theory combines the codes around defensive communication, ward moves, weak 
and non-existent RCAs, poor relationships, other priorities and sequence of events 
(see Figure 4.9). 
 
Fig. 4.9 Defensiveness/diffusion of responsibility 
Much of the evidence collected referred to service level issues, and gaps between 
services involved in patients’ care. The notion of ‘blame’ was not readily apparent at 
service level (this code emerged more between individual staff, patients and carers and 
vice versa) although for Chris (Patient 3) there was some degree of this. However, the 
emerging theory was around defensive practices, where services (and wards) did not 
communicate issues between each other about the patient and worked in silos 


























presented as a diffusion of responsibility by services (Latané and Darley, 1970) 
regarding patients (this theory is developed in the chapter of the same name following 
this section). Services for PUs seemed complex and ill-defined (namely for Bernie, 
Chris, Danni, Elliott, Frankie, Glenn; DS 1, 2, 3, 4). For example, for Bernie, the 
Physiotherapist admitted that they did not sit down as a team and discuss her 
communication needs. Had they done this instead of working in silos then all parties 
may have followed one plan of action, rather than following the non-communicative 
approach that led to her ulcer worsening. This happened too for Danni (DS 1, 2, 3, 4). 
She ‘slipped between’ services, and the same happened for Glenn, Frankie and Chris 
(DS 1, 2, 3, 4). 
For Chris this was most apparent, as no member of staff working on the rehabilitation 
ward that he was admitted onto decided whether it was a diabetic foot ulcer or an SPU 
(DS 1, 2, 3, 4). This meant that he moved between services, yet no one took ownership 
or responsibility for the SPU. Once again there was no definitive plan of action, so no 
one was able to make a definitive decision in his care (DS 1, 2, 3, 4). For certain 
patients risk assessments and documenting decline in PUs seemed to take priority 
over action and escalation regarding the patient’s high risk (particularly for Bernie, 
Chris, Danni, Frankie, Glenn; DS 1, 2, 3, 4). For other cases the documentation was 
lacking, omitted or poor quality (Bernie (on the stroke rehabilitation ward), Frankie (on 
one of the wards) and Elliott.  
4.20 Conclusion 
Four distinct hypotheses or candidate explanations for future analysis were noted 
above from inductively examining the raw data and refining the initial analysis; i. 
patients’ and carers’ voices were not heard; ii. difficulties in decision-making within a 
complex system; iii. was there a mindless safety culture? and iv. did diffusion, poor 
communication and coordination between health care services, wards and teams 
contribute? These different tentative theories were formulated out of collapsing the 
codes and moving from descriptive categories to ones which could be subject to further 
in depth analysis. This section re-examined the codes with the aim of formulating 
testable hypotheses to develop and revisit.  The next section will discuss these 
hypotheses in much more detail as four discrete chapters then combine them in one 







Chapter 5: Patients' voices not being heard: If staff had listened more to 
patients and carers, would they have developed their severe pressure 
ulcers? 
5.1 Summary 
This chapter will test the hypothesis that patients felt their voices were not heard, so 
when clinicians failed to listen to patients and carers, this might have contributed to the 
development of their severe pressure ulcers. Failing to listen to patients appeared to 
centre on whether the staff viewed their patients as equal partners, or whether they 
saw them as ‘compliant’ with pressure ulcer prevention and treatment. The findings will 
be reviewed against three areas of literature; the health services and decision making 
literature, the patient safety literature and the organisational culture literature. This is to 
provide a systematic and applied approach to testing the hypothesis. 
5.2 Background 
For patients' voices to be 'heard' by the health care professionals who care for them, 
we might suggest that a mutual respect and partnership would be the best option for a 
positive experience. There has been debate over the years in health care over what the 
best partnership between patient and health professional actually is. A 'compliant' 
patient is one who follows the care that is given to them, and a non-compliant patient 
has historically been seen as one who does not. Compliance is defined in the 
Cambridge English Dictionary as “the act of obeying an order, rule, or request” 
(Cambridge Dictionary, 2017) so can be translated within healthcare as the extent to 
which a patient follows a health professionals’ advice and treatment. Concordance, on 
the other hand, is defined more as an agreement reached after negotiation between a 
patient and a health professional that respects the beliefs and wishes of the patient 
(Marinker, 1997). NICE recommendations and the Department of Health have been 
encouraging health professionals to move towards the notion of concordance rather 
than compliance for a number of years (National Institute for Healthcare and Clinical 
Excellence, 2009, Department  of Health, 2012, Marinker, 1997). Although this is not 
without its critics, who argue that that concordance can be a poorly defined, idealistic 
term (Segal, 2007). By the mid-1990s the term ‘non-compliance’ was perceived as 
having negative connotations (Marinker, 1997). In contrast, concordance values the 
patient’s perspective and expertise in managing their health, and aims to understand 
what impact the disease process has on them. The concept of concordance has 





Health through initiatives such as the Expert Patient Programme (Health, 2012). This 
particular initiative began in 2002 as a Department of Health research project to find 
out how to put patients at the centre of their health care. Initially funded by government, 
the project was devolved, and became a CIC (Community Interest Company). The idea 
behind the successful programme is that patients self-manage and control their own 
symptoms and health, by developing more user-led self-management courses to allow 
people with chronic diseases access to opportunities to develop the confidence, 
knowledge and skills to manage their conditions better. 
However, valuing the patient’s choice and treating them as experts in their care are not 
without their issues, as it may cause a dilemma for a health care professional if the 
patient chooses to take action that is likely to cause a poor health outcome. 
Furthermore, the expertise offered by patients is different from the professional’s 
(McKinnon, 2013). A concordant consultation is meant to be one which includes both 
these views in the decision-making process regarding management. This is contrasted 
with a more traditional paternalistic approach underlying compliance where the patient 
has historically taken a more passive role and been obedient to a health care 
professional’s advice. According to Hobden (2006), paternalism is still a possibility in 
concordance, provided it reflects the patient’s preference for involvement in the 
decision-making process and that this preference has been actively sought and 
documented (Hobden, 2006). 
If we apply this to the field of patient safety, patients (and carers to an extent) are often 
first hand witnesses to adverse events, as they are at the centre of their treatment, and 
are observers of all their care (Unruh and Pratt, 2007).  They may not understand the 
clinical aspects of their care (although with the advent of internet search engines, many 
are well-informed) but many who have chronic illnesses, become experts over time, 
and can often offer a valuable and contextual insight into their condition, and can detect 
unexpected events that occur outside their usual treatment (Unruh and Pratt, 2007). 
Yet, despite their central role in their treatment, and encouragement through national 
policies to take on a decision-making role, patients are still often seen, and even 
choose to be, passive recipients of their care, with a nurse or doctor having 
responsibility for them (Vincent, 2010, Reed, 2011).  
Moreover, patients can be disempowered as a result of this passivity when in a health 
care setting (Donaldson, 2008) and his or her voice is often lost, but more notably 
when something goes wrong (Institute of Medicine, 2000). For example, in the Inquiry 





recommendations were made to include patients and relatives in drug-checking 
procedures.  Both patient and carer could have helped to avoid the fatal mistake, had 
they been consulted. Instead, doctors new to the ward, who were unsure of 
procedures, independently carried out routine chemotherapy, wrongly, that led to the 
teenager’s death (Toft, 2001). Some of this vulnerability and disempowerment is due to 
the patient being too aware that the person caring for them has ‘their life in their hands’ 
(Vincent, 2010) p.290. This is where some of the disempowerment lies, and if patients 
are worried they might be seen as difficult they are less likely to voice concerns 
(Entwistle et al., 2010).  
In addition, sharing of information is not always equal between the patient and health 
service, and researchers in patient safety have tried to encourage staff to find better 
ways to engage and empower patients (Unruh and Pratt, 2007, Coulter, 2011). 
Involvement of patients in the reporting of incidents and safety management has 
recently been recommended by the Council of Europe and the World Alliance for 
Patient Safety. The NHS Constitution also sets out the following promise about patient 
rights: ‘to be involved in planning and making decisions about your health and care with 
your care provider or providers, including your end of life care, and to be given 
information and support to enable you to do this. Where appropriate this right includes 
your family and carers. This includes being given the chance to manage your own care 
and treatment if appropriate.’ And ‘to an open and transparent relationship with the 
organization providing your care’ (Department of Health, 2013a). 
Yet, despite the ideal of giving weight to a patient’s view, in practice this is not always 
the case, and research outcomes have so far rarely uncovered ideal nurse-patient 
communication (Schubert et al., 2008) or empowered patients (Stevenson et al., 2004). 
Stockwell’s notion of an ‘unpopular patient’ (Stockwell, 1972), despite being a study 
conducted years ago, has been shown, even in current healthcare climates to impact 
on how health care staff react to patients, although others have explored the concept 
more recently with similar outcomes (Jackson and Kroenke, 1999). Stockwell’s (1972) 
work highlighted that some patients are easier to care for than others, and there are a 
number of reasons why some patients are more ‘difficult to nurse’ than others, from 
simple anti-social behaviour from the patient, to more complex relationships such as 
‘nurse knows best’ and patients who challenge this. A more recent systematic review 
into concordance also found that professionals do not always explore a patient’s 
preferred role in decision making (Stevenson et al., 2004) and prefer to rely on an 





However, where patients feel confident in their communication with health care staff, 
this has been shown to foster a safer environment, and encourages patients to speak 
up about concerns. In a qualitative study by Entwistle et al, (2010) those participants 
who felt well informed by staff were encouraged and felt confident to speak up, but 
likewise, others worried that speaking up might result in staff labelling them as difficult, 
and less willing to care for them. Although none of the patients had pressure ulcers, 
and some of the patients had already lodged concerns about their safety, which may 
have indicated a confidence in 'speaking up', other groups of patients were sampled 
from a range of settings. In-patients who were dependent on professional help were 
particularly anxious that speaking up might affect their relationships with staff and make 
them more vulnerable to neglect or abuse (Entwistle et al., 2010). 
This chapter therefore explores the interaction between staff, patients and carers and 
examines the views of patients in relation to the staff that were caring for them. It tests 
the hypothesis that if the patients' voices were not heard, or if they had poor 
relationships with staff that cared for them, then they were more likely to develop a 
severe pressure ulcer. The evidence is examined against current literature in the areas 
of health services literature, safety literature and organisational literature for clarity.  
5.3 Patients feeling unsafe and vulnerable-Evidence from the data 
The findings from this study highlighted many references within the data to patients 
feeling 'unsafe' and worried about the care they received. For example, although the 
health care assistant stressed in her interview that they cared for Frankie the same as 
they would for any other patient, Frankie’s perception was to feel vulnerable and 
frightened regarding her care on the ward. Frankie’s account of the reasons why she 
thought she developed a severe pressure ulcer referred very much to her reaction to 
the nursing care on the wards she was admitted to. She spoke of people not knowing 
who she was, ‘A bank nurse came to see me after I arrived at the ward (post surgery) 
and said ‘I don’t know anything about you, could you tell me your name?’ and I was 
scared, because I’d been entrusted to the care of the ward’.  
This was however, later explained by the staff nurse, who wrote in Frankie’s notes that 
she had no notes accompanying her following surgery. She also referred to ‘reassuring’ 
Frankie. She noted that she had informed her that she had no proper admission docs 
hence the questions. 
However, this was different than Frankie’s perception of the situation. Frankie informed 





she tried to tell the staff that her mattress wasn’t inflating properly.  Frankie described 
the incident, when she said, ‘I rang the nurse, and they knew that I’d just come off 
morphine –And I don't think they initially took it very seriously, because what I said to 
them was that ‘my mattress is eating me alive’ but I couldn’t think ... I hadn’t slept 
properly for days and ... That was as much as I could say’.  
However, the TVN explained more fully about the patient’s mattress problem when she 
was interviewed. She stated that there were issues if staff do not inflate mattresses 
properly: ‘The Nimbus mattresses should be inflated fully before the patient’s put on it, 
but sometimes you haven’t got time, so you can put the patient directly on the Nimbus 
mattress, but if it’s not inflated fully and then you profile it, it might not inflate 
properly…The way she described it was just that...’ 
Frankie’s consultant said she knew Frankie better than the staff on the wards she was 
admitted on, due to having a long term clinical relationship with her, and part of the 
issue was that Frankie was often not forthcoming in how ill she was she noted 
that,‘ Frankie is very articulate but she tends to play down her ...symptoms. So when 
she’s talking to me, she’ll say things, but I suppose because I know her so well, I pick 
up on things a lot more.’ 
Frankie may have not communicated her worries well enough. However, for Frankie to 
feel an equal partner in her care and safe, the staff needed to have heeded her 
concerns. This suggests a difference in perceptions between Frankie and the health 
professionals of her situation. 
Danni was a woman with a congenital neurological condition, and used a wheelchair to 
mobilise.  She initially developed a Category 2 pressure ulcer which worsened over the 
course of a year, and became an SPU which resulted in her being bed-bound for 18 
months.  She had suffered with pressure damage in the same body site (sacrum) 
around fifteen years before. 
Danni mentioned the district nurse in the past ‘telling her off’ about her pressure ulcer.  
She noted that she could ‘always remember a nurse coming in and saying, ‘You’ve not 
been looking after yourself’. Danni added that she felt it was the nurses’ attitude 
towards her that made her think that everybody else would think she was not looking 
after herself.   
Danni also spoke of her reticence to access health services, although she attended the 





her skin. However, had she been more confident and assertive in her interactions with 
health care services, her Category 2 pressure ulcer may have been dealt with quicker, 
and referred by the Practice Nurse more quickly to specialist services, rather than it 
deteriorating to a Category 4 ulcer. Danni also claimed to have little knowledge of her 
pressure ulcer risks. Although this was denied by the staff at the local wheelchair 
service, who argued that she should have had information leaflets.  Instead, although 
Danni visited the GP’s practice, she found it difficult to get herself onto the bed in the 
practice nurse’s office, and for this reason she preferred to ring up and re-order 
dressings for her pressure ulcer. However, the practice nurse did not ask her to view 
the pressure ulcer on her sacrum.  The expert witnesses voiced this as a reason that 
Danni’s pressure ulcer worsened: They noted that ‘There’s a kind of sort of 
misguided ... collusion with the patient, in the sense that she was shy and she didn’t 
like exposing herself, and they knew that, she talked about that herself, so… the 
practice nurse was colluding with that by letting her not expose herself.  
However, Danni did not actually say anything negative about her care, and when 
interviewed she found it hard to work out why she had developed a severe pressure 
ulcer. She praised the nursing staff, and did not realise that the practice nurse was not 
acting in accordance with policy when she did not assess her skin fully.  
In another case example, Alex had issues with her voice being heard on the ward she 
was on. She explained that she ordinarily had a manual bowel evacuation (as she was 
paraplegic) every night. This action did not happen at the usual time when she was on 
the ward so she was incontinent during one of the nights she was on the ward. 
However, she felt the response from the ward sister was upsetting. Although Alex 
challenged the Sister about having been left in her faeces for a while the night before, 
the Sister argued with her about it, and in Alex’s opinion she blamed her. Alex felt 
upset and noted that, ‘it sort of got thrown back at me that it was my fault that [I was left 
in my faeces]…which annoyed me a bit, I felt I had to fight my corner.’ 
5.4 Insights from health services literature  
Although Alex’s pressure ulcer was seen as a wound breakdown following the research 
investigation, and limited evidence can be drawn around the causes of severe pressure 
ulcers as opposed to other categories, Alex's case highlights some issues with the 
patient voice not being heard and there not being a concordant agreement between 
patient and staff about his or her care. Equally, Frankie did not feel empowered to 
speak up, and felt 'unsafe' and Danni felt that she was 'told off'. This echoes the health 





to speak up to ensure their safety are dependent on the settings and cultures of 
healthcare provision, and particularly on the attitudes that health professionals 
communicate (Entwistle et al., 2010, Davis et al., 2011, Latimer et al., 2014). As 
referred to above, the Entwistle et al. study focused on people with recent experience 
of one of five conditions or interventions associated with different safety problems 
(childhood asthma, diabetes, breast cancer, elective joint replacement and severe and 
enduring mental health problems). The study highlights that patients’ abilities to speak 
up to ensure their safety are dependent on the attitudes of health professionals. It also 
highlights how ‘personal factors’ such as knowledge and confidence that have been 
associated with differing levels of patient engagement can be altered by the ways staff 
behave and relate to patients. When patients are given a voice, however, such as was 
explored in the Latimer et al. (2013) study, it affected them positively. Latimer et al. 
(2013) offer evidence directly relating to patients with pressure ulcers in their 
interpretive study. Although the study was small scale and based in only two Australian 
hospital sites, the findings highlight that majority of the 20 adults involved in their study, 
all of whom had suffered pressure injuries, preferred a proactive role in their care. They 
wanted to be 'heard' and involved in their decision-making to feel safe. These findings 
mirror the findings in my study.  
5.5 Insights from safety literature  
Being listened to and encouraged to speak up by health care staff appears to lead to a 
safer environment, which is supported by several studies in the wider safety literature 
(Pittet et al., 2011, Department of Health, 2000, Kohn et al., 2000). Yet, the most 
common complaint among NHS users is that they are neither listened to nor 
adequately informed about the care they receive (Freshwater and Stickley, 2006, 
Coulter, 2011). This notion is supported by a systematic review regarding a two way 
patient and staff communication mentioned earlier in this chapter (Stevenson et al., 
2004) where patient participation was associated with positive outcomes. This also 
mirrors the findings of similar studies which explore the patient voice and his or her 
view of incidents (Iedema et al., 2012). In the Iedema et al. qualitative study, patients 
voiced the challenges they faced when explaining the knowledge of their condition with 
health care staff. These studies further echo the findings in this thesis, which suggests 
that how safe patients feel is often interlinked with how confident and involved the 
patient feels with his or her care.  





Although the possibility that patients may feel unsafe should be at the heart of health 
care systems there remains an absence of literature in this field which explores the 
links between the patient's view of safety and the system. More recently, O'Hara et al. 
have been looking at the patient and family's voice in the context of resilient health care 
(see Chapter 10 for a discussion of resilience), and the findings are relevant to those 
within my thesis. O'Hara et al. note that the aim of their study (O'Hara et al., 2019) has 
been to demonstrate how, without the patient and carer perspectives, our 
understanding of resilient patient safety may be limited, and does not account for 
variability introduced by these key actors within a system, that both supports, and 
compromises, the resilience of the health care system. Without this understanding of 
the perspectives of these key participants, we risk misunderstanding the resilience of 
our healthcare systems. O'Hara notes that in the main, to date, the evidence for 
resilient health care has almost exclusively been undertaken from the perspective of 
staff and does not include the patient's perspective. The suggestive findings in this 
thesis around the patient's view of what they see as safe or unsafe care regarding their 
pressure ulcers, offer some support in attempting to understand and heed the patient's 
perspective.  
5.7 Patients recognise the value of staff caring for them-evidence from the data 
Patients feeling 'unheard' is not supported as much by one of the patients particularly in 
the study, who was happy that his voice was heard. Chris developed a pressure ulcer 
after being placed in a side room. Although he knew he was provided with a pressure 
relieving mattress that he had become accustomed to using over the long time he was 
in hospital, he felt that the nurses were only doing the best they could for him, and that 
it was an unfortunate mistake that they forgot to turn him when they placed him on an 
ordinary mattress. Following this he developed his heel pressure ulcer in a 
rehabilitation hospital. Chris noted that, ‘They thought I would be better to be a bit 
nearer,[to the dining room] and they wanted me to have exercise but it was quite long-  
it was the full length of the hospital more or less you know to walk.  I think they was 
[sic] trying to safeguard me and make it easier for me.’ Chris recognised the care that 
the staff were showing towards him, and felt the mistake was just ‘unfortunate’. 
Likewise, Danni was very complimentary about the nursing staff who came to visit her 
and they became 'like friends' as they visited her daily at one point. She spoke 
positively about her relationship with the nursing staff. 





Reiterating from comments earlier in this chapter, it is probable that Chris had a more 
‘concordant’ and partnership style relationship with the staff on the wards. There 
appeared to be more mutual respect and less frustration towards the health services 
staff. Recent literature in this area has noted that concordance is centred around 
‘having a consultation that allows mutual respect for the patient’s and professional’s 
beliefs, and allows negotiation to take place about the best course of action for the 
patient.’ (Hobden, 2006). It appears from Chris’ perception that this mutual respect was 
apparent in his case. Although the consultant in wound care noted later that the change 
to an ordinary mattress shouldn’t have happened, at least Chris felt that the staff had 
considered him in the decision to move him. This changed his view of his care. Hobden 
(2006) argues as part of that staff need to build ‘genuine, patient-centred relationships 
with patients.’ Again, it appeared that there was more of a patient-centred relationship 
with Chris than with other patients within this study. Other literature which has explored 
the partnership within pressure ulcer care includes again the study by Latimer et al. 
(2014) which found that for concordance and partnerships with patients to work, 
processes should be reorganised to make explicit the patient's involvement, and to use 
the views of patients to inform prevention strategies. Although caution must be taken in 
generalising from a small scale study.   
5.9 Insights from the safety literature 
Again, when considering the patient's respect for staff looking after them, in terms of 
the broader patient safety literature, there are a number of studies reflecting the mutual 
respect between patient and health care professional. For example, in a survey study 
of 80 medical and surgical patients by Davis et al. (2011) doctors' and nurses' 
encouragement appeared to increase patient-reported willingness to ask challenging 
questions; however no other consistent findings were observed. There was little 
uniformity in patient involvement in their care. The study concludes, in spite of its 
conflicting findings, that efforts are needed to encourage patients to participate 
challenging safety orientated behaviours as these are behaviours where patients 
appear less inclined to take on an active role. To some extent the patients in my study 
had varied views on their personal safety, if at all, and this makes it harder to extract 
confident claims about them. However, others were very vocal in their perceptions of 
feeling unsafe. 
Research has often been carried out relating to medicines management and how 
patients will take medications if they feel empowered in their relationship with their GP. 





'adherence' or compliance with pressure ulcer management.  Again, though, reflecting 
my earlier findings set out above,  a major reason for non-adherence within medicines 
management is higher patient-physician discordance leading to decreased patient 
satisfaction (Weingarten et al., 1995). In the study by Weingarten et al. (1995) they 
found a significant association between patient satisfaction and the performance of 
some but not all preventive care services (median satisfaction score 4.2 on a 1-5 scale 
where 5 was most satisfied). However, the authors do not state whether there was a 
relationship between patient satisfaction and quality of patient care. Also the study is 
limited in its location, and number of physicians involved (48).  
5.10 Insights from organisational culture literature 
Patients recognising and appreciating staff caring for them, is often hard to measure 
from an organisational cultural perspective, as the results are compounded with other 
variables. This issue was discussed earlier in Chapter 2. Nevertheless, guidance from 
professional bodies is to use tools such as Patient Reported Outcomes and Friends 
and Family Tests, to inform health care provision at a service level (Care Quality 
Commission, 2019; NHS Improvement 2019). A study by Tzeng et al, (2002) found that 
the strength of organisational culture predicted job satisfaction amongst nurses 
positively; job satisfaction predicted inpatient satisfaction significantly and positively; 
and inpatient satisfaction predicted general inpatient satisfaction well and positively. 
The direct effects and the calculated indirect effects (based upon standardized 
coefficients from regression analyses) demonstrated that nurses’ variables, strength of 
culture and job satisfaction, interestingly, had a cause-effect relationship with a path 
coefficient of 0.297 (strength of culture on general inpatient satisfaction with nursing 
care) or higher on inpatient satisfaction variables (Tzeng et al., 2002). Also, a Before 
and After study by Wick et al (2015) developed a trust-based accountability model to 
address all elements of preventable harm in colorectal surgery patients. This initiative 
resulted in a rapid improvement in patient outcomes, patient experience, and cost.  90% 
of patients said they would recommend the hospital to their friends and family after the 
pathway implementation, as compared with 79% before. Although it was not clear if 
specific behaviour changes had made a difference or not. Other similar work has been 
done by Rebecca Lawton and colleagues on Patient Reported Outcomes and safety 
culture (2015), which discovered that the Friends and Family test was associated with 
patients’ perceptions of safety, but was not associated with safety outcomes. Staff 
responses to a specific patient safety culture survey were not significantly correlated 





predicted safety outcomes. Lawton et al, (2015) concluded that feedback from patients 
about the safety of the care that they receive can be used, in addition to data from staff 
to drive safety improvements in healthcare, and further work should be undertaken to 
consolidate these findings. For patients such as Chris, in my study, his respect for the 
staff involved in his care highlights the value of positive feedback from patients in 
contrast to the more negative experience of Bernie and Frankie. However, this 
alternative finding casts more doubt over whether the patient's voice impacts on the 
development of a severe pressure ulcer.  
5.11 Non-compliant patients-evidence from the data  
Overall, issues regarding the apparent concordance and compliance of patients as 
separate entities were apparent from the evidence collected as part of this thesis. As 
far as the notions of concordance and compliance are understood and accepted as a 
real construct, by both the author and the participants. Staff beliefs often centred on 
their patients’ ‘compliance’ or ‘non-compliance’ with treatment, rather than their aiming 
for a shared partnership with the patient during their care, and some referred to 
patients as 'difficult'. 
Frankie’s case, for example, highlights this issue. She was a confident, assertive 
person (evidenced in her interview), however the staff did not seem keen on her when 
interviewed. A HCA noted that she felt she was difficult to nurse, giving an example 
about what she thought Frankie was likely to say:  ‘Do this for me, do that for 
me’…‘You’re not doing it like this, we do it like -- ‘ Do you know what I mean? She’s a 
bit --She was a little ... She was a little bit, [difficult]’.                                                                                                                                                                     
Bernie was a 65 year old woman, and had mobility problems. She had a contracted leg 
from a previous stroke, and was admitted into hospital after collapsing. Three days 
following her admission to hospital, she was referred to the stroke team and transferred 
onto a stroke ward where she stayed for six days. Bernie had cognitive impairment 
following the stroke, which led to her not following instructions for turning herself when 
she moved onto the stroke rehabilitation ward. The physiotherapist was reflective about 
the MDT’s communication with Bernie, and felt that they had not appreciated the 
cognitive difficulties that she had. The physiotherapist summarised the issues as 
follows,’ … looking back, I think we should all have just sat down and been clear about 
what we were going to accept in her interests and not, because by the time she was 
discharged, and not going to walk, and with long term soft tissue management issues, 





we were dealing with, so I don’t think  I appreciated her ability to consent properly’ 
(Physiotherapist). 
Bernie was seen as not ‘complying’ and following instructions as she did not turn when 
she was asked moving back into the position she had been lying in before. This was 
seen as a factor in the development of her severe pressure ulcer as she did not follow 
her pressure ulcer care plan properly, which can be common in stroke patients 
(Dehghan Nayeri et al., 2014). Despite the issues with her memory, due to the stroke, 
Bernie was viewed as ‘non-compliant’ by ward-based staff, who argued that this was 
the main reason that she didn’t follow her pressure care plan. A HCA noted that ‘‘She'd 
comply and you'd go away and turn your back and she'd be back on it…she would 
comply and turn with it, but she wouldn’t comply to stop on that side, you can't force 
her.’ 
However, as stated earlier, the physiotherapist explained that Bernie’s ‘non-compliance 
was due to cognitive impairment, ‘She wasn’t really very compliant with the positions 
that people were trying to put her in because she couldn’t retain the information as to 
why they were doing that… I remember having to tell a lot of people that Bernie lacks 
insight into her problems, (Physiotherapist). 
The expert witnesses also noted that Bernie’s case indicated mistaken assumptions 
from staff members about her cognition: 
Expert Witness 1 stated: ‘I thought there was a big thing around assumptions – 
assuming that the patient knew, and then said that she was non-compliant. So, they 
didn’t actually go through explaining to her that this is what you’ve got, and recognising 
that she’s been quite ill and she’s got some cognitive impairment. They just assume 
that you’ve told her once and that’s it.’ 
5.12 Insights from health services literature  
Bernie’s cognitive abilities made it difficult for her to follow the instructions to turn in 
bed, set out by staff to avoid a pressure ulcer. Yet, even mild cognitive deficits can 
contribute to lack of adherence to treatment plans, with the patient and health 
professional’s relationship being a factor in compliance (Okuno et al., 2001). If Bernie 
had been assessed correctly rather than been dealt with as non-compliant, she may 
have been treated more carefully regarding her skin and rehabilitation. A small 
observational study by Calhoun et al (2017) used the Braden risk assessment scale to 





busy 21-bed emergency department over a six-month period with a Braden Scale 
score ≤18 and who were expected to be admitted to the hospital were placed on a 
two-hourly turning protocol. These patients had wearable wireless sensors placed to 
monitor patient turning. These reminded patients when they needed to be turned. Turn 
activity data was compared for those continuously monitored patients for the duration 
of their ED and entire hospital stay. Descriptive analyses and tests of difference were 
performed to obtain percent compliance and change in compliance scores by patient, 
group, and Hospital-Acquired Pressure Ulcer (HAPU) incidence. During the study 
period, the initiation of patient turning protocols in the ED contributed to an overall 38% 
reduction of hospital acquired pressure ulcers. This type of intervention may have 
worked better with a patient such as Bernie. However, staff who cared for her seemed 
to assume that they knew what she required without actually asking her or helping her 
in the ways she needed (Morse, 1991, Stockwell, 1972). Although there was no 
evidence that any parties were behaving neglectfully, there appeared to be a lack of 
consideration around the patient’s needs, as she could not remember to turn herself.  
5.13 Insights from safety literature 
More general literature into non-complaint patients offers insights into patients who do 
not, for many reasons, comply with their health care professional's advice. However 
other studies in this area have found that staff are still not willing to relinquish their 
‘control’ and felt they know best in relation to their patients (Henderson, 2003). In a 
qualitative study, referred to earlier, which examined patients' abilities to speak up 
about safety concerns (Entwistle et al., 2010), patients were found to be worried that 
speaking up might result in staff labelling them as ‘difficult’ and being less willing to 
care for them in future. Frankie was in fact labelled as 'difficult' which supports this 
idea. In-patients who were dependent on professional help (as were most of the 
complex patients in this study) were anxious that speaking up might affect their 
relationships with staff and make them more vulnerable to neglect or abuse. There 
were similarities in the findings around patients in my study and the study by Entwistle 
et al (2010). 
5.14 Insights from organisational culture literature  
The notions of 'non-compliance' or the 'difficult patient' are recognised in national policy 
and the NHS constitution (2015), which asks staff to acknowledge things going wrong, 
by offering apologies, (Sign up to Safety, 2014) and engaging patients in their care 





Open' and honest was offered by national health care bodies, however, the tentative 
findings around the lack of partnership and mutual respect between patients and health 
care staff in terms or pressure ulcer care, highlight the many complaints within the NHS 
around 'whose fault is it'. The NHS Constitution (2015) asks that patients should follow 
the health care professional's advice, but, particularly in Bernie's case, and for other 
patients in this study, her condition made it difficult for her to follow advice. It is my 
suspicion that, if Bernie's case become a complaint, the settlement would have been in 
her favour. There is now, thankfully, much more policy interest around shared care and 
the patient voice (Elwyn et al., 2016, Department of Health, 2013b, Department  of 
Health, 2012). 
5.15 Staff not responding to patient issues-evidence from the data 
Elliott was admitted from a supported living home into a district hospital with cellulitis 
(swelling of his legs). He had existing pressure ulcers, but there was some confusion 
about where these were during his admission, although there was a plan in both the 
nursing and medical notes to check under the ‘bandages’ on his legs. It was found, 
through the research investigation, that Elliott had already developed a pressure ulcer 
pre-admission, but as the staff did not document the Category of the pressure ulcer on 
admission, and appeared not to have checked under his bandages for five days, it was 
recorded by the TVN on review as a hospital acquired Category 3 pressure ulcer. Elliott 
said that he didn’t feel ‘right’ about the care he received care at the hospital and urged 
the researcher to talk to his daughter about it: 
Patient: I didn’t feel right and proper... you could get in touch with CARER... 
LP: CARER? Is that your daughter? 
Patient: Yes. Because...she was crying when...if you have a chat with... CARER. 
Because when CARER cried she was genuine.’ 
Elliot’s carer spoke of her issues with the ward sister on the ward, and the lack of 
responsiveness from the ward staff to her father’s condition. She told the researcher 
that, ‘All of the time that he was in, on all of the wards, I was never once approached by 
a nurse to tell me about my father. It was always me that had to ask to see someone. 
And I think there was only once that I ever spoke to a sister…and they didn’t know 
which ward he was going to and she said she’d ring me to let me know which ward he 
was going to. She didn’t ring me. It took me God knows how many phone calls -- to find 





about her father's dry mouth on one occasion, and her sister had raised concerns 
about this, but felt that the response was lacking from ward staff.  
5.16 Insights from health services literature 
Some of the evidence I collected around the response of health care staff is reflected in 
the health services literature. For example, in a cross sectional survey study by 
Schubert et al. (2008) nurses self-reported implicitly rationing nursing care. Higher 
levels of rationing were associated with better outcomes for their patients, and a 
reduction in adverse events.(Schubert et al., 2008).  In another qualitative study in this 
area, (Dellefield and Magnabosco, 2014) where nurses saw pressure ulcer prevention 
as their mission, and had positive responses to their patients, the outcomes were better 
for both staff and patients. However, this was a small scale study with a convenience 
sample, so the findings must be interpreted with caution. Nevertheless, these 
similarities point to an area of interest and possible further investigation.  
5.17 Insights from safety literature 
The concerns about staff responding to their patients' concerns reflect those found in 
several patient safety studies which have examined the active role of the patient in safe 
care (Giles et al., 2013, Scott et al., 2016, Lawton et al., 2017)).  Lawton’s more recent 
work on Patient Reporting and Action (PRASE) (Lawton et al., 2017) argues that 
although patients (and carers) are willing and able to provide feedback, the 
engagement of staff is crucial to act on the feedback and absorb it into their practice 
otherwise the intervention will not be successful. This, and other studies around patient 
feedback in patient safety ((Lawton et al., 2011, Scott et al., 2016) have encouraged 
patients to record and feed back to staff their concerns around safety using written 
tools which are then analysed by staff, with the aim of feeding back into practice. 
However, for the patients, such as Bernie, in my study, it did not seem overall, as if 
patients were encouraged to speak up about their concerns; they may have been 
actively discouraged, if anything.  
5.18 Insights from organisational culture literature 
From an organisational culture perspective, the explanation that staff do not respond to 
patients' needs is very much reflected in the Bristol Inquiry (2000). According to 
findings from this high profile Inquiry, the 'club' culture prevailed and there was "a lack 
of consideration of risks to patients, defensiveness, looking inwards not outwards, 





a failure to put the patient first in everything done” (p2357). As mentioned earlier in this 
thesis, the sad deaths of so many babies during the Bristol scandal, and the Inquiry 
that followed, have impacted hugely on subsequent health policy since the Inquiry's 
publication. This suggests that the importance of the collective staff response at an 
organisational or cultural level can have a massive impact, and just how serious the 
consequences of a lack of consideration of patient needs can be. 
5.19 Discussion 
Given that this study has focused on the development of severe pressure ulcers in 
health care, it is understandable that there is little evidence of fully satisfied patients. 
These complex wounds cause much suffering for patients making them feel vulnerable, 
and by nature affect those more vulnerable (Gorecki et al., 2009). Therefore it is not 
surprising that their relationships with health professionals can be fraught, and we must 
take care not to assume this is indicative of every person’s experience in health care 
settings.  
However, research experts agree that the patient’s voice can have a strong impact on 
nursing care and safety (Donaldson, 2008, Leape et al., 2009, Coulter, 2011). This 
drive for patient involvement has been reflected repeatedly in government policy to see 
the patient as expert rather than passive recipient of care (Vincent and Coulter, 2002). 
The patient is being viewed increasingly as a partner in health care as health policies 
move towards more patient choice. Initiatives such as No decision about me, without 
me (Health, 2010), and other patient directives, champion more patient involvement, for 
example, Patients for Patient Safety (World Health Organization, 2013). The Duty of 
Candour also aims to include patients in all investigations (Sign up to Safety, 2014) 
aiming to foster trust between patients, carers and services, and thus minimise 
complaints and lawsuits. Other recent government policy drives, such as the formation 
of Health Services Investigation Branch (Health Services Investigation Branch, 2017) 
aim also to foster patient involvement in investigations, and be more active participants.  
The above evidence from this study appears in some ways to support the idea that 
patients can help with their safety concerns, and some become very knowledgeable 
about their care (namely Chris and Frankie). However other patients were too ill to be 
active partners (Elliot and Bernie) and caution must be taken in suggesting that 
patients must always take an active role. The findings did not always say that patients 
were unhappy (Chris and Danni). However, the evidence also shows that 
‘concordance’ was lacking in several of the cases in this study. This resonates with 





compliance’ (Elwyn et al., 2016) and supported by the Entwistle et al study (2010). 
Elwyn et al (2016) drawing on their MAGIC study of concordance and shared decision-
making, put forward a strong argument that the main aim of concordance is not the 
giving of information, or information exchange, but the achievement of overall 
understanding by the patient. It is likely that such understanding occurs when decision 
making is seen more as a process rather than an instant outcome. This process was 
recognised by Chris, when he valued the nurses’ input despite the mistake they made 
at once point in his care. However Frankie spoke passionately about not understanding 
why the staff who were caring for her behaved as they did. 
Patient led safety initiatives where the patient is more involved and powerful in his or 
her care management have been encouraged in recent years, despite a lack of robust 
research evidence to prove that these initiatives actually change practice (Lawton et 
al., 2017, Lawton et al., 2011, Wales, 2010). This lack of evidence may however, be 
more around the staff’s reaction to the initiatives, rather than failed interventions per se 
(Lawton et al, 2016).  
Both Doherty's (2012) systematic review and Lawton’s recent work call for more 
exploration of clinicians’ attitudes towards patients’ engagement in safety to aid 
understanding on how to effect more profound cultural change (Doherty and 
Stavropoulou, 2012, Lawton et al., 2017).  If attitudes do not foster learning and acting 
on patient concerns, involving patients appears to be less effective (Lawton et al., 
2017). Despite evidence shown of more involvement of patients through incident 
reporting of such as severe drug reactions (ADRs), and reporting hand hygiene issues 
on NHS sites (NPSA) these initiatives have also shown limited success in encouraging 
patients to challenge health care professionals (Stone et al, 2007). The patients in my 
study did not seem to feel confident enough to speak up about their safety concerns, 
particularly Danni and Elliott.  
So what can be done to improve relationships and encourage the patient to feel 
confident and empowered? In pressure ulcer care particularly, patients still remain 
largely uninvolved in the process, aside from being given a verbal and written apology 
(Sign up to Safety, 2014). This is partly due to the nature of their vulnerabilities and 
situation, as was also found in the Doherty et al. review on barriers to speak up about 
safety (Doherty and Stavropoulou, 2012). In the review, the authors found that 
incidents were reported and dealt with at a professional level, rather than genuinely 
engaging patients and carers. Pressure ulcers are more complex to report in local trust 





who are traditionally more unwell are those who will develop severe pressure ulcers 
and very unwell patients are less likely to have the energy to speak up assertively 
(Doherty and Stavropoulou, 2012). Elliott’s interview was indicative of this problem, as 
was Bernie’s. Therefore, if a patient is too ill to have an active voice in their relationship 
with staff, this issue will remain a problem for pressure ulcer care unless there is a way 
to encourage and allow time for a more balanced relationship, with recognition of the 
frailty of patients, particularly at the time of treatment. Elliott managed to tell the 
researcher about his problems during his interview, yet there appeared to be no 
evidence of his worries being communicated to health care staff. The encouragement 
of patients to speak up in health care appears to be an ambitious target. However, this 
would be a theory to test in future work in this area.  
5.20 Conclusion 
The hypothesis set out at the beginning of this chapter was whether or not patients' 
voices not being heard led to the development of their severe pressure ulcer. To some 
extent this has been supported by the evidence and consolidated by research evidence 
already published. Indeed there is value in a positive patient experience whatever 
treatment they are undergoing. Although this study is exploratory, there is enough 
support for this possible theory to warrant further investigation.  A practical, more 
applied way to test this could be a detailed, shared treatment plan around pressure 
care in high risk patients (see (Elwyn et al., 2016), which could be a way of engaging 
the patient and carer more fully in their treatment, to monitor deterioration of pressure 
ulcers and to aim to prevent the pressure ulcer deterioration earlier. Some NHS trusts 
have already moved towards shared care agreements, although there has been no 
research published regarding pressure ulcer care to date. However, a shared 
agreement could be measured or audited to see how this affects a patient's pressure 
ulcer. This idea is discussed further later in this thesis (Chapter 10). The tentative 
findings of this chapter advocate that patients assessed at risk of pressure ulcers 
should be given comprehensive information, and communicated with as soon as skin 
damage appears, so that they can make informed decisions about their treatment. This 
would disregard the concept of the ‘non-compliant’ patient and move towards a more 








Chapter 6. Decision-making in a complex environment. 
 
6.1 Chapter summary 
In this section I discuss the hypothesis that the decision-making by staff in response to 
high risk patients impacted on the development of their severe pressure ulcers. I also 
discuss issues around decision-making in a complex environment, including risk 
assessing and using clinical judgment for ‘high risk’ patients. When staff are faced with 
a situation where they recognise a safety issue, they have to respond with a decision or 
action(s), but often the patients within this study developed pressure ulcers slowly and 
nebulously, and staff were not equipped at the time to make informed decisions to 
prevent them deteriorating. The reasons for this are discussed below. 
6.2 Background 
There are numerous similar terms to describe decision making in health care. Clinical 
decision making is the most commonly used (Ford, 1979) (Field, 1987, Luker and 
Kenrick, 1992). Other terms include clinical judgement (Benner et al., 2009); clinical 
inference (Hammond et al., 1964) (Hammond, 1996), clinical reasoning (Grobe et al., 
1991), and diagnostic reasoning (Carnevali and Thomas, 1993, Radwin, 1990). 
Although these terms are used interchangeably, they relate to slightly different 
perspectives of what is now thought of as a continuum of decision-making which is 
discussed in detail below. Fundamentally the terms above describe the choice of a 
discrete option from a range available to a clinician. Three examples of possible 
choices might involve selecting interventions, making a diagnosis, or the 
communication of future prognostic possibilities: clinical decisions inevitably involve 
these choices (Thompson and Dowding, 2002). However, there is still debate and lack 
of understanding around how people make clinical decisions within health care 
(Thompson and Dowding, 2002). This debate will be considered alongside the 
evidence in this chapter.  
For clarity, I define clinical judgement as one made at individual level within health care 
setting. Decision-making incorporates the contextual or environmental and patient 
influence when an individual makes a decision (Thompson et al., 2011). Decision-
making is often defined by intellectual leaders in the field as making an informed choice 
about what action to take from a range of alternatives (Cheyne et al., 2006) (Lamb et 





6.3 Pressure ulcer management 
The process of pressure ulcer risk assessment and management is associated with a 
process of both decision-making and clinical judgment (Samuriwo and Dowding, 2014). 
The authors of this systematic review define judgement as the assimilation of different 
types of information about a situation to arrive at an overarching assessment of it, while 
decisions entail making a choice about what action to take from a range of alternatives. 
This is also supported by other authors in the field of decision-making (namely (Cheyne 
et al., 2006, Lamb et al., 2011, Dowie and Elstein, 1988). The Samuriwo and Dowding 
(2014) review highlights a lack of robust research evidence exploring how nurses make 
judgements and decisions related to pressure ulcer risk assessment, how they 
categorise pressure ulcers and how they plan care to prevent or manage pressure 
ulcers. These review findings sit within the lengthy debate around variations in 
assessment of category which are offered by current pressure ulcer risk assessment 
tools such as the Waterlow, Braden and Norton scales (Nixon and McGough, 2001). 
Variation of assessment would ordinarily lead to variation in action planning or 
prevention measures. If the evidence suggests that the subjectivity of interpretation is 
not mitigated by the use of a prescriptive tool, then that is a risk factor for decision-
making in itself. There is currently little understanding of how, and if, pressure ulcer risk 
assessments and grading judgements affect the decisions that are taken by nurses 
regarding pressure ulcer prevention or management (Samuriwo and Dowding, 2014). 
However, although judgement and decision making are concepts which share many 
links, according to other authors they require different cognitive processes which are 
explained below (Thompson and Dowding, 2002, Gillespie and Peterson, 2009) and 
the impact of variations in either the judgement or decision process may have different 
effects on the care patients receive. 
6.4 Different approaches to decision-making 
There are debates within the clinical decision making field about how to differentiate 
between models of decision-making. There is not room within this thesis to enter into 
this debate fully. However, a general guide is offered by prominent authors in the field 
who suggest the categories of decision making are: normative (where the decision-
maker is rational and logical in an ideal word) descriptive (where the description of how 
individuals reach a decision is focused on), and prescriptive (aiming to improve the 





However, other authors have aimed to categorise the approaches slightly differently, 
and this is a useful overarching model. Banning (2008) argues that there are three 
main over-arching approaches to decision making, which are: information processing, 
an intuitive-humanist approach and a cognitive continuum (Banning, 2008). What 
makes this a useful conceptual position is that Banning demonstrates that these 
theories originate from different academic disciplines historically. Clinical decision-
making initially arose from an information processing model, alternatively called the 
hypothetico-deductive model, or scientific process model, which has its roots in medical 
decision-making (Joseph and Patel, 1990). This is usually represented by a four stage 
hypethetico-deductive process: 
• the clinician takes part in a patient encounter and gathers preliminary clinical 
information about the patient (also called the cue acquisition stage) 
• following this, the clinician generates initial and tentative hypotheses (usually 
around 4-6 in number). These are related to already gathered data and short term 
memory-based cues 
• the third stage involves the clinician interpreting the cues gathered and classifying 
them as confirmatory, negative, or non-contributory hypotheses 
• in the final stage the clinician weighs up the pros and cons of each decision 
alternative and chooses the one most favoured by the evidence, or evaluates the 
hypothesis ((Thompson and Dowding, 2002). 
This model was initially adopted in nursing, for example using decision trees to analyse 
how the information was processed in a logical manner (Thompson and Dowding, 
2002); however, other authors in the field of decision-making, such as Hammond 
(1996) highlighted the difficulties with using this approach, as it made professionals 
more cautious when trying to make decisions under uncertainty. Hammond argued 
instead that uncertainty is ‘irreducible’ and we must acknowledge that we, as human 
beings, will always have an impact on decisions. Hammond's (1996) comprehensive 
review of the debates within decision-making also argues that decision-making is an 
ongoing rivalry between intuition and analysis, accuracy and rationality.  
Arising from this debate, an alternative explanation for how decisions are made, and 
sitting at the opposite end of a deductive theory, is the idea of intuitive-humanist 
approach. This approach asserts instead that the motivational force for a decision is 





their expertise and experience (Benner, 1984, Benner and Tanner, 1987, Benner et al., 
2009). Definitions include: 
• ‘understanding without a rationale’ (Benner et al., 2009) 
• ‘a perception of possibilities, meanings and relationships by way of insight’ (Gerrity, 
1987).  
This theoretical approach has been popular in nursing as it distinguishes the expert 
from the novice and nursing often appears intuitive to the outside observer, involving 
an almost unconscious level of cognition (Hamers et al., 1994, King and Clark, 2002).  
Recent developments in decision-making have however, focused more on the concept 
of a cognitive continuum (Hannond et al., 1987), which asserts that decisions vary in 
the degree to which they rely on intuitive and analytical processes. Conditions such as 
amount of information and time available determine where decisions fall on this 
continuum and whether people rely more on patterns or on functional relationships. At 
the far end of this continuum and a development of the intuitive-humanist approach, is 
an instinct based model, namely the naturalistic decision making (NDM) paradigm. This 
theory originated in fieldwork, rather than tested a pre-defined model of decision-
making. It suggests that decisions are made under uncertainty, under time pressure, 
with ill-defined goals, and are based on expertise, pattern matching or recognition of a 
given situation, and are thus nonlinear, non-analytical and not necessarily logical, 
rational or based on risk/benefit considerations (Klein, 2008). In a further study 
focusing on this area, only 45% of decisions were found to be planned in a study in 
emergency departments, and were opportunistic, and not always being made about 
one patient’s care, but incorporating a whole department’s views in considering a 
decision (Franklin et al., 2011). The important point to note about this work is that in 
this NDM model there is a tension between safety and efficiency. It is not only about 
the individual making the decision, but about the system within which they are a 
functioning part. This, of course includes achieving concordance with the patient, as 
Chapter 5 discussed. 
Part of the reason for the focus on decision making theories within this study, is that an 
evidence-based culture of decision-making has long been advocated by UK health 
policy (DoH: 1989, 1993, 1994, 1996), and with this has come an increasing need for 
transparency and accountability in how health care staff make decisions. For nursing 
particularly, the increasing focus on autonomous decision-making has sat side by side 





decision making based on evidence, using intuition when necessary as well. The 
Advanced Clinical Practitioner (ACP) or Advanced Nursing Practitioner (ANP) roles are 
recent developmental roles which allow elevated status for nurses (this also includes 
physiotherapists, pharmacists and occupational therapists). Both roles focus on 
leadership, expert knowledge and decision making skills. A mixed-method, case study 
by Begley et al. (2013) examined the role of the ACP. This consisted of field 
observations (92 hours) and included a service user survey. The study's result was to 
define the ACP role as one requiring a registered practitioner to have acquired an 
expert knowledge base, complex decision-making skills and clinical competences for 
expanded practice, shaped by the context in which the individual practices” (Begley et 
al., 2013). In contrast to the ACP role, the Samuriwo and Dowding review (2014) found 
that most nursing decisions focussed instead on discrete areas such as: dressings, 
pressure ulcer monitoring, monitoring observations, referrals to colleague/ senior 
nurse/ doctors/ clinical nurse specialists/ therapists/ pharmacist, referral to 
relatives/involvement of relatives, interpreting results mainly of blood tests/exercise 
tolerance tests, and staff development/ supervision/ training. 
Nurses however, do seem to vary within their profession and with doctors in their 
decisions, particularly in wound care. Vermeulen et al. (2007) examined the 
agreement, assessed by a questionnaire, between a sample of doctors and nurses 
who chose between gauze or occlusive dressings for a selection of wounds. The study 
was based on one hospital and the response rates were better for doctors than nurses, 
which may have biased the sample. However, an interesting finding was that for 
wounds that warranted gauze dressings, the mean level of agreement among nurses 
was poor (kappa [l] 0.23, 95% confidence interval [CI] 0.15-0.31). Agreement was even 
worse for occlusive dressings (l 0.12, 95% CI 0.07-0.16). Experience with more 
wounds did not lead to a greater consensus about what to do; the lack of agreement 
did not diminish in line with nurses' increasing clinical experience (Vermeulen et al., 
2007). 
To expand the above argument, regarding pressure ulcer care, decision-making 
focuses on the assessment of risk of skin breakdown and choosing which actions to 
take to maintain skin integrity. This is an integration of judgement processes (judging 
the risk of the patient) and ‘deciding’ what to do to minimise the risk. Therefore, it 
appears to be more focused on assessment, monitoring and prevention, (Samuriwo 
and Dowding, 2014) and not currently on making decisions regarding patients when 
they deteriorate, as this concerns the doctor, or specialist nurse, which is apparent in 





clinical judgements and decisions were made in uncertain circumstances for the 
patients involved in the study and this may have impacted on the choice of decision 
made.  For example, severe pressure ulcers ordinarily appear in patients alongside 
other comorbidities, and in patients, judgements, whether by nurse, or doctor, or 
specialist nurse, may contribute positively or negatively to the pressure ulcer 
management of patients.  
6.5 Delays in decision making: Evidence from the data 
The previous analysis chapter (Chapter 4) highlighted that delayed referrals and 
decision making were readily apparent in this study.  For example, the practice nurse 
assessing Danni noted that she ‘should have referred earlier to the DNs, as they knew 
more about complex wounds’. There was also an issue around decisions not being 
made at all concerning Danni, and delayed decisions, but this will be covered further in 
the following chapter on safety culture. 
Bernie’s TVN also stated that they should have ‘referred to her earlier’. This was 
echoed by the doctor involved with Bernie, who wrote in the medical notes ‘Refer to 
TVN requested last week’. The TVN involved with Glenn also stated that she wished 
the staff had referred him earlier to her. She added that for some nurses ‘they might be 
able to deal with [a pressure ulcer], but some of the nurses they might not, so it tends 
to go on their professional judgement’. Glenn and his carer also noted that they felt the 
DNs ‘should have referred earlier’. However, in contrast, some decisions based around 
Chris' care were made in a more timely manner, including the decision, rightly or 
wrongly, to situate him in a side room. Staff also referred him to the rehabilitation unit in 
an arguably hasty decision, as he had wanted to 'get home'. However, there is some 
value in discussing the issues around delayed decision-making, as when this 
happened there were some similarities which are worth further exploration.  
6.6 Delays in decision making: Insights from the health services literature  
The specialist TVN nurse is usually not on-site when initial management and decision 
making around a pressure ulcer are needed (Flanagan, 1996), which is evidenced in 
the analysis within this thesis (see Data Analysis chapter, and the following chapter, for 
further details. They tend to provide a consultative service, which supports frontline 
staff (Flanagan, 1996). However, a systematic review in this area reports that there are 
numerous delays in decision-making and referrals to the TVNs by nurses, (supported 
by evidence in this study) which then has implications for analysis of care, and is not 





Samuriwo and Dowding (2014a) also suggests that most nurses do not appear to 
assess their patients’ risk of developing a pressure ulcer on admission to acute 
services. Instead this is often deferred to the day after admission or even later in the 
patient’s stay (Samuriwo and Dowding, 2014, Unbeck et al., 2013, Fossum et al., 2011, 
Funkesson et al., 2007) (Gould et al., 2004). The review highlighted that it can take up 
to three weeks for nurses to consider the efficacy of the measures that they may or 
may not have implemented to protect a patient’s skin (Fossum et al., 2011, Funkesson 
et al., 2007, Gould et al., 2004). For the patient, this three week delay may have 
profound implications for the quality of skin care that they receive, as often patients do 
not stay for a lengthy period of time in one care setting especially in the acute phase of 
their illness when they are at the highest risk for skin breakdown (Goulding, 2011, 
Czaplinski and Diers, 1998). This was the case for Bernie, Frankie and Chris in this 
study. Although recent recommendations by NHS Improvement have brought in a six 
hour admission window of assessment (NHSi, 2018).  
6.7 Insights from wider safety literature 
Staff often have to make decisions about complex patients within time constraints, and 
in these cases they may refer to what they know, (ad hoc, intuitive reasoning and rules 
of thumb) rather than following analytical, step by step decisions (Catchpole, 2013). 
This point is explored further in the discussion below. However, as was shown in the 
introduction to this chapter, the decision-making literature ((Thompson et al., 2004, 
Hannond et al., 1987) has shown that the more complex the information cues that a 
decision-maker is faced with, the more likely it is that he or she will opt for intuitive 
reasoning and not use a hypothetico-deductive approach. It has also been shown more 
recently in psychological studies on decision-making, that intuitive decisions are very 
rarely optimum and we are actually poor intuitive decision-makers (Catchpole, 2013).  
This may in turn jeopardize patient safety and the quality of care (Brindley, 2010, Wong 
et al., 2012). 
6.8 Complex patients: the uncertainty around co-morbidities and which are 
prioritised 
As people live longer, there are countless patients who present to health services with 
numerous needs, which could be considered ‘complex’.  Recent surveys of primary 
care practices found that 25% of patients were considered complex by doctors.  
Although healthcare decision making usually follows medical literature, including 
domain specific evidence-based medicine (EBM), guidelines, checklists, and protocols, 





study (2013) ad hoc decisions related to organizational issues such as placement of 
the patient, the availability and capability of the nurse, the timing of the treatment and 
ensuring the continuum of care from shift to shift.  Uncertainty or ad hoc decisions, may 
lead to inconsistency and vagueness, distorting the decision-making process towards 
intuitiveness, which has been shown to incorporate bias (Lundgren-Laine et al., 2013). 
The complexity of needs of the patients in this study meant it may have been harder for 
health care professionals to make an initial judgement in a timely and effective manner. 
This variability in need is what would define a complex patient, and as well as their high 
risks which may have been missed on admission by staff, the complexity, arguably, 
would need more regular assessment. Whether this affected the decisions given the 
patients' complexity in this study is discussed below.  
6.9 Evidence from the data 
Four of the eight patients in the study were of an older age (over 65) namely Bernie, 
Chris, Elliott and Hilary, and three others had chronic illness, (i.e. Alex, Danni, and 
Glenn). All would be considered complex or frail patients, and all but Hilary were high 
risk for pressure ulcers as they were immobile at the time their pressure ulcer 
developed. Hilary became immobile after she lay supine on the floor of her house. 
These issues relate to the complex decision making process introduced above in the 
Introduction section, as all the patients had comorbidities which impacted on the 
management of the care they received.  
To illustrate the decisions made in this study for complex patients, on admission Bernie 
was queried for a diagnosis of stroke, a UTI, shortness of breath, malnourishment, and 
dehydration. She already had problems with mobility due to a previous foot injury. She 
remained unwell with a low grade temperature following on from her admission and it 
was found she had pneumonia, but this was not diagnosed until 18 days later following 
a chest x-ray. Therefore, she remained a very ill patient; at high risk for pressure ulcers 
during the time that staff were trying to make decisions about how best to treat her.  For 
example, a staff nurse on the stroke rehabilitation ward noted that Bernie, ‘was very, 
very ill, she had pneumonia, and wasn’t eating. Despite this concern, a positioning care 
plan was not put in place until 6 weeks after her admission when she already had a 
degree of skin damage 
Staff members’ lack of knowledge of pressure ulcer care also contributed to Bernie’s 
pressure ulcer’s development, as they had difficulty accurately describing body site and 
grade of wound (noted in the TVN report). As noted in the systematic review in the 





is pivotal in prevention of pressure ulcer deterioration (Samuriwo and Dowding, 2014), 
and with this in mind one can further appreciate the nurses' lack of knowledge as a 
contributing factor.  Bernie arrived at the Emergency Department unable to 
communicate any reason for her being there, and did not remember anything about her 
initial stay for at least a week. This was noted in her initial admission documents which 
state that was ‘confused and disorientated’. Yet staff were under pressure to make 
decisions about her diagnosis and plan from the outset (Johnson et al., 2017). Staff 
members made referrals and decisions based on what they could uncover about her in 
the absence of other knowledge. For example, the medical notes state a list of possible 
diagnoses ‘inflammation, urinary retention, and predicted Urinary Tract Infection, 
Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease, Ultra Sound abdomen. Will need urology 
review re retention’. Although many patients who are admitted through Emergency 
Departments are equally as unwell as Bernie and are accurately diagnosed and 
assessed as high risk of pressure ulcers, the complexity of Bernie’s condition appeared 
to impact on staff missing documenting her skin status, which was recorded as medium 
risk at the time. The TVN noted that this was inaccurate.  
Danni was also a complex patient based on the criteria set out above. She had a 
congenital neurological condition, and was wheelchair bound. She had developed a 
pressure ulcer previously, which made her aware of what one was, so on developing 
one, many years later, she acted promptly to access health care and deal with it. In her 
case, the nurse at the GP’s practice examined the pressure ulcer briefly, but left Danni 
and her carer [husband] to care for it, ‘assuming’ that they both were competent in 
pressure care. This judgement to allow Danni to care for her self and not monitor the 
wound, and not to escalate the case to more specialist care, meant that the pressure 
ulcer worsened into a severe ulcer before anything was done to monitor it more 
carefully. Danni visited the practice nurse, but it was noted by the nurse that 
appointments are only ten minutes long, and there was not enough time to look at her 
wound in the time available, or offer any advice around the pressure ulcer to prevent it 
worsening. The Practice Nurse noted that she only got ‘ten minutes’ to advise and treat 
Danni. This is assuming that a booking for a double appointment for Danni was not 
considered. There was no evidence of this from analysis of the GP's patient notes. 
When asked by the researcher whether the message about skin care could be passed 
on to a patient in that time, the nurse replied, ‘Not if you are doing a dressing… it’s hard 
to do it in that time.’ 
Also, in part, the practice nurse dealing with Danni, was under pressure by her GP’s 





the researcher that she ‘tried to deal with the pressure ulcer in-house’ although she 
was not familiar with ‘complex pressure ulcers’, and thus the Danni was not referred as 
quickly as she should have been to more specialist care, given her circumstances.  
Chris had multiple comorbidities too. He had been a cardiac patient, was diabetic, had 
cancer and already had a healing pressure ulcer. He then developed C-Difficile on the 
community hospital ward. As the consultant said about him ‘he was a very unwell 
man…and he didn’t need another pressure ulcer’. However, the staff made a decision 
to place him in a side room on a foam mattress, rather than thel high risk air mattress 
that he had previously been on.  
In certain cases, contextual influences prevailed over decisions made by an individual. 
This was apparent in Frankie’s case, where her consultant would have preferably 
placed her on a high dependency unit (HDU). However, because the consultant had 
moved over to another site, he was aware that he did not know the staff well, and there 
was no room on the HDU at that time. He did not exercise his power to push for 
sending her to the ward regardless, as he was not as familiar with the culture there. 
This meant that Frankie was placed on a ward which did not respond to her needs 
enough. This was noted by both her specialist consultant and the ward sister. This, 
more cultural decision-making issue however is described in further detail in the 
chapter on Safety Culture, so is not explored further here.  
6.10 Insights from the health services literature  
The evidence above around high risk patients resonates with current health services 
literature on decision-making which was referred to in the introduction to this chapter 
(Thompson and Dowding, 2002, Samuriwo and Dowding, 2014). The more complex 
the patient, the more difficult the decision will be. Thus, the health services staff may 
have been in an uncertain position, not knowing which choice to make for the best for 
the patients who presented with several comorbidities. Several models to help decision 
making at initial admission offer insights into this area, for example the work around 
recognising sepsis in patients (Johnson et al., 2017, Syyed et al., 2015). However, 
acutely presenting symptoms, such as sepsis, are bound to be prioritised over skin 
status, and less obvious symptoms (like skin damage) are rarely focussed on at this 
stage. This is especially true regarding pressure ulcers which sit behind a more acute 
diagnosis needing urgent attention (Evans, Evans et al., 2006). Then gradually, 
pressure ulcers which deteriorate may become the worst symptom and in turn lead to 
acutely presenting and life threatening symptoms. The priority route for patients is set 





Figure 6.1: Priority route for patients 
 
 
Thompson and Dowding (2002) discuss the idea of super-strong rules when making 
decisions, similar to the priority route I have set out in Figure 5.1 above. They use an 
analogy of horse racing to illustrate. There is never a certainty in racing that one horse 
will win, but some rules outweigh others, e.g. form and previous race history. The same 
is true of decision making for patients, particularly if they are complex. Although health 
care staff cannot guarantee an outcome, due to previous knowledge of patients and 
probabilities, some decisions can be made based on stronger options (for example 
dealing with an obviously septic patient) and possible outcomes. Pressure ulcers 
however, fall into the category of smaller rules which sit alongside stronger diagnoses, 
until they take over as a more serious issue, as with the patients within this study.  
 
6.11 Insights from organisational culture literature 
According to (DiCenso et al., 1998) evidence-based decision making generally involves 
combining clinical expertise, patient preferences, and research evidence within the 
context of available resources. This echoes March and Simon’s work on Bounded 
Rationality, which proposes that when individuals make decisions, their rationality is 
limited by the information they have, the cognitive limitations of their minds, and the 















solution, lacking the ability and resources to arrive at the optimal one (March and 
Simon, 1958, Simon, 1955). However, I would argue that this area of decision-making 
is more aligned with a ‘social rationality’ where decisions are made within a complex 
system and are based within social as well as cognitive systems. This concept will be 
developed in the Final Discussion chapter of this thesis, referring to all of the 
theoretical chapters, however, it also leads on to the next area of decision-making 
regarding this study, which is around how decisions are made collectively and 
alongside colleagues.  
6.12  Who makes the decisions? Evidence from the data 
In several cases, (namely Bernie, Chris, Elliott, Frankie and Glenn), nursing staff did 
not make a definite decision, until much later, to refer to Tissue Viability, which is 
consistent with findings from elsewhere, (Samurio and Dowding, 2014). In some cases 
the doctors involved in the patients’ care tended to make a more definitive decision 
what to do next (particularly for Alex, Bernie and Danni).  For example, Bernie was on a 
stroke rehabilitation ward. The doctor asked the nursing staff to refer her to the Tissue 
Viability Specialist, and noted this n the patient’s notes. Yet this conflicts with the idea 
that pressure ulcer care is in the remit of nursing staff. The doctor was surprised that 
he had to get involved as he always saw pressure ulcer care ‘as a nursing thing’. This 
belief was stated in his interview. Alex’s consultant was the main decision-maker over 
her care, which was picked up in several interviews with nursing and HCA staff, despite 
the private disagreement of the nursing staff on the ward. Alex also followed her 
surgeon's advice against the advice of the nurses (which differed) and this caused a 
degree of tension between her and the nursing staff. The consultant’s view was noted 
by the ward sister to be ‘out of date’, yet the consultant appeared to override the 
nursing staff’s decisions. There is little reference to decisions made for Chris and Glenn 
by doctors regarding their care, so this was less of an issue in their cases. 
6.13 Insights from the health services literature 
This issue of delaying and deferring decisions is referred to in some of the decision-
making literature, for example, Thompson et al (2009) suggest, rather sweepingly, that 
nurses need more confidence in making autonomous decisions, rather than referring 
on to specialist services. (Thompson and Dowding, 2009). However, this seemed to be 
supported for some nursing decisions around pressure ulcer care for the patients in this 
study, in that referrals and escalations were not made in a timely manner, as shown 
above, and they were overridden by medical decisions.  Following recent policy 





decisions about patients. However, it has been shown in health care and political 
literature that medical dominance and the medical profession has limited the full 
realization of nursing’s historical rise in status to autonomous decision makers (Chua 
and Clegg, 1990) (Schutzenhofer, 1987). In a qualitative study of English nurses and 
decision making processes carried out by Traynor et al (2010) nurses often described 
themselves as ‘overruled’ in hierarchical decision-making processes, where they had to 
comply with decisions made by other, higher ranking nurses or by other professional 
groups, notably medical doctors (Traynor et al., 2010). The study was small scale and 
only involved qualified nurses attending post‐qualifying courses at a London university, 
however, it offered some insights into the ‘experience’ of nurses and ‘situational 
decision-making’. Participants were asked to talk about influences on their decision‐
making, and the responses were that staff used ‘situated decision making’ and 
managed their decision-making in a very complex way.  This highlights that, despite a 
professional rhetoric which strongly emphasises its autonomy and separateness from 
medicine (Salvage, 1988) nursing’s close proximity to the medical profession raises the 
question around how far it exercises control over its own practices (Walby and 
Greenwell, 1994). 
According to a study focusing on 120 nurses’ use of research in decision making, 
(Thompson and Dowding, 2009), many of the decisions they faced were made in 
conjunction with colleagues or specialised sources of advice such as clinical nurse 
specialists, pharmacists or doctors. Although this should highlight the essence of a 
multi-disciplinary team. Often, however, these sources constituted ‘information’ sought 
as a response to uncertainty. At other times the other individuals were ‘stakeholders’ in 
a decision and their views had to be accommodated in the decisions made by the 
nurse – for example, doctors’ role in prioritisation of cases for discharge. Almost all the 
decisions nurses made which involved stepping outside the realm of personal 
experience and internalised knowledge, involved these other sources.  
This issue relates again to the literature on the autonomy of nurses (Thompson et al., 
2004), where their role is currently being elevated as decision makers in UK Health 
Policy (Begley et al., 2013). This role is often in conflict with medical staff regarding 
their historical position as primary decision makers (Chua and Clegg, 1990, McDonald 







6.14 Insights from wider safety and organisational literature  
Who makes decisions and how, links again to the work of Hammond (1996) on human 
judgement, where medics, for example, are expected to make decisions as part of their 
medical training, and the focus of this is often on a 'coherent' approach to decision-
making. This was referred to earlier in Chapter 3. This coherent or rational approach is 
in spite of the move in the 1990s towards the more evidence based model for decision-
making. In the 1990s, the correspondence approach gained momentum with the 
evidence-based medicine (EBM) movement, defined as “the conscientious, explicit, 
and judicious use of current best evidence in making decisions about the care of 
individual patients. (Sackett et al., 2007, Sackett et al., 1996)(p.71). Nursing has been 
associated more with evidence based and structured decision making, (Thompson et 
al., 2004). This dichotomy in how staff make decisions for patients with pressure ulcers 
is discussed in further detail in the Discussion below.  
6.15 The role of risk assessments 
Risk assessments in wound care do not currently contain elements of decision making 
for pressure ulcer care, as they tend to be ‘static’, and offer a one off picture of a 
patient’s risk at a point in time. Validated tools such as the Waterlow risk assessment 
and the Braden scale (most commonly used) are not currently linked to a workable 
care plan (Samuriwo and Dowding, 2014). These tools tend to offer a 
recommendations list based on the scores, but the list is general and does not help 
staff to make informed choices. Evidence from a systematic review in this area found 
that nurses did not seem to use a pressure ulcer risk assessment score (PURAS) as 
the basis for their judgement of pressure ulcer risk on a routine basis. A PURAS was 
used by only 32% of the nurses in one study (Acaroglu and Sendir, 2005) and only 
27% of the nurses in another study (Tolmie and Smith, 2002). Some nurses (between 
11% and 23%) also reported having more confidence in their clinical judgement than in 
PURAS, (Gould et al., 2004; Tolmie and Smith, 2002).  
6.16 Risk assessments: Evidence from the data 
For patients involved in this study, the risk assessments were not used adequately in 
most cases to make any decisions about patient care. For Frankie, for instance the 
Ward Manager noted that she scored ‘at risk, according to the Braden scale’. However, 
Frankie was ‘high risk’ as she had lost a large amount of weight and was post lengthy 





minimum expectation would be then that the Braden [risk assessment] would be done, 
you would have a daily skin assessment and a weekly Braden…But that wasn’t done’.  
For Bernie, the TVN review noted that her skin assessment and risk assessments were 
not completed adequately. She stated ‘There is no record of risk assessment in A&E or 
on the acute assessment ward. A Braden score is recorded 6 days after admission on 
the stroke ward. The score assesses a low level of risk but is probably inaccurate.’ 
For Chris, however, on the first vascular surgical ward he was on, the risk assessments 
were fully completed and done regularly, so there was a clear picture of how his skin 
status changed from week to week. This corresponded with his own view of noting how 
things were ‘better’ on that ward than the community rehabilitation ward.  
6.17  Insights from the health services literature 
Although risk assessments are noted to play a pivotal role in pressure ulcer prevention 
according to authors in the field of nursing care (Arblaster, 1998) (Bolton et al., 2007), 
this study, and others have pointed to repeatedly unwell scored risk assessments. For 
example, a large scale Swedish cross sectional survey of retrospective audits identified 
that there were a number of inadequacies in pressure ulcer related nursing 
documentation of 413 hospitalised patients (Gunningberg et al., 2008, Gunningberg et 
al., 2004). These shortcomings included the omission of a recognised pressure ulcer 
grading scale, poor pressure ulcer risk assessment and no clear statements about the 
measures taken to protect the patients’ skin (Gunningberg et al., 2008, Gunningberg et 
al., 2004). 
Pancorbo-Hidalgo et al., in a study on risk assessment sensitivity reported on 
sensitivity and specificity estimates for validated pressure ulcer risk instruments, and 
concluded that the Braden scale showed optimal validation and had the best balance 
between sensitivity (57.1%) and specificity (67.5%) as compared to the Norton and 
Waterlow scales (Pancorbo‐Hidalgo et al., 2006). However, the low values in general 
suggest that Braden scale scores poorly predict who will develop a PU and who will 
not. A comprehensive risk assessment framework, based on patient risk factors has 
recently been field tested (Briggs et al., 2013).  An important feature of this risk 
assessment framework (named PURPOSE-T) is the inclusion of skin status which was 
identified as a key predictor of PU development. It is hoped (early findings are 
indicative of good inter-rater agreement rates) that this latest development in risk 





pathway for high risk and immobile patients, which guides staff better in decision 
making. 
6.18 Insights from safety literature  
Risk assessments are intrinsic to safety literature in general. The National Patient 
Safety Agency (2004) highlighted the importance of risk assessment when it published 
its Seven Steps to Patient Safety. These steps included the need to integrate risk-
management activity, involve patients and implement solutions to prevent harm. Risk 
management is an essential part of the NHS focus on patient safety as it allows staff to 
minimise both the risk and the consequences of an adverse event. It can also provide 
an early-warning system and maximise the probability of a positive outcome. 
Therefore, it is important that staff prioritise risk assessment in their practices. 
However, for some of the patients within this study, this importance was not 
recognised.  
6.19 Insights from organisational culture literature 
If an organisation is focused on safety there should be recognition of both risk analysis 
and assessment. In Vaughan's study of the Challenger launch, risks were taken by the 
staff, in launching under unsafe conditions, which were indicative of a risk-taking 
culture where financial priorities overshadowed the safety concerns and the risks 
pointed out by engineers were overridden.  
6.20 Discussion  
However, where does this evidence lead us in terms of assessing the utility of 
decisions and judgements made by health care staff about the patients with pressure 
ulcers in this study? It appears from the above evidence that decisions about wound 
care in particular, are often delayed, deferred, and made under time constraints without 
full knowledge of patients, who are complex. This would support the idea to some 
extent that this impacted on the patients' severe pressure ulcer. We also know that 
delays in decision making and its impact on patients is also supported by other studies 
in this area (Samuriwo and Dowding, 2014, Catchpole, 2013).  
However, the data in this study also suggests that a naturalistic decision making 
paradigm is a prominent feature of how health care professionals make decisions 
regarding preventing pressure ulcers, incorporating uncertainty, time constraints, with 
ill-defined goals and decisions that are non-linear. Staff members seemed, within this 





logical decisions, despite given certain tools, such as risk assessments to aid clinical 
judgement. Although it would be fair to recognise the limitations of these risk 
assessments and the clinical variation and uncertainty, which make them an 'adjunct' to 
clinical judgement. This nevertheless supports the idea, raised in the introduction to the 
chapter, of experienced nurses using their expertise intuitively, rather than reliance on 
processual decision aids. This makes the case also for training in pressure ulcer 
prevention and management for novice staff to increase their knowledge and 
understanding in making decisions, rather than reliance on snapshot tools. The use of 
risk assessment tools was varied from the evidence in this study. The validity of these 
tools as decision aids has also been brought into question by other experts in decision-
making (Samuriwo and Dowding, 2014). This issue also relates back to ‘mindless’ or 
automatic processing practices, which are discussed in more detail in Chapter 7 
(Mindless safety culture). There was little evidence in the documentary analysis and 
interviews carried out as part of this study that staff were adhering rigidly to risk 
assessments and protocols for several of the patients.  
It seems also apparent from the data analysed that the complexity, or high risk, of the 
patients is an important factor leading to the way they are dealt with. What was 
highlighted from the evidence above is that patient complexity, high risk of pressure 
ulcers and the uncertainty around decision-making must somehow be accounted for 
better within a large system of health care if severe pressure ulcers are to be 
prevented. Rather than ignoring this uncertainty, which seems largely the case for the 
patients involved, who get lost within a decision-laden system, there must be a more 
effective way to make intuitive decision making more transparent in the earlier stages 
of a patient’s pathway. For some staff (where they used a decision tree in other studies 
regarding pressure ulcers) it appeared to be a useful aid (Samuriwo and Dowding, 
2014). 
If we also consider social judgement theory regarding the decisions made, the idea that 
an individual makes a decision based on a number of factors, and there are few 
possible outcomes based on these factors, then it becomes easier to understand. This 
incorporates the social rationality principle mentioned briefly earlier in this chapter, 
developed by Brunswik (1952) and further explained by Hammond (1996). For 
example, Brunswik’s lens model (1952) (on which social judgement theory is based) is 
a good way of modelling this idea simply. Clinicians use ‘cues’ to make a judgement. 
For example for high risk patients this could be noting the frailty of the patient, the age, 
the presentation of their illness. However a judgement can be weighted in different 





at different conclusions based on what weighting they give to each cue. One, with 
expertise in respiratory medicine may focus on the wheezing of the patient, another 
who has recently seen a Category 4 pressure ulcer develop in a patient may focus on 
the skin status. Therefore, crucially even before ‘decision cues’ are used there are also 
‘environmental’ influences on the judge. These can include not only the expertise of the 
person judging, but time constraints to actually make a decision, lack of knowledge, 
changes to ward environment affecting the type of judgement cues and so on.  Thus, 
rather than focusing on autonomous decision made by an individual nurse, who refers 
after an assessment of a wound for example, it may be more helpful, yet more 
complicated, to work out how decisions are made within an environmental context. 
Decision analysis may be useful if it focuses more on clarifying which other social 
influences are also at work, but there is not space to discuss this here. Alternatively, 
the next chapter on Mindless Safety Culture uncovers some of these influences. This 
finding also echoes the earlier references to decisions made in a naturalistic system 
where other influences prevail ( NDM). 
6.21 Normal accidents waiting to happen 
This study is retrospective in nature, which meant staff were able to reflect later and 
report on decisions they made after the event. Often we are not aware of the wrong or 
right decision in real time (Perrow, 1984). It is easy to say this should have happened 
or that, but the staff do not always have the resources available at the time that we do 
when we look at what should have happened for a particular scenario. This is one of 
the benefits (and faults) of Root Cause Analysis and other such investigative 
techniques. The practice nurse involved with Danni suggested that in hindsight she 
would have reacted differently to her pressure ulcer. However, hindsight can also offer 
biases towards us knowing more when we piece all of the facts together after an event. 
In other words, the person looking retrospectively, attempts to make sense, or a 
coherent whole, out of all that he knows about the event.  Fischkoff (1975, 2003) 
advises that “In situations where information is limited and indeterminate, occasional 
surprises—and resulting failures—are inevitable. It is both unfair and self-defeating to 
castigate decision makers who have erred in fallible systems, without admitting to that 
fallibility, and doing something to improve the system.” (p.311). 
At the time, particularly in the cases of Bernie, Danni and Frankie, staff members 
dealing with the patients made the decisions that they felt were appropriate at that time, 





 In a huge system such as the UK National Health Service, with so many 
interchangeable parts, things must inevitably go wrong, as this uncertainty is irreducible 
(Hammond, 1996) noted earlier in this chapter. ‘Medicine used to be simple, ineffective 
and relatively safe; now it is complex, effective and potentially dangerous’’ (Perrow, 
1984). This is where Perrow’s concept of ‘Normal Accidents’ becomes so integral to 
this study. Although doctors in particular, are trained to be autonomous in their 
decisions, this is not always helpful in such a large system with so many influences. 
There is something about the dialogue between doctors and nurses, and taking in to 
account their social environment, which we need to tease out regarding their the 
decision making to make it more equal for all professions, and more open to scrutiny, 
so we can learn how to make the best choices in uncertain circumstances.   
6.22 Conclusion  
The evidence gathered in this area would suggest that issues with delays and the 
ability to make decisions in an uncertain environment did impact on the severe 
pressure ulcers which developed in patients in this study.  They certainly appeared to 
have some degree of involvement. Although these claims remain at an exploratory and 
qualitative level of analysis. This conclusion however, leads us to think about the 
systems of care in pressure ulcer prevention, rather than individuals simply being 
accountable for decisions they made at the time. The theoretical debates raised within 
this section also suggest that staff use intuition to make decisions in a complex 
environment regarding prevention and treatment of pressure ulcers, rather than relying 
on validated tools such as risk assessments. These debates highlight gaps in frontline 
practice and there may be further value in clarifying the actual decisions made using 
decision analysis within a social environment, rather than focusing on an individual’s 
actual decision. It is also possible that expectations are not high enough of prevention 
and management of pressure ulcers at initial presentation of complex patients. Future 
consideration could be given to awareness-raising at frontline level and a more 
prominent research and service improvement focus on the decisions made regarding 









Chapter 7: Mindless or mindful safety culture: The impact on pressure 
ulcer development. 
7.1 Chapter summary   
This section focuses on evidence which was gathered to formulate the question 
whether or not a ‘mindless’ style safety culture contributed to the development of 
severe pressure ulcers.  This chapter first defines safety culture and situates it within a 
complex adaptive system. It then explores some of the reasons why professionals 
within this study failed to respond to patients in a timely manner. The healthcare 
environment is then further examined for evidence which supports or contradicts the 
‘mindless’ hypothesis.  Finally, the chapter discusses the reasons for supposing that 
mindful awareness will result in a safer culture. 
7.2 Introduction  
Safety culture is an ill-defined concept (Vincent, 2010). As patient safety has evolved 
as a discipline, there have been more detailed developments in defining what it really 
means. It originates from the concept of ‘organisational culture’, which grew in 
popularity in the 1980s. In brief, and given that the history and debates around 
organisational theories would be the basis for another thesis, it suffices for the purpose 
of this chapter to highlight that organisational theorists moved the focus away from 
structures and management practices (see Weber’s Bureaucracy Theory, and Taylor’s 
Scientific Management Approach)(Weber et al., 1947, Taylor, 1913) towards an 
emphasis on the ‘culture’ and ‘values’ of organisations in order to interpret and 
understand them (Schein, 2010).  
7.3 Definition of culture 
‘Culture’ within an organisation is typically thought of as the sum of a group of specific 
characteristics. These may be behaviours, day-to-day rituals, ceremonies, practices, 
unwritten rules and relationships (Kroeber & Kluckhohn, 1952 (In (Bidney, 1954). 
Alongside 164 definitions that they collect around culture, Kroeber and Kluckhohn note, 
‘the psychologist tends to focus on the individual, the sociologist on social structure, the 
anthropologist on culture’ (p.200). This thesis attempts to combine all three of the 
above approaches to understand why severe pressure ulcers develop within the 
healthcare environment, incorporating the individual, the social structure and the 





Psychologically-oriented cultural theorists see organisations as influenced by 
underlying beliefs, norms, values, attitudes, and systems of knowledge, which are 
consistent and enduring. For them, culture is a composite but static ‘social fact’ and 
dependent on individual cognition (Hofstede, 2001). For others, culture is better 
construed as being dynamic and emergent rather than static (Chia, 1996, Davies et al., 
2000b). Essentially, culture can either be defined in terms of shared meanings held and 
exhibited through behaviours, or instead defined in terms of people’s practices. The 
central debate over the definition of culture is around whether culture is either what an 
organisation ‘has’ or ‘is’ (Vincent, 2010, Hollnagel et al., 2013). 
In a synthesising view of the different meanings of culture, Schein offered a composite 
model (1985). At the surface level Schein positioned visible artefacts, such as 
structures, dress and ceremonies. He explained the median level of the model as 
beliefs and values that appear outwardly as assertions, strategies and goals, and the 
third, underlying level consisted of unconscious assumptions, taken-for granted 
expectations, thoughts and feelings (Schein, 1992). Schein articulated this further in his 
‘Organisational Culture and Leadership’ work (Schein, 2010), where he speaks of 
culture as ‘the foundation of the social order we live in and the rules we abide by’. 
Schein refers to anthropological models of culture when he asks us to think of ways in 
which we share experiences, such as group norms, observed behavioural regularities, 
values, habits of thinking and shared meanings. However, he adds ‘structural stability, 
depth, breadth and patterning or integration. Above all, he argues that culture is about 
shared assumptions that are learned by a group. These assumptions can be taught to 
new members as the correct way to perceive think and feel.  
In applying this theory to healthcare, the priority of patient care is the overriding value. 
Underlying this there are differences between professionals and different providers, in 
terms of their attitudes, formalities and power to overrule each other.  Vincent 
summarises this further in his description that culture in healthcare can be seen as ‘the 
way we do things around here’ (Vincent, 2010).  
7.4 Safety culture within health care 
Safety culture is one aspect of an overall ‘organisational culture’. The UK Health and 
Safety Commission (1993) offered the following definition of safety culture as ‘the 
values, attitudes and behaviour that determine the commitment to an organisation’s 
health and safety programmes.’. The culture of safety in health care is often seen as an 
evolving concept, and focuses on preventing medical errors and maintaining patient 





approach to risk (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001).  Promoting a culture of safety has become 
one of the pillars of the patient safety movement (Francis, 2013, Department of Health, 
1997, Department of Health, 2013b). This is despite recurrent debates about the 
definition of culture (Vincent, 2010). In recent years there has also been increasing 
understanding within healthcare that various factors such as the emphasis on efficiency 
and cost, and professional norms among healthcare providers combine to create a 
culture contradictory to the requirements of a safe culture (Vincent, 2010). 
Consequently, despite efforts towards a so-called ‘mindful’ safety culture, the culture of 
the healthcare industry is regarded as a potential risk factor threatening the patients for 
whom it provides care. At frontline level, Weick and Sutcliffe (2001) and Hollnagel 
(Hollnagel et al., 2013) encourage an organisation to have a ‘mindful’ safety culture in 
contrast to a ‘blame’ or ‘mindless’ culture and to express expectations by praising what 
is approved and making clear what is disapproved. This is in contrast to a ‘culture of 
low expectations’ or ‘laissez-faire’ approach.  
7.5 Safety in a complex adaptive system 
On the other hand, to refer to safety simply as ‘culture’ has been described as 
‘conceptual shorthand’ by other writers in the patient safety field (Hollnagel et al., 
2013). Being safe can mean different things to different groups of people (see previous 
chapter on the patient role for a debate around this dichotomy) and can be described in 
a number of ways. Other experts in the area of patient safety have preferred to 
conceptualise health care instead as a ‘complex adaptive system’, which allows for a 
different, more structural lens to examine safety. A system is defined by a collection of 
components that cohere in a pattern to produce an outcome (Braithwaite; In Hollnagel, 
2015). Complex systems refer to multi-scaled, diverse, interactive hierarchical and 
heterarchical systems, where behaviours cannot be predicted easily. The most 
common definition of a complex adaptive system, based on the work of John Holland, 
is a dynamic network of agents acting in parallel, constantly reacting to what the other 
agents are doing, which in turn influences behaviour and the network as a whole 
(Holland, 2006). Control tends to be dispersed and decentralised and the overall 
behaviour of the system is the result of many decisions made constantly by individual 
agents. A complex adaptive system emerges and changes, and can self-organise, 
adapt and learn from the ‘bottom up’ but this means behaviour within it is difficult to 
predict (Hollnagel et al., 2013).  
Perrow conceptualised safety within a complex adaptive system in his work ‘Normal 





terms of specific accidents, he argues that we cannot predict them or know where they 
will appear, hence the term ‘normal’. This debate has been covered more fully in 
Chapter 2 (Literature Review) in this thesis. However, Perrow’s complex systems view 
(Perrow, 1984) sits alongside Vaughan’s more socio-cultural view of what causes 
disasters (Vaughan, 1996) with both viewing safety and risk through slightly different 
lens’. To recap, Vaughan focused more on the social processes regarding the 
Challenger space shuttle disaster. She found, rather than an inherent systems failure, 
that poor judgement was behind the disaster within a culture which normalised risky or 
deviant behaviour and decisions.  
 The results of the data collection in this thesis, linked to the initial review of the 
literature, have suggested, in general, that the environment contributed to the 
development of patients’ severe pressure ulcers, (Explanation D; and aligned with 
Vaughan’s theory on culture) but this could also be understood in terms of ‘sequences 
of events’ for certain patients (Explanation C; aligned more with Perrow’s theory on 
complex-adaptive systems).  
Braithwaite (2013) suggests that, as agents within a system interact, they produce 
emergent behaviours and attitudes which then become the ‘culture’ and have 
distinctive, localised ‘patterning’. These cultures within health care affect and react to 
each other, and can be grouped as wards or departments, or more localised small 
cliques of groupings, and in-group and out groups. Braithwaite thus argues, as does 
this thesis, that there is a place for both of these lens’ within healthcare (Hollnagel et 
al., 2013). Healthcare can be understood as a complex adaptive system which has 
sub-cultures within it, one of which is a safety culture, and both elements of which 
contribute to the development of severe pressure ulcers. 
The main question I am posing within this chapter is how far do the complex adaptive 
system or the safety culture (whether mindful or ‘laissez faire’) contribute to patients 
developing pressure ulcers? Also, can the two be juxtaposed successfully to study the 
development of severe pressure ulcers more usefully than current investigative 
techniques which are used within the NHS today (for example, Root Cause Analysis)? I 
have drawn together evidence from various data sources to examine these questions.  
7.6 The systems perspective-lack of response  
The sequence of events chronology and associated documentary sources (for 
example, local policies, clinical notes) were useful aids regarding the above questions, 





already set out in patterns as it unfolded over time. I was also able to delve into 
responses, actions and escalations within the health care environment as they 
happened during a patient’s pathway, whilst exploring whether these were adequate, or 
contributed to the development of the severe pressure ulcers. This was poignant for 
those patients where the judgement by the expert team was that a sequence of events 
contributed alongside the environment (namely, Bernie, Elliott and Frankie).  
7.7 Lapses in response-evidence from the data 
For some patients in the study, the sequence of events was a complex build up of 
lapses in care, which escalated, almost unnoticed by staff, into a severe pressure ulcer 
(see Reason 1997 and Perrow, 1984). Bernie, for example, already had leg 
contractures from a previous stroke (making her high risk for a pressure ulcer before 
she was admitted). She was brought in to A&E after collapsing. There was no record of 
skin assessment at point of entry into services. Seven days following admission, Bernie 
received a diagnosis of a simple lobar haemorrhage (stroke). She was confused. Her 
Braden pressure ulcer risk assessment score was 16, which scored her at low risk of a 
pressure ulcer, although she was immobile, and dehydrated so this was underscored. 
This was the first documented pressure ulcer risk assessment in her notes. Staff 
continued to miss her high risk of pressure damage during her admission. For example, 
on Day 8, a red area the size of 10 pence was noted on Bernie’s thigh, and the 
following day she was transferred to a stroke ward, yet she was now only recorded as 
medium risk for pressure ulcers. The rationale for this was given as decreased mobility, 
incontinent, stroke, and elderly. The Ward Manager on the ward felt that ‘patient care 
took priority over documentation’. 
Bernie remained on the stroke ward for six days, and was confused throughout her 
stay. She was then transferred to a stroke rehabilitation ward (on Day 14) where ‘pin 
head’ pressure damage to her ankle was noted at transfer, and she was noted to have 
Pneumonia. At this point Bernie also was noted to have pressure damage (2cmx 2cm 
size) on her right buttock.  Bernie’s mattress was changed to a ‘high risk’ mattress, but 
‘no nimbus was available’. (A nimbus mattress is an alternating air mattress and 
recommended for patients at high risk of pressure damage). This was nine days after 
the first record of any skin damage (Day 16). She kept returning to sleeping on her right 
side while she slept. She received a nimbus air mattress ten days after skin damage 
was first described. The medical consultant advised to refer Bernie to Tissue Viability, 
although this action was not carried out until five days later (Day 22), following another 





policies when she said, ‘Bernie clearly would come up as high risk on the scales’. 
However she added: ‘more focus is generally placed on clinical judgement at the [local] 
trust site than on risk assessments, but why did the staff not use their clinical judgment 
to assess the high level of risk involved with Bernie?.’ 
By the time she saw the wound, the TVN noted that the ulcer was a Grade 3 (3cm x 
2.5cm). She noted that Bernie was mobile in bed, but recorded in the nursing notes 
that she couldn’t tolerate her left side (the side opposite to the side which developed a 
pressure ulcer) when sleeping. The TVN also documented that the wound should be 
reassessed weekly, and following this intervention it began to heal.  
Figure 7.1 Bernie’s pathway 
 
Elliott had a similar experience in terms of missed documentation and assessments. 
He did not receive a timely risk assessment when he was admitted to hospital. He was 
nearly ninety at the time of the study, and was admitted into a district hospital, primarily 
with cellulitis.  
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Figure 7.2 Elliott’s pathway
Elliott had a contracted leg (as did Bernie). He also had existing pressure ulcers, but 
there was some confusion about where these were during his admission, although 
there was a plan in both the nursing and medical notes to check under his bandages 
on his legs. It was found through the research investigation that Elliott had already 
developed a pressure ulcer pre-admission, but as the staff did not document the Grade 
of the pressure ulcer on admission, and appeared not to have checked under his 
bandages for five days, it was recorded by the TVN on review as a hospital acquired 
Grade 3 pressure ulcer (see timeline B above). A staff nurse felt that the reasons why 
staff did not check under bandages was that staff were ‘afraid’ and ‘worried’ about how 
a wound may have been dressed by a district nurse. Also, there was a concern from 
staff members that the pharmacy shut outside office hours, ‘because it’s five 
o’clock…pharmacy’s shut….we do have an emergency cupboard but that’s not to say 
that everything would be in it.’ 
The clinical risk coordinator added that there was no evidence to show that staff had 
checked under the bandages to check for a pressure ulcer. She noted that nursing staff 
‘hadn’t taken the bandages down…’she added that ‘we know that from the information. 
There’s no documentary evidence….until Tissue Viability took them down: And if we 
can’t prove it was there on admission, we’ve got to own it.’ Although Elliott came in with 
a pressure ulcer ‘under his bandages’ the TVN had no option but to record the previous 
pressure ulcer as hospital acquired because there was not documented proof that 
anyone had checked or assessed his skin before. His daughter (carer) however told 
the researcher that he had had the pressure ulcer for around six months: 
A: ‘So I would say he had it for about six months here [home]. 
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Q: On his right ankle? 
A: His right…it was weepy but it wasn’t infected. And then it gradually got 
bigger, and we got the community nurses in ... maybe two or three times a 
week, and if it came off or needed changing, I would do it…When he went into 
SUPPORTED LIVING... I would say it was only about that big… 50p size.’ 
The district nurse also noted that Elliott’s pressure ulcer was a Grade 2 before his 
admission to hospital. She stated’ It was probably a 2 when I first saw it. It wasn’t a 
Grade 3 when I last saw it’. 
There is no real way of knowing whether this is correct however, as another district 
nurse who was interviewed felt that it was a Grade 3 when she had last seen it. Despite 
the difference in judgement, the pressure ulcer had developed before the admission to 
hospital. 
7.8 Insights from health services literature  
Both of the sequences of events above (see Method) highlighted delays and lapses in 
response to pressure ulcer skin damage by healthcare staff involved. Bernie was not 
assessed (there was no evidence of documented assessments) for pressure ulcers 
until seven days after her admission despite her being a seriously unwell, immobile, 
high risk patient. Firstly, this highlights a lack of adherence to the local trust policy 
around pressure ulcer assessment and skin damage, which states that all patients 
identified by the screening process should have a ‘documented formal risk assessment 
commenced within 2 hours and completed within 24 hours of admission or transfer’. 
Secondly, national NICE guidance states that patients should be assessed for pressure 
ulcer risk when they are admitted into an NHS service (Elliott’s was not) and RCN 
guidance (2001) recommends that: ‘The timing of risk assessment should be based on 
each individual case. However, it should take place in under six hours of the start of 
admission to the episode of care.’ 
A key issue in management of pressure ulcers is identifying individuals who may be at 
risk of developing ulcers, so that prevention strategies can be introduced (Samuriwo 
and Dowding, 2014). However, this relies on the ability of nurses to accurately identify 
in a timely manner whether or not a patient may be at risk of developing an ulcer. 
However, Samuriwo et al’s review also suggests that nurses rarely use a risk 
assessment to help them to identify their patients’ risk and that this impacts on the 





numerical risk assessments (e.g. Waterlow and Braden scales) have little effect on 
nursing judgement and offer little predictive value (Webster et al., 2011) Haigh and 
Pinkney (in press), so this may be one of the reasons why nurses in all of the examples 
above did not respect the local and national policies around timely assessment 
(Samuriwo and Dowding, 2014); (Johansen et al., 2014). This is despite the 
recommendations. More recent research in this area has developed evidenced based 
risk assessments, which aim to support care plans rather than produce a numerical 
score,  but this work is in its infancy (Briggs et al., 2013).  
For the patients above, who were assessed using numerical risk assessments, there 
was a similarity in the lapses in timely response by staff. This echoes research 
evidence which highlights that nurses often do not ‘prioritise’ pressure ulcer prevention. 
Athlin et al (2010) for example, found that nurses place a low value on pressure ulcer 
prevention, which reflects the same as the result from Moore and Price’s (2004) Irish 
survey study, despite in the latter study the majority of participants expressing a 
positive attitude towards pressure ulcer prevention. This was not however, reflected in 
practice. Similarly, Samuriwo (2010) found that the despite the high value that nurses 
appear to place on pressure ulcer prevention, the day to day work is often delegated to 
HCAs. In this study this was the case for Bernie; the first documented pressure care 
entry is by a HCA. Samuwiro (2010) concludes that pressure ulcer prevention may be 
‘perceived’ by nurses to be important, but ‘less urgent’ than other aspects of nursing 
and therefore easier to delegate. The time element is important, as it highlights that 
pressure ulcer prevention does not get urgently prioritised, and patients do not receive 
a ‘timely response’. However, Samuriwo and Dowding’s (2014) review also highlights 
that a combination of delays in a formal pressure ulcer risk assessment and the 
manner in which they are used can increase the risk of pressure ulcer formation and is 
not currently indicative of best practice.  Yet guidelines for best practice are explicit in 
local trust and national guidelines. However, best practice guidelines did not seem to 
be followed in either of the cases above, which may well have impacted on the 
development of the patients’ pressure ulcers. 
7.9 Insights from safety literature 
Much work has been done in the field of patient safety and lapses in response. The 
impact of Reason's modelling on the NHS was originally based around cognitive lapses 
at individual level, and thus began the movement towards the uptake of Root Cause 
Analysis (RCA) in patient safety and the NHS as a whole. Identifying lapses in care (as 





currently. Indeed the author of this thesis herself, often finds herself debating with 
colleagues about 'lapses in care'. Although this highlights an issue around what a 
'lapse in care' actually means, as it is not an easily identifiable construct, and whether 
'lapse in response is a more helpful term, if it is at all.  
7.10 Referral delays-evidence from the data 
Referrals to specialist tissue viability services and decisions around care planning were 
not prioritised and were poorly understood, and even forgotten about, in some cases 
within the study. The expert witnesses stated this in their judgement that a referral was 
not made quickly enough for Bernie. They referred to a ‘delayed referral.’  The referral 
process to tissue viability was not followed through promptly in response to Bernie’s 
Grade 2 pressure ulcer, after the expert witnesses also commented that ‘they [the staff] 
didn’t up the care at all…until she developed a Grade 2 pressure ulcer.’ This was 
evidenced by a reminder written in the nursing notes by the consultant which states 
‘refer to tissue viability, suggested last week’. However, one of the junior doctors 
argued that the staff on the ward ‘couldn’t get tissue viability to see her enough’. This 
he added was ‘because there’s not tissue viability…there’s only two of them and they 
are really busy’. This suggests that referrals to the TVNs may not be an easy task for 
ward staff, which would impact on how quickly staff referred.  
In the community, a similar picture of delayed referral appeared around Danni’s case, 
where delays in both assessment and referral by a practice nurse allowed her pressure 
ulcer to deteriorate unnoticed. The nurse did not refer Danni to more specialist 
services.  
Danni visited the practice nurse at her GP’s surgery, yet was never assessed 
comprehensively until two months after initially reporting skin damage. Danni first noted 
her pressure ulcer when she got out of the bath and she noticed a blood stain on her 
towel. Two days after this she made a visit to the practice nurse at her GP’s as, in her 
words, ‘she didn’t have to see the doctor’. The practice nurse noted that there was a 
small broken area the size of a penny on her left buttock (she saw Bernie’s wound at 
this point). The wound was irrigated and Danni was given a dressing, and left to dress 
the wound by herself, with her partner’s help. The practice nurse noted to the 
researcher, ‘we irrigated it…And Danni said then that she would look after it herself at 
that point.’ 
The expert witnesses highlighted this lack of referral by the practice nurse in their 





went to her GP and then they didn’t look at her, assess her, and treat her from there, 
and if they couldn’t assess her because she was in a wheelchair and it was too difficult 
to get her onto a bed, they didn’t then refer her over to the district nurses to go and do 
that assessment at home.’ 
 It was noted, in nursing notes, by the practice nurse initially that ‘no action would be 
taken, unless the wound inflamed’, however the wound did develop some inflammation, 
but no action followed from this and it was never measured properly. Two months after 
discovery of the pressure ulcer, Danni returned to the practice nurse for more 
dressings. The practice nurse did not examine the wound at this appointment. The 
wound had started to be smelly and sloughy at this point. Danni was seen by the GP 
and was prescribed Metronidazole. Danni said that the nurse had a word with the 
doctor at this point (Pt Interview). She was able to request more dressings simply by 
phoning the GP’s surgery.  
Figure 7.3 Danni’s pathway
 
Three months later, Danni then saw the practice nurse again. The wound was now 
noted to be a ‘black cavity’, which was then irrigated, de-sloughed, a dressing was 
applied, and a further appointment was made for three days later. The nurse said in her 
interview that this was the first time she had seen the wound. She noted that it was 
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Ten days later Danni returned to the surgery, and the wound had doubled in size and 
was smelly (nursing notes). She was noted by the practice nurse to be anxious and 
embarrassed by the wound odour. She was advised to keep off it as much as possible 
(medical notes). One week later, Danni was seen again by the practice nurse, after 
having been in bed all week to keep pressure off the wound. Her husband had been 
dressing the wound every day and applying gel. As Danni had to be bed bound now, a 
referral was now made to the district nursing team for home visits. The practice nurse 
did not record the size again at this point. She spoke of her mistakes in her reflections 
about this when she said, ‘In hindsight, I ought to have probably referred her more 
quickly to the district nurses, rather than me dealing with it in-house.’ 
The nurse also noted that, ‘It prolonged.’ And explained that ‘It started to do very well, 
but it wasn’t healing up as quickly as perhaps it should have been, because she should 
have been off her bottom completely… when she came back it was getting a lot worse 
then I had to do something.  But I ought to have done it earlier’ (Practice Nurse). 
A district nurse (DN) then came to see Danni and it was decided that she would receive 
daily visits. The DN did a Waterlow pressure ulcer risk assessment and Danni scored a 
17, (high risk). It was noted that the wound was 4x3cms. The DN remembered that the 
wound was a Grade 3 to 4 (SPU). By the next month, following daily input, it was noted 
that Danni’s wound was shallower. The HCA and staff nurse felt that the wound got 
better all the time. The wound continued to improve (nursing notes). Danni’s pressure 
ulcer improved gradually and by the next year it had fully healed. Nursing input was 
stopped at this point.  
However, as can be seen from the sequence of events above, Danni first went to the 
GP’s practice nearly two years prior to the pressure ulcer healing fully. The practice 
nurse did not (from the evidence from interview and the chronological sequence of 
events) act as promptly as she could have done, which resonates with the above 
issues raised in Bernie’s case around delays in response. The pressure ulcer was not 
assessed in the first few months (this is evidenced from the Practice Nurse’s own 
interview), which compares with the issues with Bernie’s admission, and Danni was not 
given any advice or knowledge about her sore, when it developed initially. Danni was 
left mainly to manage the wound herself, with her husband’s help, until the referral five 
months later to the district nursing team. A lack of recognition by health professionals 
involved of Danni’s high risk status seemed to be a contributing factor for the 
development of the SPU, coupled with the lack of referral to a TVN, or someone more 





Additionally, Glenn’s pressure ulcer was dealt with by district nurses for a long time 
before he was referred to Tissue Viability services.  Glenn was 65 years old at the time 
of the study, and had suffered a spinal injury 34 years ago when he broke his neck.. 
His wife was his main carer, and he had district nursing input twice weekly to manually 
evacuate his bowels. Glenn stayed in bed most of the time on a pressure relieving 
foam mattress. 
There were several district nurses involved in Glenn’s care. The Tissue viability Nurse 
pointed out that Glenn’s wife dealt directly with her directly eventually because of this 
issue. She said, it’s funny how I’ve always spoken to her [Glenn’s wife/carer] about the 
progress as well….because, at the moment with district nursing, it’d take me days to 
get the information I wanted. Because of how the teams have been formed, you’d 
never get the same person going in which can’t be helped so I’ve always phoned her. 
Because I’ve found that I’ve got information that’s good and worthy, I know that I can 
trust if she said ‘I’m worried’, it’s something that I need to be worried about as well.’ 
This issue around delays in referral to the tissue viability team was also echoed by the 
expert witnesses when they noted that, ‘the district nurses were task-orientated, the 
Category 1 development didn’t raise any alarm bells with anybody, apart from the 
patient himself, who was worried…and there was no communication between 
anybody ... the district nurses didn’t flag it up to the TVN or the spinal injuries unit, or 
anybody. Or the GP.’ 
The expert witnesses judged  that, ‘The organisational failures are really around the 
district nurses not picking up the cues, either the physical cues from the examination of 
him, or the messages from the patient and his wife, and acting appropriately on those 
messages, isn’t it? Why aren’t they?’ 
7.11 Insights from health services literature 
When patients (particularly Bernie, Chris, Danni, Elliott, Frankie and Glenn) presented 
with initial symptoms of skin damage, the staff seemed to respond with a lack of 
urgency around escalating care regarding skin integrity. This was evident by analysing 
the sequence of events chronology. Also, when less obvious issues around lack of 
escalation were noticed in the sequence of chronological events, it became apparent 
that each delay can contribute to a worse outcome than initially imagined. However, 
aside from putting preventative strategies in and anticipating problems ahead 
(discussed above), there was a lack of prompt escalation of care and referral. Bernie’s, 





As well as echoing the literature findings around lapses in care at the risk assessment 
stage, set out above (Athlin et al., 2010, Moore and Cowman, 2008, Samuriwo and 
Dowding, 2014), this issue resonates with literature around the tissue viability specialist 
nursing role, which remains poorly defined, and access to their advice and input can be 
variable (Flanagan, 1996). Staff seem unsure when to refer or how to use their input. 
Samuriwo (2011) found, in his doctoral study around nursing perceptions of pressure 
ulcers, that nursing staff felt the TVNs were too preoccupied with reviewing patients 
themselves and did not provide nurses with sufficient training to empower them to 
make appropriate decisions about pressure ulcer prevention and management. 
Although this work is based around the opinions of nursing staff, there still appears to 
be confusion around the role of the tissue viability specialist nurse and variability in how 
nursing staff are able to access their expertise (Catania et al., 2007, Samuriwo and 
Dowding, 2014, Flanagan, 1996). This may be one of the reasons why nursing staff 
above did not refer as promptly as they should have to tissue viability services. There is 
little high quality research around the role of the tissue viability nurse in clinical settings, 
and how nurses refer to them, so further research to examine the escalation pathway 
to tissue viability would be a useful exercise.  
7.12 Insights from safety literature  
The errors (mainly in documentation) and time lapses in assessment and escalation, 
despite not following local and national policies, may have not seemed an issue in real 
time to frontline staff working with Bernie, yet when the lapses in care were examined 
together over time, they highlighted a lack of overall response to Bernie’s risk of 
pressure damage. The evidence from the above cases points to each pressure ulcer 
being caused by a complex sequence of events (Perrow, 1984) within a complex 
system which made it difficult for staff to recognise that their actions were contributing 
and interacting within that system to cause the severe pressure ulcers. Here was a 
combination of a lack of follow up and knowledge by professionals at the first point of 
entry to services, and a delay in treating a pressure ulcer effectively when it was in its 
early stages, but only seen clearly by patterning the events over time. This is also the 
style of investigating incidents which Root Cause Analysis (RCA) employs, with varying 
success, following Reason’s Swiss Cheese theory (Hollnagel et al., 2015).  
The technique of Root Cause Analysis (and other tools which examine evidence 
chronologically) is not without its critics, particularly in recent years.  Dekker et al., and 
other prominent human error researchers, have been critical of the safety movement's 





highlighted how hindsight bias can thwart efforts to understand causality in serious 
incidents. Hindsight bias occurs when people investigating a situation already know the 
outcome, and they view the ‘error’ from a post error, rather than real time perspective. 
This issue was discussed in the Methods section of this thesis, so will not be discussed 
again here.  
7.13 Insights from organisational literature 
The danger however, with the enlightened position above, according to theorists such 
as Perrow, Vaughan and Hollnagel,  is that we may simplify complex accident 
trajectories into simple, linear processes and identify decisions that may have been 
ambiguous in real time as ‘wrong’. We may attribute blame when the actions of 
individuals are not blameworthy, but actually the ‘whole’ system is at fault (Dekker et 
al., 2011, Perrow, 1984, Hollnagel et al., 2013). This argument will be discussed more 
fully in the Final Discussion section of the thesis as it forms a recommendation for 
changing and improving current investigative practices in line with new directions in 
patient safety research. 
However, aside from methodological weaknesses and debates around whether 
sequences of events are linear or complex, these sequences of events were noted by 
the review team to contribute alongside environmental or socio-cultural causes to the 
development of patients’ severe pressure ulcer. Environmental and cultural influences 
are now discussed below. 
7.14 Environmental contributions to severe pressure ulcer development 
The environment was judged by the expert witnesses to impact most on the 
development of patients’ pressure ulcers. For several of the patients within the study 
this was the case. Alex, Chris, Elliott, Frankie and Glenn were patients identified by the 
research team as those whom the environment was solely responsible for their severe 
pressure ulcers. Bernie’s and Danni’s cases also involved a sequence of events. One 
of the examples drawn from the data was that Frankie’s pressure ulcer developed 
within a trust which was under organisational upheaval, and the environment around 
her played a significant part in the development of her pressure ulcer. This is described 
below. 
7.15 Misplaced patients within organisational disruption-evidence from the data 
Frankie was admitted to hospital following complications with an abdominal operation. 





two (specialist and general) surgeons and was transferred to a new post-operative 
surgical ward. According to the nursing notes, she came from theatre with no ‘easy 
care’ information. The nurse informed her that he/she had ‘no proper admission 
documents’. The staff nurse told the researcher during her interview about the issues 
around having to ask the patient questions again, and highlighted some of the 
weaknesses in the current system, noting that ‘She came from theatre so we won’t 
have known anything about her whatsoever, apart from her name and what surgery 
she’s had. So we had to just get the basics. So…you’re going to pick somebody up 
from theatre that you’ve never met before...’ 
The specialist surgeon noted that Frankie would be transferring to the new  ward from 
theatre. It was written that the doctor would ‘ensure the weekend team were aware.’ At 
this point, the doctor also noted that Frankie’s sacrum ‘appeared hot’. Aquafoam (a 
foam dressing to alleviate soreness) was applied. An air mattress (to alleviate 
pressure) was ordered and Frankie was advised to change position in bed. The 
following day Frankie was noted to be at risk of pressure damage. The plan was to 
assess and reposition her every four hrs. Frankie scored at low risk on the pressure 
ulcer risk assessment (Braden scale 18). Frankie was sitting out in a chair (no pressure 
relieving cushion was supplied (Nurse Interview). Her left bottom ‘appeared red’. Skin 
was intact.  
One ward manager in the trust told the researcher of the issues they faced overnight 
with other patients coming onto the ward with different needs, when she stated, ‘That’s 
where your key problem is. They originally had colorectal post-op patients, but then 
overnight they had to take the urology major cases as well. These are really poorly 
and…what I’m saying is their workload has doubled.’  
One specialist surgeon noted that Frankie was part of organisational upheaval and this 
impacted on her movement between wards. She stated that, ‘Frankie’s (general) 
surgeon, would have liked her to go onto HDU (High Dependency Unit). But, you know, 
it was his first day at the other site; and I think he felt he didn’t really have much 
sway ... you know, I think if he’d been here in his own territory, he would have got on 
the phone and said, look guys, this is not negotiable, she’s going wherever. And I think 
if she’d gone onto HDU, then the assessments would have been different.’ The 
specialist surgeon also reported that the general  surgeon did not feel empowered by 
the organisational upheaval at that point to make a definitive decision about where 
Frankie went to, which meant that she was admitted onto a general post-operative 





moved to another site while Frankie was admitted, and that this had played a part in 
her pressure ulcer development. She stated, ‘For us, it was a pain moving. You had 
boxes everywhere and it was higgledy-piggledy. So at the time she would have been 
on a busy ward…‘We moved on the Saturday morning and it took us from 8 o’clock till 
half-one before all the patients were in the bays and the side rooms. And then we still 
had ... other things to do – you’ve still got your boxes to unpack, the drugs to put away, 
CDs to take from one cupboard to another, so it was quite labour-intensive.’  
Frankie’s description around the discovery of her pressure ulcers highlighted that she 
felt there was a lack of awareness of ‘tasks’ when she said, ‘I think that when they first 
discovered the bruising there was a massive reaction but it wasn’t followed through in 
any depth or detail.’ She added that,’ there didn’t seem to be the resource or the level 
of awareness of the task to follow it through. So the fact that I’d been turned once didn’t 
mean that I got turned again. The task got dropped.’ One of the expert witnesses 
judged Frankie’s treatment on the ward above as chaotic, and stated, ‘The staff on the 
ward were all over the shop without adequate resources.’  
The expert witnesses felt that one of the main issues with Frankie’s stay were that staff 
did not realise or were not aware how ill she was on the several wards that she was on. 
One of them stated, ‘I think the other issue that runs through all of this is that nobody 
appreciated how ill she was. So on the specialist ward there were delays, then on the 
post-operative ward there was a lack of recognition that she was so ill’. 
Frankie was discharged 13 days after admission. The outpatient report stated that the 
pressure ulcer was then improving. Frankie’s severe pressure ulcer thus appeared to 
develop in a particularly unstable organisational environment. The expert team 
concluded from the evidence that the organisational environment caused the sequence 
of events leading to the development of Frankie’s severe pressure ulcer (D caused B in 
the explanations). Frankie was in the midst of an upheaval of the organisation i.e. 
surgical services moving hospital site.  
Another example of where the patient was misplaced according to his or her needs, 
and the prevailing culture on the ward was not helpful, was regarding Chris, who was 
‘keen to go home’ and was ‘allowed’ [in his words] to be sent to a rehabilitation hospital 
when he was still an unwell patient, thus still at high risk of a pressure ulcer. Chris had 
been in hospital for a long time leading up to the development of a new pressure ulcer. 
He had multiple chronic medical problems. He was already being treated for other skin 
damage which had developed at home. From the interviews with staff and from Chris’s 





that this activity appeared to take priority over other patient care. The fact that Chris 
had to be assessed to see whether he was ‘suitable’ showed that there was a 
difference between this and acute hospital care.  
Therefore, the staff, who were focused on rehabilitation, on this ward may have had 
different priorities than the staff on the acute wards that Chris had been on previously, 
which is similar to the different priorities on the specialist surgical ward that Frankie 
was on.  The diabetic foot consultant involved in Chris’ care also suggested that the 
rehabilitation ward may have had other priorities, She stated, ‘If they are thinking his 
priority is getting him mobilised and they then are not fully aware of all his medical 
conditions that put him at such a high risk, then they may have miscalculated his risk.  
This means that they have probably made that decision not based on anything apart 
from what they want to be.’ 
7.16 Insights from the health services literature  
Studies have found that if patients are 'wrongly' placed on a ward, otherwise known as 
'outliers' this places them at more risk of injury (Czaplinski and Diers, 1998). The 
Czaplinksi and Diers (1998) longitudinal study included five years of patient data for 
approximately 11,000 patients who had been inpatients in one USA speciality hospital. 
Although the one site location casts doubt on generalising from the study, it found that 
outlying patients (Frankie fell into this category as she was both a specialist and 
general surgical patient) received a lower standard of care than on units where 
specialist nursing care was offered. According to the study it also affected length of 
stay. This result is also supported by a prospective cohort study by Schuurman et al, 
2009, which found that length of stay was significantly increased in intensive care for 
patients with pressure damage , although this result wasn't significant for patients on 
cardiothoracic wards (Schuurman et al., 2009b).  
7.17 Insights from wider patient safety literature 
Patients who are outliers on wards may compromise input from knowledgeable staff, 
may provide an unsuitable ward environment, and can be inappropriate for individual 
patients’ needs (Goulding, 2011). Goulding also argues in her mixed methods study on 
medical outliers, that the placement of patients on clinically inappropriate wards is a 
specific patient safety concern and constitutes a latent condition which may expose 
patients to a number of contributory factors that underlie adverse events. This 
resonates with the issues raised across this thesis around factors which are not readily 





As can be seen from the evidence above, the organisational picture is needed 
alongside the sequence of events, to understand what happened more fully. However, 
the issue with outlying patients is also coupled with other more socio-cultural 
organisational factors, which are outlined below. 
7.18 Socio-cultural issues-evidence from the data 
There was an amount of social and professional tension between staff groups on the 
rehabilitation ward that Bernie was on (Consultant; HCA 2) and unrest on the ward 
between different ‘sub-cultures’, which included longevity groups, different racial 
groups and hierarchical groups (HCA1; HCA 2; Consultant; Matron). This was due to 
two wards becoming one rehabilitation ward, as part of two hospital sites merging 
services. Although this appears superficially to be unrelated to Bernie’s severe 
pressure ulcer development, there were, in this case, definite communication barriers 
amongst sub-cultures (new staff) and longer serving staff members. The lack of 
information exchange between competing groups meant that information was not 
passed on as it should have been. This resonates with safety literature around 
hierarchies and different cultures on wards (West, 2000), where different professional 
groups view information differently due to their backgrounds and skills, and 
communication is limited. This also relates negatively to literature on ‘positive safety 
culture’ which suggests that staff members need ‘open communication and trust to 
foster a strong patient safety culture.  
Ward staff ratios were not the recommended ones for stroke rehabilitation, 43% 
RN:57% HCA instead of 65% RN:35% HCA, these ratios included a slant towards 
more HCAs rather than qualified staff nurses who were trained more comprehensively 
in pressure ulcer care. The HCAs were the dominant professional group numerically on 
the ward due the larger ratios, and there was talk of new nurses who started working 
on the ward being ‘one of us’ [in contrast to the rest of the qualified nurses who were 
members of staff before a merger between two sites]. A HCA explained there was a 
problem with HCAs and nurses on the ward, ‘it’s difficult when it’s on a ward like this 
where you’ve got staffing levels at which are just not right at all, you’ve got one 
qualified staff like I say to two healthcare, you’ve got your qualified saying…well, I’m 
sorry but I can’t do this, I haven’t got time… because, well they’re so nasty aren’t they?’ 
The social group issues were echoed by both the matron and ward clerk who 
highlighted that the amalgamation of wards two years ago had produced a ‘difficult’ 
culture on the ward. One other HCAs noted that she struggled to communicate with the 





‘I’m saying to the qualified – I need help. She then added that the ‘qualified’ response 
was. ‘I’m sorry but I can’t, I’m doing medicine’. The HCA concluded that, this is when 
I’m in tears and I think to myself she needs cleaning up…What do you do, and then I’m 
going out of here not feeling appreciated’ 
7.19 Insights from the safety and organisational literature  
Socio-cultural groupings in the NHS and how these impact on safety issues have been 
explored elsewhere and echo the evidence above. For example, Edmundson suggests 
that teams and staff members must feel safe with each other if they are to 
communicate issues and learn well together (Edmondson, 1999). McDonald also 
speaks of the differences between professional groups in her ethnographic work 
comparing doctors and nurses within operating theatres and how they follow different 
cultural rules, which mean they have barriers to communication (McDonald et al., 
2005). 
7.20 Discussion  
When we look at the sequences of events and delays in response alongside the 
organisational environment, we can compare staff members’ actions and responses 
within organisational contexts which led them to be less aware of pressure ulcer risks, 
for various reasons. Samuriwo (2010) usefully highlights that pressure ulcer care is not 
as high on nurses’ priorities as it should be, which was clear from Danni’s, Bernie’s and 
Frankie’s cases, for three different reasons. Danni’s nursing input was hindered by the 
policies which meant a woman who was immobile in terms of accessing services had 
to attend a GP’s surgery for a brief appointment. Bernie was caught up in cultural 
tension between staff groups, who did not pass information to each other. Frankie was 
admitted when the wards were in upheaval.  
However, above all, the responses and decisions made for all of the patients above 
appeared to suggest a mindless (Weick et al., 2008) as opposed to a mindful 
awareness of skin care. Why was it that the staff just didn’t respond with more 
awareness and recognition to patients who were all high risk of skin damage given that 
this area has neglectful and patient safety connotations? 
 ’Mindlessness’ within organisational research roughly translates as behaviour in an 
organization which has a reliance on often outdated routines, a dysfunctional 
awareness of a changing external environment, and the inner state of the people 





repetitive work, but mindlessness closes us off to possibility, freezes our responses, 
and prevents needed change (Filo, 2013) . Mindlessness, despite its detrimental 
general meaning is possibly a useful starting point, as it suggests the opposite of 
mindful awareness. Weick and colleagues (Weick et al., 2008) noted that within 
organisations when fewer cognitive processes are activated less often, then an actor 
goes into a ‘mindless state’ and acts in an ‘auto-pilot’ mode. This automatic processing 
is in response to repetitive and non-dangerous tasks which would elicit a prompt 
reaction, and is thus a mindless, automatic response. Others have argued that this is a 
‘failure to rescue’ (Hollnagel et al., 2013) which is discussed in more detail in Chapters 
2 and 9. 
Alternatively, the concept of mindfulness, which originated in psychological literature by 
authors such as Langer (1989; 1997) refers to  openness to novelty; alertness to 
distinction; orientation in the present, sensitivity to different contexts;  and most 
importantly implicit, if not explicit, awareness of multiple perspectives; (Langer, 2016). 
According to Weick and Sutcliffe's systematic review (2001) mindful organizations 
spend more time examining failure as a lens from which to view the health of the 
system, more time preventing the simplification of tasks, more time observing 
operations and their effects, more time developing resilience to manage unexpected 
events, and more time locating local expertise and creating a climate of deference to 
those experts. These capabilities of an organisation are labelled mindful organizing 
(Weick and Sutcliffe 2001). Research on mindful organizing offers three definitions 
(Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007a; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007): (1) it results from bottom-up 
processes; (2) it enacts the context for thinking and action on the front line; and (3) it is 
relatively fragile and needs to be continuously re-accomplished.  This contrasts very 
subtly, and must not be confused with Ray and colleagues' version of what they term 
'organizational mindfulness' (2011). These authors claim that organizational 
mindfulness is evident when leaders create cultures that encourage rich thinking and a 
capacity for action. It is a more top down approach. There is not room in this thesis to 
debate these differing concepts further. Instead, a more recent approach I would like to 
elaborate on is  Hollnagel et al. 's (2013) version of mindfulness, which offers a more 
elaborate view of this concept as ‘rescuing, recognising and managing’ emerging 
complications, and suggest that organisations which are mindful, are more able to 
rescue before failure occurs. This leads, they claim, to a more resilient organisation.  
The concepts above, aside from being heavily debated amongst organisational safety 
experts (Levinthal and Rerup, 2006)  resonate with the issues around the mindless 





concerning pressure ulcer care from mindless to mindful awareness? Or alternatively, 
away from ‘failure to rescue’ towards ‘rescuing’? Levintal and Harrop ask us to think of 
organisational mindfulness as both a sustained high level of sensitivity to errors, 
unexpected events, and to subtle cues suggested by the organisation's environment or 
its own processes; and the capacity to engage in a flexible range of behaviour in 
response. They suggest that mindfulness involves thinking in real time, and is 
simultaneous with an action. In contrast less mindful behaviour is seen as routine and 
given less attentional focus (which has similarities to pressure ulcer management for 
some of the patients within this study). Mindfulness should be necessary both because 
ongoing organisational activity often deviates from plans and expectations (as with 
complex patients), and because ongoing activity may reveal not previously recognised 
issues (in this study newly developing pressure damage). In order to prevent 
unexpected events like pressure ulcers, mindful organisations should be preoccupied 
with resilience ((Hollnagel et al., 2013) which is the ability to contain and manage real-
time unexpected events in an adaptive, flexible fashion (Levinthal and Rerup, 2006, 
Hollnagel et al., 2013). This means reinforcing automatic processes (such as 
conducting pressure ulcer risk assessments and responding to pressure ulcers) and 
raising them to a consistent level of awareness so that they do not slip into mindless 
practices. This, however, did not appear to be the case for several of the patients who 
developed severe pressure ulcers in the study.  
To an extent this idea of mindful awareness has been addressed recently in the advent 
of ‘safety huddles’ or ‘safety briefs’ in healthcare, during which common patient safety 
issues (for example, patient falls, and pressure ulcers) are discussed regularly (once a 
day at least) on a ward setting as a multi-disciplinary team. These daily huddles aim to 
keep such safety issues at the forefront of staff’s minds and thus increase situational 
awareness (Venkataraman et al., 2017). Safety huddles now form part of NHS 
Improvement's suggestions for patient safety best practice. A recent evaluation of 
safety huddles (the HUSH project; Huddling up for Safer Healthcare) found that 6,051 
falls were prevented through the use of them. Based on cost estimates from NHS 
Improvement, this equates to £15.7 million in avoided healthcare costs (Improvement, 
2019).  However, research studies in this area are in their infancy, and work is mainly 
found through Plan Do Study Act Quality Improvement initiatives. Safety huddles have 
been found by some small scale studies however, to facilitate better information 
sharing and communication within and across departments and increase shared 
understanding of the cultural assumptions of safety, risk and threats (MacDonald, 





increased accountability, which enables a culture of collaboration, resulting in an 
increased quality of collective awareness of safety issues (Goldenhar et al., 2013). 
These interventions, which aim to increase mindful awareness of pressure ulcers and 
other patient safety issues in such a complex environment, and where other priorities 
compete for staff attention, would be a further area of systematic research.  
7.21 Conclusion 
Examination of the data in terms of sequences of events has highlighted the delays in 
response by staff members towards pressure ulcer risks in patients. In these cases 
specific events played a role: however these occurred in organisational environments 
which fostered a 'mindless awareness', and hindered the staff in doing their work to 
their best ability. This analysis of the evidence thus supports the question set out at the 
start of this chapter around whether mindless awareness contributed to patients 
developing severe pressure ulcers. Furthermore, if we examine the evidence using 
both a sequence of events and the organisational culture surrounding patients 
simultaneously, we can achieve a more comprehensive understanding of what might 
contribute to the development of severe pressure ulcers. This understanding is only 
partial, given the exploratory nature of this study and its tentative findings. However, 
these insights into pressure ulcer and the contextual influences surrounding them could 
offer research or quality improvement opportunities, to enhance the benefits of 
interventions such as safety huddles, and keep pressure ulcer care at the forefront of 















Chapter 8: Diffusion, poor communication and coordination between 
health care services. 
 
8.1 Summary  
In this chapter I examine the hypothesis that a lack of coordination and communication 
between professionals, sites, wards and settings contributed to the development of 
severe pressure ulcers in the patients in the study. This theory is explored using the 
psycho-social concept of ‘diffusion of responsibility'. 
8.2 Background 
The Mid-Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust Inquiry (2011) referred to the concept of 
diffused responsibility as a causal factor in the events where a number of patients died. 
Donald Berwick’s (2013) government review, following the Inquiry, noted this issue as a 
general problem in the NHS. It stated that, ‘Responsibility for oversight and remedy for 
quality and safety concerns was, and is still to some extent, diffused in the NHS in 
England, with that responsibility divided among many agencies, and with unclear or at 
times non-existent lines of coordination, communication, pattern-recognition and follow-
up for action. When so many are in charge; no one is.’ (Berwick, 2013). This divided 
responsibility was a key area identified within the review, and one of the many issues at 
the Trust around system and communication failings, which led to serious patient harm. 
Social psychologists theorise that people tend to act differently in a large group than 
they would alone. Often when many other people are present, we feel less personally 
obligated to help. Known as the ‘bystander effect, the phenomenon was tested in a 
number of classic social psychology studies by Latané and Darley (Latané and Darley, 
1970), prompted by the stabbing and of a young woman Kitty Genovese, where no one 
intervened after hearing the woman screaming. She then died of her injuries. Latané 
and Darley used students as participants in one particular experiment, who were 
placed in a room—either alone, with two strangers or with three strangers to complete 
a questionnaire while they waited for the experimenter to return. While they were 
completing the questionnaire, smoke was pumped into the room through a wall vent to 
simulate an emergency. When students were working alone they noticed the smoke 
almost immediately (within 5 seconds). However, students that were working in groups 
took longer (up to 20 seconds) to notice the smoke. Latané and Darley claimed this 





etiquette in public, and that one feels less responsible to act in a large group. This has 
been known since the 1960s among psychologists as ‘diffusion of responsibility’. 
Although the theory has been contested by other psychologists as being pre-women's 
rights, and lacking in socio-cultural analysis (Manning et al., 2007, Cherry, 1995) it 
remains an accepted and influential theory to date.  
In a large system of health care, such as the NHS, there are many people working 
together for patients, and as well as the multiple interactions which characterise a large 
organisation, there is often a diffusion of responsibility and ‘many hands’ approach. The 
increased specialisation amongst the ‘many hands’ brings problems of coordination, 
communication, and cooperation, i.e. it is no longer possible for one person to hold all 
the specialist knowledge needed to treat patients. Members of a health care delivery 
team are mostly educated and trained separately. They have little informal 
communication aside from work (McDonald et al., 2005, Vincent, 2010). Thus they may 
have only limited understanding of each other’s role (West, 2000). This is not just 
because of the increasing scientific and technical sophistication of medical care, but 
also because of increasing specialisation of the occupations and professions involved 
in health care. The nursing profession, for example, has become increasingly 
specialised over time (Samuriwo and Dowding, 2014).  
Given some of the background theories on how people function in large groups, it is no 
surprise that communication failures remain one of the leading causes of adverse 
events in the NHS (Kitch et al., 2008, Leape, 2009, Kohn et al., 2000). Analysis of a 
patient’s full care pathway is critical as communication failures are not discrete events 
and information loss in one phase of care can potentially compromise safety in a 
subsequent phase (Greenberg, 2007).  
However, despite the awareness of the contribution of communication failures in 
current research, issues with communication and coordination between wards, 
professionals, sites, and agencies on the ground are still hard to prevent (Halverson et 
al., 2011, Kitch et al., 2008). 
One of the themes to emerge from this study was a lack of coordination and 
communication between services wards, community and multi-agencies. Below, I 
explore this area to see whether or not the evidence within this thesis supports the 
hypothesis that these areas were a causal factor in the development of the patients’ 
pressure ulcers. Also, I explore whether or not the evidence supports a theory of 
diffusion of responsibility. I have used the sequence of events alongside other data 





8.3 Communication issues at MDT level: evidence from data 
Within this study, arising from my initial coding, there were recurrent themes which 
identified issues with communication and coordination at ward level between members 
of different professional groups within the multi-disciplinary teams. This had an impact 
on how shifts were planned and whether things were forgotten. For example, on the 
stroke rehabilitation ward where Bernie was admitted, the staff spoke of their 
frustrations around working with other professions. There was unease between nurses 
and health care assistants on this ward, which was partly to do with the merging of two 
wards from different sites. This had led to some resentment among healthcare 
assistants who were previously working on the site towards new staff. They spoke of 
working together as a team and how they felt left out, when they said during a 
collective interview, ‘we’re nursing assistants, healthcare assistants, we’re meant to be 
assisting the nurse, not working on our own…and I think that’s what’s forgotten to be 
honest.’ (HCA, Site 2). There were also issues with verbal communication on the ward 
between HCAs and nurses in handing over information between each other about 
pressure ulcers (HCA 2). Another HCA from the same ward stated about 
communication with nurses that, ‘They don’t give you feedback…they don’t come to 
you and say to you…and I’m thinking to myself, well, I passed it on what’s getting done 
about it, I want to know what’s getting done.’ The same HCA added further details 
about her frustrations with Bernie’s skin care, ‘She was incontinent, every time she was 
incontinent with faeces that made it worse, because of the dressings were getting in 
touch with the faeces.   Now when you go to a qualified, and you say to the qualified… 
this dressing is all full of faeces, it needs changing –I’m sorry but I’ve no time, I’m doing 
medicine.’ 
One of the staff nurses, in contrast, when interviewed, felt that everyone helped equally 
to care for Bernie. She stated that, ‘the physios did their bit, the night nurses did their 
bit, the day nurses and so on…’ although she did not mention the HCAs’ role.  
Alternatively, the junior doctor on the rehabilitation ward noted that they found it difficult 
to contact the Tissue Viability Nurses. He said, ‘I mean, away from medical,  she had 
this pressure sore and unfortunately we couldn’t get tissue viability to see her enough 
because there’s not tissue viability… because there’s two of them  and they’re really 
busy… I don’t think they’ve got many people.’ One of the staff nurses noted the same 
thing, when she said, ‘the business of referring patients, isn’t very good… if I want to 
refer somebody to Tissue Viability then I’ve to ring up and ask if I can refer this patient.   





name of the patient, and often they do come, but sometimes people have said they’ve 
rung up and there’s nobody there and they haven’t left a message, or they’ve left a 
message, and people don’t come.   It could do with something…a form to fill in-a 
referral form.’ 
The TVN, in contrast, felt she hadn’t been called early enough. She argued, ‘when they 
first realised that Bernie was having this problem with not re-positioning…if they’d 
called us in then as a preventative measure then maybe we wouldn’t have ended up 
with the pressure sore that we did have.’ 
However, (as shown in the earlier chapter around delayed response) the consultant 
had left a note in the nursing notes which showed a week’s delay in contacting the 
TVN. He wrote ‘refer to tissue viability, requested last week’. This evidence suggests 
that the staff on the ward did not act as promptly as they might have done in 
communicating over Bernie’s pressure damage to other specialist areas.  
The ward was very short staffed by nurses (noted in the consultant geriatrician 
interview, ward manager interview, and HCA interviews) and nurses seemed unable to 
deal with information straight away (evidenced in delays in nursing documentation), but 
also there appeared to be tensions between groups which led to a lack of 
communication between them (see previous chapter). For example, the consultant 
geriatrician on the ward noted there were issues between staff groups. He said, ‘I know 
the HCAs very well…there have been issues between the HCAs and the nurses, about 
a number of things.  I’ve witnessed it as an observer on the ward.’ He argued that the 
HCAs, ‘didn’t feel listened to…and what else can you do except talk to someone else, 
outside the nursing system.’ This issue may have been in part because many of the 
HCAs had been on the ward longer than newer registered nurses, which collectively 
they highlighted in their interviews with me. 
Interestingly, the ward leader offered her view on why Bernie’s pressure ulcer 
deteriorated, which she felt was around communication. She stated, ‘there are times 
when you are missing some of the things and screening tools are not done promptly, 
they are not done as patients’ conditions deteriorate or change or even get better.’ She 
added that, ‘I still think you would get your instance of pressure sores, things will still 
happen…but it [the severe pressure ulcer] developed.’  
The physiotherapists rehabilitating Bernie also spoke of their frustration with working 
alongside other professions, and regretted that they ‘hadn’t just sat down as a 





of team working on the ward had impacted on how Bernie was treated by all members 
of staff concerned, and contributed to the development of her severe pressure ulcer. 
This evidence was supported by other staff members working on the ward, such as the 
consultant geriatrician, staff nurses, and the visiting junior doctor. All expressed 
concern about communication patterns between ward staff. The expert witnesses also 
judged that this impacted on Bernie’s severe pressure ulcer. They noted that, ‘the lack 
of knowledge on the ward of the TVN role and how to contact them and how to do that 
referral, and they seem to put a lot of responsibility on the link nurse, but they didn’t 
know who the link nurse was. They couldn’t identify her, she’d left…it comes down to 
management, leadership and team-working.’  
The expert witnesses judged that Bernie was passed on with a lack of responsibility 
between teams. They stated, ‘There was lack of clarity about whose role it was to 
manage her risk. And it seemed like the nurses passed it to the physios and the OTs, 
and the OTs passed it back and thought it was a nursing role, the nurses seem to take 
what the consultant says or the doctors on the ward.’ They concluded that, ‘It was just 
a complete shambles, in terms of who was responsible.’ 
Similarly, for Glenn, in a community setting, the issue of communication between 
professionals was also apparent. No one except his wife appeared to take 
responsibility for coordinating his care. Each service carried out their own specific tasks 
and left without communicating or collaborating with other teams. The HCAs 
communicated well with the patient and his carer however, (evidenced from Glenn and 
his carer’s interview). Glenn’s carer noted the differences between the District Nurses 
and the carers when she said ‘the district nurses... they’re in and out. The carers are a 
completely different kettle of fish…they always bring it to my attention if there’s any 
marks on his body whatsoever…Any red areas at all.’ Whether or not the HCAs 
communicated with the DNs is not evidenced in this case. 
Glenn and his carer felt alternatively, that poor communication between members of 
the DN team led to his pressure ulcer deteriorating. Glenn noted’ ‘They should have 
known which way the pressure ulcer was headed. But with different nurses coming 
in…Nobody knew...they kept saying… I haven’t seen it for three weeks, or I haven’t 
seen it for a while ... it was just getting left’. 
The expert witnesses also felt that for Glenn, communication was an issue. They stated 
that, ‘‘…the failures are really around the district nurses not picking up the cues, either 





his wife, and acting appropriately on those messages’. They added, ‘They didn’t refer 
to the TVS. They didn’t contact the spinal cord injury ...nobody did anything.’ 
However, for other patients in this study, on the wards particularly, there seemed to be 
more cohesion, at least between staff nurses and HCAs. An example where staff at 
ward level communicated well between professional groups was regarding Elliott’s 
care. The healthcare assistant spoke of good communication between them and staff 
nurses, when she said, ‘we tried to have a nurse and a healthcare doing things 
together so the nurse could see any changes or anything to the patient. I would say 
generally we tried to do the best that we could and because we were all friends and we 
knew each other it wasn’t hard’. 
For Alex’s care the HCAs also appeared to have a good communicative relationship 
with the staff nurses. One stated that, ‘the majority of time they (nurses and HCAs) all 
work together…and know what’s going on with every patient on the ward’. She added 
that, ‘if Alex’s sore broke down they would all work together trying treatments, and if not 
they would try others, communicating through handovers.’  
For Danni, the DNs and community HCAs also spoke well of each other and seemed to 
work closely as a team. When they were interviewed collectively, a HCA stated that, 
‘We discuss it as a team, don’t we?’ 
Staff Nurse:  As a team.  And then you think oh well we’ll try that next time we go, don’t 
we? 
HCA: Every day.’ 
Danni’s pressure ulcer healed under the DN and HCAs who worked together closely, 
were aware of each other’s roles and met frequently. The pressure ulcer however, had 
already deteriorated earlier, under the care of the practice nurse and GP. The 
communication between professionals was different, and not as effective at this point in 
Danni’s care pathway. The practice nurse noted that she ‘should have referred to the 
DNs earlier’. This issue will be discussed further below under the heading ‘lack of 
communication between services.’ 
The expert witnesses judged that for Danni’s case the practice nurse should have 
communicated Danni’s needs earlier and referred her on to another, more specialised 
service earlier. They stated, ‘in another GP’s surgery the practice nurse may well make 
the referral much quicker, recognise that it’s not within her skill set. So, you know, it’s 





 8.4 Insights from health services literature  
The findings from this thesis appear to support the theory that when communication is 
poor between the MDT this affects the development of patients’ pressure ulcers. This 
was not only suggested by ward staff, but by the judgements of the expert witnesses 
for a number of the patient cases. Poor communication within MDT teams has been 
highlighted as an issue in health services literature. In a qualitative study by Sutcliffe et 
al. (2004), which focused on errors or 'mishaps', out of 70 of the identified mishaps, 
practitioner's knowledge (30) and communication (28) were cited most frequently as 
the most important factors that contributed to each mishap. The study only focused on 
one teaching hospital and only elicited the patient's view, therefore only offers one 
perspective of an error. However, the data showed that in some relational contexts too 
little information is communicated and is not timely. The authors of the study argue that 
communication failures arise from vertical hierarchical differences, concerns with 
upward influence, role conflict and ambiguity, and struggles with interpersonal power 
and conflict. Although these are grand claims, and not necessarily explored in depth, 
these findings echo some of the inter-relational conflict which is found in my study. This 
suggests an avenue for further exploration. 
Improving communication has been a key area of focus in improvement work in latter 
years, bringing such interventions as ‘teamwork training’, to healthcare settings (Blegen 
et al., 2010, Dellefield and Magnabosco, 2014). Recent research studies describe 
promising results in general medical units, in operating theatres, and intensive care 
units where teamwork training sessions have been introduced as a means of improving 
teamwork and collaboration (Blegen et al., 2010).  
Nevertheless, caution has to be applied to interpreting Blegen et al. study’s results as 
there were a number of interventions implemented concurrently. This was the case for 
much of the research on improvement methods, which were studied as part of the 
literature review for this thesis (see (Al-Kandari and Thomas, 2009, Ausserhofer et al., 
2013, Bosch et al., 2011). The Blegen et al. study raises issues with measuring safety 
climate as an indicator of improvement. This also resonates with the previous chapter 
in this thesis on safety culture, where definitions of safety climate and culture are 
themselves cause for debate.  
8.5 Insights from safety literature 
Nonetheless, effective teamwork has long since been agreed within patient safety to be 





professions advocated as a good tool (Institute for Healthcare Improvement, 2004). For 
example, an experimental study in handover methods by Bhabra et al in 2007 found 
that there can be up to five handovers on wards over a typical weekend, and only 2.5% 
of information from the first handover is retained at the final handover if there is no 
written record. If notes are taken, 85.5% of information is retained. If a standardised 
proforma is used, this rises to 99% (Bhabra et al., 2007). For a number of years in the 
history of patient safety, studies have confirmed that communication breakdowns are 
involved in the great majority of adverse patient outcomes (Leonard et al., 2004, 
Wheelan et al., 2003). 
These findings have also been the foundation for recent work on standardised 
proformas such as the SBAR, which originated in the Royal Navy as a method of 
improving communication. It stands for Situation, Background, Assessment and 
Recommendation. This way of communicating aims to capture as much information in 
a handover possible to facilitate communication.  
One RCT study which examined the SBAR method of communication found that 
warfarin management in patients in an intervention group which used the SBAR was 
improved. The intervention was associated with a statistically significant and clinically 
meaningful higher percent of time in the therapeutic range, indicating better warfarin 
management (Field et al., 2011). There appeared however, to be no such structured 
communication within my study regarding pressure ulcer prevention or care at the time 
of data collection. Mostly, communication in pressure ulcer care appeared to be passed 
on intermittently, with no structured approach.  
8.6 Insights from organisational culture literature 
Since the time of data collection there have also been other culture focused 
interventions such as the safety huddle (Goldenhar et al., 2013), which was discussed 
in previous chapters. This initiative, although not tested widely to date, appears to 
foster better daily communication, teamwork and collaboration within teams 
(Venkataraman et al., 2017). Work in this area continues to gather support in health 
policy fields with the advent of the NHS Improvement guidance for spoken 
communication (NHS Improvement, 2019a) highlighting its important in patient safety. 
The evidence from my study also appears to support the view that less effective 
teamwork at MDT level may contribute in some way to the development of certain 






8.7 Lack of communication between wards: evidence from the data 
Not only were there issues around communication at MDT level within the same site, 
according to the study’s findings, but also between wards at particular sites. A number 
of patients in the study were subjected to ward moves, with associated communication 
failures. This included Bernie, Chris, Elliott and Frankie.  
This issue was highlighted during Frankie’s experience of being in hospital. She was 
moved from ward to ward (twice), and one of these wards was reconfigured during the 
time she was admitted (see Fig. 8.1). No formal written information went with her, 
leaving staff on the admitting wards not knowing what her needs were. When Frankie 
transferred wards, she said that it made her ‘feel frightened’ that new staff dealing with 
her did not know what was wrong with her. The timeline of events, drawn mainly from 
written documentation, showed that the absence of communication between wards 
meant that ward staff did not have full information on Frankie’s risks for developing a 
severe pressure ulcer (see previous chapter for more details) and Frankie was too ill 
before and following surgery to communicate her needs clearly. For example, to 
explain that her mattress was uncomfortable and faulty, Frankie told ward staff ‘it’s 
eating me alive’ rather than a straightforward complaint about the faulty mattress. She 
was still on morphine at that point which, in her words, had affected her cognition.   
Fig 8.1 Frankie’s pathway 
 
Staff on Ward B were not really aware of Frankie’s poor communication and high risk of 
skin damage at the time as surgical notes were not passed on for her. The nursing 
notes stated, ‘She came from theatre with no easy care’ [surgical notes]. Secondly there 
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was little verbal communication between the doctors and the ward. That was related to  
the ward reconfiguration as the general  surgeon felt  it was not his ‘patch’ because 
he’d just moved across to another site. Frankie’s specialist consultant, who knew her 
well, (as she had treated her as an outpatient for a number of years), noted, ‘I was 
quite cross that the first that I knew my patient had come back was in theatre, so I was 
called to theatre to see her’. She argued that the trust’s policy was that when ‘a 
patient’s readmitted, the original operating surgeon should be informed’ but she noted 
that this ‘didn’t happen’. She added, ‘And there ‘wasn’t a proper handover from 
recovery to the ward.’ 
The consultant also highlighted the communication issues around the general 
consultant and the bed managers/ward staff when she said, ‘Her [general] surgeon, 
would have liked her to go onto HDU. But, it was his first day at  Site 2 (Ward C), and I 
think he felt he didn’t really have much sway ...if he’d been here in their own territory, 
my impression was he would have got on the phone and said, look guys, this is not 
negotiable, she’s going wherever.’  
The ward manager’s view also supported the evidence that there was little information 
for the ward when patients arrived from theatre. She stated ‘you’re going to pick 
somebody up from theatre that you’ve never met before, you don’t know if she can 
walk normally, you know, whether she’s normally incontinent.’ 
The expert witnesses judged that Frankie was admitted while the environment was in 
‘chaos’. One noted, ‘I think that even if they’d done everything right, she was never 
going to get the right care – she was in the wrong place, she was admitted into chaos 
and I know the ward said that they’d got more staff in and they’d got senior support, but 
that…was to move, not to care ‘. 
The same issue of little information passed on through handovers between wards 
arose for Bernie, who was moved through wards because of her co-morbidities and 
while she was being diagnosed, although this is not uncommon in hospital stays where 
patients are diagnosed with stroke (see evidence from the literature below). On the 
acute stroke ward, the staff there could remember very little about her, although Bernie 
was with them for nine days. One staff member stated, ‘as they have many patients 
passing through, they can’t remember people individually.’  The consultant geriatrician 
pointed out that recalling patients is often difficult for staff, when he said, ‘it’s not that 
they can’t recall her, it isn’t a failure of ownership it’s that…they’re incredibly busy, and 
if you mentioned a female patient with a stroke on a stroke ward it doesn’t help much. 





Bernie was a complex patient, whom the consultant later stated he found ‘hard to 
forget’, as Bernie was ‘medically unusual’, but the focus of the care on the acute stroke 
ward was around treatment for the patient with stroke symptoms and Bernie did not 
quite fit the category due to her other comorbidities. This is, however also typical of 
stroke care (see literature below). 
When Chris was transferred to the community rehabilitation hospital, his high risk of 
developing a pressure ulcer was not communicated fully to the new team there, partly 
because he had been in hospital so long, (he also had multiple comorbidities) and he 
had asked the staff if he could go home via the rehabilitation unit. However, the staff on 
the rehabilitation unit were aiming to rehabilitate him. He was noted to be a diabetic 
foot patient, but he developed a pressure ulcer due to other reasons related to his co-
morbidities and his being placed on an ordinary mattress. However the staff did not 
change their view that it was a diabetic foot ulcer, even when challenged by the 
researcher.  
Chris’s pressure ulcer developed when he was placed on an ordinary mattress in a 
side room, when he developed a diarrhoea and vomiting virus, and was unwell and 
dehydrated. The staff however, prioritised the quarantining of him over his high 
pressure ulcer risk. He then developed a pressure ulcer, but he was still treated as if it 
were a diabetic foot ulcer, so there was no learning from this situation, (and no 
subsequent investigation undertaken)  despite nurses dealing with him in an 
appropriate manner, and putting in preventative measures when they discovered the 
pressure damage. This was evidenced in interviews with the staff nurse who 
discovered the pressure ulcer, the Ward Manager, and Chris.  
Elliott, in his interview, noted that moving wards had distressed him, and although he 
had a Category 2 ulcer before he went in to hospital, the lack of communication 
between him, his carer and the ward staff, meant that he (or his carer) did not get 
chance to disclose this ulcer to the staff, and it deteriorated, and was then recorded as 
a hospital acquired ulcer. There was a lack of communication about what his skin 
damage was on the ward. No one on the admitting ward found out why his leg was 
bandaged during his stay, or at least no one recorded this. 
The initial skin damage had happened before he was moved around wards, but it is 
unclear how far the damage was when he was admitted. His carer (and Elliott himself) 
noted that the moves impacted on her father’s health, when she said, ‘‘he had about 





ward, I think he was on about three times, and then another ward, and then he was on 
another ward, which is orthopaedic, and he was there for about a week’. 
 8.8 Insights from health services literature  
The patients above moved around several wards. These patients’ skin care needs 
seemed to have little attention drawn to them as they moved. Athlin et al. (2010) 
carried out a small scale qualitative study, which found that patients who had been 
assessed as non-risk patients yet developed PUs had been moved between wards and 
this appeared to be a factor in their development. Although the findings of the study by 
Athlin et al must be interpreted with caution given its small scale, as does this study's 
findings, the results show similarities.  
8.9 Insights from safety literature 
It appeared that no one was aware of the patients' movements and the lack of skin 
inspection until the benefit of hindsight (Bernie, Chris, Danni, Frankie and Glenn). This 
shows the value of detailed retrospective investigative work to examine patient safety 
(discussed in the final chapter of this thesis). For example, a member of staff on a new 
ward may ask questions that are in line with current ward policy, (for example, query 
and document a patient's skin status) but there may be dynamic changes in a patient 
that are not picked up when a patient transfers wards, like a Chinese whispers effect 
(Bhabra et al, 2007). It is often seen as the admitting ward’s fault that they do not pick 
up on cues about high risk patients, unless these are communicated well in the first 
place. This is particularly true of pressure ulcers,  where the origins are not as easily 
traced to a single point in time (Runciman et al., 2002).  
This study used a retrospective chronology of events based around each patient rather 
than from a health service perspective (see Chapter 3), and this made it possible to 
see, albeit in hindsight, the ‘latent’ communicative failings that staff dealing face to face 
with patients are often not able to pick up (Reason, 1997b, Perrow, 1984, Lawton et al., 
2012). However, this issue aligns more with Perrow’s Normal Accident theory, and 
Lawton's Yorkshire Contributory Factors model than Reason’s, in that the errors are 
inherent within the complex system of health care, and it is difficult, if not impossible to 
see these from a frontline perspective until after the event (Perrow, 1984). This 
argument will be returned to in the Final Discussion (Chapter 10); and there is little 
published literature related solely to this area, but it was apparent that there is an issue 
related to pressure ulcer development between ward moves, which needs to be 





8.10 Poor communication between community and acute trusts-evidence from 
the data 
Not only was communication between wards, and the MDT factors which impacted on 
patients developing severe pressure ulcers in this study, but communication problems 
between acute trusts and community services were also evident, particularly for Chris, 
Elliott and Frankie.  
Elliott was admitted with district nursing care in place but his existing pressure ulcer 
was not communicated to staff on the admitting wards, nor were the reasons that he 
had bandages on. The ward staff did not follow up why he had these with the district 
nursing team (who had dressed his wound), but neither did they take responsibility for 
checking his wounds, and it was assumed from trust staff, that his ulcer deteriorated in 
acute hospital (it was noted to be a Category  2 before his admission and the TVN 
reported it as a Cat 3 in her assessment). However, none of the health care 
professionals on the ward examined him in a timely manner to assess why he had 
bandages on, or at least if they did they did not document it. There was a query about 
whether this had happened in one of the nurses’ interviews, but it is not definite. She 
stated, ‘I would have taken off the bandages, with that doctor there, because I always 
do.’, but there was no action, or escalation following this, if it did happen.  
Chris ‘slipped between’ professional services i.e. the diabetic foot clinic and the acute 
rehabilitation team on the ward. As he already had a diabetic foot ulcer on his right foot, 
he was under supervision by the diabetic team. The TVN on the rehabilitation ward 
described some of the communication issues around Chris when she said, ‘the ward 
staff were requested to refer to the foot clinic at the acute site and refer him back to the 
vascular team…and for that period of time we had no communication to what his 
arterial status was… so until they’d established that, until they could establish his 
arterial status and know what plan the vascular team had for him, then we couldn’t do 
anything pro-active other than to relieve pressure and dress it, with simple dressings’. 
She also noted that, ‘we were told that if he had a diabetic foot it comes under the care 
of the diabetic service and not under the tissue viability service, so really even though 
they referred him to us they didn’t need to because he was already under the diabetes 
which is standard.’ However the TVN was not aware that when Chris went for his 
monthly appointment with the diabetic foot clinic, he had developed a pressure ulcer 
alongside the diabetic foot ulcer. When she visited him on the ward, she was not aware 





The diabetic foot clinic wound care specialist noted that she was ‘disappointed’ in the 
health provision when Chris developed pressure damage alongside his other co-
morbidities. This suggests a communication issue between the service provision for 
patients with both a diabetic ulcer and a pressure ulcer.  
The expert witnesses noted for Chris that, “it was partly to do with services not 
communicating his needs to one another, and partly that he’s slipped through a net of 
services, none of which would take responsibility for him to be beneficial and work 
preventatively.” 
Danni’s needs also slipped between the GP practice and district nursing team, as she 
did not fit the criterion for treatment by the district nursing team due to her independent 
mobility. She was seen as mobile as she could physically attend the practice, yet she 
was not fully immobile (she used a wheelchair and could not transfer easily on to the 
bed at the GP’s). However, she did not qualify for a district nurse visit her at home, 
where it would have been easier to assess her, until she had developed a severe 
pressure ulcer.  
However, in contrast to the above evidence, communication at the initial admission for 
Bernie, by her GP, was much clearer, and she was admitted quickly, with the podiatrist 
and GP working closely together to admit her. The admission notes state that, ‘Bernie 
was found by her podiatrist at home on her sofa, unable to mobilise and feeling dizzy. 
She was brought in to A&E’ 
The handover for Hilary by the ambulance service was also very clear and structured, 
with written evidence, and had allowed the staff at the acute site to identify her skin 
damage quickly and put a care plan in place as soon as she arrived at hospital. Hilary’s 
daughter told the researcher that she found her mother on the floor of her bedroom and 
called an ambulance straight away, and she was admitted to the local A&E ward. The 
ambulance crew noticed that Hilary had a pressure ulcer.  They did not state what 
grade it was at this point. They also took a photograph while Hilary waited in A and E, 
according to Hilary’s daughter the reason they gave for this was ‘so that they weren’t 
liable for any claim.’ Aside from the slightly defensive views associated with this 
comment, the communication between services was clear. 
 8.11 Insights from health services literature 
The importance of off-loading pressure for diabetic foot ulcers has been explored and 





off-loading foot ulcers heal much more quickly. In terms of responsibility, it appears that 
the care (for someone as high risk for skin damage as Chris) should have been the 
same regardless of which service he was cared for under. However, the issue of 
whether the services were coordinated actually has no bearing on whether he 
developed a pressure ulcer, because he was placed on an ordinary mattress, which 
contributed to his severe pressure ulcer. The expert witnesses noted this in their 
judgement. Chris did not have an RCA investigation conducted, as it was felt by the 
Ward Manager that his pressure ulcer was a diabetic foot ulcer. However, the different 
services’ lack of joint working compounds the issue in staff recognition and awareness 
of the cause of the skin damage. This has been pointed out elsewhere in studies 
relating to pressure ulcer trajectories (Athlin et al., 2010). Athlin et al.’s qualitative study 
found that too many healthcare personnel were considered (by nurses interviewed) to 
be involved in the care of the individual patient. This meant that nobody knew who was 
responsible for what, which often led to neglect and failure in the trajectory of care. As 
this was a small scale study it has limitations in its generalisability to other settings, but 
supports the findings in this thesis between communication issues in pressure ulcer 
development.  
8.12 Insights from safety literature 
Communication is a key component in the area of patient safety (Francis, 2013, NHS 
Improvement, 2019a, Bhabra et al., 2007). Communication tasks vary across the whole 
of the healthcare system and the communication boundary between primary care 
givers in the community and hospital based health services, for example, often use 
different task styles and organisational structures, which make communication more 
difficult. This is a recognisable issue from the evidence gathered in this study, 
regarding the patients and the communication issues they were faced with. However, 
as Lawton et al (2012) point out in their systematic review of contributory factors to 
patient safety incidents, communication problems are often not noticed by staff at 
organisational level, but only at local or ward level (Lawton et al., 2012) and these are 
then not translated to organisation-wide actions. In contrast Perrow (1984) highlights 
that this issue can also be reversed, and systemic errors are not necessarily noticed at 
the frontline. This complicates the issue of communication and responsibility further. 
Therefore staff are often unable to identify issues between sites and to see them as 







8.13 Discussion: Diffusion of responsibility 
The findings above suggest that there were several issues around communication 
between teams, wards and settings which may have contributed to patients developing 
severe pressure ulcers. The problem with communication is that it is multi-faceted and 
offers a range of possible reasons for being inadequate. The full range of possibilities 
cannot be explored fully here. However, the poor communication in this study did 
appear to be associated positively with a diffused (or lack of) responsibility for patients’ 
skin care, despite some discreet areas of good practice (Latané and Darley, 1970). 
This does support the hypothesis, as much as it can given the evidence collected, that 
poor coordination and communication do contribute to patients developing a pressure 
ulcer. No individual member of staff appeared to have taken responsibility for the 
decline in Bernie, Chris, Danni, Elliott, Frankie and Glenn’s pressure ulcers because of 
the diffusion of their responsibility within the NHS’s complex system. Some of this may 
relate to decision-making capabilities within a complex environment, where nurses 
often do not have hierarchical authority to make decisions about escalating patient care 
above ward level (Samuriwo and Dowding, 2014). In a few cases, doctors escalated 
the level of care for the high risk patients in this study. In some ways this is indicative of 
their professional training and autonomy but has been discussed elsewhere in this 
work (decision-making chapter), so will not be explored further here. 
There was a diffused responsibility relating to ward level communication and decisions 
(regarding Bernie, Frankie and Elliott). No one took active responsibility for decisions 
and communication around patients’ high risk of developing skin damage. The ward 
leaders in several cases had little knowledge of the pressure ulcer problems for specific 
patients (namely for Chris, Elliott and Frankie). When staff wanted to refer patients, 
they had difficulties trying to contact the tissue viability service (regarding Bernie, Chris, 
and Glenn). The issue around the role of the TVN highlights again (it is also discussed 
elsewhere in this thesis) the problem of when to refer patients, how much involvement 
the TVNs should have on a ward, and how this can cause confusion (Flanagan, 1996). 
This would be an area to explore further in research, as current studies do not offer 
much evidence of the reliance on TVNs.  
Similarly, other patients in this study were treated by multiple services (namely Chris, 
Danni and Glenn) but no one appeared to take full responsibility for their overall risks 
and needs. They also seemed to ‘slip somewhere between’ the responsibilities of 





all of the public Inquiries into patient safety (National Advisory Group on the Safety of 
Patients in England, 2013, Francis, 2013, Kennedy, 2001). 
It also seems there was little responsibility or accountability. Nursing staff did not 
appear to take responsibility for the deterioration of ulcers when patients were admitted 
into their care, and instead focused more on specific task-based care, and often 
delegated skin inspection tasks to HCAs. This is one of the main issues associated 
with pressure ulcer care (Samuriwo and Dowding, 2014). Clinical judgements also 
appeared to take a back seat behind focusing on risk assessments, which is also 
apparent in other literature in this area (Dowding et al., 2012). Doctors took 
responsibility for the change in patient skin care in certain cases (for example regarding 
Bernie and Danni) despite the view from their interviews that skin care was seen as the 
‘nurses’ responsibility’.  
The lack of responsibility, however, at a systemic level, relates again to a ‘mindless’ 
cultural attitude to pressure ulcer development, which links to the previous chapter on 
safety culture. Ultimately the above issues with patients highlight confusion over who is 
responsible for pressure ulcer prevention and care. Who does have responsibility for 
which aspect of skin care and how does this manifest itself? The doctors felt the 
responsibility for skin care and assessment belonged with the nurses; the ward leaders 
spoke passively of patients with pressure ulcers on their wards; and the TVNs were 
absent from real time concerns and decisions over patients.  
When patients frequently move around wards, it is easy to be dissolved of 
responsibility as the patients do not stay in one place long enough to become anything 
more than an anonymous stroke patient, for example. This fits well with the 
psychological theory that the more people involved the less responsibility one has to 
take.  However, pressure ulcers, by their nature, also afflict patients who already have 
co-morbidities, and their risks of skin damage sit alongside other competing health 
priorities (Samuriwo and Dowding, 2014). For patients who are not well known by staff 
and treated for their other illnesses in the first instance, the idea that their skin care will 
take priority is a huge ask.  
Work has been done in the field of teamwork research to create a safer, more 
collaborative environment for patients. Lingard et al. (2004) found communications 
addressed to the wrong person and with unclear purposes, led to a quarter of all 
communications being seen as failures, in similar findings to Bhabra et al (2007). The 
success of checklists in surgery have partly been attributed to the focus on teams 





clearly defined team goals (Nagpal et al., 2010). However, this style of team work was 
also not apparent, or relevant in this study. Team communication, rather than 
individuals, can impact massively on safety, positively or negatively (Ballard et al., 
2008, Edmondson, 1999). When working well they can provide an effective barrier to 
unsafe practices (Venkataraman et al., 2017). Wound care passports have been used 
recently to try and link communications better between services, which aim to remain 
with the patient once they develop any skin damage, and offer information about how 
they are being treated, but there have not been any research studies into their 
effectiveness to date. And, as long as IT systems and processes between health care 
services do not comply with each other, this is also a difficult tool to make a success of 
(Hua et al., 2012). 
The role of carer and patient as key to the coordination of care is an interesting finding 
from this study (see Chapter 5) and is relevant again here. This is a key area which 
may offer a solution to the problem of communication between parties. No one has 
more interest in their well being than the patient themselves (Coulter, 2011, Vincent, 
2010, Vincent and Coulter, 2002). The only caveat is that the patient must be able to 
communicate well enough, or be cognitively able, to monitor and understand their skin 
status and risks (2008, Bazin et al., 2016). Patients and carers, however, may provide 
continuity and counteract the diffusion of responsibility between services (Berger et al., 
2014). They may offer insights into where care is lacking, or highlight issues with 
communication. Lawton et al have researched the patient’s role in this area in a large 
study on the patient’s role in patient safety (Lawton et al., 2017, Lawton et al., 2011) as 
has Scott (Scott et al., 2016). This is also gathering support in health care policy with 
the advent of Improving Safety Critical Spoken Communication (NHS Improvement, 
2019a), and Liberating the NHS: No Decision about me without me. (Department of 
Health, 2012b)  The patient's communication with health care professionals  would be 
an area for further research specifically relating to pressure ulcer care. However, in this 
study, the evidence was that patients were not utilised for their knowledge for helping 
to coordinate and communicate between services (except for Glenn’s and Danni’s 
carers, who took the role on voluntarily). Instead, different areas of MDT, wards and 
services operated in silos and did not communicate well between each other.  
 8.14 The role of error in the complex system 
Additionally, for the patients involved in this study, information loss often occurred over 
time, what was lost was not fully apparent to staff at each handover, consistent with the 





‘Normal’ accidents, or system accidents, are so-called by Perrow (Perrow, 1984) 
because such accidents are seen as inevitable in extremely complex systems. Perrow 
argues that operator error is a problem, but big accidents almost always have very 
small beginnings. Such events appear trivial to begin with to those at the frontline 
before cascading unpredictably through a system to create a large event with severe 
consequences. With the slow onset of decline in skin integrity, starting from small 
beginnings, namely Category 1 or 2 skin damage, this can have consequences if staff 
are not aware constantly of changes to skin status. This fits well with Perrow’s theory 
(Perrow, 1984). Using timelines to track patients’ decline in skin status is helpful, but 
they are only used retrospectively for pressure ulcers as part of incident investigations, 
and wound care risk assessments and wound care plans are rarely used dynamically 
by staff to assess skin (Angood, 2008, Briggs et al., 2013). A linear timeline is also only 
part of the casual factors, which include environmental perspectives. In hindsight we 
can see how a patient’s skin has declined due to subtle changes in circumstance and 
risk status but this is not always obvious to staff in real time. Coleman et al.  have since 
developed a more dynamic approach to risk assessment (Briggs et al., 2013) notably 
the PURPOSE T tool, arising in part from this study’s findings. This tool monitors risk 
using a pathway approach, which leads to the implementation of a care plan. However, 
results from this work are still in their infancy and it is not known whether this will 
address the issue of dynamic skin status. The SBAR and safety huddles (Goldenhar et 
al., 2013, Field et al., 2011), mentioned above, also aim to improve issues with handing 
over patients, and keeping pressure ulcers at the forefront of health care staff’s minds, 
but again, time and further research will tell whether these are able to prevent severe 
pressure ulcers developing or deteriorating. 
8.15 Conclusion   
This chapter has highlighted that problems of poor communication on hospital wards, 
between wards and between multi-disciplinary professional groups may lead to patients 
developing severe pressure ulcers. However, the findings are exploratory and simply 
offer opportunity for further research into this area. The chapter has also highlighted 
how, if no one takes responsibility within a large complex system, and passes patients 
on from ward to ward for example, this may reduce the care of a patient in terms of 
pressure ulcer management, which is more likely lead to the development of a severe 
pressure ulcer. This links to the theory of diffusion of responsibility.  Key areas for 
safety and prevention of pressure ulcers appear to be good coordination and 
communication, including the patient’s and carer’s view too if possible to provide 





missing. This study's findings have offered some grounding for further exploration, and 
although more current safety work is heading towards focussing on the area of team 
work and communication, more research needs to be done to expand and tease out 


























Chapter 9: Reflections on a very long PhD journey. 
 
“Reflexiveness is the essential condition, within the social process, for the development 
of mind.” (Mead, 1934) 
9.1 Introduction: A passion for pressure ulcers.  
I set out on my PhD journey fresh from a jump from forensic psychology. I had always 
loved psychology ever since I found my mum’s old encyclopaedias in our loft and I 
passionately presented a study to my eleven year old class mates about why we yawn 
and why yawning is such a social phenomenon. They yawned- I hope because of the 
social phenomenon and not my delivery technique.   
However, after a number of years studying forensic patients, and being genuinely being 
frightened by the people I encountered, I felt that scoring people out of 30 for their 
psychopathy traits and making legal decisions based on this score was ethically wrong 
( I refer of course to The Hare Psychopathy Checklist-Revised). I needed a new 
direction for my love of psychology; I was fast becoming disillusioned. However, I was 
then lucky enough to gain a ‘permanent’ (it was back in 2007) position as a researcher 
in the Leeds Institute of Health Sciences.  
Here, I met the most qualitatively focused research team that you can imagine. Instead 
of scoring people with binary numbers and inputting data into SPSS, they pontificated 
in our shared office about ontological positions and how ‘science’ is simply a construct. 
We all wondered what a search for knowledge really entailed. I could go on. 
At the same time, I felt out of my depth. Most of my colleagues had backgrounds in 
sociology and I felt a bit lost in their musings. When one of the professors (Justin Keen) 
asked me to join him as a researcher on a project with one of his colleagues from the 
Clinical Trials Unit (Professor Jane Nixon) who was an empiricist, I felt strangely safe 
again. Jane had asked Justin Keen to be part of her huge programme grant 
investigating pressure ulcers because of his health policy and systems knowledge, and 
his leanings towards qualitative research. I preferred this research ground, where we 
measure but allow for some musings and social contexts. This seemed to fit my 
research persona. It also amused me that I was seen as a qualitative researcher at our 
meetings in the Clinical Trials Unit.  
My PhD was born. Jane and Justin had written three paragraphs tagged on the end of 





idea for a small qualitative study was based on a hunch from Jane and her team that 
the healthcare system somehow contributed to patients developing pressure ulcers, but 
they did not know how. Some patients got better, and others deteriorated despite 
having similar risks and presentations, and as caring nurses by background, this still 
bothered them. Justin, who remains an eminent Professor in Health Politics, was asked 
to help to devise a study around this.  
Justin and Jane then asked me to write a proposal about how to study why patients 
develop pressure ulcers. I did not know what a pressure ulcer was at this point. I had 
certainly never seen one, although have of course now. Justin instructed me to go and 
read Normal Accidents by Charles Perrow (1984). I read it, and was as enthused by this 
book as much as my mum’s encyclopaedias! How had Justin connected nuclear 
accidents to bed sores/pressure ulcers? My passion for pressure ulcers was ignited in 
this connection. I read (nearly) every book on safety in our university library, fascinated 
by the psychological orientation of safety. However, what I had not realised in my 
exuberance was how long and hard this research journey to connect pressure ulcers and 
safety would be, and how many academic disciplines I would need to study. 
There are many times since I started studying pressure ulcers that I have wished I could 
go back to coding binary numbers in SPSS. Many psychology colleagues have passed 
their PhD Vivas during my research journey, and I’ve read their studies, which are often 
based on careful re-analysis of current theories.  
However, I have met some wonderful people in the course of my research. Some of 
whom aren’t now with us. It is for them that I have kept plodding on this arduous journey 
to get their voices heard. This isn’t sycophantic or tokenistic. I met people who gave me 
their time when they were in their last days of life (#Thelast1000days by Professor Brian 
Dolan) illustrates this beautifully). For this I will be eternally grateful, and when I have 
wanted to give up on this thesis, I think of these brave people and get back to writing. 
The problem with cross disciplinary PhDs are that they cannot possibly cover everything 
about what the thesis needs to cover. Where to draw the line is so subjective that I came 
unstuck many times. Was it a study on severe pressure ulcers? Was it a study on 
organisational systems from a psychological perspective? Was it a study on safety of 
complex systems? Was it a study on patient experience? 
My biggest reflection then, is a PhD of such cross disciplinary focus worth completing? 
Yes. After I registered this as a PhD under Jane’s instruction in 2009, ten years later still 





how the organisation has contributed to why patients develop Category 3 and 4 or severe 
pressure ulcers.  
9.2 What is reflection? 
So what is reflexivity? Simply, it is the process of self-critique by the researcher to 
examine how his or her own experiences might or might not have influenced the 
researcher process (Dowling, 2006). There are many definitions of reflexivity as a 
concept, and there is not space in this thesis to debate the differing approaches. 
Rather than attempt a review of the variety of ways in which the concept of reflexivity 
has been defined and employed (Berger, 2015, Finlay, 2012, Fook, 2002, Forbes, 
2008, Finlay and Gough, 2003) instead here I discuss reflexivity and highlight some of 
the ways in which it has been applied to research methodology, and to my research in 
particular.  
In contrast to quantitative methods’ claim to objectivity (see Chapter 3 on debates about 
quantitative data and qualitative data), qualitative research has often been criticised for 
being influenced by researcher’s bias (Buckner, 2005). The subjective nature of the data 
construction associated with qualitative research (Guba and Lincoln, 1989) and the focus 
on the researcher rather than the process of research are criticisms that have led to a 
closer examination of researcher’s reflexivity and its role in analysis. Thus, reflexivity can 
be seen as a continuous awareness, assessment, and reassessment by the researcher 
of the researcher's own contribution or shaping of the research and consequent findings 
(Dowling, 2006). 
Reflexivity acknowledges the role of the researcher as a participant in the process of 
knowledge construction, and goes beyond a process of introspection or self awareness 
to celebrate the role of the researcher in data construction. In addition, technical research 
skills used in qualitative research such as interviewing (Hsiung, 2008) demand that the 
researcher engage in the study of self both as subject and as object. 
9.3 Methodological Reflexivity  
For my study, the concept of ‘methodological reflexivity’ or reflexivity from a critical 
standpoint was relevant. This concept acknowledges the relationality of the researcher 
with the research, but also strives to ensure that standardised procedures have, 
nevertheless, been followed throughout the research process. Regular monitoring and 
testing of assumptions and approaches, ensures that the researcher can establish the 





location”. Methodological reflexivity thus identifies and examines ethical, social and 
political considerations that affect the field of enquiry.  
Examining the institutional context and strengthening research rigour are methodological 
goals which can be achieved through this reflexive process. My choice to ‘hear’ all the 
voices of stakeholders, (my voice, the patients, nurses, HCAs, doctors, and expert 
witnesses) in the research study supported this stance. The coherent account for each 
patient was designed to reflect these voices. I was looking for the ‘truth’ or 'reality' in the 
process, through constant monitoring and testing of the coherent account using my 
staged review process (see Chapters 3 and 4).  
The notion of a staged review process did not arise from my researching the concept of 
reflexivity though. It emerged from reflective discussions with my supervisor, Justin. I 
remember returning from fieldwork with my completed 'coherent account' and the TVN’s 
account of what happened. However, the patient’s version of events (elicited from my 
interview with them) was vastly different from the TVN’s version. “What can I do to 
empower the patient?” I asked Justin. “It seems unfair that the patient’s view is 
overthrown by everyone else’s professional opinion.” This has happened for Chris, 
Frankie and Danni (see Chapters 4, 5 6, 7 and 8). So we decided that I should keep the 
patient’s account in full until the end of the analysis to give it ‘strength’ of political and 
social location throughout the six stages of scrutiny. My ‘politics of location’ then was 
deliberately skewed in favour of the patient, and I still, to this day make no apologies for 
this. This decision led to my analysis that professional decisions are not always in line 
with a patient’s view (see Chapter 7). This, for me, is one of the main strengths of this 
thesis, and is discussed in more detail in Chapters 3, 4 and 7.  
I was also trying to find a middle ground and ‘reality’ throughout my interviews with staff. 
Staff members who I interviewed were nervous, worried and knew that pressure ulcers 
were associated with quality of care and patient safety. Extracting rich data from 
sometimes stilted interviews was not an easy task (which again I explore further in 
Chapters 3 and 9). However, a reflective relational position here also helped me to 
navigate through the ‘lack’ of material and find ways to use my judgment about what 
happened. I also used the opinions of the other members of the research review teams 
(that is the TVNs, the expert witnesses, the psychologist and the health politics expert) 
to establish the reflexive ‘reality’, search for the 'best explanation' and validate the 
findings. This was both a strength and a weakness of the study, and is discussed as 
such in Chapter 10. 





According to Attia and Edge (2017) reflexivity can also be divided into two other types: 
prospective and retrospective. They argue carefully, from an educational viewpoint, 
that reflexivity should be seen as a developmental learning approach, and extend the 
idea that reflexivity is bi-directional and context-dependent (see Cole and Masny (2012) 
and Mann (2016).  Attia and Edge (2017)  propose that it is useful to characterise 
reflexivity as comprising two interacting elements: prospective and retrospective 
reflexivity (Edge, 2011). Prospective reflexivity, according to their view, refers to the 
effects of the researcher on the study, whereas retrospective reflexivity refers to the 
effects of the study on the researcher. Reflexivity, for them involves a process of on-
going mutual shaping between researcher and research. Development thus involves an 
increase in awareness of processes of interaction between researcher and context. 
Rather than see development only as a welcome side-effect of reflexive research, Attia 
and Edge (2016) see the development of the researcher as central, with reflexivity in 
an instrumental relationship to the process.  
Attia and Edge’s (2016) conceptual understanding of reflexivity fitted my approach and 
development as an early career researcher. In a study, such as mine, which took ten 
years to research and write up, and caused me much personal stress over the years, 
both types of reflexivity, as described above have been central to my development as a 
researcher and for my research. Below I discuss how the two different concepts 
impacted on my study, and on my life as a researcher. 
9.5 Prospective reflexivity 
When I was asked to be part of a research team which studied 'bed sores', I could not 
see the reason why I was asked. After conversations with Jane Nixon, who clearly must 
have had vision beyond mine, I realised that the team of mostly nursing background 
academics wanted a researcher who was not a nurse. 
As experts in their field, they knew the pre-conceived ideas that most of their professional 
colleagues had about pressure ulcers. Jane, instead, wanted a 'blank slate', and a 
researcher who had the technical skills but no content knowledge of pressure ulcers at 
all. This was not to skew the data with any professional opinion. Therefore I already was 
employing prospective reflexivity before I had collected any data! I was affecting the 
study with my lack of knowledge. However, I did realise, soon after drowning in a mass 
of medical jargon, and worrying that I might miss vital information, that I would need a 
professional view as well, to aid my data collection. This is where the TVN’s account was 
useful in collecting information that I might have overlooked. Therefore, I set out on my 





expertise in psychology, and although I have since gained much detailed knowledge of 
healthcare, and the politics of health care systems, I have mostly remained committed 
to a psychologically focused stance during the ten years. 
9.6 An outsider's perspective 
My psychological interest meant that I interpreted much of the data from an outsider 
perspective. I was interested in the people behind the interviews, and the cognitive 
decisions that were made by participants. In some ways my perspective enriched the 
study with psychological insight, and encouraged an exploration of the psychological 
responses of participants. However, in other ways the focus on the psychological was at 
the expense of exploring content knowledge around the clinical presentations of patients. 
Several times I was asked by the wider research team to return to the field to gain further 
data because there was not enough clinical evidence to find a best explanation for the 
cause of a patient's pressure ulcer. In some instances the lapse in time made it difficult 
to collect further data. 
9.7 A developing appreciation of sociological insights and organisational theory 
Whilst I remained wedded to a psychological perspective at first, I realised over time that 
a wider reflective stance was necessary to understand the concepts of patient safety and 
severe pressure ulcers. The psychologists who had attempted to understand and 
conceptualise the area of patient safety and human error found themselves moving 
towards organisational theory ((Reason, 2016) and sociological theory (Hammond, 1996) 
to understand and explain human error. I too found that it was necessary to look wider 
at more sociological theories such as March and Simon’s ‘Bounded Rationality’ and 
Perrow’s explanation of errors in complex systems (March and Simon, 1958). As I 
referred to earlier in this thesis (Chapter 2) Reason did not manage to explain error fully 
in terms of psychology. My dilemma was also therefore in part because I realised the 
decisions taken by staff in a complex environment such as the NHS, were both socially 
dependent and organisationally driven. The challenges for my study were how far to 
steer the focus towards these areas, and how far to remain committed to social 
psychological explanations. I still believe that patient safety theorists are still grappling 
with this issue (Hollnagel et al., 2015, Reason, 2016, Nicolini et al., 2011, Waring J et al., 
2010, Lawton et al., 2014), and it will be some time before we are comfortable with the 
most useful theoretical position. 





However, in the same way a coroner has to make a best explanation judgement around 
why a patient has died, and what the conclusions must be, the choice of using expert 
witnesses was key to finding the 'reality' within my study. The reason for revisiting their 
role, is that this was another area where my prospective reflexivity led to a research 
design decision, and became a strength of the study. The role of the expert witnesses 
helped to triangulate and enrich the data with other perspectives which led to a more 
developed understanding of the data. The role of the expert witnesses has been 
discussed elsewhere in the thesis (Chapters 3, 4 and 10) however I explain below how I 
came to my decision to have expert witnesses, and why this choice was an example of 
prospective reflexivity. 
 While I was writing the proposal for Jane and Justin, one of the TVNs working on another 
study within the Programme Grant, told me about a passionate coroner who was an 
expert in pressure ulcers. His name was Nigel Chapman, and he was based in 
Nottingham. I contacted him by email to ask for his advice, and he invited me to meet 
him. He remains one of the most important people I have ever met, and has had 
considerable influence on my career ever since. When I met him, he asked if I wanted to 
attend his coroners' inquiry about a patient who had died due to complications of a severe 
pressure ulcer. I was really keen to gain insight into what led to the patient developing 
the pressure ulcer, so I took him up on his kind offer. This was life changing for me; the 
charming gentleman I had met initially, donned a gown and wig and became someone I 
did not recognise. He was an intimidating figure, who interrogated every participant at 
the coroner's inquiry (apart from the deceased patient's family, whom he treated with 
gentle respect). I watched with trepidation, as ward managers, Tissue Viability Nurses 
and other staff nurses were questioned on their practice, and as Nigel Chapman 
repeatedly asked why they felt their patient had developed a pressure ulcer. The high 
levels of emotion involved from all participants during this inquiry was something I will 
always remember. After all staff had been interrogated thoroughly, the coroner called up 
the 'expert witness'. Immediately I could tell that this person was a voice of reason in the 
inquiry. While being repeatedly asked about how the patient's pressure ulcer developed, 
the response from the expert witness was often, "I would have expected that this should 
have happened at this point". It appeared to me that this was not an idealised expectation 
but simply an expectation of normal care. The expert witness repeatedly used the word 
'normally'. I realised that this person was key to working out what was 'normal' care on a 
usual day, if there is such a thing in health care. After the inquiry was over, I asked Nigel 





and how he decided who, if anyone was to blame. He answered that he made a personal 
judgment based on all of the evidence.   
My PhD research design was conceived. I told Justin Keen what I had witnessed and 
learnt, and he loved the idea of drawing together evidence as a coroner would. It also 
had similarities to the design set forward in a (George and Bennett, 2005) book called 
Case Studies and Theory Development, that Ray Pawson had asked us both to read. 
The next ten years of my life I then spent trying to turn this initial concept into a workable 
study design, which highlights prospective reflexivity as a central part of my research 
study.  
9.8 Retrospective Reflexivity.  
This section has been more difficult to write, as this PhD has affected me in many subtle 
ways that are hard to articulate. Firstly, and probably most importantly, it has changed 
the course of my career from an academic one and taken me to a role in an NHS 
environment.  
I was a different person when I started out on this journey ten years ago. I was 
enthusiastic about research and approached the prospect of studying for a PhD with 
excitement. Now, I tell anyone who expresses a desire to study for one, that it is the 
hardest thing I have ever done. 
The main aspect of retrospective reflexivity however; which I discuss here, is about the 
people I interviewed as part of my research study. I refer mainly to the eight patients, 
who were interviewed and gave me their time and energy, when they were suffering 
from severe pressure ulcers, which must have been painful and debilitating on top of 
their other conditions. The fact that they each had a severe pressure ulcer meant that 
they were frail, had complex needs or were ill (see Chapters 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8). In my 
darkest moments when I did not think I could finish this PhD, I thought of their suffering 
and about the time they gave to me, and this reflection gave me the drive to get this 
done; for their voices to be heard, at least. In this way too, the detailed investigations 
about every patient, and the reasons they developed their pressure ulcers, also 
impacted on my decisions as a researcher, and then as a Patient Safety Manager. I am 
now very much oriented towards the perspective of the patient, knowing that their 
version of what happened to them is often different from the professional's.  





Although there have since been research studies and policy drives within patient safety 
which are now centred around the patient's view (O'Hara et al., 2018) (Liberating the 
NHS; No decision about me without me, Department of Health). This study has 
evidence supporting this view, and more importantly for me, has steered my 
perspective towards a particular patient-centred, or user-centred view point. This is the 
most important message of this PhD, in my view, as it offers a 'situated position' for 
patient safety centred on the patient, while linking the patient's view to wound care. 
This links to the 'politics of location' mentioned above, but develops this in order to 
examine the 'power' dynamic involved. . When I refer to ' situated position' I mean it as 
Madge (1993) and Haraway (1991) suggest, which is where the researcher's role of 
'self' (in terms of race, nationality, age, gender, social and economic status amongst 
other attributes) influences the data. This refers to a 'situated position' offering a type of 
'situated knowledge' which shows where the power dynamic, which is generated from 
the data, is actually situated. In other words, for this study, the power was between 
myself, as a psychology focused researcher, and the patient. However, this was a 
conscious decision, following the development of the method, as initially, the nurse 
experts and research team had the 'power' over the data, because they knew about 
how patients developed pressure ulcers from a clinical perspective. However, I made 
decisions (in using the patient interviews per se, rather than using excerpts from them 
in my coherent account) to keep the 'power' with the patient throughout the data 
analysis. Much of the method became about addressing these power dynamics 
between participants (see Chapter 3 for detailed discussion about this). I was 
determined not to override the patients' versions of events, as they were very different 
from the health professionals' perspective. In doing so, this allowed me to explore the 
concept of a 'best explanation' rather than data as 'truth'. The impact of the findings 
around contrasting perspectives, has led to developmental work, as part of my current 
role, to incorporate the patient as shared decision-maker in pressure ulcer care. I see 
this as a positive step forward, which arose from my reflections on the PhD. 
9.10 Discussion 
I have discussed prospective and retrospective reflexivity in context, but there is also 
potential for much more exploration of reflexivity at other theoretical levels of 
interaction. For example, it would be possible to investigate whether the findings that I 
reported as significant were the same as the answers to the research questions with 
which I had started the study. The varying disciplines I drew on for my explanations 
offered perspectives, but if I had focused less on psychological explanation and more 





If, for example, I had focused more on the political environment around pressure ulcers 
and health policy, I might have offered recommendations at a more policy oriented 
level. I chose instead, to remain at the position of frontline, within the NHS system. 
Underneath the umbrella of inter-disciplinary questions, are also those around which 
'situated position' to take when data is being collected.  Again, I may have found 
different answers had I allowed the health professionals more power during the course 
of analysis, and if I had more nursing knowledge at the outset to draw upon.  
I could also have considered a different methodological approach to analysis rather 
than a realist-based one. I chose to interpret the data as 'facts'. An Interpretative 
Phenomenological Analysis, for example, might have focused more on the meanings 
generated by the patients and staff and what a severe pressure ulcer meant to them. 
However, my choice to focus on 'explanations' meant that I was searching for the best 
explanation, taken as truth,  that I found 'at the time', with the evidence I gathered, 
(which was as exhaustive as I could manage, although this is open to scrutiny and 
critique) incorporating the notion of reflexivity of who I am as a researcher. The quest 
for the explanation was therefore the nearest to my 'truth' or politics of location, or 
'situated position' as I could articulate it.  
Reflecting encourages the researcher to articulate the understanding that emerges 
from experience, and to take responsibility for the raised awareness as he or she 
identifies a desired direction of travel. Then, the researcher must pursue the knowledge 
needed to help with this direction. I have lost count of the times that this happened 
within my PhD study.  Sandywell (1996) notes that reflexive action changes the self, 
and a reflexive practice never returns the original self. A developmental approach to 
reflexivity has therefore potential both to enrich the researcher's experience and shape 
learning and progress (Attia and Edge, 2016).  
A developmental approach to reflexivity also recognises the value of reflection as a 
means of capacity-building, as it supports creativity and innovation by encouraging the 
researcher to discern methodological opportunities within his or her own environment, 
and to be purposeful in decision-making and analysis. In doing so, a study's findings, 
generated with reflexive insight, can highlight new ways of looking at a phenomenon, 
and highlight alternative avenues for research. This journey, if anything, is what is 







Chapter 10 Conclusion 
10.1 Chapter summary  
This chapter draws the four previous discussion chapters together in one concluding 
chapter beginning with a discussion of the strengths and limitations of the research 
study. It examines the fundamental role of the environment and decisions which impact 
on the development of severe pressure ulcers in patients. It revisits the literature review 
in terms of sociological, psychological and organisational views of patient safety.  
The chapter then discusses how using a combination of these inter-disciplinary views 
may offer an improved method of investigating the causes of severe pressure ulcers, 
and how this in turn may offer improvements to current investigative tools and 
processes. It briefly revisits the theories of coherence and correspondence, the Theory 
of Explanatory Coherence (TEC) and inference to the best explanation, in relation to a 
retrospective case study method. It considers how the use of these reasoning and 
analysis techniques may lead us towards supporting the concept of a ‘Safety III’. The 
chapter concludes with how the application of the findings to the study of severe 
pressure ulcers may help to point towards a future direction for health care 
investigation techniques.  
10.2 The background and rationale revisited  
This study aimed to explore and explain the reasons why patients develop severe 
pressure ulcers and whether the organisational environment contributed to their 
development.  These ulcers are seen as a major burden to patients, carers and the 
healthcare system, affecting an estimated 1 in 10 hospital and 1 in 20 community 
patients (Gunningberg, 2006, Bredesen et al., 2015b, Vanderwee et al., 2011, 
Schuurman et al., 2009a).  Before this study was conducted, we knew that immobility 
was a significant clinical risk factor (National Institute for Clinical Excellence, 2001a, 
EPUAP/NPUAP, 2009, Nixon and McGough, 2001, Nixon, 2009, Briggs et al., 2013). 
However, what we did not know enough about was why some severe pressure ulcers 
develop in patients which cannot be explained by clinical risk factors alone. There were 
suggestions from previous literature that organisational environments may have an 
influence, and that associated clinical negligence may also contribute (Bennett et al., 
2004, Nixon, 2009, Department of Health, 2000).  
Additionally, and reiterating points made in Chapters 1 and 2 of this thesis, a narrative 





that much research attention has been focused (since the growth of the patient safety 
movement) on solutions such as checklists, guidelines, re-training and technological 
innovation. However, studies included in the literature review in this thesis showed that 
these initiatives are also influenced by wider socio-organisational factors, and that 
greater thought and attention should be given to translating techniques typically used in 
other industries to health care (Hollnagel et al., 2013, Waring J et al., 2010, Vincent et 
al., 2017). The narrative review also called for greater focus on the connections 
between services, and patients’ and carers’ roles in patient safety (Waring J et al., 
2010). These issues continue to raise concerns to date in the search for better 
investigation techniques in health care (Vincent et al., 2017).  
Therefore, questions about the organisational environment, pressure ulcers and socio-
organisational factors in patient safety formed the rationale for this study. These 
questions were specifically; Why do patients develop severe pressure ulcers? And 
does the healthcare environment contribute? 
10.3 Strengths and limitations of the study 
10.3.1 Retrospective study 
One of the main limitations of this study however, is that it was retrospective in nature. 
Although steps were taken by the researcher to reduce hindsight bias, which included 
the sense checking review process, the sequence of events chronology and the use of 
‘good usual care’, the study was not able to counteract this problem fully. This issue 
was debated in Chapter 3 in detail, so will not be reiterated here. Associated issues 
with hindsight bias also included historical accuracy of accounts from all participants 
and the sample, which was not a randomised sample, but patients chosen who had 
already developed severe pressure ulcers.  
10.3.2 Sample and data collection issues 
The data collection phase of this study took two years to complete, which highlights 
issues with the length of time spent collecting data deemed useful enough to 
investigate. This could have potential negative impact on the future usability of the 
study. The sample size was also small (n=8) , which highlights the strongly debated 
issue with generalisability associated with small sample sizes in qualitative research 
(Hammersley, 1992, Emmel, 2013). Again, this was debated in Chapter 3, so will not 





I wanted to represent the evidence in the most accurate way to get the most suitable 
explanation. However, I faced several smaller challenges while trying to do this. I 
found, while carrying out interviews with each patient that, although he or she was 
witness to most of what happened, there were other people’s versions of events which 
he or she was not witness to, such as decisions made by nurses, physiotherapists and 
consultants. This meant that data collection was substantial and I had to gather 
numerous and varied sources of evidence for each patient to make sense of what had 
happened.  
However, the small sample did allow a very thorough investigation of each case, not 
associated with larger scale survey style investigations. Focusing on a small sample 
also offered the opportunity to refine and develop candidate explanations. The intention 
was never to generalise to a larger population, but to offer possible candidate 
explanations and possible theories from which to better understand how severe 
pressure ulcers develop.  
10.3.3 Issues with reflexivity 
Issues with reflexivity were debated in Chapter 9 and explored questions around which 
approach I took. For example, if I had focused less on psychological explanation and 
more on a sociological one, would I have found different answers to my research 
questions? Or had I focused more on the political environment around pressure ulcers 
and health policy, I might have offered recommendations at a more policy oriented 
level. I chose instead, to remain at the position of frontline, within the NHS system. 
Whether this was the best choice is always debatable. 
10.3.4 Defensiveness and time constraints of participants  
As the study was observational, and mainly carried out on NHS sites, most of the field 
work took place on busy hospital wards, where staff members had little time to spare to 
help with my research. A number of informants were defensive, given the issues 
around severe pressure ulcers and patient safety indicators, so some didn’t give 
enough time, and others did not attend their arranged interviews. I used the on-site 
TVNs as gatekeepers to overcome the defensiveness of staff, and mostly this was 
useful, however, the outsider issue always presents a difficulty as for field researchers 
and can only be overcome to an extent.  
I was non-clinical and some aspects of the information were not understandable, but I 





earlier). I therefore had an on-site account of what had happened, from the TVN’s 
clinical perspective. However, this still presented a challenge, as sometimes I did not 
understand fully the clinical issues, and had to have these clarified by the TVN, and 
project team.  
10.3.5 Patient story bias  
In each case I chose the patient’s story to structure the timeline. The bias towards 
timelines according to staff members had been part of the issues with current 
investigative tools (such as RCA). I realised that if I wanted to improve current practice 
I needed to minimise the effect of different perspectives of events. Although I knew 
each of the accounts was not perfect and couldn’t offer the ‘right’ answers, I still strived 
for a best explanation of what happened (Lipton, 1991, Haig, 2009). However, this was 
from the perspective of the patient and it was often difficult to navigate through which 
‘true’ account to accept. This issue was covered in Chapter 9; however, this was 
overcome by a method of staged analysis which became a strength of the study (see 
below). 
10. 4 Strengths of the study: 
10.4.1 The stages of analysis 
The data was subjected to detailed scrutiny (Shadish et al., 2002, Guba and Lincoln, 
1989, Hammersley, 1991, Lipton, 1991). I used the analytical review process to 
develop my coherent account for each patient, to counteract different perspectives and 
to compare the coherent account of what happened with good usual care seen on a 
ward. The expert witnesses offered their verdict on whether good usual care had been 
followed. I knew I wanted to be open to all disciplines (see Chapters 2 and 3) when 
explaining how a severe pressure ulcer developed.  Applying this was more difficult. I 
used the review process as a forum for applying different cross disciplinary 
explanations (see Table 1 below), and asked the team to choose which ones, if any, 
they thought were the most appropriate. I asked them to read each patient’s coherent 
account with the explanations in mind.  
10.4.2 The key role of the expert witnesses 
The staged review process that this method used and the expert witnesses’ accounts 
were also key to the study’s findings, in that they internally validated the coherent 
accounts (Hammersley, 1991, Campbell and Stanley, 1966). Figure 3.4/10.1 reminds 
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The final coherent account; having gone through six stages of member-checking 
(Hammersley, 1991), had considerable internal validity (see debate in Chapter 3 for the 
preference of this term over more qualitative language) which was strengthened 
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notes/local policy documents 
Box B: Draft account Box C: Account by local 
nurse specialist 
Box D: Integrated 
account 
Box E: Revised account and 
summative group judgement  
Box H: Final ‘fair’ account and 
summative judgements  
Box I: Cross-patient thematic 
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Box G:Theory 
refining  





through the analysis process. The associated summative judgements for each 
coherent account validated by each review stage, allowed me to make a more 
plausible judgement about the validity of each coherent account for each patient. At the 
same time extensive recording of empirical data through analysing different types of 
data sources meant that the audit trail was easy to monitor for any discrepancies or 
inaccuracies (see Chapters 3 and 4). It becomes clear that the correspondence and 
coherent approaches complement each other and both are needed to support an 
investigation around why severe pressure ulcers occur in a complex system.  
More importantly, the expert witnesses provided an account of ‘good usual care’ for all 
cases which does not form part of an RCA investigation. An RCA method tends to 
focus on idealised practices and how a system can be altered to rectify the errors 
which occurred (NHS Direct, 2011). However, the expert witnesses judged what was 
‘good usual care’ and not idealised care. This is a subtle but important difference in 
focus. This was a key element of the method’s contribution to the debates in patient 
safety (Vincent et al., 2017). 
The expert witnesses within the study offered me their accounts of ‘good usual care’ for 
every patient involved in the study. The methodology was at the outset made explicit to 
the people involved in judging each case (see Chapter 3) in that I was not looking for 
perfect care, but the care that they, as experts in their field, would have expected as 
good everyday care (see Chapters 3 and 4)). The expert witnesses included two tissue 
viability nurse specialists who were not involved with the patients or employed at the 
NHS sites. An academic with expert knowledge in nursing also helped to review the 
account. The tissue viability nurses and academic, who were all experienced expert 
witnesses in legal proceedings, provided an account of ‘good usual care’ which was a 
benchmark against which the care of the patients could be judged. I provided the 
expert witnesses with raw data, alongside coherent accounts, so that they could 
compare the accounts with the original sources of information. They recorded 
departures from treatment and care that each individual might reasonably have 
expected to receive. This is similar to how evidence is used within a coroner’s inquiry 
(see Chapter 3), and was indeed the basis for the whole of my study. For example for 
Bernie, who had a number of complex needs such as contracted legs and cognitive 
impairment due to a stroke, one expert witnesses noted that,  ‘For Bernie there was no 
mention at all of physiotherapists and Occupational Therapists – (Agreement from 





For Glenn, who was a paraplegic gentleman, who had been on a long journey via 
ambulance to a specialist healthcare centre and developed his severe pressure ulcer 
following this episode of care, the expert witnesses discussed his case and provided a 
consensus of opinions as follows: 
Expert witness A:   So, we’re assuming that what we’re looking at is the ischial 
pressure ulcer. 
Expert witness B      But if he was elevated slightly in the ambulance, given that he’s so 
thin, is there not that potential that although he’s not sitting directly on his ischium, that 
actually, there would be... 
Expert Witness C      But I don’t agree... if you sit like that and you’re thin – 
Expert Witness A You still miss your ischials  
Expert witness B Yes, you still miss your ischials.’ 
The similarity to a coroner’s method of analysing a case, would be where an expert 
witness would be called to explain and compare what had happened in a particular 
investigation, where normal good practice and deviances from this normal good 
practice might have occurred. Somewhere between the judgements for each patient’s 
case in this study, the team of experts and I drew the best explanations we could elicit, 
given the evidence analysed, about causal inferences relating to each case. The expert 
witnesses offered me the hypothetical ‘positive deviance’ alongside the adverse event 
analysis. Interestingly, Hollnagel et al (2013) also refer to their concept of Safety II in a 
similar way as this study’s concept of ‘good usual care’ when they refer to looking at 
‘work as done’, rather than ‘work as imagined’ and note ‘normal’ practice. In other 
words, they want us to focus on systems that are real (or in my study ‘good usual care’) 
rather than ideal (Hollnagel et al., 2013).  
In executing the method, the explanations became consistent and transparent and 
added validity to the data collection and method.  
I recognise that this technique of investigating complex adverse events is a time-
consuming and multi-method approach (on average taking three months at two days 
per week) and that issues of time constraints and tools of adverse event investigation 
have already been documented in research (Waring, 2007, Nicolini et al., 2011). 
Nevertheless, I have found that using this approach offered interesting insights 





way of discovering the causes of a complex event such as a severe pressure ulcer, 
which focuses on the patient’s view of events rather than an in-house investigation, 
based on health care professionals’ views. Although studies in patient safety are 
starting to address this issue (O'Hara et al., 2018). This type of thorough investigation 
has been called for in patient safety literature (Waring, 2007). I felt that this study 
addressed this issue.  
What has been shown by this study is how to address the organisational culture (to an 
extent, given the exploratory nature of the research), and yet remain close to the 
primary sources of evidence. The method allows us to formulate candidate 
explanations of what happened, which remain grounded in primary evidence (Pawson, 
2006). For this thesis, the explanations I refer to aim to offer a degree of abstraction 
from observable and measurable data, but these could be applied to real world 
settings, while at the same time I do not make grand claims of generalizable rules 
(Merton, 1968).  This time-consuming method of looking at the whole picture alongside 
raw data may not be transferred per se into practice, however, this new way of 
examining and understanding evidence suggests a way to incorporate psychological, 
sociological and organisational research and offer  a more holistic, multi-method way of 
studying patient safety than has ever been practised before (Waring J et al., 2010).   
The use of evidence gathering and making sense of the data corresponds to a 
coroner’s or large scale inquiry, see Mid-Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust Inquiry 
(Francis, 2013, Secretary of State, 2001); and the Bristol Inquiry; (Kennedy, 2001). 
However, the difference between this study and recent large scale inquiries is that it 
does not conclude with a list of recommendations which can be difficult to put into 
practice. In contrast, in this study I used the evidence in a coherent way; in the form of 
an account of events, which also allowed me to refer back to corresponding evidence 
in the primary data. This gives a transparent audit trail for my choice of explanations 
and strengthens the evidence, accountability and stability of findings.  
 10.5. Final discussion 
Overall, this study found that the main plausible explanation for patients who develop 
severe (Category 3 and 4) pressure ulcers was that the environment made their 
development more likely (see Chapters 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8). This was in some cases 

















1 Alex     ●  
2 Bernie   ● ●  
3 Chris  ●  ●  
4 Danni   ● ●  
5 Elliott     ●  
6 Frankie   ● ●  
7 Glenn    ●  
8 Hilary ●     
 
Table 10.1 shows that for three patients (Bernie, Danni and Frankie) the best 
explanations for the development of a severe pressure ulcer, following the staged 
analysis, were that there was a combination of a sequence of events and the 
environment. For another three patients (Alex, Elliott and Glenn) the environment was 
judged as solely the cause of their severe pressure ulcer. For one patient (Chris) there 
was a precipitating isolated error in combination with the environment.  For the final 
patient (Hilary) the severe pressure ulcer was seen to be outside health services, 
therefore in terms of analysis, was unavoidable.  
10.5.1 Four emerging candidate explanations  
As well as the main finding that environmental influences do contribute to the 
development of severe pressure ulcers, the study then began to highlight four discrete 
emergent candidate explanations arising from further coding and analysis of the data 
(see Chapters 3 and 4). These have been explored separately in the four previous 
discussion chapters. These were i.patient (and carer) voices not being heard; ii. 
difficulties with decision making in a complex environment; iii. a ‘mindless’ safety 
culture, and iv. diffusion of responsibility, poor communication and coordination 
between staff, wards and health care services. This discussion now compares these 





how the application of these may improve our approach to studying severe pressure 
ulcers. The four explanations link together and this chapter suggests a logic model 
which may analyse and predict a patient’s pathway if he or she presents with high risk 
of skin damage. 
As I analysed the data, it became apparent that the four candidate explanations also 
linked with other literature in a layered, or multi-tiered way (see Figure 9.1 below). This 
mirrored my initial questions around trying to understand why patients developed 
severe pressure ulcers, and my initial analysis of the data. For example, the 
explanation that patients' voices were not heard worked better at an individual or micro 
level of analysis, and links with the literature at an individual, patient focused level were 
more helpful to understand this area (Blegen et al., 1998, Coleman et al., 2013b). The 
next theoretical explanation, that decisions about pressure ulcer management were 
difficult to make in complex environments, fitted better with the psychological literature 
at a psycho-social level (Benner and Tanner, 1987, Klein, 2008, Thompson and 
Dowding, 2009). The third candidate explanation, that there was a mindless safety 
culture, linked with more socio-cultural level thinking and literature, and insights from 
that area of research were more useful in this area, to understand and define my 
explanation (Ausserhofer et al., 2013, Goldenhar et al., 2013, Weick et al., 2008). 
Finally, the diffusion of responsibility, and poor communication was better understood 
in terms of organisational level literature (West, 2000, Hollnagel et al., 2015, 
Edmondson, 1999).  
The role of the patient (and his or her carer) has been highlighted in the findings of this 
thesis as a key candidate explanation in the development of severe pressure ulcers; 
which has often been overlooked to date in patient safety (Bazin et al., 2016, Vincent 
and Coulter, 2002, Berger et al., 2014). This study supports the possible view that 
health care staff were not listening enough to patients and often treated them as ‘non-
compliant’ and ‘passive’, disregarding their role in their care (see Chapter 5). These 
tentative findings have implications for current investigation techniques within the 
patient safety field, given the links between pressure ulcers and patient safety (2008, 
Bredesen et al., 2015b, McMaster, 2005, Salcido, 2007). Staff could engage patients 
more fully in their care, and move towards a more concordant approach, if we want to 
work towards the prevention of severe pressure ulcers (see Chapter 5).   
The findings of this study also suggest that the dialogue between doctors, nurses, and 
the wider MDT, needs to incorporate the social environment that they make decisions 





understandable, to make it equal for professions, and more open to scrutiny, so that we 
can learn how to make the best choices for high risk patients within uncertain, time 
pressured environments (see Chapter 6). Alternatively, it maybe that some of these 
decisions are inherent within the system and no amount of retrospective investigations 
would equip the staff with the foresight (Klein, 2008, Perrow, 1984, Vaughan, 1996). 
However, rather than individuals simply being accountable for decisions they make, it 
may be that expectations, time to decide and awareness are not high enough around 
prevention and management of pressure ulcers and staff need to be equipped with 
more clarity of process and decision making analysis. Although, the conclusions drawn 
from this study need to be interpreted with a degree of caution, given its exploratory 
design, it suggests that staff (particularly nursing staff) should be empowered, 
encouraged and supported to make those decisions around pressure ulcer prevention 
and management, while recognising the complex environment they make decisions in. 
This complexity was discussed in more depth in Chapters 6, 7 and 8. 
Examination of the data in terms of sequences of events highlighted delays in response 
by staff members towards pressure ulcer risks in patients. In these cases specific 
events played a role; however these occurred in organisational environments which 
hindered the staff in doing their work to their best ability (see Chapters 7 and 8). Above 
all, the responses and decisions made for all of the patients appeared to point towards 
a mindless (Weick et al., 2008, Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001) as opposed to a mindful 
awareness regarding skin care. To reiterate, when I refer to ‘mindless’, it is not a 
detrimental term in the commonly used sense, but acts as a psychological term, 
meaning opposite to ‘mindful awareness’, such as when an actor goes into a ‘mindless 
state’ and acts in an ‘auto-pilot’ mode (Weick et al., 2008, Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001). 
Weick et al. (2008) note that when people within an organisation are in mindless mode 
they face confusing signals and rely on past ways of doing their work, and hold on to 
their perspective without awareness that things could be different. The authors add that 
this is more likely to happen when people are distracted, hurried or overloaded.  
When I examined the sequences of events and delays in response alongside the 
organisational environment, it appeared, while interpreted with a degree of caution, that 
staff members’ actions and responses within organisational contexts led them to be 
less aware or mindless of pressure ulcer risks, for various reasons, including being 
distracted and hurried. It also appeared from the findings that pressure ulcer care is not 
as high on nurses’ priorities as it should be, which is supported by other literature in 






Part of the ‘mindless’ state of awareness is that there seemed to be poor 
communication on hospital wards, between wards and between multi-disciplinary 
professional groups (Goulding, 2011) (see Chapter 8). Although this was not true of all 
locations or services. The tentative findings, to further explore, from my exploratory 
study, suggest that, if no one takes responsibility within a large complex system, and 
passes patients on from ward to ward, for example without a clear handover process 
(which happened for several of the patients in this study) this may impact on the care of 
a patient, and is more likely lead to the development of a severe pressure ulcer. This 
finding also supports the theory of diffusion of responsibility set out earlier in Chapter 8 
of this thesis (Latané and Darley, 1970). Conversely, key areas for safety and 
prevention of pressure ulcers, arising from the findings of this study appear to be good 
coordination and communication, including the patient’s and carer’s views, to provide 
information.  
10.5.2 Model of high risk patients’ pathway through hospital 
One of the main findings of this thesis relative to frontline health care practice is the 
mapping of a typical high risk patient as he or she enters the healthcare system, and 
the organisational influences which are more likely to result in a severe pressure ulcer. 
The logic model below (Figure 10.2) describes a typical high risk patient’s pathway 
through care. In the context of both a lack of awareness and mindless safety culture, 
the issues may escalate to impact on the likelihood of a patient's skin deteriorating. The 
logic model highlights in stages the effects of health care practices on the high risk 
patient as he or she enters health care (such as the patient and carer’s voice not being 
heard and delays in risk assessments) and the likelihood, according to these effects, of 
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 10.5.3 Four candidate explanations in one model 
However, there are also relationships between the patient and the different candidate 
explanations set out above. The four areas are discrete but relate to each other in that 
they represent different tiered levels regarding pressure ulcer prevention and management. 
What I mean by  ‘tiered levels’’ is a hierarchical health care structure graduating away from 
the patient, but still impacting on him or her. Central to this model is the ‘high risk’ patient, 
and at varying outer layers are the influences on the patient’s severe pressure ulcer 
development. These are shown in the diagram below (Figure 9.2). At the centre is the 
patient, and at a micro-social level there is the impact of staff not listening to their patient’s 
needs. Surrounding this are the decisions made by staff in relation to the patient at a socio-
cultural level, which must be supported and acted on to prevent deterioration of a patient’s 
skin condition. Surrounding this level is the safety culture within which the staff work, and 
surrounding this is the macro, or service/governance level supporting mechanism. Although 
the model does not quite follow familiar sociological tiers (micro, meso and macro) it does 
echo these levels to an extent.            
Fig. 10.3 Four tiers        
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The high risk patient, at the centre, is affected directly by relationships with those around 
him or her (namely frontline health care staff and carers). If the patient’s or carer’s voice is 
not heard, or their concerns not heeded at a one to one relational level, this affects the 
decision-making around the patient and vice versa. Decisions made by individuals who 
operate within a mindless safety culture appear to be more difficult, although this finding is 
tentative given the exploratory nature of the study (see Chapters 5 and 6). Coupled with 
this however, if communication and coordination between services at this wider, more 
macro level is lacking then the patient will most likely develop a severe pressure ulcer.  
Although some of this argument is likely to be seen as common sense, it is useful to 
see a visual model of the support systems (or lack of) surrounding a patient and it is 
easier to target areas for training or service improvement based on this, which may be 
deficient or weaker.  
Illuminatingly, there are recent models used within patient safety which have set out 
similar relationships to analyse adverse events at a more general level of analysis. 
Lawton et al.'s Yorkshire Contributory Factors Framework (2012) offers domains to 
analyse adverse events based on a systematic review of factors which contribute to 
patient safety incidents. The framework consists of active failures (at individual level), 
situational factors, local working conditions, latent/organisational factors and 






Fig. 10.4 Yorkshire Contributory Factors (Source Lawton et al. 2012) 
When I compared my findings, and my subsequent model, regarding the patients in my 
study who develop severe pressure ulcers, with the Yorkshire Contributory Factors 
Framework, it became apparent that there was some overlap with the domains. In the 
centre of both models sit errors at individual level, surrounded by decisions made at 
team level, then surrounding these on both models are cultural factors, and then at the 





The similarities, while not an exact replication, i) provide support for the findings in my 
thesis around individual level factors, and socio-cultural factors, then service level 
findings; and ii) highlight that the model generated in this thesis may have value in 
offering analysis for investigating patients who develop severe pressure ulcers. This 
has implications for the RCA technique of analysis currently used in health care when 
examining adverse events. This is discussed in detail below. 
10.5.4 The inadequacies of Root Cause Analysis 
As has been mentioned earlier in this thesis (Chapters 1 and 2), over the last decade 
Root Cause Analysis (RCA) and other methods of error investigation have become the 
main tools for analysing adverse events such as severe pressure ulcers in health care 
(NHS Direct, 2011, Ovretveit, 2005). Originally used in high risk industries such as 
nuclear power and aviation (Carroll JS and Edmondson AC, 2002) RCA was adopted 
in 2001 by the National Patient Safety Agency, (now NHS Improvement) arising from 
the Department of Health’s report ‘An Organisation with a Memory’ (2000). RCA still 
remains the most recommended method in health care which is used to examine 
clinical incidents retrospectively, and to devise strategies to change practice (Public 
Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, 2017, NHS England, 2015). It is 
designed to work towards preventing future adverse events based on the learning 
achieved from incident investigations.  
Normally, an RCA is undertaken when an incident is reported, however, this requires 
correct and accurate reporting of incidents, and not all adverse events are easily 
reported and measured (Benn et al., 2009, Evans et al., 2006). Pressure ulcers, for 
example, as we have seen in this study, often do not have an easily identifiable 
beginning, and tend to happen on wards gradually, where the staff are sometimes not 
aware of their initial development (Evans et al., 2006). Currently, as has been 
discussed previously in Chapters 2 and 7, the tools (such as RCA) which are used to 
examine the causes of severe pressure ulcers, are based more around, or at least 
interpreted as, psychological and reductive perspectives rather than focused on an 
organisational, coherent view (Nicolini et al., 2011, Peerally et al., 2017, Waring J et al., 
2010, Vincent et al., 2017). This study has suggested that this way of investigating 
incidents is not helpful if we are to gain a coherent, whole system perspective on what 
happens when a patient develops a severe pressure ulcer. This then can affect 
associated learning and service improvements.  






In collecting and analysing data using an adapted George and Bennett process-tracing 
methodological approach (George and Bennett, 2005), this study found that the most 
plausible explanations contributing to the development of severe pressure ulcers were 
environmental, rather than clinical or isolated causes. These included poor 
communication and service coordination, staff not listening to patients, decision making 
in uncertain, complex climates, and a less than ideal safety culture. These explanations 
place the findings firmly within the realms of organisational, human factors and socio-
cultural theory rather than clinical literature around pressure ulcers. 
The study has shown that there are more complex causal influences than factorial ‘root 
causes’ regarding patient safety issues such as severe pressure ulcers. This calls into 
question the search for ‘root causes’ of them. This also adds weight to the framework 
of investigation offered by Lawton et al., (2012). Aside from frontline managers’ views 
in healthcare, other knowledge and judgements are needed to fully understand the 
organisational issues which impact on patients developing pressure ulcers (Wallace et 
al, 2009; Nicolini et al, 2011), yet frontline managers, debatably, still remain the most 
popular staff group who are currently directed to conduct RCA investigations (Vincent 
et al., 2017, NHS England, 2015). The chronology for this study took the perspective of 
the patient rather than a service level view, and this offered a different lens from which 
to view the system of healthcare. This study has suggested that the views of patients 
and carers, and experts who can compare investigations to typical good usual 
standards of care, could be successfully incorporated into investigations. However, 
these elements are overlooked currently in investigations (Evans et al., 2006, Lawton 
et al., 2017, Greenwood and McGinnis, 2016), although things are changing with more 
interest in the patient's view in patient safety (O'Hara et al., 2019). However, these 
would be areas in which to test the theories generated by the findings of this thesis. 
Although one study aimed to do this, in one NHS Trust, following the results of earlier 
publication of this thesis’ findings (Greenwood and McGinnis, 2016), the study was 
limited in its scope and the authors note that the systems and organisational 
explanations were limited in the study. However, supporting this thesis' findings, they 
also noted that patient and staff interviews offered more insight into care delivery 
issues, and that the quality of the RCA process is improved when it is completed by 
someone external to a patient’s care as it minimises bias (Greenwood and McGinnis, 






10.6 Implications of the thesis’ findings  
 
Reviews of patient safety research have noted the need for multi and mixed method 
approaches to researching what is such a diverse and complex area (Waring J et al., 
2010). Patient safety experts have also suggested that improvement should involve 
specialist expertise in incident investigations, including using underlying theories, 
human factors and hands-on experience of analytical methods in the patient safety field 
(Vincent et al., 2017). The focus on human factors has started to be addressed through 
the National Patient Safety Strategy (NHS Improvement, 2019b). Human factors has 
come to the fore in the NHS since the signing of the human factors concordat in 
November 2013 by the members of the National Quality Board (NQB) including Health 
Education England, the General Medical Council, Nursing and Midwifery Council and 
NHS England (Nationa Quality Board, 2013). This area of work is fast developing and 
this study's findings have supported the consideration of this wider view of investigating 
serious incidents (in this case, severe pressure ulcers). To an extent this issue has also 
been addressed by the recent formation of the Health Services Investigation Branch 
(HSIB), which aims to take investigations away from the frontline and offer a 
professional human factors approach to a selection of incidents (Health Services 
Investigation Branch, 2017).   
The HSIB movement is in its early stages, having been created in April 2017, and its 
value has yet not been evaluated to date; however, this study’s findings support the 
introduction of techniques of investigation which the HSIB aims to employ, which are 
human factors-based and organisational theory approaches, and which also include 
patients and or carers more actively in an investigation. The HSIB notes that ‘patients, 
families and staff must be active participants in the process of investigation and must 
be engaged with and supported compassionately and respectfully investigations’ and it 
also notes that investigations ‘must be led by experts’. Both of these aims are findings 
within this thesis and support current developments to practice.  
The need for an improved approach is partly because, as stated earlier in this thesis, a 
linear, reductionist approach to isolate ‘root causes’ has been shown in the RCA 
evaluation literature as too simple an approach to understand and learn from the 
causes of such complex events as severe pressure ulcers (Vincent et al., 2017, 
Perrow, 1984). The approach may be helpful in investigating isolated, time delineated 
events such as medication errors, but is inadequate regarding more complex patient 





the culture which surrounds the patient, are both required to fully understand these 
phenomena. As highlighted above, work has already been started in patient safety 
which considers this cultural system with the advent of the Yorkshire Contributory 
Factors Framework (Lawton et al., 2012). 
10.6.1 Perrow’s contribution to investigating severe pressure ulcers 
As I have demonstrated in this thesis, Perrow’s analytical view is that the complex 
adaptive system sets an actor up to ‘fail’ within a complex system (Perrow, 1984). 
There is often no way of predicting where and how the failure will occur. This view is a 
more coherent perspective than a reductionist view. Perrow instead allows the system 
itself to cause the error, rather than a local actor or system at a micro level. An actor 
within a system may behave in a way that he or she thinks is rational, given the 
knowledge he or she has available at the time. For example, within the NHS system, a 
nurse may receive a frail patient who has transferred from another ward. The focus 
would be on their prevailing symptoms, which may or may not have been handed over 
clearly by staff on the previous ward. What they were likely not informed of, however, 
was the underlying skin damage that the patient may have been exposed to alongside 
their co-morbidities, such as lying on a trolley in the Emergency Department (ED), or 
how far the patient was able to comply with frequent turns, or how unwell they became 
when undergoing previous surgery. The person on the frontline often has no idea about 
the underlying systemic issues which have also impacted on the patient presenting to 
them.  This not only links to a theory of diffusion of responsibility discussed earlier (see 
Chapter 8), but also shows us that, for the patients involved in this study, information 
loss often occurred over time. What was lost was not fully apparent to staff at each 
handover; consistent with Reason’s ‘swiss cheese model’ (Hollnagel et al., 2015) but 
also consistent with the Normal Accidents theory that errors become ‘normal’ within a 
large system and are not always preventable in real time (Perrow, 1984). Perrow’s 
‘Normal Accidents’ theory argues that big accidents almost always have very small 
beginnings. Such events appear trivial to begin with to those at the frontline before 
cascading unpredictably through a system to create a large event with severe 
consequences. With the slow onset of decline in skin integrity, starting from small 
beginnings, namely Category 1 or 2 skin damage, this can have consequences if staff 
are not aware constantly of changes to skin status. These subtle systemic issues echo 
the findings of this thesis relating to a complex sequence of events, which was 
particularly valid for three of the patients. Poor communication and awareness on 
hospital wards, between wards and between multi-disciplinary professional groups was 





takes responsibility, or is indeed able to take responsibility due to the failings within a 
large complex system, this may impact on the care of a patient, which is more likely to 
lead to the development of a severe pressure ulcer. 
The study’s sequence of events also differs from usual investigations conducted 
currently in health care, in that the chronology was based around the patient‘s 
perspective, not the health care professionals’, and thus aimed to provide a more 
coherent picture of the development of severe pressure ulcers.  Although this has been 
discussed previously, Perrow’s (1984) view about the systemic and ‘Normal Accidents 
theory’ therefore helps us to understand in part what happened for the patients in the 
study who developed severe pressure ulcers, in that the structure of the organisation 
can be such that a patient will develop a severe pressure ulcer due to factors outside 
the control of frontline staff. Perrow’s insights help us to see that systems are more 
than ‘components or equipment’; they can also be human constructions and decisions 
(Perrow, 1984). Typically, health services are systems based around human 
constructions in tandem with equipment and tools.  
The analysis of the health care system using Perrow’s Normal Accident Theory (1984) 
helps us towards a slightly depressing view that all complex systems will cause errors 
eventually, despite criticism of this theory from other authors, such as Weick et al. 
(Weick et al., 2008) who argue that it is possible to prevent errors with more mindful 
awareness (discussed below). Applying Perrow’s analysis to health care however;  and 
in particular regarding the development of severe pressure ulcers, makes us see that 
good coordination and clear communication, which include the patient’s and carer’s 
view to provide information, should be part of that system to provide consistency, 
transparency and clarity. In this study, the analysis showed that these factors were 
missing overall from the eight cases investigated.  
10.6.2 Safety I and Safety II-are these concepts enough to understand safety? 
The concept of Safety I has been explored in detail within my study, as the study’s 
method allowed a retrospective investigation of cases where patients developed severe 
pressure ulcers (seen as adverse events in UK health policies, 2000 to date) which 
aimed to uncover causal explanations for these ‘adverse events’. I spent several 
months collecting research evidence using timelines or sequences of events, in a 
similar manner to how Root Cause Analysis is undertaken in healthcare, examining the 
evidence causally, alongside interviews with everyone involved in a patient’s care and 
documentary analysis. The findings showed interesting insights into how far the 





For example, when I examined Danni’s case, I found that the practice nurse admitted 
she should have referred Danni more promptly for more specialist care regarding her 
severe pressure ulcer, rather than repeatedly meeting with her in the GP’s practice but 
not examining her wound or seeking specialist advice. This delayed decision was not 
picked up by the nurse herself until the retrospective analysis of the case and 
associated timeline of events highlighted this issue to her. This is without doubt one of 
the useful offerings of the Safety I approach (Waring J et al., 2010, Nicolini et al., 
2011). The nurse noted that ‘in hindsight she would have referred Danni earlier’. 
However, the question is, does knowing this detail actually affect our judgement of this 
situation or its final outcome? Although we understand in retrospect what happened in 
terms of sequences of events following detailed investigation into the case, given that 
practice nurses are often only given ten minute appointments to treat their patient, and 
patients within the GP’s practice in Danni’s case are ordinarily required to visit the 
practice if they use a wheelchair; this means that this issue would be very likely to be 
repeated in future. This is in spite of us knowing the detail of why the delay in referral 
happened. NHS healthcare policies and local GP’s policies would not necessarily 
facilitate longer, more considerate appointments with patients, so this becomes less 
about examining the sequence of events which were so carefully examined, and more 
about the organisational cultural influences at work. No amount of causal analysis 
could change the way the patient was treated. Fischkoff reminds us (1975, 2003) that 
in situations where information is limited, surprises and failures are inevitable, as does 
Perrow in his study of disasters (1984) where he says accidents are ‘normal’ within a 
complex system, and we are unable to ‘find and fix’ them (Waring J et al., 2010). 
Detailed system descriptions do not appear to fit today’s world as well, either in 
industries or in health care (Hollnagel et al., 2015). In health care in particular, systems 
such as an intensive care or emergency setting cannot be systematised easily in a 
componential way, although attempts have been made along the way. There are often 
unexpected events and decisions to be made (see Chapter 7, and Bernie’s case). To 
date, major policy drives using Safety I as a basis have offered few convincing 
reductions in risk, harm, serious error or death with the harm ratio of patients who are 
cared for through healthcare remaining at 1 in 10 since 2000 (NHS England, 2015; 
Vincent, 2004; Carson-Stevens et al, 2016). This has led some researchers in the field 
to call for different thinking, such as what has been currently termed Safety II 
(Hollnagel et al, 2015) which is described below. Indeed, as this thesis has also found, 





be variable and flexible, not easily systematised, with a need for situational awareness 
among frontline staff (see Chapters 6 and 7 on decision making and culture).  
10.6.3 Safety II 
Safety II focuses its investigations on gaining an understanding of how things usually 
go right, since that is the basis for explaining how things occasionally go wrong 
(Hollnagel et al., 2013). Hollnagel and colleagues, remind us that, in contrast to the 
tried and tested Safety I style tools of investigation, the situation is different for the 
many more events that go right. Despite the suggested importance and interest in this 
area, these events receive less attention in safety management activities such as risk 
identification, safety assurance and safety promotion. There are no current 
requirements from authorities and regulators to look at what works well (although 
things appear to be changing with the advent of positive deviance; (Lawton et al., 
2017). Possible exceptions are audits and such where good practice is celebrated 
(NHS Wales, 2010).  A system (for example, a hospital) is said to be unsafe if there are 
several adverse events; alternatively, a system is said to be safe if such adverse 
events occur rarely or not at all. This is, by logic, an indirect definition because safety is 
being defined by its opposite, by what happens when it is absent rather than when it is 
present (Hollnagel et al., 2015). Hollnagel et al. (2015) posit that we analyse and try to 
learn from situations where, by definition, there was a lack of safety and although 1 in 
10 admissions to healthcare globally result in an adverse event, by the same logic, 9 in 
10 or 90 per cent do not result in an adverse event-a large difference. 
Safety II has argued this issue; instead of only looking at the few cases where things 
go wrong, this approach askes that we look at the many cases (90 per cent) where 
things go right and try to understand instead how that happens (Hollnagel et al., 2013); 
Lawton, 2017). The Safety II movement advocates that clinicians are often able (90 per 
cent of the time) to adjust their work to conditions. Resilience engineering (Hollnagel et 
al., 2013) also acknowledges this, and argues that the reason why people are able to 
work more or less effectively is that they continually adjust their work to current 
conditions. We have seen this portrayed earlier in this thesis when staff made 
decisions based on acute presentations of patients; particularly for patients such as 
Bernie, where staff focused on her stroke rather than her skin integrity-with 
catastrophic consequences. Thus, as health care systems expand, these continual 
adjustments by staff at the frontline become increasingly vital for safety and therefore 
present both a challenge and an opportunity for safety management (Weick et al., 





where this thesis offers evidence for focusing on a more abstract level of analysis. The 
environmental influences for the patients involved in this study appeared to be 
important and caused the patients to develop their severe pressure ulcers, according to 
the evidence collected. 
To fully understand these environmental influences, I return to and discuss the 
following authors’ positions (Vaughan, 1996, Hollnagel et al., 2013, Weick et al., 2008). 
These authors all focused their analysis on socio-cultural, organisational influences at 
play when errors occur, which is where the most plausible explanations lay, according 
to this study’s findings (see previous chapters). These influences were the case for 
every patient involved in the study, according to the analysis. These are opposed and 
contrasted in this thesis with a more logical and system focused view, which was seen 
to be applicable to three patients in the study, and more associated with graphical 
models discussed above such as Reason’s (1999) Swiss Cheese model, and with the 
Safety I approach.   
The findings from this study first suggest that the ‘safety culture’ within most patient 
cases was lacking, particularly with reference to a lack of ‘mindful’ thinking. Vaughan 
also found a ‘mindless’ safety culture contributed to the poor decisions made in her 
study of the Challenger disaster (Vaughan, 1996). To reiterate earlier discussions from 
this thesis (Chapters 2 and 6) Vaughan referred to NASA’s technical culture altering 
into a culture which merged bureaucratic, technical and cost efficiency mandates. This 
included a tolerance for low-lying problems because of the focus on resources and 
efficiency drives over technical issues. This normalised a ‘deviant’ safety culture within 
the organisation (Vaughan named this ‘normalisation of deviance’) which led to the 
disastrous consequences of the Challenger crash. Vaughan argued that deviant 
behaviour, such as was the case for NASA leading up to the Challenger crash, 
becomes normal over time to people working within a culture, and it is only in hindsight, 
or to those outside the system, that this deviance is apparent. In light of the findings of 
my research, Vaughan’s work has a particular resonance, despite hers being about a 
technical industry. She is able to draw on perspectives around organisational culture, 
but also she used a historical ethnography as a methodology, to systematically 
examine the evidence. This was less about causal inferences, but about the cultural 
influences. This also became the method my study used overall to examine the data 
collected, and although my analysis aimed to draw in both psychological and 
sociological perspectives (see my five initial explanations), the analysis suggested that 






The lack of recognition of safety culture is also alluded to by Weick and colleagues 
(Weick et al., 2008). Interestingly, despite Weick achieving a psychology degree, when 
he remained to study his PhD, the Ohio university department eventually built a degree 
based partially on Weick’s theories (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001), calling it an 
‘Organizational Psychology’ degree. This highlights a move away from traditional 
psychological theories and analysis. Weick et al. first noted (1999), amongst other 
organisational theories, the concept of mindfulness within an organisation, which they 
developed from Langer’s previous work (Langer, 2016) (see Chapter 8) and suggest 
that the adoption of this concept cultivates safer cultures and improved system 
outcomes. However, in contrast to this, they suggest that, within organisations when 
fewer cognitive processes are activated less often, in a less safe culture, then an actor 
goes into a ‘mindless state’ and acts in an ‘auto-pilot’ mode. This automatic processing 
is in response to repetitive and non-dangerous tasks which would elicit a prompt 
reaction, and is thus a mindless, automatic response. Others have argued instead that 
this is also a ‘failure to rescue’ (see Chapter 7) (Hollnagel et al., 2013). However, this 
theory appears to support some of the findings within this thesis, particularly around 
staff not noticing pressure ulcers developing, when preoccupied instead with other 
acute or organisational conditions (such as was the case for Bernie-her stroke, Chris-
his rehabilitation and Frankie-the hospital alterations). Weick et al. (1999) suggest that 
a safe culture should have a preoccupation with dynamic ‘non-events’ to prevent the 
state of automatic response, in a similar vein to Hollnagel’s suggestions above. This 
means again that rather than focusing on things which go wrong, we emphasize those 
which are going right, which is thus termed Safety II (Hollnagel et al., 2015).  
Weick et al.’s (1999) approach, and the perspective based on my study’s findings, are 
similar to other new perspectives which identify ‘positive deviant’ approaches instead to 
focus on (Lawton et al., 2014). The positive deviance approach has its origins in 
nutrition research in the 1970s. Researchers observed that, despite the poverty levels 
in a community, some poor families had well-nourished children. The idea of the 
positive deviance approach is that it operates within the specific cultural context of a 
given community (village, business, schools, ministry, department, hospital) and is 
therefore appropriate to their needs. It provides to community members the "social 
proof" that a behaviour can be adopted by all because it is already practiced by a few 
within the community. The solutions come from the community itself, therefore avoids 
the experts’ offerings such as best practices that are often unsuccessful in promoting 
sustained change (Heckert and Heckert, 2007). Advocates of the positive deviance 





instead on using how things go right, and not think in terms of ‘error’ using the good 
practice sustained in other areas of similar identity and spread this to less effective 
areas. The aim is to repeat the ‘good practice’ noted in the positively deviant’ areas and 
use it in other comparable sites. These new approaches recognize that in current 
patient safety climates, unlike the often publicised and newsworthy stories which 
surround adverse events, the delivery of safe care under complex and difficult 
circumstances is often not recognised. This was apparent in the findings within Chapter 
6 of this thesis, where nursing staff and doctors made decisions about complex 
patients within a complex environment without decision aids or other such tools. In the 
main, these decisions naturally go unnoticed (or every patient would develop a severe 
pressure ulcer when they arrive into hospital).  
10.6.4 Issues with Safety II as an entity  
Despite all the positivity, detecting safe patient care is nevertheless a huge challenge 
because of the lack of validated measures of safe care, (Lawton et al., 2014, Hollnagel 
et al., 2013). This is in spite of small scale ‘Before and After’ quality improvement 
studies regarding pressure ulcer care noted in the literature review in this thesis 
(Goldenhar et al., 2013, Baier et al., 2008, Berlowitz et al., 2003, Bredesen et al., 
2015b). The positively deviant areas noted in the studies referred to in the literature 
review, were already succeeding and were not healthcare providers which were poor 
performers and then made changes. It has already been noted that areas which are 
‘organisationally ready’ to improve will improve more readily than other areas (Berlowitz 
et al., 2005) . This evidence has also been supported by recent shifts in Care Quality 
Commission (2017; 2018) and NHS Improvement drives (2019). Hughes et al. (2019) 
have tentatively identified positively deviant orthopaedic care in one NHS health 
provider who would not usually noted to be an outlier regarding safe systems of care 
(Patient Reported Outcomes, 2015, (Davis et al., 2011). This study offers an interesting 
development to this debate. It highlights that organisational readiness to improve and 
good leadership are factors which are crucial if a culture is to be positively deviant. 
Interestingly, mindful awareness is also a factor which is apparent in the study site that 
was found to be positively deviant. 
However, in contrast, when my study examined errors which occurred (in this case 
severe pressure ulcers), I found there to be several causal links with high risk patients, 
who present with complex needs, being coupled with a lack of empowerment for nurse-
led decision making (see Chapters 6 and 7). The cultural influences which were 





studying adverse events, and not departing too much from Safety I in practice where 
healthcare is not organisationally ready. The analysis of the sequences of events 
helped to uncover and contrast alternative safer perspectives (for example in the cases 
of Bernie, Chris and Frankie). 
Additionally, in terms of public health interest in safety in healthcare, and following 
interest in such as the Wayne Jowett case (Toft, 2001) which led to changes in how 
healthcare treats patients who receive chemotherapy, the public would be disappointed 
not to honour those that have suffered due to errors in healthcare. To not look at a 
story of a patient’s experience of harm inflicted by the health system is departing from 
the core value of respect and the ‘Duty of Candour’ which asks frontline staff to openly 
admit mistakes to patients and families and apologise personally to them (Secretary of 
State, 2014).  
The issue around whether to use adverse events, in my opinion, following the tentative 
findings from this study, is that few reliable ways have been found to strengthen how 
learning from adverse events is used to improve our healthcare systems in a way that 
sustains a risk reduction. This resonates with the concerns of other important voices in 
the patient safety field (Waring J et al., 2010, Vincent, 2010). There has also been a 
lack of knowledge around undertaking detailed investigations of incidents of the kind 
that are needed to help develop interventions (Waring J et al., 2010, Waring, 2007). It 
has already been argued elsewhere, and repeatedly, in this thesis (see Chapter 8) that 
frontline staff are not always best placed to conduct RCAs on their patients (Waring J 
et al, 2010). In addition to this, whilst research groups have provided insights into which 
incidents to focus attention on, many have been reluctant to take the difficult step of 
moving to intervention development, implementation and testing (Carson-Stevens et 
al., 2018). This research study has nevertheless made attempts, however small, to 
develop a possible method of approach which can offer insights into this area, and one 
of the key strengths has been in its use of expert witnesses (as highlighted above). 
10.7 A composite model 
This study’s findings were that for all eight patients the organisational, environmental 
influences were the best overall explanation for a patient developing a severe pressure 
ulcer, twinned with a causal sequence of events for three of the eight patients (see 
Chapters 3 and 4). These conclusions suggest that there is a place for examining what 
goes wrong (Safety I) alongside what goes right (Safety II) using a compare and 
contrast style of analysis. Some, not all, advocates of Safety II acknowledge that things 





differentiate at all between those that ‘go wrong’ and those that ‘go right’ (Hollnagel et 
al., 2013). They argue that one of the issues is that Safety I (error focused) and Safety 
II (good practice focused) use fundamentally different approaches to learning in patient 
safety. The trick, they say, is to rid ourselves of any distinction at all between the two. 
They suggest instead that outcomes of adverse events may, for instance, be due to 
transient conditions that only existed at one particular point in time and space. For 
example, local healthcare politics may be antagonistic on one particular day because 
two adjoining departments were arguing over resource allocations. This idea of 
‘transience’’ resonates with some of the findings of my thesis, particularly regarding 
Frankie’s experience of being hospital when the wards she was admitted onto were 
changing their identity and moving site. Hollnagel et al (2015) argue, quite convincingly, 
that these example conditions may, in turn, have emerged from other transient or 
emergent phenomena. Again, in the case of Frankie, some decisions were made about 
her care (not to admit her onto a High Dependency Unit, where she would have 
received more one to one care) based on the ward upheavals mentioned above.   
However, despite Hollnagel et al.’s (2015) offerings, other authors in the field have 
argued that they do little to explain Safety II properly, instead focusing too much on 
what Safety II isn’t (Sujan, 2018). The main text from which the Safety II approach is 
based on, devotes most of its emphasis on describing the issues with Safety I and 
doesn't develop the detail around how to study Safety II.  Nevertheless, aside from this 
criticism, Hollnagel et al (2013; 2015) conclude, as does this thesis, that a mixture of 
the two approaches, in whatever guise, is probably necessary to really understand 
adverse events and learn from them, and to reconstruct them to understand safety. 
The discussion of the two approaches is described further below. 
10.8 Towards Safety III: a middle ground. 
So what if we looked slightly differently at the contrasting safety approaches? Instead 
of trying to work out the difference between Safety I and Safety II as separate entities, 
combining the two approaches could instead be seen as conjoining a correspondence 
approach (Safety I) with a coherent approach (Safety II). Chapters 2, 7 and 8 in this 
thesis suggest that both Safety I and II approaches can complement each other for the 
best outcome, as Sutcliffe and Weick asked us to consider in Hollnagel et al. (2013). 
Hollnagel and colleagues (2013) suggested that for health care to become resilient, we 
should use a twin lens of a complex adaptive system, and within it study the localised 
patterning of culture. However, I aim to develop this debate further and use another, 





Safety I and Safety II. To do this we return to the theory of correspondence versus 
coherence, which underpinned the method for this study.  
10.8.1 Correspondence v coherence.  
To highlight the idea of coherence versus correspondence theories in relation to this 
study, I will reiterate the difference between the two. The correspondence theory of 
judgement focuses on empirical accuracy, and whether a person, or approach 
achieves this. A coherence theory, in contrast, focuses on whether a judgement or 
approach to data achieves logical rationality during the process. Thus for 
correspondence we are aiming for accuracy, and for coherence we aim for explanatory 
rationality (Hammond, 1996). Neither offer ‘truth’ per se. According to the Stanford 
Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, for coherence theorists, the truth conditions of 
propositions consist in other propositions, relative to a constructivist view. The 
correspondence theory, however, states that the truth conditions of propositions are not 
propositions, but instead objective features of the world, more consistent with a 
positivist view. Although coherence and correspondence theories are fundamentally 
opposed in this way, they both present a conception of empirical truth. Regarding 
health services, I have already demonstrated in the literature review and method in this 
thesis that the correspondence theory of truth, associated with positivism and hard 
evidence still dominates in current research debates and is more readily accepted 
within health care than supposition or coherent versions of truth (Hammond, 1996; 
Pawson (2006).  
However, while correspondence theories explain the observation and verification 
component of scientific reasoning, and internal validity, along with supporting evidence, 
coherence theories try instead to explain explanatory hypotheses and 
counterhypotheses, along with their supporting arguments. Coherence theories posit 
that science, along with any system of beliefs, is simply a philosophical model. 
Therefore, for coherence theorists, the "actual world" referenced by someone or some 
theory is just the largest maximally consistent and minimally inconsistent set of 
propositions held by that person or theory. So when we refer to "facts", or "states of 
affairs", we are really just referring to the dominant explanatory model.  
This is how the coherent account was arrived at within this study. I was not asserting 
that it was the ‘truth’ but that it was the most ‘truthful’ or ‘best’ explanatory account of 
what happened given the evidence we had (see section in Method chapter on Theory 
of Explanatory Coherence) and the dominant explanation was ‘judged’ to be the most 





coherent account within this study, this supplemented each account with 
correspondence evidence and thus satisfies all audiences of ‘truth’ in receipt of such 
evidence. Again, the evidence was collected following a patient centred approach, 
which brought forward alternative evidence than purely health service based 
investigations. For example, regarding this study, the correspondence approach 
focused on the sequence of events and retrospective evidence collected from data 
sources, whereas the coherence approach focused on the judgements and logical 
suppositions about why the severe pressure ulcers developed. Nevertheless, both 
versions of truth are grounded in empirical evidence. In terms of healthcare, the 
positivist focus (Pawson, 2008) and insistence on Evidence Based Medicine means 
that healthcare professionals are more comfortable with using correspondence 
evidence to make decisions, or form the basis of an intervention. The logic of this is 
that a tool such as Root Cause Analysis, with its emphasis on finding causality to 
explain an adverse event, (Safety I) would be a method chosen over the explanation or 
theoretical building, or more coherent analysis of an adverse event. Surely then, 
frontline healthcare professionals would feel more comfortable with a composite model 
which twins correspondence evidence (in this study the sequences of events) and 
coherence evidence (in this study the coherent account and ‘best explanations’). 
Perrow (1984) made an excellent attempt at portraying these two lenses to some 
extent in his work ‘Normal Accidents’; when he examined the disasters at Chernobyl. 
His findings were that the technology and human error were conjoined to produce 
‘normal accidents’ within a system (see Chapter 2); however he did not focus in great 
detail on examining the socio-cultural influences at play, although they were implied, 
and his socio-technical approach examining disasters within technological industries 
was never applied to the study of medical error. However, if we were to combine 
Perrow’s socio-technical approach with Vaughan’s (1996) and Weick’s (Weick et al., 
2008) socio-cultural approaches, and incorporate Hollnagel et al.’s (2013) using the 
lens of correspondence versus coherence instead of all of the other approaches to 
understanding safety, we can also apply the approaches to error in health care with 
more intellectual insight. For example, we can use the empirical accuracy of the 
correspondence approach of Safety I to add internal validity to the findings, but the 
coherence approach, with its emphasis on logical rationality, helps understand the 
emergent ‘story’, and situates it so that it becomes more meaningful to staff working 
and trying to learn from mistakes. In addition this ‘coherence’ view allows us to 
understand the Safety II’s focus on ‘good usual care.’ This idea was first introduced in 





and subsequent findings (see Chapters 3, 4, 7 and 8). These approaches can, and 
ought to be considered in parallel if we are to improve methods of investigating 
incidents such as severe pressure ulcers. If we can understand how and why the 
theories of correspondence and coherence can offer insights into healthcare 
perspectives and decision making, we can understand better how to deal with adverse 
events. This thesis has attempted to do just that. 
10.9 Conclusions and recommendations for future practice  
Part of the coherent story behind examining severe pressure ulcers, is allowing the 
‘story’ to be understood. The discrepancies between data sources highlight gaps in the 
current approaches to studying adverse events. The whole story means including the 
views of the patients, not only in apologising following an error (as is now evident in 
current RCA practice), but in genuinely seeking out and using their version of events, 
as this study has shown that these often differed from the views of staff.  
To include the patient in an investigation and as part of preventative treatment, one 
suggestion would be that a detailed shared treatment plan is firstly drawn up between 
staff and patient. Currently these are used variably in practice (National Institute for 
Healthcare and Clinical Excellence, 2005), although there are NHS England and 
several other drives to work towards a better process of consent (Montgomery v 
Lanarkshire Health Board UKSC 11 (UKSC), 2015). However, an additional 
improvement might be that a consent form is also used as a tool for achieving 
concordance. 
Patients currently often receive an information leaflet about pressure ulcer risks and 
treatment (usual practice in NHS settings, following NICE guidance and 
recommendations). NICE guidance for patients suggests questions for patients to ask 
about their care, but there is no way of knowing or auditing whether a patient gets the 
chance to ask these questions. Question examples are given on the NICE website as 
follows: Can you tell me if I am at risk of getting a pressure ulcer? What are the 
symptoms of a pressure ulcer? How do you check my skin to see if I'm likely to get a 
pressure ulcer? 
Following the findings of this study, a useful development for pressure ulcer prevention 
could also be a process similar to a research ethics-based consent system (UKREC), 
(see Appendices for examples of this) where a shared care agreement is offered to 
patients about pressure ulcer risks and management. These type of agreements are in 





remains at local level. This process would require commitment and signatures on both 
sides (patient, carer, or advocate) and agreement with statements, rather than an 
expectation that patients will ask questions voluntarily. For example, statements might 
include the following: 'I have read the Patient Information leaflet about my pressure ulcer 
risks and care, and have had opportunities to ask questions'. Further questions might be 
'The health care professional has explained to me the risks involved with my choices.' and  
'I will inform the health care professional if there are any changes in my skin status in terms 
of increasing pain or skin breakdown.' 
This process encourages a more interactive, ‘concordant’ approach with patients 
(Hobden, 2006, McKinnon, 2013), relating to pressure ulcer care, and a responsibility 
from both sides to ‘sign up’ to a shared agreement. This can empower the patient 
(Stevenson et al., 2004) and offer a documented partnership centred approach. 
Rather than ignoring issues around the uncertain nature of complex patients, which 
seems largely the case for the patients involved in this study, who get lost within a 
decision-laden system, there could be a more effective way to make intuitive decision 
making more transparent, particularly for nursing staff in the earlier stages of a patient’s 
pathway. For some staff (where they used a decision tree in other studies regarding 
pressure ulcers) it appeared to be a useful aid (Samuriwo and Dowding, 2014b). Future 
work could focus on this area regarding high risk patients who present to health care 
services.  
In this study staff didn’t appear to respond with enough awareness and recognition to 
patients who were all high risk of skin damage, although this wasn't true of all staff. 
This could be seen as ’mindlessness’, or a dysfunctional awareness of a changing 
external environment, and the inner state of the people working in the organization 
(Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001). Mindlessness closes us off to possibility, and prevents 
needed change (Filo, 2013, Weick et al., 2008). It suggests the opposite of ‘mindful’ 
awareness, and future work would look towards encouraging mindful awareness 
regarding pressure ulcer prevention and management. This could, and has to an extent 
already included, changes in risk assessments to focus on the main issues which affect 
high risk patients (Coleman et al., 2013b). Also useful, according to these findings, 
would be to encourage staff safety briefs which include awareness-raising around 
patients at high risk of pressure ulcers (Goldenhar et al., 2013).  
For the patients involved in this study, information loss often occurred over time, what 
was lost was not fully apparent to staff at each handover, consistent with the 'normal 





of decline in skin integrity, starting from small beginnings, namely Category 1 or 2 skin 
damage, this can have consequences if staff are not aware constantly of changes to 
skin status. Keeping pressure ulcers at the forefront of health care staff’s minds would 
be a useful service improvement to prevent severe pressure ulcers developing or 
deteriorating. This could also be through the continued use of safety huddles or briefs. 
10.10 Conclusive comments 
Overall, this thesis has highlighted the role of the organisational environment as a main 
contributing explanation for the development of the patients’ severe pressure ulcers 
involved in the study. Although more specific explanations are around safety culture, 
decision making, the patient voice not being heard, diffused responsibility and 
communication issues, these also combine, as shown in the models above, to highlight 
the possible role of the organisation. This finding has never been explored before in the 
study of pressure ulcers. There would be scope in exploring this finding further.  
Investigations into severe pressure ulcers do not currently focus enough on the whole 
organisational system regarding their development. This study suggests that the 
current investigative approach should be widened to include (where resource allows) 
experts in organisational studies, alongside frontline staff, who are often too close to 
the issues, and often not equipped, in terms of training, to make informed human 
factors based judgements about the development of severe pressure ulcers. This is 
partly because current investigative analysis is more similar to that carried out by 
engineers, not staff who are not trained in standardisation and reliability of 
processes.(Vincent et al., 2017, Vincent et al., 2014). Although things are changing and 
the need for human factors training is increasingly being recognised in health care 
systems (NHS Improvement, 2019b). 
Currently, this novel method has only been applied to pressure ulcer research, and it 
could be applied to other types of clinical area to see if it works in the same way to 
produce coherent explanations. It could also be tested alongside current or newer 
adverse event investigation tools, such as the Yorkshire Contributory Factors tool 
(2012), to see how it compares in practice, or alternatively, it could also be tested out in 
areas of good practice to see if it generates similar results. 
The study has answered its research question that the environment does contribute to 
the development of severe pressure ulcers, although how far this is applicable needs 





expert witnesses, or a staged review process and focusing on the wider organisational 
perspective could be helpful in improving current investigative approaches.  
The retrospective case study method also offers a possible, and testable, new 
theoretical lens to allow the concepts of Safety I and II to be combined semantically 
and theoretically in a Safety III paradigm, and to examine evidence in a practical way, 
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Chapter 12. Appendices  
Appendix 1 
(Delete this line then print on Trust headed paper- given with study information) 
PATIENT AGREEMENT TO RESEARCHER CONTACT 
 
Name of researcher:    Lisa Pinkney 
      Centre for Health and Social Care 
      University of Leeds 
      Leeds Institute of Health Sciences 
101 Clarendon Road 
Leeds 
LS2 9LJ 
      0113 343 0828 
 
Name of consultant/nurse:    __________________________ 
Contact number:    __________________________  
 
Why do patients develop severe pressure ulcers? Patient interviews 
 
Please initial the boxes: 
 
• I have read the information sheet (version 1) and kept a copy. 
 
• I am happy to be contacted by telephone by the above named researcher to 








• I am happy for my nurse to arrange a time for me to meet with the researcher 
on the ward 
Please complete your contact details in the space provided 
 




Telephone Number ___________________________________________________ 




Date and time of visit___________________________________________________ 
Thank you for completing this form. Please return to Lisa Pinkney at Centre for 
Health and Social Care, Room 2.02, LIHS, University of Leeds, 101 Clarendon Road, 


















(Delete this line then print on headed paper) 
PATIENT CONSENT FORM 
Why do patients develop pressure ulcers? 
 
Name of researcher:  Lisa Pinkney 
Address: Centre for Health and Social Care, University of Leeds, Institute of Health 
Sciences, 101 Clarendon Road, Leeds, LS2 9LJ 
Telephone: 0113 3430828 
 
 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet for the above study 
Version 1 dated 17/12/2008 and have had the opportunity to ask questions. 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any 
time without giving any reason, without my nursing care being affected. 
 
3. I understand that the above named researcher may ask my nurse, caregiver or 
other people relevant to my care, additional information about my pressure ulcer 
history and relevant treatment. I give permission for the researcher to access my 
healthcare records e.g. hospital nursing, and GP records to obtain further 
information for the above study and any further research that may be conducted in 
relation to it, provided that strict confidentiality is maintained. 
 
4. I agree that my interview will be tape recorded and typed out, maintaining 
anonymity. 
 
5. I agree to allow any information arising from this study to be used for healthcare 
and/or medical research purposes. I understand that my identity will remain 
anonymous. 
 
6. I consent to the storage including electronic, of personal information for the 
purposes of this study. I understand that any information that could identify me will 
be kept confidential and that no personal information that could identify me will be 
included in the study report or other publication.  
 
7. I understand that a copy of this Consent Form will be sent to the Centre for Health 
and Social Care and my GP. 
Please initial box 






8. I agree to take part in the above study. 
___________________  _____________ _________________ 
Name of Patient   Date    Signature 
 
I have given written information and a verbal explanation to the person named above 
who has freely given their consent to participate. 
 
___________________ _____________ _________________ 
Name of Person   Date    Signature 
taking consent 
 























(Delete this line then print on headed paper) 
STAFF CONSENT FORM 
 
Why do patients develop pressure ulcers? 
 
Name of researcher:  Lisa Pinkney 
Address: Centre for Health and Social Care, University of Leeds, Institute of Health 
Sciences, 101 Clarendon Road, Leeds, LS2 9LJ 
Telephone: 0113 3430828 
 
 
9. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet for the above 
study version 1 dated 17/12/2008 and have had the opportunity to ask 
questions. 
 
10. I understand that my patient is aware  that I will be asked to participate in the 
study and that he/ she has given consent for me to be approached in regard to 
this. I have seen a copy of my patient’s consent form confirming this 
 
11. I understand the purpose of the study and know that my participation is 
voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any time without giving any reason. 
 
12. I agree that my interview will be tape recorded and typed out, maintaining 
anonymity. 
 
13. I agree to allow any information arising from this study to be used for 
healthcare and/or medical research purposes. I understand that my identity 
will remain anonymous. 
 
Please initial box 





14. I consent to the storage including electronic, of my personal information for the 
purposes of this study. I understand that any information that could identify me 
will be kept confidential and that no personal information that could identify me 
will be included in the study report or other publication.  
 
15. I understand that a copy of this Consent Form will be sent to the Centre for 
Health and Social Care 
 
16. I agree to take part in the above study. 
 
 
___________________                     
Name of Staff member       Date         Signature 
 
___________________ _____________ _________________ 
Name of Person            Date    Signature 
taking consent 
 

















(Delete this line then print on headed paper) Interview Topic Guide 
 
‘Why do Patients develop severe pressure ulcers?’ study. 
Researchers: Lisa Pinkney, Professor Justin Keen, Dr. Jane Nixon. 
Address: Centre for Health and Social Care, University of Leeds, LS2 9LJ 
Tel: 0113 343 0828 
 
Interview Topic Guide: Patients 
(verbal introduction….) Have you any questions about this study? Are you happy to 
start the interview?  
 
This interview will be unstructured and informal and guided by you, not by a set of 
questions. 
However, as an opening question…. 
Introductory question: 
‘Why do you think you developed a severe pressure ulcer?’ 
 
Some topics which will be covered, but which are only tentative topics and will be 
developed as the research progresses: 
Background/history of events  
Severe pressure ulcer description 
Timeline of events-micro, mezzo and macro levels 
Interpersonal level 
People involved 












  direct line: 0113 343 0828 
 fax: 0113 343 0862 
 email: l.m.pinkney@leeds.ac.uk 
 
 
21 January 2009 
 
Dear Sir or Madam 
 
 
NIHR Study: Why do patients develop severe pressure ulcers? 
Ethics ref: 
We are writing with regard to the above study, funded by the National Institute for 
Health Research. We are researchers from Leeds University Centre for Health and 
Social Care (Lisa Pinkney and Professor Justin Keen). Local Tissue Viability Nurses 
will be working with us to identify appropriate patients. 
 
Our study aims to uncover some of the non-clinical reasons why patients develop 
severe pressure ulcers, i.e. full thickness cavity pressure ulcers. One of the purposes 
of this research is to see whether the causes may be down to healthcare system 
weaknesses, rather than individual weakness or blame. The study also aims to help 
produce a risk assessment tool, which will try to help prevent severe pressure ulcers 
from developing. There is an information sheet with this letter should you wish to read 
further details. 
 
As part of our investigation we have gained consent from identified patients in the 
Yorkshire area to access their healthcare records. One of your patients in the 
study …………………………….. …………………………….. 
……………………………………………………………………. has given their consent to 
participate in the study. We have completed an interview with them and we would now 





preceding the development of the severe pressure ulcer. We enclose a copy of the 
patient’s consent form with this letter. 
 
We were hoping to arrange a time that is convenient for you for us to search through 
the records.  
 
The study has ethical approval from Leeds West Research Ethics Committee 
(date/details…..) and we enclose a copy of the letter of ethical approval. 
We will contact you in the next few days by phone to try and arrange a mutually 
convenient time to search patient records. 
 
If you have any queries about the study, or need any further information, please do not 








Professor of Health Politics 
Centre for Health and Social Care 
Leeds Institute of Health Sciences 
University of Leeds 
Charles Thackrah Building 











(Delete this line then print on Trust headed paper) 
 
Participant Information Leaflet and Consent Form 
 
Why do patients develop severe pressure ulcers? Patient 
interviews (community based) 
 
We would like to invite you to take part in a research project. Before 
you decide to take part, it is important for you to understand why the 
research is being done and what it would involve for you. Please take 
the time to read the following information carefully and discuss it with 
your relatives and your ward nurse or carer if you wish. Ask us if there 
is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information.  
 
(Part 1 tells you the purpose of this project and what will happen to 
you if you take part. Part 2 gives you more detailed information about 




What is the purpose of the study? 
 
The development of a severe pressure ulcer (PU), also called a bed 
sore or pressure sore, has serious consequences for everyone 
involved. For patients, they cause much suffering and pain. For staff 
involved in the care of someone with a severe pressure ulcer, they 
are now seen as what is called a ‘serious clinical incident’, and require 
investigation into the causes. For carers they are a major worry, and 
an obstacle to caring. 
 
This study is about trying to find out the reasons why people develop 
severe pressure ulcers which may not always be clinical ones. One 
of the purposes of this study is to see whether the causes may be 
down to healthcare system weaknesses, rather than to individual 
weaknesses or blame. The study involves interviewing patients like 
yourself, and all the people involved in your care throughout the 
development of your severe pressure ulcer, to see if there are any 
general underlying patterns which lead to developing a severe 
pressure ulcer. The study also aims to uncover any other reasons for 
developing a severe pressure ulcer, which may have not yet been 





assessment tool, which will try to help prevent severe pressure ulcers 
from developing. 
 
Why have I been invited? 
 
You have been chosen to take part because we are interested in 
talking to people who have experience of having severe pressure 
ulcers. Any person who has, or has had in the past, a severe pressure 
ulcer, from a sample of either hospitals or within the community, will 
be asked to participate.  
 
Do I have to take part? 
 
You are under no obligation to take part in this study, it is up to you to 
decide. We will describe the study to you and go through this 
information sheet.  If you agree to take part we will then ask you to 
sign a consent form to show that you have agreed to take part. You 
will be given a copy of this information sheet and the consent form for 
you to keep. You are free to withdraw at any time, without giving a 
reason. This would not affect the standard of care you receive. If you 
do not wish to take part this will not affect the care that you are 
currently receiving. 
 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
 
If you agree to take part, you will be introduced to the researcher, who 
will be accompanied by the tissue viability nurse. This will give you an 
opportunity to ask questions about the study. If you then still wish to 
take part, the researcher will arrange an interview with you. It is 
expected that the interview will take about an hour. We will make sure 
the interview takes place in as private a place as possible, either in 
your own home or on the ward where you are admitted, at a time 
convenient for you. The interview will be informal, in a conversation 
style, rather than a list of questions.  
 
The researcher will also seek permission to access and analyse your 
case notes, to look into what possibly led to you developing a severe 
pressure ulcer. Your nurses and carers/relatives will be approached 
to participate in the research and provide information relating to your 
care. 






The discussion that you have with the interviewer, with your 
permission, will be tape recorded and transcribed to help us analyse 
it. The tape recording will be used only by researchers involved in the 
project and it will be stored in a locked cabinet. As soon as the 
information on the tapes in analysed, the tapes will be destroyed. 
 
What are the possible disadvantages and risks of taking part? 
 
We do not foresee any disadvantages or risks to you in taking part in 
this study. However, you are being asked to give some of your time 
and you will need to reflect on your personal experience of having a 
severe pressure ulcer and what your experience of care has been. 
There is a possibility that you may find this distressing. The interview 
can be stopped at any point if you feel you do not want to continue. If 
necessary, a referral can be made to your nurse or other healthcare 
professionals if you are distressed at all by the interview. 
 
What are the possible benefits of taking part?  
 
We hope that being given the opportunity to take part in this study 
would give you some satisfaction that you are contributing to 
increasing knowledge about the reasons and risks behind why people 
develop severe pressure ulcers. We hope that the information we get 
from the interviews will help to inform healthcare services about 
patterns in a person’s care pathway which may be more likely to lead 
to the development of a severe pressure ulcer. We also hope to help 
produce a risk assessment to help prevent severe pressure ulcers 
from occurring. 
 
Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
 
Yes. All information which would be collected about you during the 
course of the study will be kept strictly confidential. We will follow 
ethical and legal practice and all information about you will be 
handled in confidence.  In the event that any evidence of poor 
practice, neglect or abuse is identified during the course of the 
interview, the researcher might need to disclose details to a third 
party outside of the interview.  This would not be done without 
discussing it with you first. Details are included in Part 2. 
 
This completes part 1. 










What will happen if I don’t want to carry on with the study? 
 
You are free to change your mind at any point up to, during or 
following the interview. You will not be able to be identified in the study 
results but if you wish to withdraw any data already collected prior to 
publication of the results then arrangements can be made for the 
interview tape to be destroyed and your discussion excluded from the 
study. 
 
Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential? 
 
The procedures for handling, processing, storage and destruction will 
be according to the Caldicott principles and the Data Protection Act 
1998. 
 
Lisa Pinkney and her supervision team have a duty of confidentiality 
to you as a research participant and will do their very best to meet this 
duty. Any information that is collected about you will have your name 
and address removed so that you cannot be recognised from it. All 
information will be kept in locked cupboards and will only be 
accessible by members of the research team. No names or details 
that would identify specific people will be included in the outputs from 
this study. Outputs, including quotations from interviews, may be used 
in reports, presentations and papers, and for healthcare and/or 
medical research, but these will not be traceable to specific 
individuals. All published and unpublished reports will disguise the 
identity of people.  
 
 
What will happen to the results of the research study?  
 
Participants will not be identified in any report or publication. The 
study results will be used to inform healthcare provision, and to help 
produce a risk assessment tool, based on the information gathered 
from participants. Information from this study will be included in a final 
report and published in a scientific journal. 
 






This study is funded by the National Institute of Health Research, 
which is part of a larger pressure ulcer research programme aimed to 
reduce the impact of PUs on patients, and to produce a risk 
assessment framework to help prevent pressure sores. 
This study is also being undertaken as part of a PhD qualification 
supervised by the University of Leeds.  
 
Who has reviewed the study? 
 
This study has been peer reviewed by the National Institute of Health 
Research before approval for funding was given. In addition, all 
research in the NHS is looked at by an independent group of people 
called a Research Ethics Committee to protect your safety, rights, 
wellbeing and dignity. This study has been reviewed and given 
approval by the (name of REC) Research Ethics Committee. 
 
What do I do now? 
 
Once you have read the information and if you would like to take part 
in the study, please tell your district nurse or tissue viability nurse who 
provided you with this information leaflet. They will complete the 
Agree to Researcher Contact Form at the end of this leaflet and send 
it back to the researcher, Lisa Pinkney, who will contact you upon 
receiving the form, to discuss this study further (with your tissue 
viability nurse present) and then arrange a time for the interview. 
 
Further information and contact details 
 
Thank you for taking the time to read this leaflet and for considering 
this study. If you would like to discuss the study further or have any 
questions about the study at any time, please contact the researcher, 
Lisa Pinkney on 0113 343 0828 or the study supervisor,  Professor 
Justin Keen on 0113 3436941 or speak to your district nurse or tissue 






(Delete this line then print on Trust headed paper- given with study information) 
 
PATIENT AGREEMENT TO RESEARCHER CONTACT 
 
Name of researcher:    Lisa Pinkney 
      Centre for Health and Social Care 
      University of Leeds 
      Leeds Institute of Health Sciences 
101 Clarendon Road 
Leeds 
LS2 9LJ 
      0113 343 0828 
 
Name of consultant/nurse:    __________________________ 
Contact number:    __________________________  
 
Why do patients get severe pressure ulcers? Patient 
interviews 
 
Please initial the boxes: 
 
• I have read the information sheet (version 1) and kept a copy. 
 
• I am happy to be contacted by the above named researcher to discuss the 




Please complete your contact details in the space provided 
 




Telephone Number ___________________________________________________ 
Preferred contact time _________________________________________________ 
 
Thank you for completing this form. Please return to Lisa Pinkney at Centre for 
Health and Social Care, Room 2.02, LIHS, University of Leeds, 101 Clarendon Road, 










Leeds (West) Research Ethics Committee 
A/B Floor, Old Site 
Leeds General Infirmary 
Great George Street 
Leeds 
LS1 3EX 
 Telephone: 0113 3923181  
Facsimile: 0113 3922863 
26 February 2009 
 
Full title of study: Why do patients develop severe pressure ulcers? 
REC reference number: 09/H1307/8 
 
Thank you for your letter of 03 February 2009, responding to the Committee’s request for 
further information on the above research and submitting revised documentation. 
The further information has been considered on behalf of the Committee by the Chair.  
Confirmation of ethical opinion 
On behalf of the Committee, I am pleased to confirm a favourable ethical opinion for the 
above research on the basis described in the application form, protocol and supporting 
documentation as revised, subject to the conditions specified below. 
Ethical review of research sites 
 The Committee has designated this study as exempt from site-specific assessment (SSA). The 
favourable opinion for the study applies to all sites involved in the research. There is no 
requirement for other Local Research Ethics Committees to be informed or SSA to be carried 
out at each site.  
Conditions of the favourable opinion 
The favourable opinion is subject to the following conditions being met prior to the start of the 
study. 
Management permission or approval must be obtained from each host organisation prior to 





Management permission at NHS sites (“R&D approval”) should be obtained from the relevant 
care organisation(s) in accordance with NHS research governance arrangements.  Guidance on 
applying for NHS permission is available in the Integrated Research Application System or at 
http://www.rdforum.nhs.uk. 
Approved documents 
The final list of documents reviewed and approved by the Committee is as follows: 
 Document    Version    Date      
Indemnity Letter   1  18 December 2008    
Insurance Details   1  02 October 2008    
Flowchart of Research Design  1  17 December 2008    
Appendix K - Interview Topic Guide   1  18 December 2008    
Appendix G - Interview Topic Guide   1  18 December 2008    
Participant Consent Form: Appendix F1 - Staff Consent   1  17 December 2008    
Participant Consent Form: Appendix E1 - Caregivers Consent  1  17 December 2008    
Participant Consent Form: Appendix D  1  17 December 2008    
Participant Consent Form: Appendix C  1  17 December 2008    
Participant Consent Form: Appendix B  1  17 December 2008    
Participant Information Sheet: Appendix F  1  17 December 2008    
Participant Information Sheet: Appendix E  1  17 December 2008    
Participant Information Sheet: Appendix D  1  17 December 2008    
Participant Information Sheet: Appendix A  1  17 December 2008    
GP/Consultant Information Sheets  1  17 December 2008    
Letter from Sponsor  1  17 December 2008    
Covering Letter  1  17 December 2008    
Protocol  1  17 December 2008    
Investigator CV  1  17 December 2008    
Application  5.6  17 December 2008    





Timeline  1  17 December 2008    
GP/Patient consent form  1  17 December 2008    
Response to Request for Further Information    03 February 2009    
 
Statement of compliance 
The Committee is constituted in accordance with the Governance Arrangements for Research 
Ethics Committees (July 2001) and complies fully with the Standard Operating Procedures for 
Research Ethics Committees in the UK. 
After ethical review 
Now that you have completed the application process please visit the National Research Ethics 
Website > After Review  
You are invited to give your view of the service that you have received from the National 
Research Ethics Service and the application procedure.  If you wish to make your views known 
please use the feedback form available on the website. 
The attached document “After ethical review –guidance for researchers” gives detailed 
guidance on reporting requirements for studies with a favourable opinion, including: 
• Notifying substantial amendments 
• Progress and safety reports 
• Notifying the end of the study 
 
The NRES website also provides guidance on these topics, which is updated in the light of 
changes in reporting requirements or procedures. 
We would also like to inform you that we consult regularly with stakeholders to improve our 
service. If you would like to join our Reference Group please email 
referencegroup@nres.npsa.nhs.uk. 
 
09/H1307/8 Please quote this number on all correspondence 
 
With the Committee’s best wishes for the success of this project 
Yours sincerely 
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This study will investigate the hypothesis that severe pressure ulcers may result 
from whole system weaknesses in the organisation of health care. Rather than 
concentrating on individual and organisational risk ‘factors’ as separate 
measurable entities, it will aim to gain insight into the whole picture, in order to 
uncover possible unexplained risks, and thus enhance knowledge about why 





Pressure ulcers are both reportable as a clinical incident in the NHS, and 
associated with quality implications (DH, 2001; DH 2001b). They can also 
contribute to the deaths of patients. Severe pressure ulcers are now seen as a 
serious clinical event. Although the main clinical risk factor: immobility, occurs 
particularly in elderly, medical, cardio/vascular surgical, orthopaedic, intensive 
care, spinal cord injured, long-term care and community care populations 
(Nixon et al; 2001), implications are that clinical negligence can also be a factor 
(Bennett et al, 2004).  
 
Very recent work by Gorecki et al. (2008) has examined the formation of PUs in 
relation to clinical risk factors, and advocates the use of appropriate and 
rigorous tools in dealing with patients, however additional ‘outlying’ reasons 
which can contribute to severe PU development currently remain unexplained 
solely by clinical risk, and are not always attributable to negligence (Fox, 2002; 
Langemo; 2000). Although patients may belong to similar high risk groups of 
patients with a propensity for developing a severe PU, some go on to develop 
one, and some do not, or recover, despite belonging to a high clinical risk 





In the light of these findings, and with litigation predicted to increase, due to 
both societal trends, and with proposed changes in legislation in investigating 
PUs as markers of institutional and professional neglect of vulnerable adults 
(DfES, 2006; DH, 2001; AEA, 2008; No Secrets, 2000; The Mental Capacity 
Act, 2005; Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Bill, 2006 ), there has been growing 
demand for uncovering all unexplained reasons why patients should develop 
severe pressure ulcers despite consideration of all clinical risk factors. 
 
Following concerns that severe PUs could indeed be indicative of ‘inadequate 
care’ there have been recent developments around guidelines for PU treatment. 
They have been identified as a NHS quality indicator and priority through DH 
policy (see DH, 2001; DH, 2001a), with subsequent development of national 
guidelines (NICE, 2001; 2003; 2005; RCN, 2001). A main focus of the 
guidelines was in identifying patients at risk, through risk assessment of all 
patients on admission to acute hospitals and community nursing services, with 
a parallel focus on preventative care. The guidelines also highlighted a 
consequential need for improved risk assessment and prevention (NICE, 2005), 
but were largely based on consensus, and less on a specific evidence base.  
 
Therefore, there is also a requirement for development of a rigorous and 
thorough risk assessment tool as a preventative measure, and to provide a 
detailed understanding of the possible individual and organisational factors 
which may contribute to risk, but equally, how the whole system may contribute. 
Recent literature has suggested that the propensity for ‘errors’ in healthcare is 
‘hard-wired’ into the system (see Institute Of Medicine, 2001), and that although 
individual staff do make mistakes or ‘active errors’ (Reason, 1990), recurrent 
errors are more likely to result from weaknesses or ‘latent errors’ in the whole 
system organisation of health care (see Bristol Inquiry, 2000), and although 
every member of staff may act in their patients’ best interests, and in the most 
professional manner possible, there still remain issues in healthcare which are 
difficult to attribute to individual blame (see Laming Inquiry, 2003). 
 
There have been a number of retrospective, methodologically robust studies by 
well respected academics which have examined systems failures in fine detail, 
including the Three Mile Island nuclear reactor (Perrow, 1984) and the 
Challenger space shuttle disaster (Vaughan, 1996). Recently these innovative 
methods of investigation have been applied to studies of safety in healthcare 
(Waring et al, 2006) highlighting the ‘tightly-coupled’ (Perrow, 1984) 
organisational relationships, based on timely information exchange, services 
and resources, which are required for the delivery of health care, and can lead 
to failures or ‘breakdowns’ in the system. These ‘breakdowns’ can be due often 
to staff working quickly rather than safely. The above methods can similarly be 
applied to the exploration of why patients develop severe PUs, in order to elicit 
underlying causal ‘mechanisms’ (Pawson, 2006) which may ‘yield to multiple 
explanations’ (Pawson, 2008, p7), yet nevertheless may follow a similar 
underlying process for different patients.  
 
The above approach allows for thorough investigation of all the issues involved 
in the development of severe pressure ulcers, while allowing for any ‘outlying’ 





judgement emphasises the tension between ‘coherence’ and ‘correspondence’ 
and is relevant to the research in its theorising on professionals having to make 
judgements about healthcare amongst uncertainty. A ‘correspondence’ 
approach to making judgements, and offered by years of studying human 
decision-making by psychologists highlights the ‘functional’ and ‘cognitive’ 
approaches to human judgement and emphasises ‘empirical accuracy’, 
whereas ‘coherence’ highlights that a judgement is made using an ‘intentional 
rationality’ to find a ‘best fit’ for a judgement under the particular circumstances. 
The tension which exists between the two approaches is symbolic of the 
tensions which exist for professionals working and making decisions within a 
culture, and which may have a bearing on the decisions made as to whether a 
patient develops a pressure ulcer or not. 
In addition, Vaughan (1996) applied a ‘decision chronology’ to examine 
retrospectively the decisions made at certain points in time by all the people 
involved in the Challenger disaster, and found that although all the decisions 
were made using the professionals’ best judgements they nevertheless 
contributed one by one to the huge disaster. This concept, of a ‘decision 
chronology’ will also underpin this study, to try and explore why patients 




4  AIMS AND OBJECTIIVES 
 
The main aim of the research study is to identify the unexplained reasons which 
may contribute to development of severe pressure ulcers, using innovative 
methods of investigation (Vaughan, 1996; Perrow, 1984; Waring et al., 2006; 






5  STUDY DESIGN 
 
5.1 Brief overview of research design 
 
The research study will assume a realist approach (Pawson and Tilley, 1997; 
Pawson, 2006; Pawson, 2008) and consist of a multi-centre retrospective case 
study design (see Ragin, 2005). It will incorporate two phases, in order firstly to 
develop a thoroughly detailed understanding of the system weaknesses, and 
patterns or mechanisms which may lead to the development of severe pressure 
ulcers, then to examine, and test the data generated in terms of which 
‘mechanisms’ are at work (Pawson, 2006; 2008).  
 
 








This will consist of a retrospective multiple case study, following the line of an 
inquiry (see Laming, 2003; Bristol Inquiry, 2000) in order to gain a detailed 
insight into unexplained influences and patterns involved in the development of 
severe pressure ulcers, exploring in terms of the ‘whole system’, and informed 
by detailed studies of systems failures (see Vaughan, 1996; Perrow, 1984).  
 
This phase will include retrospective analysis of all documentary evidence 
available and relevant to the pressure ulcer process, and involve conducting 
semi-structured interviews with all patients (where applicable), carers and 
professionals involved in the process of the development of a pressure ulcer, in 
order to produce a thorough, detailed and ‘sense-making’ account of the 
multiple explanations, or causes of why severe pressure ulcers occur, including 
why decisions were made historically and under what circumstances (see 
Vaughan, 1996, for her ‘historical ethnography’ and ‘decision chronology’ 
terms.) This can also be aligned to the ‘process-tracing’ type method (George 
and Bennett, 2005; Cherkel, 2006), which consists of tracing the operation of 
causal mechanism(s) at work in a given situation. The process is carefully 
mapped, and the extent to which it coincides with prior, theoretical expectations 
about the workings of the mechanisms is explored.  
 
An initial case study will be carried out as part of Phase 1 in order to elicit the 
amount of data to be generated. This will then inform the case sample size. It is 
anticipated that the sample will be approximately 12 - 15 cases dependent 
upon time resources. The initial case will be chosen to maximise the range of 
patient and service characteristics. Further cases will then be chosen using a 
purposive or ‘building block’ approach to sampling (Blaikie, 2000; Pawson, 
2006) in order to refine the sample, locating cases best able to develop 
explanation. Data will be collected until saturation is reached. Each case study 
will involve documentary analysis (medical records, case notes, meeting 
minutes and so on) and interviews with all stakeholders involved in the patient’s 
‘care pathway’ from his or her present circumstances, tracing back until the 
point in time where the pressure ulcer first occurred. 
 
A list of potential plausible explanations will be generated as a result of the thick 
descriptive data. 
 














































6  ELIGIBILITY 
 
6.1 Inclusion Criteria 
 
Patients from participating acute and community trusts will be included if they 
have had or have currently a severe PU (Grade 3-4; EPUAP), including hospital 
in-patients, hospital out-patients, intermediate care or community patients under 
the care of community nursing services. 
 
The sample will be chosen to be as diverse as possible; and may include the 
following broad categories of patients from high clinical risk groups: 
 
Acute 






The sample will be taken from multiple NHS sites incorporating a range of 
services, including Acute Trusts, Intermediate Care hospitals, PCTs, 
Community Nursing Services and District General Hospitals. (are these all the 
sites?!)  
 
If the above high risk patients have developed a severe PU(Grade 3-4; EPUAP) 
they will be assigned to group 1; if their severe PU has healed despite their high 

























Grade 1 Non-blanchable erythema of intact skin. Discolouration of the skin, 
warmth, oedema, induration or hardness may also be used as indicators, 
particularly on individuals with darker skin. 
Grade 2 Partial thickness skin loss involving epidermis, dermis, or both. The ulcer 
is superficial and presents clinically as an abrasion or blister. 
Grade 3 Full thickness skin loss involving damage to or necrosis of subcutaneous 
tissue that may extend down to but not through underlying fascia. 
Grade 4 Extensive destruction, tissue necrosis, or damage to muscle, bone, or 
supporting structures with or without full thickness skin loss. 
 
 
The sample may also include participants who lack mental capacity both 
fluctuating and permanent, and strict guidelines according to the Mental 
Capacity Act, 2005 will be followed (see Recruitment and Consent). 
 
6.2 Exclusion Criteria 
 
Patients will be excluded from the study if the following criteria apply: 
 
They have not developed a severe pressure ulcer although they are high clinical 
risk. 
 
Patients who it would be ethically inappropriate to approach, for example, those 
where death is imminent (any patient who is on or meets the criteria of the 
Liverpool Care Pathway for the dying) will not be approached. 
 
 
7 RECRUITMENT AND CONSENT PROCEDURE 
 
 
7.1 Patients (who are able to consent for themselves) and any person 
involved in their care ‘pathway’, for example their informal carer, 
advocate, nursing staff, paid carer, other healthcare provider. 
 
Patients will be sampled purposively (up to 15 cases depending on pilot study 
data) in order to represent high clinical risk (Nixon et al, 2007), ensuring, where 
possible, representation of patients with grade 3 and 4 severe pressure ulcers, 
and representing different service provisions in different geographical areas. 
 
Members of the tissue viability team (TVT) which includes the local principal 
investigator and other members of their local team (i.e. tissue viability and 
clinical research nurses) at participating trusts will identify potential patients 
through critical incident reporting systems, and referrals. Those who meet the 
broad eligibility criteria will be approached by a member of theTVT, informed 
about the study, and provided with a project information leaflet (appendix A) 
which includes details about the rationale, design, and personal implications of 
the study, and an ‘agree to be contacted by the researcher’ form (including 
either telephone contact or a visit at the ward (appendix B). Members of the 
TVTs at participating trusts will also provide a record of those identified as 






Following information provision, patients will have as much time as they need to 
discuss the study with their family, advocate, carers, and healthcare provider 
(up to two weeks expected turnaround). They will be asked to complete the 
‘agree to researcher contact’ form, which will be posted back to the Centre for 
Health and Social Care). The TVT and the researcher will be available to 
answer any questions that patients might have about the study. After receiving 
the signed ‘agreement to be contacted’ form from the patient, the researcher will 
telephone the patient, carer, healthcare professional etc to arrange a time for 
the interview. The researcher will provide information about the study and 
interview process and will answer any questions before gaining verbal consent 
and arranging an interview at a mutually convenient time. For in-patients who 
cannot be contacted by telephone and who are expected to be in the hospital 
during the interview, with the patient’s permission, the TVT member will liaise 
with the researcher and patient to arrange a mutually convenient time for the 
researcher to see the patient on the ward to discuss the study further.  
 
The researcher will interview patients in their own home, in the out-patient clinic, 
or in-patient ward, as determined by the patient’s circumstances and 
preferences at the time of the interview. It is anticipated that a similar number of 
community and hospitalised patients will be interviewed. Before the interview, 
each participant will be given a further verbal explanation of the study by the 
researcher, informed that the interview will be recorded but that all identifiable 
information will remain anonymous, reminded that they can withdraw from the 
study at anytime without it affecting their care, and then invited formally to 
participate. They will be given an opportunity to ask any questions and then if 
they agree to take part, the participant will be asked to sign the consent form 
(appendix C). A copy of the consent form will be given to the patient to keep or 
filed in the patient hospital notes, and one copy kept by the researcher to take 
back to the Centre for Health and Social Care.  
 
The right of the patient to refuse consent without giving reasons will be 
respected.  Further, the patient will remain free to withdraw from the study at 
any time, again, without giving reasons and without prejudicing any further 
treatment. 
 
After the patient has been approached, given consent and interviewed, other 
professionals involved throughout their care pathway will be sought out through 
examination of the patient’s case notes, files and documentation concerned with 
their care, and using an approach similar to that of patient recruitment, except 
that staff and carers will be approached directly (face to face or by phone) and 
asked if they would be interested in participating. Information will be provided 
about the study (Appendix D) and a ‘cooling off’ time will be allowed before they 
their consent is sought to take part. The guidelines will follow those of the 
patient consent procedure apart from this initial difference in approaching 
participants. A snowballing technique will be used to enlarge the sample until 
data saturation is reached.  
 






All procedures will be followed as above; however, if the patient requires 
additional help with consenting, this will be identified by the Tissue Viability 
Nurse, and an additional ‘personal consultee’ will be chosen, who will not be a 
member of staff concerned with the patient’s care. In accordance with the 
Mental Capacity Act (MCA), 2005; Section 32-33, this specified person will then 
be asked to assist with the consent procedure (Appendix E) to determine 
whether the person would be included in the study, and could proceed with an 
interview, (again subject to MCA, 2005; Section 32). The person may also be a 
‘nominated consultee’ or IMCA (Independent Mental Capacity Advocate), and 
who will help act either in the ‘best interests’ of the person as part of the 








Once an initial patient is identified using our initial broad sampling procedure, 
and given his or her consent to taking part in the study, a fine detailed inquiry 
will be undertaken. This will take the following format: 
 
1. Semi-structured interviews with the patient (this way of using a bottom-up 
strategy avoids the researcher absorbing any pre-conceived ideas held 
by staff and allows a non-biased focus) 
2. Accessing patient case notes/medical records to examine them 
retrospectively and using the format below to record details in terms of 
the shaping influence of multi-layers at Individual, Interpersonal, 
Institutional, and Infra-structural levels (Pawson, 2006, see fig 1).  
The following methods of collecting data will be used: 
a.  Tabular timelines (monthly/ weekly/yearly) to record the data 
collected (Appendix F),  
b.  Person grids to record who was where and when in terms of staff, 
carers and any other input from people (Appendix F),   
c.  Incident sheets to record in more detail the data collected 
(Appendix G). 
3. Semi-structured interviews with staff, carers and all other ‘stakeholders’ 
within the patient’s care pathway depending on the data found within 
patient notes, and through talking to the patient themselves.  
 
The initial case inquiry will be analysed thematically, yet inductively, to look for 
patterns and possible explanations or causal mechanisms, and which will inform 
the next case choice using the ‘purposive sampling’ strategy mentioned earlier.  
The rest of the cases will follow the same format above in terms of data 
collection, until data saturation is reached and there appear no other routes to 
look for causal explanations.  
 








Thematic analysis of information collected from interviews will be ongoing, and 
conducted as soon as possible after each interview during the initial case study, 
but at minimum after every few interviews. This will enable an inductive analysis 
process to commence, (using a computer assisted software package, NVivo 7; 
QSR) to start to identify a) the key patterns which may lead to development of a 
severe pressure ulcer, and b) the potential causes. The analysis nevertheless 
will be iterative, and will be mainly to articulate ideas, at this stage, about the 
potential causes, both individual and organisational, of severe pressure ulcers. 
As the data set builds, the process of analysis will be refined and more causal 




Reason’s Model of Organisational Accidents(1990), Perrow’s theory of ‘tight 
and loose coupling’ (1984), using Vaughan’s ‘decision chronology’ and 
Hammond’s Coherence account (1996) will all be applied to aim to produce a 
general explanation of the structures involved along the care pathway of a 




5.2 Phase 2 
 
The data generated by phase 1 will then subjected to Pawson's mid-range 
theory of causal mechanisms (2008), in order to explicitly test out which 
‘mechanisms’ are at play in the development of severe pressure ulcers. This will 
consist of a comparison between the multiple case studies to examine the 
different mechanisms, patterns and contexts as they fit different scenarios of 
pressure ulcer development.  
 
Fig 1. Layers of contextual influence in Pawson’s mid range theory (2006; 2008) 
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This will also be combined with Reason’s Organizational Accident model 
(1990), and applying Hammond’s (1996) theory of Coherence, which may help 
define potential explanations, in terms of the structures and mechanisms 
involved in the process of a severe pressure ulcer development. Cases will be 
compared (Ragin, 2005) for points of commonality. 
 
The findings and conclusions drawn will thus provide a structured, theory 
informed basis from which to develop an adult incident critical incident 
methodology and risk assessment protocol. 
 
Competing explanations of events will then be evaluated to identify the most 





The causal ‘mechanisms’ or patterns, found in Phase 1, and explained in terms 
of the above theories will then be tested out as part of Phase 2, to examine 
whether the explanations and models produced can offer insight into why 




Any information which would allow individual patients, healthcare professionals, 
carers to be identified will not be released. All the participating hospitals, 
community services, and the Centre for Health and Social Care and CTRU at 
the University of Leeds will comply with all aspects of the Data Protection Act 
1998. All participants will be assigned a project number, and confidentiality will 
be maintained throughout the duration of the research and dissemination. Any 
data stored electronically will be password protected. Any hard data will be 
locked away. 
 
All information collected during the course of the study will be kept strictly 
confidential. Information will be held securely on paper and electronically at the 
Centre for Health and Social Care (CHSC). The CHSC will comply with all 
aspects of the 1998 Data Protection Act, operationally this will include: 
• consent from patients to record any personal details (i.e. name, date of birth, 
address and telephone number) appropriate storage, restricted access and 
disposal arrangements for patient recorded interviews and personal or clinical 
details 
• consent from patients for access to their medical records by responsible 
individuals from the research staff or from regulatory authorities, where it is 
relevant to study participation 
• consent from patients for the data collected for the study to be used for training 
purposes and for developing new research 
• Patient name and address will be collected on a separate ‘contact details’ form 
and patient name will be collected on the consent form. All questionnaire data 
collected will be coded with a study number. This will include two patient 






If a participant withdraws consent from further study participation their data will 
remain on file and will be included in the final study analysis. 
 
9 ARCHIVING 
At the end of the study, data will be securely archived at the CHSC and 
participating centres for a minimum of 5 years. If a participant withdraws consent 
for their data to be used, it will be confidentially destroyed immediately. 
 
 10 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
This project will recruit patients with severe PUs and will therefore include elderly 
and highly dependent patients considered as vulnerable. The study will also 
incorporate patients who may have mental capacity issues. Ethical issues relate 
to the involvement of vulnerable adults/elderly patients with high levels of co-
morbidity including acute and chronic illness. The study also raises ethical issues 
in relation to recruiting patients who may have fluctuating, and a permanent lack 
of capacity. It is important to include these participants, as they are over 
represented in terms of developing severe pressure ulcers, is there a ref for this 
Jackie?  
 
The ethical issues surrounding these potentially vulnerable patients have been 
addressed through the study design and include a thought out consent process, 
which also follows current Mental Capacity Act guidelines.  
 
The study will be submitted to and approved by a flagged Research Ethics 
Committee (REC) prior to identifying eligible patients. The CHSC will provide the 
REC with a copy of the final protocol, patient, staff and informal caregiver 
information leaflets, consent forms, and all other relevant study documentation. 
 
11 STATEMENT OF INDEMNITY 
The study is sponsored by the LTHT (?) which will be liable for negligent harm 
caused by the design of this study. The NHS has a duty of care to patients treated, 
whether or not the patient is participating in a study, and the NHS remains liable 
for clinical negligence and other negligent harm to patients under this duty of care. 
The University of Leeds does not accept liability for negligence on the part of the 
employees of hospitals. This applies whether the hospital is a NHS Trust or not, 
and the University of Leeds cannot be held liable for any breach in the hospital’s 
duty of care. 
 
12 STUDY ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE 
 
Research Governance- All approvals including R&D and ethical approvals will 








Project Team (PT) -  
The Project Team will report 6 monthly progress to the Programme Management 




13 TIMELINES OF STUDY 
 
 
Months 1-6  
 






Ethical Approval sought 










Months 7-18  
 






Pilot study commences (months 7-8) 
Sample identified 
Main study Phase 1 commences 
(months 9-18) 
Progress reports produced? 












n and pilot 
 











n roll out 
 






April 2011-Aug 2011 
 
 









14 PUBLICATION POLICY 
The success of the study depends upon the collaboration of all participants. For 
this reason, credit for the main results will be given to all those who have 
collaborated in the project, through authorship and contributorship.  Uniform 
requirements for authorship for manuscripts submitted to medical journals will 
guide authorship decisions. These state that authorship credit should be based 
only on substantial contribution to:  
• conception and design, or acquisition of data, or analysis and interpretation of 
data 
• drafting the article or revising it critically for important intellectual content 
• and final approval of the version to be published 
and that all these conditions must be met (www.icmje.org). 
  
In light of this, the Chief Investigator and relevant project team members will be 
named as authors in any publication. In addition, all collaborators will be listed as 
contributors for the main study publication, giving details of roles in planning, 
conducting and reporting the study. Individual particpants must not publish data 
concerning their patients which is directly relevant to the questions posed in the 
study until the main results of the study have been published. Data or any findings 
will not be released prior to the end of the study, for publication or presentation 
purposes, that might detrimentally affect the progress of the study or bias further 








Overall outcomes of the study: 
 
• To feedback the results to local NHS teams responsible for critical 
incidents and adult protection issues. Through participation in implementation 
groups and networks, we will work with teams to identify any practical changes 
they can make to their own work. 
• To develop a critical incident/adult neglect review protocol underpinned 
by a Minimum Data Set to standardise review of individual risk factors and 
critical organizational factors.  
• To implement the critical incident/adult neglect review protocol as a pilot 
in a designated lead acute (Bradford) and lead community trust and then roll out 
to participating centres. 
• To disseminate recommendations for multi-agency service improvements 
aimed at promoting patient safety, reducing system failures for patients and risk 
of NHS prosecution. 
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Appendix 11: Thematic structure analysis 














Clinicians failed to listen to pt 
and carer No response to signs Services not coordinated 
Patient professional relationships  
Carer’s role 
Lack of responsibility 
Blaming patients and 
staff 
Passing patients on  
Organisational upheaval  
Defensive communication  
Delays in decision 
making 
Staff too busy 
Other priorities  
Delays in response 
HIGH RISK PATIENTS 
 
Weak /non- 
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